Does Consciousness Have Non-Causal Properties?

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The discussion centers on the nature of consciousness and its relationship to physical causation. It argues that if the physical world is causally closed, then there must be a physical basis for our discussions about consciousness, challenging claims that it cannot be explained physically. The conversation also explores the idea that consciousness may have intrinsic properties that are not solely defined by their causal roles, using color perception as an analogy. A significant point raised is whether intrinsic properties can influence our understanding of consciousness, despite being non-causal. Ultimately, the dialogue suggests that while consciousness is connected to physical processes, it may also involve emergent properties that are not fully captured by current scientific frameworks.
  • #61
physics implies maths implies 3rdP
 
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  • #62
Tournesol said:
physics implies maths implies 3rdP
Sorry, is this intended to be an explanation of why the doctrine of "physicalism" necessarily implies a "3rd person objective perspective"?

MF
:smile:
 
  • #63
Yes. typing with 1 hand, hence brevity.
 
  • #64
moving finger said:
I never said that the 3rd person objective perspective cannot explain ANY of the 1st person subjective perspective; I said the 3rd person objective perspective cannot explain ALL of the 1st person subjective perspective. ANY is not the same as ALL.


Whatever.
If physicalism is true, the 3rdP perspective should explain everything.

Tournesol said:
Physicalism does imply 3rd person objectivism because it implies that structure and function are all-embracing, as you concede.

Why does this imply 3rd person subjectivity? Your assertion simply does not follow at all!
With respect, you seem to be making an unjustified assumption.

Physicalism implies everything can be described in S+F terms, which itself implies that everything can be described in 3rdP terms.

The S+F aspects of my experience , such as the squareness of the red square, are the ones I can communicate. The others, eg the redness, are ineffable.


Another way is to accept that 1st person descriptions cannot be completely accounted in 3rd person terms.

I don't see why I should have to accept the existence of irreducably 1stP descriptions in a physical universe.



Is happiness ineffable according to your definition?

maybe.



What does this have to do with physicalism?
Why do you assume physicalism necessarily implies a 3rd person perspective?

it implie that everything can be described in S+F terms.



NO. “1st person phenomena cannot be fully explained from a 3rd person perspective”. You seem to assume that this is the same as “1st person phenomena cannot be fully explained by physicalism” but you are wrong.

physicalism is a 3rdP perspective, so that would follow.


Not at all. I simply do not assume that physicalism is the same as 3rd person objectivism. You have given no explanation as to why you think these two things are the same.

physicalism means physics means maths means S+F means 3rdP.



Hoiwever, if ontological physicalism is strictly true, 1st person perspectives should not even exist; .

Why not?

because they would be explainable in S+F, hence 3rdP, terms, so they would not be irreducably 1stP.
 

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