Iacchus32
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Hey it was just an idea. And according to the way everyone is responding, a pretty "abstract one" at that. Hmm...
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quote: Originally posted by drag
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Originally posted by wuliheron
Reason and logic are abstractions, rituals,
habits. You don't necessarilly adopt habits
out of trust.
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Habit does not clearly imply usefullness,
and reason and logic are clearly usefull.
[/B]
quote:Originally posted by drag
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Originally posted by wuliheron
Thus, an even more pointed
question when discussing such things is
not why do I trust my habits, but why do
I persist maintaining my habits when they
are obviously counterproductive?
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They are not counterproductive if I also
recognize other possible approaches, are they ?
Originally posted by FZ+
So, it seems that a very plausible explanation is that we simply do not have credibility to trust reason, or at least human. Rather, our very belief in reason must be perhaps by definition unreasonable. Logic is an irrational notion
Originally posted by Tom Our arguments will not correspond to reality to the extent that our definitions do not correspond to reality. Since we can not know reality a priori, we have to use inductive reasoning.
Originally posted by Iacchus32 If there was no idea in the first place, then there would be "nothing to do" in the second place
Originally posted by Tom Thoughts by themselves can't affect anything concrete, and that is what makes those things concrete.
Originally posted by drag
I'd like to point out that we are complex
biological machines and we are born adapted to
this world. It would be strange to assume that
the adaptations are only regarding our physical
traits - we have complicated brains that are
also adapted to this Universe. For example,
brains of our size could be created with just
the preferable adaptive state to deal primarily
with chess games - like a separate computer program.
Of course, our brains appear to differ from computer
programs because we appear to be able to include
and learn new possibilities but we still have
some basic processing principles "set in".
Originally posted by Iacchus32
And yet, if there was no idea (conceived of the mind = essence) in the first place, there would be nothing concrete to "brag about" in the second place.
Which is very interesting (credit to Lifegazer), for it suggests our whole notion of material existence is brought about by abstract thought (or, as Tom would say, the application thereof) and, since we all live in the world collectively (or so materialists claim), then we all must be part of the same "collective mind" as a whole ... Only question is, whose mind is it?
In which case let me restate what I said to Tom:
I guess this has something to do with you telling me in the other thread that the "idea of God" was abstract and that nothing would become of it. And yet, what I'm telling you is that this whole world is built upon nothing "but" abstractions. Therefore it all must have begun with a single "axiom" or idea. Based upon the idea of God perhaps?
So you see that's the whole point, because if God does exist, then this becomes the axiom (idea) by which everything (materially) becomes manifest.
Originally posted by drag
wuliheron, you have an interesting point,
but don't we have the criteria of
apparent consequences to compare our basic
abstract ideas to ? You can't fully trust
anything, but I do not see how the apparent
consequenses of our abstract thought justify
an opinion that says something like - "our logic
is merely a function of physiological and
phsycological evolution (biology in other words)
and is not the result of our attempt to grasp
reality". After all, what is the evolutionary
advantage of creatures with thought "frames" that
are disconnected from reality ?
Are you referring to the possibility that everything we see around us which is man made just sprang up aribitrarily and at random? This is not possible.Originally posted by Mentat
And this is probably lifegazer's problem too. Let me repeat, a thought is not required, for an action to take place.[/color]
Originally posted by LW Sleeth
You may assume too much. A child is born, and if emotionally unhampered, knows a priori how to smile and be fascinated. Since joy and interest are part of reality, it seems there is a priori knowledge of reality. Possibly it would be more accurate to say we cannot know anything external to ourselves a priori.
Both points seem true, but maybe the issue is a chicken-egg sort of thing. All humanly-created objects are preceded by reason, yet an idea in this universe would never come to fruition without physical effort.
Nonetheless, I can't see how it can be denied that we can have creative thought without action, but no creative action without thought.
Originally posted by Iacchus32
So "abstract" is equal to idealism, and "concrete" is equal to materialism.
And yet, if there was no idea (conceived of the mind = essence) in the first place, there would be nothing concrete to "brag about" in the second place.
Which is very interesting (credit to Lifegazer),
for it suggests our whole notion of material existence is brought about by abstract thought (or, as Tom would say, the application thereof)
and, since we all live in the world collectively (or so materialists claim), then we all must be part of the same "collective mind" as a whole ... Only question is, whose mind is it?
So tell me, what's the difference between a concrete idea and a "solid idea?" Say like 1 + 1 = 2?
Is this what an axiom is? (I just looked up axiom in the dictionary for the first time by the way.)
So you see that's the whole point, because if God does exist, then this becomes the axiom (idea) by which everything (materially) becomes manifest.
Originally posted by Tom
First, the prescriptive laws of reasoning (aka logic) cannot be proven "right" within the system of logic itself.
Second, all arguments rely on unproven axioms (aka assumptions).
[We can know for ] certain that: If the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. [using deductive logic]
Originally posted by wuliheron
In turn, Tom, the science of logic can be described as both an epistemological and ontological pursuit depending upon the context. Is science or logic discovering reality, creating reality, describing reality, all the above, or none of the above? It just depends upon the context.
Hence, I would dispute your assertions that:
[We can know for ] certain that: If the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. [using deductive logic]
This tautological assertion denies the existence of genuine paradoxes and the indeterminate which can neither be said to be true or false, but whose existence can be logically demonstrated.
Originally posted by Tom
I would say that science describes what we observe. Is that reality? I don't know, but it's the only thing I have access to.
Actually, the above description does allow for the paradoxes of logic. Remember that a paradox is a type of statement to which we cannot assign a truth value. When I say, "If the premises are true..." I am not ruling paradoxes out, I am simply narrowing the scope of the condtional to exclude them.
Note that the scope is also set to exclude false statements, but it does not rule them out, either.
For a complete description of deductive validity, we could say:
When an inference is deductively valid, then
1. If the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true.
2. If at least one of the premises is false, then the conclusion must be false.
3. If at least one of the premises is undecidable (aka paradoxical), then the conclusion is undecidable.
[/color]
You're the one who brought up the Problem of Other Minds in the other thread, while it was also emphasized (by both you and heusdens I believe) that by sharing our experiences, we can be more conclusive about their actual existence, if in fact we all concluded the same thing. In other words we're speaking about a "collective experience." Whereas what could that possibly mean if we all didn't share the "same ideals?"Originally posted by Tom
This is where you go looney, and it is because you have made the jump from "notion of material existence" (which is abstract and in the mind) to "actual material existence" (which is taken as concrete) to conclude that we are all of one mind.
Originally posted by wuliheron
Because a truth value cannot be assigned does not mean paradoxes don't possesses a truth value which classical logic simply cannot determine. Therefore the argument is tautological and the clearest way out of the tautology is to create a new axiom. [/B]
Originally posted by ahrkron
What argument are you referring to?
I don't see any tautological argument there.
Originally posted by wuliheron
The tautology is that the argument Tom put forth that If the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. is based on the the definition of truth which Aristotle first established using reductio ad absurdum.
Actually, I woke up this morning with the solution to this connundrum in my mind. Instead of creating a new axiom to compound the tautology, it is more elegant to take out the word "must" and replace it with a vague conditional term like "may".
This also removes the essentially black and white fundamentalist charcter of classical logic and places it the category of paraconsistent logic.
Originally posted by Iacchus32
Are you referring to the possibility that everything we see around us which is man made just sprang up aribitrarily and at random? This is not possible.
If on the other hand, we were to take mankind out of the picture, thus leaving only the natural world, I would say the likelihood of things happening at random are more plausible. Yet even here, everything seems to have its own rhythm, and behaves in accord with its "own season," suggesting that things really don't happen arbitrarily (not as rule).
Whereas with mankind (at least in the west), it's all about "control" over the environment which, requires a tremendous amount of thought and effort.
Originally posted by Tom
I'm going to ask that we forget about god in this thread. It really has nothing to do with the topic.
Continuing along this line...
All systems of logic can be put into one of two categories:
1. Deductive
2. Inductive
I explained all this in detail in my Logic Notes thread, but let me give a rundown here.
Deductive Logic
An argument is deductive if its premises necessarily imply[/color] its conclusions. With a mandate to construct such a system of logic, one is led directly to a formal structural language that strongly resembles mathematics. It contains rules for types of inferences that can always be trusted. This should not be misunderstood to mean that deductive logic can be used to derive absolute truths about reality. In fact, deductive logic is completely silent in this regard. It should be understood as follows:
I may not know whether the premises are correct, but I do know for certain that: If the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true.[/color]
That conditional statement expresses the only idea of which we can be confident using only deductive logic. Deductive logic does not contain a procedure for testing the truth or falsity of propositions (except for some propositions about deductive logic, of course).
Inductive Logic
An argument that is not deductively valid is inductive. The premises of an inductive argument provide only partial support for its conclusion, and as such the conclusions of inductive arguments are accepted only tentatively. This may prompt one to ask, "Why bother with inductive logic?" Good question. The answer is that it is impossible to reason about anything that cannot be known a priori without inductive logic. So, the price we pay for inductive reasoning may be the lack of absolute support for the conclusion, but the benefit is that we obtain the ability to say something meaningful about reality.[/color] In other words, inductive logic provides a means to judge the truth or falsity of propositions, but only in a probable (as opposed to absolute) sense.
The discipline of implementing these two kinds of reasoning to learn about reality is called science.
You actualy remember yourself when you wereOriginally posted by LW Sleeth
That's a very tough question to ponder. I've
been trying to remember my first cognitive moments,
my first awareness of "me." One I have I don't
know if it's a dream or not, but it is such a
vivid flash of memory I've always suspected that
it's real. The memory is of being held by someone
in the delivery room and seeing a woman (my mother
I assume) in a prone position, and a dark man
with a thick, black moustache. Later in life I
asked my mom what her doctor looked like, and
she described the man I saw! I have other
flashes too, meaningless events, but things I
remember as an infant.
Originally posted by drag
You actualy remember yourself when you were
born ?! Com'mon !
Originally posted by ahrkron
No, actually, the statement is independent of how you define "truth".
Also, the statement you are referring to is not an argument, but only one of the three conditions for a deductive argument (that contains the mentioned premises) to be valid.
btw, why do you say that Aristotle defined truth using reduction ad absurdum (sp?)? I do not know much about how (and if) he tried to define "truth". Can you provide a reference?
Also, the very technique of reductio ad absurdum relies on the assumption that, when you have a self-cotradictory statement, it has to come from either a faulty reasoning or a false hypothesis, which means that it rules out contradictions as valid end points of a deductive argument.
I take it you are referring to the definition of validity given by Tom. I don't think this is a good solution, since the concept of validity is extremely helpful as it is. Also, when you use "may" instead of "must", you need to supply a way to decide if it is indeed the case that the resulting conclusion "may" be true, which means you need to have the stronger version anyway.
I don't think it has to do with paraconsistent logic. Maybe with modal logic (in which the "degree of credibility" of statements is added to the description).
Originally posted by Iacchus32
You're the one who brought up the Problem of Other Minds in the other thread, while it was also emphasized (by both you and heusdens I believe) that by sharing our experiences, we can be more conclusive about their actual existence, if in fact we all concluded the same thing. In other words we're speaking about a "collective experience." Whereas what could that possibly mean if we all didn't share the "same ideals?"
Consider "the entity" of the United States government, which rules over the entire nation. Couldn't this be perceived as the "one mind" which consolidates the interests of the entire nation?
Or, if we were to say, "We the people of the United States," aren't we referring to a "collective experience" under one "collective mind?" Me thinks so.
Originally posted by wuliheron The statement itself, If the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true, explicitely defines truth as having true premises.
Originally posted by wuliheron
The tautology is that the argument Tom put forth that If the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. is based on the the definition of truth which Aristotle first established using reductio ad absurdum.
In other words, using the concept of the absurd Aristotle defined the absurd as definitively false and then went on to declare that everything must be either true or false, which rules out the possibility of genuinely self-referential and self-contradictory paradox to which classical logic cannot assign any truth value.
The statement itself, If the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true, explicitely defines truth as having true premises.
Furthermore, it implicitely defines truth as either applying to everything or not being that which is false.
Originally posted by ahrkron
What you are doing is similar to the following:
Tom says "a lung doctor is reliable if: 1. when he says you're ok, your lungs are ok, 2. If he says you're bad, there's something wrong with you, ..."
Then you blame Tom for defining "OK" as having to do with the lungs, when his aim was at the concept of "reliability", and he provided no general criteria for the definition of "OK" (truth).
Originally posted by ahrkron
What you are doing is similar to the following:
Tom says "a lung doctor is reliable if: 1. when he says you're ok, your lungs are ok, 2. If he says you're bad, there's something wrong with you, ..."
Then you blame Tom for defining "OK" as having to do with the lungs, when his aim was at the concept of "reliability", and he provided no general criteria for the definition of "OK" (truth).
Originally posted by Tom
OK, I think I see where there could be some confusion. First, the "if...then" is not an argument, but a statement (but that's a minor point).
The major point here is that statement is not a tautology[/color]. It only makes sense to refer to statement schema (the skeleton of a statement, expressed in terms of variables) as "tautologies".
The schema for my statement is: p-->q, which is not tautological. It would only be so if p=q, which it does not here (p and q have different subjects).
Like Ahkron, I don't know about the reductio ad absurdum definition of truth, and I also don't see how it is important.
We don't have to stick with Aristotle. Propositional logic does indeed accommodate paradoxes. Statements are either true, false, or undecidable.