Fra said:
Holography in a quantum spacetime by Fotini Markopoulou and Lee Smolin
"We propose a formulation of the holographic principle, suitable for a background independent quantum theory of cosmology. It is stated as a relationship between the flow of quantum information and the causal structure of a quantum spacetime. Screens are defined as sets of events at which the observables of a holographic cosmological theory may be measured, and such that information may flow across them in two directions. A discrete background independent holographic theory may be formulated in terms of information flowing in a causal network of such screens.
Geometry is introduced by defining the area of a screen to be a measure of its capacity as a channel of quantum information from its null past to its null future. We call this a ``weak'' form of the holographic principle, as no use is made of a bulk theory."
--
http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/9910146
Now, seeing the holographic principle as relating to communication channels in general is IMO a step in the right direction. There are still more questions but it's sniffing is the right way.
Now, if we can combine a generalization of this (holography in terms of general interaction channels) with a entropic force defined relative to each screen in this "multi-screen" ~ "multi-observer" idea then I think it's starting to get really nice.
Some further interesting ket pointers from Smolin in that paper goes onto Fotinis "quantum causal histories" approach and Louis Cranes abstractions of categories of observers and observations. I like parts of this, but still feel that there is still a lot of baggage that is coming from forcing the desired results. I like to pick some raisins out of the bun here.
These are to me some key traits
Smolins comment on Quantum Causal histories:
"...
any physically meaningful observable corresponds to some observer (represented as an event or collection of events) inside the closed universe. (In the classical case, see [15]).
As each observer receives information from a distinct past, the algebra of observables they can measure, and hence the (finite-dimensional)
Hilbert spaces on which what they observe can be represented, vary over the history. Consequently, the algebra of observables of the theory is represented on a collection of Hilbert spaces. These replace the single wavefunction and single Hilbert space of other approaches to quantum cosmology"
Smolins comment on Cranes ideas:
"Crane proposed that in quantum cosmology,
Hilbert spaces should be associated not with the whole universe, but with any choice of a boundary that splits the universe into two parts. The idea was that the observers and their measuring instruments live on one side of the boundary, and they observe the quantum gravity dynamics on the other side by means of measurementsmade on the boundary, and recorded in a boundary Hilbert space."
IMHO, is should also be obvious that since entropy as a measure of disorder and thus related to the "a priori" probability of a particular probability distribution in a space of such, or in the discrete case a probability measure of the macrostate given ignorance of the microstate IN A GIVEN microstructure, that entropy is a strictly relative concept. IT does not make sense to talk about the entropy as an objective property of a system.
This fits in the above context that explains that entropy can only be defined in the decomposition of the universe in two parts: the observer and it's environment. Or put differently a measure of the expected future, relative to a constrained history of this observer.
The question should IMO be, how the action of a system, coding an expectation on it's environment depends on this expectation, and then the hard problem - what relations that emerge in a network of such abstractions?
I like to think of this as a purified question, and I think some approaches use global external constraits that force the emergent structures to have certain structures. The nature of these assumption are disturbing me as I've read a number of ideas related to this.
I think it's wrong to think of them as "constraints", I prefer to think of them as "expected constraints" that refer to an expected equiblirium. At first the difference is only interpretational but I think it also makes a difference on wether you try to hide in some structural realism or not.
/Fredrik