Does Consciousness Have Non-Causal Properties?

[StatusX]

What do you consider would be “different” about such an identical person in an identical world that could give rise to “different” experiences?

I'm saying it is not logically impossible that a person in a physically identical world could have the same neurological state but different experiences. When you say:

IMHO, one possible axiom is that everything arises from the “physical” – define the physical and everything else is defined. Therefore to suggest that a world can exist which is physically identical with our own but where experiences are not identical is clearly incompatible with this axiom.

That may be a belief, but it is certainly not a logically necessary statement. You can take that as unquestionable, the way many religious people take the existence of God as a fact, but it isn't going to convince a skeptic.

This is all I mean by logically possible: Red looks a certain way, and blue looks a different way. But what if every instance of red and blue were switched. That is, the experience you used to have when you looked at an apple, you would now have when looking at the sky. You would call it blue, say it is a cool, refreshing color, and all the while you would be seeing what you used to call red (of course, your memory would have to be changed as well). Maybe there is a hidden contradiction in here, but no one I know of has pointed out any that are serious enough to damage the argument.

So the question becomes, why does red look the way it does and not the way blue does? I can imagine (physically identical) universes where they are switched, so why are we in this universe and not another? This may or may not be an unanswerable metaphysical question, but what about the question of why they look like anything at all? We can't affect the physical world based on which way red looks (which is why the universes can be physically identical in the first place), but as all these words on the screen show, it seems the fact that experiences are like anything at all can have a physical effect. Then, given that it seems the content of the experiences are something outside the physical, what is the link between the existence of experiences and the physical world? This is the question I was asking when I started this thread.

 

[Tournesol]

What do you mean by SF please?

Structural + Functional.

Because properties such as “squareness” can be explained in 3rd person objective terms, whereas “redness” cannot. It is purely a 1st person subjective property.

I know. The point is, that according to you, 1st person subjectivity is an
outcome of operating "within" a S+F physical system. However, if it
is, it should be all-embracing. But it is not; some aspects of my experience
are explainable in 3P terms and othes are not. Hence, your theory
makes a false prediciton.

It seems no matter how many times I repeat it, you do not take it in.
Physicalism does not necessarily imply 3rd person objectivism.
It is not that physicalism fails explanatorily, it is that the 3rd person objective perspective cannot be used to fully explain 1st person subjective perspective.

Physicalism does imply 3rd person objectivism because it implies
that structure and function are all-embracing, as you concede. The
brute fact that there are 1st peson perspectives does not change
that implication; instead,it is an argument against physicalism.
You need to show that the chain of implication from phsycalism to
the all-embracing sufficientcy of 3rdP accounts does not follow
conceptually. Otherwise the brute fact of 1stP perspectives simply
means physicalism is not entirely correct.

I never said they could not. The original assertion was that two IDENTICAL things could at the same time be NOT IDENTICAL, which I disagreed with.

That was your paraphrase of a different assertion.

A 3rd person objective description can describe to some extent a 1st person subjective perspective, but not completely.

Why shouldn't we conclude that the world is physical, but not completely?

Why should we conclude the world is not completely physical?

It is one way of accounting for the failure of 3rdP descriptions in some cases.

Please define what you mean by ineffability.

eg redness as opposed to squareness

You still do not read my posts properly, do you?
I am not trying to portray physicalism as false epistemically – YOU are the one doing that.
I have said several times that I believe physicalism can account for everything.

You have also said:

A 3rd person objective description can describe to some extent a 1st person subjective perspective, but not completely.

You seem to insist that physicalism necessarily implies 3rd person objectivism, and I disagree with this.
3rd person objective and 1st person subjective perspectives are both IMHO compatible with physicalism, but traditional science tends to use exclusively the 3rd person objective approach (for obvious reasons).
Though 1st person subjective phenomena can be explained physically, they cannot be fully explained on the basis of 3rd person objectivism alone.

Which means they cannot be fully explained physically, since such an
explanation will reduce the biochemistry to physics and express
the physics in mathematical terms , which are 3rd-person objective.

You seem to have got confused between the idea that the existence
of 1st-person perspectives is compatible with ontological
physicalism (does not require ghosts) and the idea that
they are incompatible with explanatory physicalism.

Hoiwever, if ontological physicalism is strictly true, 1st person perspectives
should not even exist; so there is an implication from epistemology
to metaphysics. The existence of 1st person perspectives must have some ontological implications, even if they fall short of Cartesian ghosts.

Yu have suggested that 1stP perspectives come about from operating
"within" a physical system. Eiither this is physically accountable or it
is unaccountable. If it is accountable, the account will have the effect
of reducing the 1stP perspective to a 3rdP perspective. If it is not,
there is *already* somethin 1stP and ineffable going on, before
the ineffability of conscious experience even arises -- ie the
physical explanation is being prevented by the existence
of somethin non-physical, in some sense.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Physicalism does imply 3rd person objectivism because it implies
that structure and function are all-embracing, as you concede. The
brute fact that there are 1st peson perspectives does not change
that implication; instead,it is an argument against physicalism.
You need to show that the chain of implication from phsycalism to
the all-embracing sufficientcy of 3rdP accounts does not follow
conceptually. Otherwise the brute fact of 1stP perspectives simply
means physicalism is not entirely correct.

After following this exchange for some time, and becoming more and more frustrated with the repeated characterizations of "physicalism", I see in this passage a way to respond constructively.

It seems to me that the physicalism here with its reliance on 3rd person tests in both experiment and explanation is actually Behaviorism, the belief of Skinner and others that mental states had no place in scientific explanation because they were radically unavailable to 3rd person investigation. And this is true. Even today the marvelous fMRI studies to not expose mental states but only physical correlates of them - oxygen or glucose uptakes in different regions of the brain.

But psychology, and other sciences, do not limit their EXPLANATIONS to the things they can access or demonstrate in the lab. It is a false understanding of science to suppose that they do, or must. Take as an example the electrical potential. Because its curl is taken in forming the Maxwell Equations, and because the curl of a gradient is identically zero, you can add the gradient of any arbitrary function to the potential and it will still yield the same equations, the same physical observables. So the potential CANNOT BE OBSERVED, any more that 1st person experiences can.

But the potential, along with this gradient property, now called gauge invariance, is included in electromagnetic theory, it is used in explanations of obsevable electrical effects in the lab, because the explanation becomes much more coherent and effective with the potential than withut it. And this is common practice in physics and other branches of science.

So physicalism, if it is to cover the actual practices of experimental psychologists, must include the ability to explain 3rd-person observable behavior by coherent but unobservable 1st person experiences. Since the only way an experimenter has access to such states is by report from the subject, we find the necessity of heterophenomenonology, which has been discussed on another thread.

 

[Tournesol]

It seems to me that the physicalism here with its reliance on 3rd person tests in both experiment and explanation is actually Behaviorism, the belief of Skinner and others that mental states had no place in scientific explanation because they were radically unavailable to 3rd person investigation. And this is true. Even today the marvelous fMRI studies to not expose mental states but only physical correlates of them - oxygen or glucose uptakes in different regions of the brain.

Well, MRI scans aren't behaviourism.
The problem for physicalism is consciousness, and specifically qualia.
The problem -- the ineffability -- of qualia seems to be down to their
non-structureleness, which will inevitably elude physicalism, which
both MF and myself define as being about structure+function.

Note that this is much more about the "language" of science than exprimental technique.

But psychology, and other sciences, do not limit their EXPLANATIONS to the things they can access or demonstrate in the lab. It is a false understanding of science to suppose that they do, or must. Take as an example the electrical potential. Because its curl is taken in forming the Maxwell Equations, and because the curl of a gradient is identically zero, you can add the gradient of any arbitrary function to the potential and it will still yield the same equations, the same physical observables. So the potential CANNOT BE OBSERVED, any more that 1st person experiences can.

There are two different issues here. Whatever behind-the-scenes factors
you have in physics, they can be expressed mathematically, and
therefore *understood* in 3rd person terms, albeit they cannot be directly detected. However, qualia cannot even
be expressed (in mathematical technical language, anyway) -- although they can be (seemingly) directly detected.

So physicalism, if it is to cover the actual practices of experimental psychologists, must include the ability to explain 3rd-person observable behavior by coherent but unobservable 1st person experiences.

1st-person observable, but 3rd person unobservable.

Since the only way an experimenter has access to such states is by report from the subject, we find the necessity of heterophenomenonology, which has been discussed on another thread.

Physicalism has also to account for why there should be such states in the
first place. The problem is to explain why their should be an epistemological divide (between 1st person and 3rd person) without it being brought about by a corresponding metaphysical divide.

 

[Steve Esser]

Interesting debate. Here's a thought experiment:

Future physicists conclude that there exists in nature a property of certain complex natural systems which provides a function which coordinates the evolution of the system. This property is a added irreducible part of nature, which is found to be a necessary supplement to the previous roster of fundamental entities and forces. They also conclude that this property is the actual direct cause of first-person experience for the system in question and is most notable in human beings. And through future advanced diagnostics made possible by tracking this property we can tell what someone is experiencing from the third person without error.

Has the hard problem vanished, despite the fact that I still can't "have" your experiences?

 

[Canute]

I've come into this late so sorry if I raise any issues aleady covered.

And through future advanced diagnostics made possible by tracking this property we can tell what someone is experiencing from the third person without error.

Has the hard problem vanished, despite the fact that I still can't "have" your experiences?

It may not quite have vanished but it would be a lot less hard. However you have assumed that it will one day be possible to tell what someone is experiencing from the third-person, which in reality is impossible. It is easy sometimes to get some idea of what category of experience someone is having, for pain, happiness, excitement etc. show up in behaviour to some extent, but that is not at all the same thing as knowing what they are experiencing. One cannot infer an experience, or even a category of experience, from a particular behaviour with any confidence, and it is impossible to have a third-person experience by definition. Neither can an experience be reported, except from memory and vaguely.

My uncertainty here, and it seeems to be a point of confusion, is whether consciousness can be explained in terms of structure and function while not being observable in the third-person. I'm not sure. Is is coherent to say that consciousness is just structure and function but that we cannot observe that structure and function, nor be able to show when consciousness in present and when it is not? If we cannot tell by observation when C is present and when it is not, then we cannot tell when the necessary structure and function is present and when not. It's all very confusing.

I have problems anyway with the notion of something being no more than structure and function. Structure of what? Function of what? I thought that in physicalism consciousness had no function. If so then physicalism is epiphenomenalism, with all the problems that go with that view. Does structure here mean structure of the brain? If consciousness is no more than brain structure then the problem of neural correlates (or an equivalent) arises. The notion of this kind of supervenience has logical difficulties that have been pointed out many times in the literature. Some argue that the very idea of neural correlates of consciousness is internally inconsistent. In any case what consciousness is cannot be explained by reference to structure and function.

Also, the brain is not a closed system. No biological system is closed. So it seems to me that a complete analysis of the brain's structure and function would lead us from neurophysiology to quantum cosmology and from there straight to metaphysics.

One slightly silly thought. It is not possible to have fun unless one is conscious. So how would one give an explanation of a funfair strictly in terms of structure and function without running into trouble? The cause of the funfair, which is human consciousness, is supposed to be non-causal. (Or would they also have funfairs in a Zombie world, where there is no such thing as fun?)

Anyway, these are just woolly thoughts. I'm pretty confused about physicalism and have never quite made sense of it. Could someone take a moment to give a straightforward example of how something can be explained solely in terms of S + F? It's an idea I've never quite grasped.

 

[moving finger]

The point is, that according to you, 1st person subjectivity is an outcome of operating "within" a S+F physical system. However, if it is, it should be all-embracing. But it is not; some aspects of my experience are explainable in 3P terms and othes are not. Hence, your theory makes a false prediciton.

I never said that the 3rd person objective perspective cannot explain ANY of the 1st person subjective perspective; I said the 3rd person objective perspective cannot explain ALL of the 1st person subjective perspective. ANY is not the same as ALL.

Physicalism does imply 3rd person objectivism because it implies that structure and function are all-embracing, as you concede.

Why does this imply 3rd person subjectivity? Your assertion simply does not follow at all!
With respect, you seem to be making an unjustified assumption.

original assertion was that two IDENTICAL things could at the same time be NOT IDENTICAL, which I disagreed with.

Just to be clear, it is just as logically possible that someone with the exact same physical brain as me could experience red the way I experience green.

Just to be clear, what you seem to want is that “two brains can be exactly the same, but not be exactly the same, at the same time”, a clear contradiction.

Why should we conclude the world is not completely physical? .

It is one way of accounting for the failure of 3rdP descriptions in some cases. .

Another way is to accept that 1st person descriptions cannot be completely accounted in 3rd person terms.

Please define what you mean by ineffability.

eg redness as opposed to squareness.

Is happiness ineffable according to your definition?

I am not trying to portray physicalism as false epistemically – YOU are the one doing that.
I have said several times that I believe physicalism can account for everything. .

You have also said:
A 3rd person objective description can describe to some extent a 1st person subjective perspective, but not completely. .

What does this have to do with physicalism?
Why do you assume physicalism necessarily implies a 3rd person perspective?

You seem to insist that physicalism necessarily implies 3rd person objectivism, and I disagree with this.
3rd person objective and 1st person subjective perspectives are both IMHO compatible with physicalism, but traditional science tends to use exclusively the 3rd person objective approach (for obvious reasons).
Though 1st person subjective phenomena can be explained physically, they cannot be fully explained on the basis of 3rd person objectivism alone.

Which means they cannot be fully explained physically, since such anexplanation will reduce the biochemistry to physics and express the physics in mathematical terms , which are 3rd-person objective.

NO. “1st person phenomena cannot be fully explained from a 3rd person perspective”. You seem to assume that this is the same as “1st person phenomena cannot be fully explained by physicalism” but you are wrong.

You seem to have got confused between the idea that the existence of 1st-person perspectives is compatible with ontological physicalism (does not require ghosts) and the idea that they are incompatible with explanatory physicalism.

Not at all. I simply do not assume that physicalism is the same as 3rd person objectivism. You have given no explanation as to why you think these two things are the same.

Hoiwever, if ontological physicalism is strictly true, 1st person perspectives should not even exist; .

Why not?

so there is an implication from epistemology to metaphysics. .

This does not follow. You have not shown why 1st person perspectives should not exist.

The existence of 1st person perspectives must have some ontological implications, even if they fall short of Cartesian ghosts.

No more than any other perspective has ontological implications. Even 3rd person perspectives may have epistemological implications which are not necessarily consistent with ontological implications.

Yu have suggested that 1stP perspectives come about from operating "within" a physical system. Eiither this is physically accountable or it is unaccountable.

Agreed.

If it is accountable, the account will have the effect of reducing the 1stP perspective to a 3rdP perspective.

Not agreed. Contrary to our intuition, and contrary to contemporary methods of science, not everything can be reduced to a 3rd person perspective. This is the whole point.

If it is not, there is *already* somethin 1stP and ineffable going on, before the ineffability of conscious experience even arises -- ie the physical explanation is being prevented by the existence of somethin non-physical, in some sense.

There is nothing non-physical. There are only two different and incompatible perspectives.

MF

 

[selfAdjoint]

There are two different issues here. Whatever behind-the-scenes factors
you have in physics, they can be expressed mathematically, and
therefore *understood* in 3rd person terms, albeit they cannot be directly detected. However, qualia cannot even
be expressed (in mathematical technical language, anyway) -- although they can be (seemingly) directly detected.

I suppose you mean directly directed by first person experience. That is not classified as "detected" by physical science, at least not without heterophenomenological "brackets".

And I do not concede that first person experience is beyond mathematical representation; I have no reason at all to believe that. Many things that were not representable when I was younger, now are, and perhaps first person experience will fall too.

 

[Steve Esser]

The issue seems to be this:

How much of the problem is that first person experience (FPE) is beyond the reach of "physicalism" vs. the fact that today's physics (and the implied metaphysics of causality behind it) are incomplete but might someday be expanded to include a direct analogue to FPE?

 

[moving finger]

The issue seems to be this:

How much of the problem is that first person experience (FPE) is beyond the reach of "physicalism" vs. the fact that today's physics (and the implied metaphysics of causality behind it) are incomplete but might someday be expanded to include a direct analogue to FPE?

The issue seems to be this:

How much of the problem is due to the fact that some people think physicalism necessarily implies 3rd person experience?

MF

 

[Tournesol]

physics implies maths implies 3rdP

 

[moving finger]

physics implies maths implies 3rdP

Sorry, is this intended to be an explanation of why the doctrine of "physicalism" necessarily implies a "3rd person objective perspective"?

MF

 

[Tournesol]

Yes. typing with 1 hand, hence brevity.

 

[Tournesol]

I never said that the 3rd person objective perspective cannot explain ANY of the 1st person subjective perspective; I said the 3rd person objective perspective cannot explain ALL of the 1st person subjective perspective. ANY is not the same as ALL.

Whatever.
If physicalism is true, the 3rdP perspective should explain everything.

Physicalism does imply 3rd person objectivism because it implies that structure and function are all-embracing, as you concede.

Why does this imply 3rd person subjectivity? Your assertion simply does not follow at all!
With respect, you seem to be making an unjustified assumption.

Physicalism implies everything can be described in S+F terms, which itself implies that everything can be described in 3rdP terms.

The S+F aspects of my experience , such as the squareness of the red square, are the ones I can communicate. The others, eg the redness, are ineffable.

Another way is to accept that 1st person descriptions cannot be completely accounted in 3rd person terms.

I don't see why I should have to accept the existence of irreducably 1stP descriptions in a physical universe.

Is happiness ineffable according to your definition?

maybe.

What does this have to do with physicalism?
Why do you assume physicalism necessarily implies a 3rd person perspective?

it implie that everything can be described in S+F terms.

NO. “1st person phenomena cannot be fully explained from a 3rd person perspective”. You seem to assume that this is the same as “1st person phenomena cannot be fully explained by physicalism” but you are wrong.

physicalism is a 3rdP perspective, so that would follow.

Not at all. I simply do not assume that physicalism is the same as 3rd person objectivism. You have given no explanation as to why you think these two things are the same.

physicalism means physics means maths means S+F means 3rdP.

Hoiwever, if ontological physicalism is strictly true, 1st person perspectives should not even exist; .

Why not?

because they would be explainable in S+F, hence 3rdP, terms, so they would not be irreducably 1stP.