- #61
Tournesol
- 804
- 0
physics implies maths implies 3rdP
Does Consciousness Have Non-Causal Properties?
- Thread starter StatusX
- Start date
-
- Tags
- Cause Consciousness
Click For Summary
Discussion Overview
The discussion revolves around the nature of consciousness and whether it possesses non-causal properties. Participants explore the implications of a causally closed physical world on the understanding of consciousness, examining both intrinsic properties and the relationship between experience and causal roles. The conversation includes theoretical considerations, philosophical implications, and challenges related to the Hard Problem of consciousness.
Discussion Character
- Debate/contested
- Conceptual clarification
- Exploratory
Main Points Raised
- Some participants argue that if the physical world is causally closed, there must be a physical reason for discussing consciousness, while others suggest that consciousness may not be fully capturable by physical language.
- There is a contention regarding whether consciousness can be defined solely by its causal roles, with some asserting that intrinsic properties exist beyond causal definitions.
- The concept of qualia is introduced, with participants discussing whether experiences can exist without causing observable effects.
- One participant raises the inverted spectrum argument, questioning if individuals with different color perceptions could behave identically, suggesting that intrinsic properties may not affect behavior.
- Another participant challenges the psychological realism of the inverted spectrum argument, asserting that perceptions are tied to learned associations with colors.
- There is a discussion about the distinction between experiences and intentions, with some arguing that intentions may be explained through physical processes, while experiences resist such explanations.
- Concerns are raised about how we can know about aspects of consciousness that are claimed to be non-causal, questioning the basis for discussing such properties.
Areas of Agreement / Disagreement
Participants express multiple competing views regarding the nature of consciousness, the role of causal properties, and the implications of the inverted spectrum argument. The discussion remains unresolved, with no consensus on the existence or nature of non-causal properties of consciousness.
Contextual Notes
Participants highlight limitations in understanding consciousness, including the dependence on definitions and the challenges posed by the Hard Problem. The conversation reflects a range of philosophical perspectives without resolving the underlying complexities.
- #62
moving finger
- 1,689
- 1
Sorry, is this intended to be an explanation of why the doctrine of "physicalism" necessarily implies a "3rd person objective perspective"?Tournesol said:
MF
- #63
Tournesol
- 804
- 0
Yes. typing with 1 hand, hence brevity.
- #64
Tournesol
- 804
- 0
moving finger said:
Whatever.
If physicalism is true, the 3rdP perspective should explain everything.
Physicalism implies everything can be described in S+F terms, which itself implies that everything can be described in 3rdP terms.
The S+F aspects of my experience , such as the squareness of the red square, are the ones I can communicate. The others, eg the redness, are ineffable.
I don't see why I should have to accept the existence of irreducably 1stP descriptions in a physical universe.
maybe.
it implie that everything can be described in S+F terms.
physicalism is a 3rdP perspective, so that would follow.
physicalism means physics means maths means S+F means 3rdP.
because they would be explainable in S+F, hence 3rdP, terms, so they would not be irreducably 1stP.