This is the United States, not Brazil.
Tort is based on the common law principle - to sue succesfully, you must show that you were harmed, that the harm was due to negligent and unreasonable conduct, and that the harm resulted in determinable financial loss. The purpose of financial reward is to restore the defendants financial condition to what it was before the loss, not reward the plaintiff or punish the defendant; the exception is punitive damages, where are special rewards in specific cases authorized by statute.
On the matter of CO2 emissions, no plaintiff has a case, for innumerable reasons; such a case would violate every principle of common law tort precedent. Specifically, no plaintiff could show a non-tenuous damage (how does one apportion fault, when no statistician can link specific actions to specific outcomes), that the action was negligent (there is no legislative action informing business conduct with regard to CO2 emissions, or authorizing the judiciary to address these claims; how would you demonstrate unreasonableness when nobody can agree that global warming is occurring, predict with reasonable accuracy its effects, or attribute with any specificity its causes), or that the action resulted in determinable financial loss. A hypothetical decline in property values is not a determinable financial loss, or one could sue a neighbor for painting his house a particular color, or a bank for foreclosing on distresssed properties. The defendant must have taken deliberate,
direct action that damaged the plaintiff financially. An indirect action that resulted in diminished market value doesn't count - for example, if the markets decided a property was worth less based on, say, proximity to a power plant, through no fault of the electric utility. Again, the only exceptions here are those specifically granted by statute.
For a lengthy, professional summation of these issues, see the following motion to dismiss:
http://www.pawalaw.com/assets/docs/motion-to-dismiss-by-electric-utilities.pdf
This motion was subsequently granted without prejudice, with the plaintiffs given the right to refile in state court:
The parties are presently before the Court on various Defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). In their Rule 12(b)(1) motions, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable under the political question doctrine, and that Plaintiffs otherwise lack standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. Having read and considered the papers filed in connection with this matter, and being fully informed, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Court, in its discretion, finds this matter suitable for resolution without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b).
http://www.greatlakeslaw.org/files/kivalina_v_exxonmobi_decisionl.pdf
But the principles are the same; to refile there will simply result in another dismissal. See here for precedent:
http://www.bdlaw.com/assets/attachments/Comer_v_Murphy_Oil_opinion.pdf
