Does Determinism Negate Free Will?

[Tournesol]

(1) FW means nothing until we agree a definition of FW

The power of making free choices that are not entirely constrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will.

(2) some interpretations of QM would suggest that there is no causation at a quantum level, that cause and effect are macroscopic illusions.

That would depend on your definition of "causality". People tend to
grumble that there is no causation when what they mean is that
the causation in question is not as strict as they would like.

(3) are you suggesting that causation can be quantitatively measured? Please do elaborate...

It follows through conceptually. If an event were more cause than effect,
its conscequences would be unpredictable in principle, and hence contrary to determinism.

 

[moving finger]

The power of making free choices that are not entirely constrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will.

I would suggest the word free in the definition is redundant (it is a tautology to define “free” will in terms of “free” choices), thus it becomes : The power of making choices that are not entirely constrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will.

How do we define an external circumstance? As Dennett has often pointed out, one can make oneself very, very small by externalizing everything; one can also make oneself encompass potentially constraining circumstances by internalizing them.

Once this is defined, how would you then propose to show that human choices are “not entirely constrained by external circumstances”?

If an event were more cause than effect, its conscequences would be unpredictable in principle, and hence contrary to determinism.

But (I do not agree that cause and effect can be quantified in this way, but to humour you) how would you propose to quantitatively measure the magnitudes of cause and effect, to be able to say “ahhh, this event shows more cause than effect!”?

MF

 

[Tournesol]

How do we define an external circumstance? As Dennett has often pointed out, one can make oneself very, very small by externalizing everything; one can also make oneself encompass potentially constraining circumstances by internalizing them.

Ask a determinist what they consider to be the circumstances that
constrain us down to nothing -- genetics, environment, etc.

Once this is defined, how would you then propose to show that human choices are “not entirely constrained by external circumstances”?

a) argue for microphysical indeterminism

b) point out that the suppsoedly determining macroscopic influences
we grow up with (culture etc) have not, historically , prevented all
kinds of evolution and revoultion. If we are all determined by ourt upbringing,
back to the year dot, why aren't we still in caves ?

But (I do not agree that cause and effect can be quantified in this way, but to humour you) how would you propose to quantitatively measure the magnitudes of cause and effect, to be able to say “ahhh, this event shows more cause than effect!”?

You don't have to measure two things seprately to know they
are the same. If I have good reason to think Fred has never eaten
anything but hot dinners, I can conclude that the amount of
food he has eaten is equal to the amount of hot dinners he has
eaten. Nonetheless, I cannot quantify it.

Who's being pedantic now?

 

[moving finger]

Ask a determinist what they consider to be the circumstances that constrain us down to nothing -- genetics, environment, etc.

But I’m asking you, it’s your definition after all…..

Once this is defined, how would you then propose to show that human choices are “not entirely constrained by external circumstances”?

a) argue for microphysical indeterminism

microphysical indeterminism (if it exists) applies to computers as well as humans – would you therefore suggest that computers also have free will as you have defined it?

b) point out that the suppsoedly determining macroscopic influences we grow up with (culture etc) have not, historically , prevented all
kinds of evolution and revoultion. If we are all determined by ourt upbringing,
back to the year dot, why aren't we still in caves ?

what does evolution or revolution have to do with free will or constraints? Evolution and revolution can take place in a completely deterministic and constrained environment lacking in any kind of free will as you have defined it.

You don't have to measure two things seprately to know they are the same.

But you do have to measure them if you want to then claim that one is greater than the other

If I have good reason to think Fred has never eaten anything but hot dinners, I can conclude that the amount of food he has eaten is equal to the amount of hot dinners he has eaten.

If (a) is the total amount of food he has eaten, then (a) depends both on (b) the average amount of food per dinner and (c) the number of dinners. If you do not know (b) then you cannot conclude (a) is equal to (c).

MF

 

[moving finger]

i don't believe in free will--only the illusion of free will. this isn't meant to be a proof of free will. but i think if you believe that einstein was right in searching for a unified theory, and that our universe is predictable, then free will can't be possible

Discussions on "free will" are notoriously difficult, usually because most participants take sides before they even agree what they are talking about (ie participants declare "I do/do not believe in free will" before there is any agreement on the definition or meaning of "free will").

Therefore, rather than debate whether "free will" (whatever the definition) really exists, I think it is much more instructive to ask :

what do people really mean when they say that they believe they act with "free will", and are they justified in having this belief?

I humbly suggest that what most people (who claim to believe in "free will") mean when they say they act with "free will" is that they believe their actions are not entirely constrained by external factors

I say "entirely" constrained because I believe most of us would agree that our actions are usually some way constrained to a greater or lesser extent by external factors (eg I cannot willingly hold my breath for more than a minute or two, no matter how much I "want" to), but belief in "free will" would imply that not all of the external constraints on our actions are necessarily absolute.

This is where it becomes useful to look closely at how we define the "person" (or better still, the agent) which we are claiming has this "free will".

Paraphrasing Dennett, one can externalise everything by making oneself really, really small. Conversely, an agent can subsume many (potentially external) constraints within itself by making itself a sufficiently finite size.

What we call our "self" is not an infinitesimal point in space. It has finite physical and logical boundaries and, most importantly, it includes within those boundaries many of the causes and effects of our decisions; in fact the personal decision-making process is based on what I like to call self-referential causal loops.

If we can identify the external "cause" of a particular decision (ie an external constraint on our free will) then we know that we are not deciding freely. But for many of our decisions we are unable to unambiguously identify the "causes", simply because those causes are internalised in a complex and self-referential way within our decision-making selves.

Thus, it is not the case that our "free will" decisions are uncaused; it is not the case that our "free will" decisions are unconstrained. It is simply the case that the decisions that we choose to call "free will" decisions are caused and constrained largely by internal self-referential causal loops, of which we have (most of the time) incomplete awareness - and this is what leads us to say that we act with "free will".

Some may call "free will" illusion. I do not. "Free will" is a very real feeling that we have, and when we understand precisely what it is in the way I have described above, then we can clearly see that "free will" is real and we are justified in believing that we act with "free will", even in a deterministic universe. "Free will" is not an illusion. But it is important to understand exactly what it is, and also what it is not.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

But I’m asking you, it’s your definition after all…..

FYI, libertariansim is the opposite of determinsim. Libertarians think we are not
totally constrained by just the same things determinists think we are totally constrained by.

microphysical indeterminism (if it exists) applies to computers as well as humans – would you therefore suggest that computers also have free will as you have defined it?

It is a necessary but insufficient condition. The other factors include
consciousness, rationallity, etc and are not ususally in dispute.

what does evolution or revolution have to do with free will or constraints? Evolution and revolution can take place in a completely deterministic and constrained environment lacking in any kind of free will as you have defined it.

They have to do with the "high level" argument for determinism.
OC it might be the case that only microphysical determism is true,
and allows for the appearance of novelty at the social/cultural level,
as you say. And that...ta-daaaaa!... is exactly why I cited the need
for microphysical indeterminism as well.

But you do have to measure them if you want to then claim that one is greater than the other

Nope. Have you ever done any maths ? The kind involving x's and y's ?

 

[moving finger]

FYI, libertariansim is the opposite of determinsim. Libertarians think we are not totally constrained by just the same things determinists think we are totally constrained by.

We started with you defining free will in terms of no constraint from “external circumstance”. I asked you how you would define an “external circumstance”. Instead of answering you start spouting about Libertarianism and Determinism? Seems you are avoiding the question.

It is a necessary but insufficient condition. The other factors include
consciousness, rationallity, etc and are not ususally in dispute.

You did not include consciousness or rationality as prerequisite properties in your definition of free will, and they do not fall out as implied properties. Would you now like the chance to revise your definition?

what does evolution or revolution have to do with free will or constraints? Evolution and revolution can take place in a completely deterministic and constrained environment lacking in any kind of free will as you have defined it.

They have to do with the "high level" argument for determinism.

That does not answer the question. I still maintain that evolution and revolution can take place in a completely deterministic environment. You suggested that somehow a deterministic environment would somehow prevent evolution or revolution. I am interested to know how you think that could possibly happen (since I think it is false).

Have you ever done any maths ? The kind involving x's and y's ?

Educate me. Show me how you can demonstrate that x is greater than y (apart from just assuming it) unless you put values against x and y.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

We started with you defining free will in terms of no constraint from “external circumstance”. I asked you how you would define an “external circumstance”.

genetics, environment, etc.

You did not include consciousness or rationality as prerequisite properties in your definition of free will, and they do not fall out as implied properties. Would you now like the chance to revise your definition?

Is there any reason to believe that no-one anywhere is in possession of
them ?

That does not answer the question. I still maintain that evolution and revolution can take place in a completely deterministic environment. You suggested that somehow a deterministic environment would somehow prevent evolution or revolution. I am interested to know how you think that could possibly happen (since I think it is false).

If being determined by the cultrue you are brought up in doesn't
cause you to behave just the same as your ancestors what does it do?

(NB the difference between low-level and high-level determinism)

Educate me. Show me how you can demonstrate that x is greater than y (apart from just assuming it) unless you put values against x and y.

let y=x/2

 

[moving finger]

We started with you defining free will in terms of no constraint from “external circumstance”. I asked you how you would define an “external circumstance”.

genetics, environment, etc.

I grant you that in the context of “free will”, environment is normally an external circumstance and we should be able to make most decisions free from environmental constraints. However I think genetics is bit more tricky (I can imagine instances where behaviour is tightly constrained by genetic factors).

You did not include consciousness or rationality as prerequisite properties in your definition of free will, and they do not fall out as implied properties. Would you now like the chance to revise your definition?

Is there any reason to believe that no-one anywhere is in possession of them ?

Are you suggesting therefore that only human beings (endowed with consciousness and rationality) can possesses this thing called “free will”?

That does not answer the question. I still maintain that evolution and revolution can take place in a completely deterministic environment. You suggested that somehow a deterministic environment would somehow prevent evolution or revolution. I am interested to know how you think that could possibly happen (since I think it is false).

If being determined by the cultrue you are brought up in doesn't cause you to behave just the same as your ancestors what does it do?

The cultural environment one is brought up in may condition one to think in certain ways, I agree, but it is no more of a constraint on free will than is the physical environment (which we saw above is an external circumstance that should not completely prohibit free will).

I see no reason why free will is a necessary pre-requisite for either evolution or revolution. Evolution in particular can be thought of as a purely deterministic process. And revolution can be simply (for example) a catastrophic change in the social order within a (hypothetical) purely deterministic society bereft of free will. But I would be happy to see examples of where you think free will is a necessary prerequisite for either evolution or revolution.

Educate me. Show me how you can demonstrate that x is greater than y (apart from just assuming it) unless you put values against x and y.

let y=x/2

which is an assumption (or definition) about the relationship between x and y, not a demonstration that x is greater than y.

This whole question arose because you asserted that “If an event were more cause than effect, its conscequences would be unpredictable in principle” which begs the question “how do you measure whether an event is more cause than effect”. As far as I am aware cause and effect are not quantitative parameters in any meaningful sense, ie it is not possible to equate or compare them and say for example “ohhh, here the cause is double the effect” – but I am open to this latter statement being proven wrong. Simply asserting “let y = x/2” does not prove it wrong.

MF

 

[moving finger]

FYI, libertariansim is the opposite of determinsim. Libertarians think we are not totally constrained by just the same things determinists think we are totally constrained by.

Libertarians (so I understand) do not accept that the whole universe behaves deterministically, for they maintain that the human mind (or the innermost regions of the brain) present an exception. According to Libertarians, a person's mind can itself cause that person to perform a particular action when that person chooses so to act, without the choice itself having any antecedent cause. The usual unbroken chain of cause and effect is thus broken, and when a person exercises his or her free will, a new chain is initiated by the act of will itself. However, the supposed mechanism for initiating a new chain of cause and effect by the mere act of free will remains a mystery.

In some ways, this seems reminiscent of Descartes' dualism (the thinking self can act independently both of causation and of the physical self).

Would you agree this is an accurate view of Libertarianism?

MF

 

[Tournesol]

Are you suggesting therefore that only human beings (endowed with consciousness and rationality) can possesses this thing called “free will”?

Other being with rationaility and consciousness might have FW, but there
are not many pertinent examples.

The cultural environment one is brought up in may condition one to think in certain ways, I agree, but it is no more of a constraint on free will than is the physical environment (which we saw above is an external circumstance that should not completely prohibit free will).

whatever. The question is what the world would look like if the high-level
argument were true.

I see no reason why free will is a necessary pre-requisite for either evolution or revolution. Evolution in particular can be thought of as a purely deterministic process.

Again, you are making themistake of considering the argument against
high-level determinism as thought it were independent of the argument against.
low-level determinism.

which is an assumption (or definition) about the relationship between x and y, not a demonstration that x is greater than y.

There is such a thing as truth by stipulation. BTW, do you think I am only entitled to assert that the number of hydrogen atoms in a glass of awater is twice the number of oxygen atoms if I have counted them ?

 

[Tournesol]

Libertarians (so I understand) do not accept that the whole universe behaves deterministically, for they maintain that the human mind (or the innermost regions of the brain) present an exception. According to Libertarians, a person's mind can itself cause that person to perform a particular action when that person chooses so to act, without the choice itself having any antecedent cause. The usual unbroken chain of cause and effect is thus broken, and when a person exercises his or her free will, a new chain is initiated by the act of will itself. However, the supposed mechanism for initiating a new chain of cause and effect by the mere act of free will remains a mystery.

In some ways, this seems reminiscent of Descartes' dualism (the thinking self can act independently both of causation and of the physical self).

Would you agree this is an accurate view of Libertarianism?

MF

No, it is a straw-man. Libertarians do no believe in a rigid causal chain
to which the human brain is an exception. They think strict determinism
is false in general (which is a necessary condition for FW which only becomes
sufficient in the presence of various other factors such as rationallity and lack of external constraint).

 

[Huckleberry]

Free will? Does that mean that if I choose to be happy then I actually am? If I decide to love my girlfriend then I actually do? I feel that I have some choice in the logical processes, but I have very little choice in my own emotional processes. LOL, It is actually easier to control other peoples emotional processes than my own. It seems to me that we are both in control of our own will and subject to the will of others.

In statistics it is easy to predict what a large group of people will do under certain circumstances. It is almost impossible to predict what an individual (a stranger to you) will do under those same circumstances. A cloud of gas will expand in a completely predictable manner, but a particle of that gas could go almost anywhere. I would suggest that we do indeed have a will, but that it is not free at all. There are restraints and limitations on it beyond our control.

P.S. What would the possibility of time travel mean for free will?

What was the question?
Huck

 

[moving finger]

Are you suggesting therefore that only human beings (endowed with consciousness and rationality) can possesses this thing called “free will”?

Other being with rationaility and consciousness might have FW, but there are not many pertinent examples.

Hmmm. Why does one need to be rational to possesses free will? If I possesses free will as a rational being, and I then somehow “lose my wits” and start acting irrationally, are you suggesting that I have also lost my free will?

Does it also follow that if we can at some stage endow machines with consciousness, that they could also start acting with free will?

The cultural environment one is brought up in may condition one to think in certain ways, I agree, but it is no more of a constraint on free will than is the physical environment (which we saw above is an external circumstance that should not completely prohibit free will).

whatever. The question is what the world would look like if the high-level argument were true.

What “high level argument” is this please? Can you clarify?

I see no reason why free will is a necessary pre-requisite for either evolution or revolution. Evolution in particular can be thought of as a purely deterministic process.

Again, you are making themistake of considering the argument against high-level determinism as thought it were independent of the argument against.
low-level determinism.

Please clarify the difference between your concepts of high-level and low-level determinism, since this is not something we have defined so far (as far as I know).

which is an assumption (or definition) about the relationship between x and y, not a demonstration that x is greater than y.

There is such a thing as truth by stipulation.

With respect, this is rubbish. Truth by stipulation is only valid where there is logical preceding reasoning which supports the stipulation. You can no more claim that an unsubstantiated y=x/2 than I can claim that the morning sun will be blue. Both are unsubstantiated assertions. What you need to do to support your assertion that a system can exhibit more cause than effect is to demonstrate how cause and effect can be quantified, which you have not done.

do you think I am only entitled to assert that the number of hydrogen atoms in a glass of awater is twice the number of oxygen atoms if I have counted them ?

In this case, you KNOW from prior data that there are two hydrogen atoms per oxygen atom in water, and it is this knowledge which legitimises your “stipulation”. This is what I mean by logical preceding reasoning. Simply stipulating (without substantiation) that there are two hydrogen atoms for every oxygen atom would be simply a guess, and worthless (even if true).

Libertarians do no believe in a rigid causal chain
to which the human brain is an exception. They think strict determinism
is false in general (which is a necessary condition for FW which only becomes
sufficient in the presence of various other factors such as rationallity and lack of external constraint).

You have told me what Libertarians do NOT believe, can you tell me what they DO believe? This is the more important issue.

MF

 

[TheUnknown]

Free will? Does that mean that if I choose to be happy then I actually am? If I decide to love my girlfriend then I actually do? I feel that I have some choice in the logical processes, but I have very little choice in my own emotional processes. LOL, It is actually easier to control other peoples emotional processes than my own. It seems to me that we are both in control of our own will and subject to the will of others.

In statistics it is easy to predict what a large group of people will do under certain circumstances. It is almost impossible to predict what an individual (a stranger to you) will do under those same circumstances. A cloud of gas will expand in a completely predictable manner, but a particle of that gas could go almost anywhere. I would suggest that we do indeed have a will, but that it is not free at all. There are restraints and limitations on it beyond our control.

P.S. What would the possibility of time travel mean for free will?



What was the question?
Huck

To address your question straight forwardly... i have stayed longer sicne more information is needed on the thought process of beings such as moving_finger... go to special relativity, and look up the discussion on GR and time travel... me and figner had an 8 page long discussion on time travel and free will... i basically took him to school with my 300 year advanced knowledge on the subject, and it caused him to come down with a rather pecuilar case of amnesia. I would advise all to read it who question free will. When the human mind can fathom the 4th dimension, evolution will take place.

 

[moving finger]

To address your question straight forwardly... i have stayed longer sicne more information is needed on the thought process of beings such as moving_finger... go to special relativity, and look up the discussion on GR and time travel... me and figner had an 8 page long discussion on time travel and free will... i basically took him to school with my 300 year advanced knowledge on the subject, and it caused him to come down with a rather pecuilar case of amnesia. I would advise all to read it who question free will. When the human mind can fathom the 4th dimension, evolution will take place.

 

[Tournesol]

Hmmm. Why does one need to be rational to possesses free will?

We do not ususally attribute FW to unstable nuclei. (pace John Conway)

If I possesses free will as a rational being, and I then somehow “lose my wits” and start acting irrationally, are you suggesting that I have also lost my free will?

We do not usually attribute moral responsibility to crazy people, and
FW foes with moral responsibilit as far as most peope are concerned.

Does it also follow that if we can at some stage endow machines with consciousness, that they could also start acting with free will?

Maybe.

What “high level argument” is this please? Can you clarify?

Once this is defined, how would you then propose to show that human choices are “not entirely constrained by external circumstances”?

a) argue for microphysical indeterminism

b) point out that the suppsoedly determining macroscopic influences
we grow up with (culture etc) have not, historically , prevented all
kinds of evolution and revoultion. If we are all determined by ourt upbringing,
back to the year dot, why aren't we still in caves ?

I mean (b).

What you need to do to support your assertion that a system can exhibit more cause than effect is to demonstrate how cause and effect can be quantified, which you have not done.

It's a conceptual relationship derived from determinism and predictability.

In this case, you KNOW from prior data that there are two hydrogen atoms per oxygen atom in water, and it is this knowledge which legitimises your “stipulation”. This is what I mean by logical preceding reasoning. Simply stipulating (without substantiation) that there are two hydrogen atoms for every oxygen atom would be simply a guess, and worthless (even if true).

But it is "prior knowledge" that in a deterministic universe, everything is predicable. Everything else follows logicaly from that.

You have told me what Libertarians do NOT believe, can you tell me what they DO believe? This is the more important issue.

They believe that FW, as previously defined, does exist, and is incompatible
with determinism, which is therefore false.

 

[moving finger]

Does that mean that if I choose to be happy then I actually am?

Assuming that your "choice" to be happy then leads to the state that "you are happy" then - of course. Happiness is a state of mind.

What you have to understand is that "choosing" something and "deciding" something does not then automatically lead to that "thing" taking place. I can "choose" that I wish to jump over the moon, but I cannot actually accomplish that feat. I can "decide" that I want to hold my breath for 20 minutes, but the mere fact of me deciding that does not enable me to do it.

If I decide to love my girlfriend then I actually do?

As explained above, if you are capable of loving your girlfriend, and if the act of deciding to love her leads to you loving her, then you actually do.

I feel that I have some choice in the logical processes, but I have very little choice in my own emotional processes.

Perhaps you just need to "know yourself" a little better. With practice and with self-knowledge and self-understanding, you CAN control your emotions and emotional processes.

It is actually easier to control other peoples emotional processes than my own.

I humbly suggest that is simply because you need to practice.

It seems to me that we are both in control of our own will and subject to the will of others.

Please define "will"?

In statistics it is easy to predict what a large group of people will do under certain circumstances.

No. It is easy to predict what they are "likely" to do. This is not the same as what they "will" do.

It is almost impossible to predict what an individual (a stranger to you) will do under those same circumstances. A cloud of gas will expand in a completely predictable manner,

Wrong. It will expand in a statistically predictable manner, but not completely predictable.

but a particle of that gas could go almost anywhere. I would suggest that we do indeed have a will, but that it is not free at all. There are restraints and limitations on it beyond our control.

Please define what you mean by "will" in this context.

What would the possibility of time travel mean for free will?

If time travel is possible, and if there is only one universe, then the only way to ensure self-consistency (ie not being able to go back and "change" the past) is if the world is super-deterministic.
But free will CAN be compatible with determinism - it depends on how you define free will. What kind of free will are you talking about?

MF

 

[moving finger]

Why does one need to be rational to possesses free will?

We do not ususally attribute FW to unstable nuclei. (pace John Conway)

How did we get onto “unstable nuclei”? Are you suggesting that every agent must be either “rational” or an “unstable nucleus”? Surely not.

If I possesses free will as a rational being, and I then somehow “lose my wits” and start acting irrationally, are you suggesting that I have also lost my free will? .

We do not usually attribute moral responsibility to crazy people, and FW foes with moral responsibilit as far as most peope are concerned.

Crazy is not the same as acting irrationally; and I submit that free will is not the same as moral responsibility (I can have free will, and still act morally irresponsibly; I can be sane and still act irrationally).

Does it also follow that if we can at some stage endow machines with consciousness, that they could also start acting with free will? .

Maybe.

I agree!

What “high level argument” is this please? Can you clarify? .

Once this is defined, how would you then propose to show that human choices are “not entirely constrained by external circumstances”? .

a) argue for microphysical indeterminism

b) point out that the suppsoedly determining macroscopic influences
we grow up with (culture etc) have not, historically , prevented all
kinds of evolution and revoultion. If we are all determined by ourt upbringing,
back to the year dot, why aren't we still in caves ? .

I mean (b) .

As pointed out already, even if our upbringing is part of the deterministic process that defines what we are today, this does not necessarily imply that we should still be living in caves. A deterministic world can still grow, evolve, change. Evolution and revolution are entirely compatible with determinism. Therefore I have no idea what you really mean by your “high level argument”.

What you need to do to support your assertion that a system can exhibit more cause than effect is to demonstrate how cause and effect can be quantified, which you have not done.

It's a conceptual relationship derived from determinism and predictability.

Which is a purely qualitative statement, and does not imply that cause and effect can be quantified and compared such that one can say “ahhhh, here we have more cause than effect”. You have not shown that cause and effect can be quantified in this way.

In this case, you KNOW from prior data that there are two hydrogen atoms per oxygen atom in water, and it is this knowledge which legitimises your “stipulation”. This is what I mean by logical preceding reasoning. Simply stipulating (without substantiation) that there are two hydrogen atoms for every oxygen atom would be simply a guess, and worthless (even if true) .

But it is "prior knowledge" that in a deterministic universe, everything is predicable. Everything else follows logicaly from that.

Nope. A deterministic universe is NOT necessarily predictable, and (most importantly) it is IMPOSSIBLE to predict the future of even a deterministic universe from WITHIN that universe. If the universe is deterministic, the only way to predict the future is to stand “outside” of 4D spacetime (eg as God). Any being within (and interacting with) 4D spacetime cannot reliably predict the future (it comes back to those wonderful self-referential causal loops again).

You have told me what Libertarians do NOT believe, can you tell me what they DO believe? This is the more important issue.

They believe that FW, as previously defined, does exist, and is incompatible with determinism, which is therefore false.

“free will” as previously defined? Sorry, I maybe missed that. Can you repeat the definition of free will for me please?

I think you will find that such a belief (depending on how you define free will…….) necessarily means that the agent with the so-called free will must be a source of causal chains, ie is in some way acting uncaused, which is basically what I said earlier.

I wonder if you can explain how this Libertarian free will can arise any other way (apart from the so-called “straw man” explanation that you seemed to dislike)?

MF

 

[Tournesol]

How did we get onto “unstable nuclei”? Are you suggesting that every agent must be either “rational” or an “unstable nucleus”? Surely not.

It was an example of something that is unpredictable but does not have FW.

Crazy is not the same as acting irrationally; and I submit that free will is not the same as moral responsibility (I can have free will, and still act morally irresponsibly;

But if you are sane you will be held accountable for your actions.

As pointed out already, even if our upbringing is part of the deterministic process that defines what we are today, this does not necessarily imply that we should still be living in caves. A deterministic world can still grow, evolve, change. Evolution and revolution are entirely compatible with determinism. Therefore I have no idea what you really mean by your “high level argument”.

For the third time, you have made the mistake of assuming that I mean
EITHER the falsehodd of the HL argument (b) OR the falsehood of the microphysical argument (a) is adequate to allow FW. As I have already pointed
out, they both need to be false.

Which is a purely qualitative statement, and does not imply that cause and effect can be quantified and compared such that one can say “ahhhh, here we have more cause than effect”. You have not shown that cause and effect can be quantified in this way.

Your quantative/qualitative thing doesn't work.

Nope. A deterministic universe is NOT necessarily predictable, and (most importantly) it is IMPOSSIBLE to predict the future of even a deterministic universe from WITHIN that universe. If the universe is deterministic, the only way to predict the future is to stand “outside” of 4D spacetime (eg as God). Any being within (and interacting with) 4D spacetime cannot reliably predict the future (it comes back to those wonderful self-referential causal loops again).

Predictable by an ideal observer such as Laplace's Infinite Intelligence.

“free will” as previously defined? Sorry, I maybe missed that. Can you repeat the definition of free will for me please?

"The power of making free choices that are not entirely constrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will."

(#31 in this thread)

I think you will find that such a belief (depending on how you define free will…….) necessarily means that the agent with the so-called free will must be a source of causal chains, ie is in some way acting uncaused, which is basically what I said earlier.

Earlier you seemed to be supporting the compatiblist idea that an agent is free
if they (proximately) cause their actions, even if those causal events are themselves entirely
caused ad-infinitum.

I wonder if you can explain how this Libertarian free will can arise any other way (apart from the so-called “straw man” explanation that you seemed to dislike)?

The straw-man explanantion has it that only humans behave indeterministically. Libertarians do not need to assume this, and QM
indicates that indterminism is in faxct widespread.

 

[moving finger]

How did we get onto “unstable nuclei”? Are you suggesting that every agent must be either “rational” or an “unstable nucleus”? Surely not.

It was an example of something that is unpredictable but does not have FW.

Which has nothing to do with “acting rationally”, which you seem to think is a pre-requisite of free will…….

But if you are sane you will be held accountable for your actions.

Which does not imply that if you are irrational you do not have free will! (again, just so we know what the question was : You asserted that rationality was a pre-requisite for free will, which I challenged. Instead of answering my challenge, you are trying to say that this has something to do with sanity and moral responsibility……… are you just trying to confuse things?)

For the third time, you have made the mistake of assuming that I mean EITHER the falsehodd of the HL argument (b) OR the falsehood of the microphysical argument (a) is adequate to allow FW. As I have already pointed out, they both need to be false.

What you call the high-level argument is false.
If by “low-level argument” you mean “quantum indeterminism”, then indeterminism (if it exists) simply gives rise to indeterminism – it is not a source of free will, it is a source of randomness.

Your quantative/qualitative thing doesn't work.

Quantitative means : Can be measured. If you believe that magnitudes of cause and effect can be quantified then please explain how this can be done, to allow us to conclude (for example) “ahhhhh, this shows more cause than effect”. You have not shown this, all you have done is make oblique references to algebra.

Predictable by an ideal observer such as Laplace's Infinite Intelligence.

Such predictions (whilst possible in principle) are also in principle inaccessible to the beings existing within the universe.

"The power of making free choices that are not entirely constrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will."
(#31 in this thread)

This kind of free will is entirely compatible with determinism (see my post #35 in this thread)

I think you will find that such a belief (depending on how you define free will…….) necessarily means that the agent with the so-called free will must be a source of causal chains, ie is in some way acting uncaused, which is basically what I said earlier.

Earlier you seemed to be supporting the compatiblist idea that an agent is free if they (proximately) cause their actions, even if those causal events are themselves entirely caused ad-infinitum.

Which is why I said “depending on how you define free will”. I think you will find that Libertarians would not accept that everything is deterministic, because 100% determinism would not allow them to have the kind of free will that they seem to wish to have.

The straw-man explanantion has it that only humans behave indeterministically.

My explanation (that you called “straw man”) said nothing about indeterminism. Where did you get this from?

Libertarians do not need to assume this, and QM indicates that indterminism is in faxct widespread.

Indeterminism is not a source of free will, it is a source of randomness. How can randomness allow Libertarians to recover the kind of uncaused causal chain that they need in their philosophy?

MF

 

[Tournesol]

Which has nothing to do with “acting rationally”, which you seem to think is a pre-requisite of free will…….

Humans are indeterministic and have Fw because they can also think rationally.

Unstable nuclei (eg) are indeterministic and do not have FW because they cannot think rationally.

Yet another spurious "nothing to do with" ?

Which does not imply that if you are irrational you do not have free will!

Yes. If you are insane, you are irrational, if you are irrational, you are
not morally accountable, and that you are not morally accountable
means you have no FW.

(again, just so we know what the question was : You asserted that rationality was a pre-requisite for free will, which I challenged.

YOu think unstable nuclie have FW ? Nothing does ..? Eveything does ..?

Instead of answering my challenge, you are trying to say that this has something to do with sanity and moral responsibility……… are you just trying to confuse things?)

Sanity, moral accountability and rationality are all part-and-parcel
of the same issue.

What you call the high-level argument is false.

You mean that people aren't determined by culture (etc)? Or
if they were, there would not be the absence of evoution-and-revolution
that I suppose.

If by “low-level argument” you mean “quantum indeterminism”, then indeterminism (if it exists) simply gives rise to indeterminism – it is not a source of free will, it is a source of randomness.

That is your opinion. Mine is the contrary:-

http:///www.geocities.com/peterdjones/det_darwin.html

Quantitative means : Can be measured. If you believe that magnitudes of cause and effect can be quantified then please explain how this can be done, to allow us to conclude (for example) “ahhhhh, this shows more cause than effect”. You have not shown this, all you have done is make oblique references to algebra.

You do not have two measure two quantities to know they are equal.
Although my argument is concpetual, it is not "qualitative" in a way
that excludes quantativity.

Such predictions (whilst possible in principle) are also in principle inaccessible to the beings existing within the universe.

SO what ? Are you saying that our inability to predict quantum effects is
due to our presence in the universe ?

"The power of making free choices that are not entirely constrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will."
(#31 in this thread) "

This kind of free will is entirely compatible with determinism (see my post #35 in this thread)

Nope. Determinism means you are entriely constrained by circumstances
prevailing before you were born.

Which is why I said “depending on how you define free will”. I think you will find that Libertarians would not accept that everything is deterministic, because 100% determinism would not allow them to have the kind of free will that they seem to wish to have.

As I have been saying.

My explanation (that you called “straw man”) said nothing about indeterminism. Where did you get this from?

I was referring to this exchange:-

Libertarians (so I understand) do not accept that the whole universe behaves deterministically, for they maintain that the human mind (or the innermost regions of the brain) present an exception. According to Libertarians, a person's mind can itself cause that person to perform a particular action when that person chooses so to act, without the choice itself having any antecedent cause. The usual unbroken chain of cause and effect is thus broken, and when a person exercises his or her free will, a new chain is initiated by the act of will itself. However, the supposed mechanism for initiating a new chain of cause and effect by the mere act of free will remains a mystery.

In some ways, this seems reminiscent of Descartes' dualism (the thinking self can act independently both of causation and of the physical self).

Would you agree this is an accurate view of Libertarianism?

No, it is a straw-man. Libertarians do no believe in a rigid causal chain
to which the human brain is an exception. They think strict determinism
is false in general (which is a necessary condition for FW which only becomes
sufficient in the presence of various other factors such as rationallity and lack of external constraint).

Indeterminism is not a source of free will, it is a source of randomness. How can randomness allow Libertarians to recover the kind of uncaused causal chain that they need in their philosophy?

Randomness automatically gives you uncaused causes. The question
is how it impacts rationallity, which is what I address in my essay.
http:///www.geocities.com/peterdjones/det_darwin.html

Once this is defined, how would you then propose to show that human choices are “not entirely constrained by external circumstances”?

a) argue for microphysical indeterminism

b) point out that the suppsoedly determining macroscopic influences
we grow up with (culture etc) have not, historically , prevented all
kinds of evolution and revoultion. If we are all determined by ourt upbringing,
back to the year dot, why aren't we still in caves ?
(#33).

 

[moving finger]

Randomness automatically gives you uncaused causes. The question is how it impacts rationallity, which is what I address in my essay.
http:///www.geocities.com/peterdjones/det_darwin.html

An interesting essay, but the essay does nothing to defend your point of view, it simply attacks a particularly "myopic" view of determinism, hence the essay actually demonstrates very little that is useful in terms of the debate.

If you have a particular belief or philosophy, I humbly suggest that what you need to do is to show how it works, and to defend it. In other words, if you believe that indeterminism gives rise to free will, you need to show how it does this, what the consequences are, what happens if we remove indeterminism, etc. You do not do this, hence it is difficult to take your argument seriously.

I still claim that indeterminism results simply in indeterministic outcomes, it does not result in “free will” (whatever that may be). You do not show how indeterminism results in "free will" in your essay. With respect, if you wish your argument to be taken seriously you need to show not only how indeterminism can result in your kind of “free will”, but also that the removal of indeterminism would then necessarily also remove that same "free will".

MF

 

[Tournesol]

You do not show how indeterminism results in "free will" in your essay.

Free will requires lack of complete constaint, by definition.

Lack of complete causal constraint is equivalent to indeterminism.

Indeterminism is therefore necessary but insufficient for FW
(it also needs to be established that it is not inimical to rationality).

http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/det_compat.html

 

[moving finger]

Free will requires lack of complete constaint, by definition.

Lack of complete causal constraint is equivalent to indeterminism.

This is the error. You equate your feeling of "I" with total lack of causation. But this is wrong.

The “I” simply “is”. It exists.

The “I” is a source of causation.

We accept the “I” as existing, and as being the source of causation.

Whether the “I” in turn has causal precedents (or is causally random) is irrelevant.

Naïve intuition suggests to us that the “I” must be somehow uncaused, must be independent of prior causes. But why should this be so?

Why does it make any difference whether the “I” is caused or uncaused? What matters is only that the “I” exists in the present time, that the "I" is at least partly unconstrained by present and future events, and that the “I” is responsible for causing future events.

I submit that whether your “present day” “I” can be traced back to prior historical causes or not is totally irrelevant. All that matters IS your “present day” “I”, and not from whence it came.

And I certainly do not see how it helps to suggest that “random indeterminism” may be partly responsible for the source of your “I”.

Indeterminism is therefore irrelevant for the feeling of individuality that humans have.

MF

 

[moving finger]

Free will requires lack of complete constaint, by definition.

I disagree. This depends on one's definition of free will.
Lack of complete constraint implies indeterminism, but you have yet to show how either "lack of complete constraint" or "indeterminism" generates free will (ie the definition of "free will" as "requires lack of complete constraint" may be inconsistent).
I am coming round to the conclusion that our feeling of free will actually requires no complete present or future constraints, but is irrelevant to whether or not we are constrained in the past.

Lack of complete causal constraint is equivalent to indeterminism.

I agree with this statement. But where the fault lies is in assuming that either indeterminism or lack of causal constraint can generate free will.

Indeterminism is therefore necessary but insufficient for FW

I would say that our feeling of free will is not dependent on either historical determinism or historical indeterminism.

I like very much a simple poem that a fellow-member submitted recently :

One ship sails East, and another sails West,
with the very same winds that blow.
Tis the set of the sail, and not the gale,
which determines the way they go.


In other words : The directions of the ships are not so much dependent on the wind, but more on the set of the sails of each ship. The ships are indeed masters of their destiny, but this says nothing about whether the set of their sails has prior causal determination or not.

The error that Libertarians make is in assuming that free will must somehow be associated with an uncaused past.

MF

 

[moving finger]

http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/det_compat.html

In response to some of the ideas in the above link :

libetarians believe that, having chosen they could have chosen differently under the very same circumstances.

This is a source of error. There is no evidence that such a thing is possible, and in believing this, Libertarians are deceiving themselves. Determinism would say that "if the circumstances are the same, the choices will be the same".

That is, that alternative possibilites were actually available, they have a positive power of choice, since they bring something of their own to a choice, they have ultimate responsibility, unlike computers whose 'choices' are always attributable to external and prior factors.

What evidence do you have that such alternative possibilities were actually available, except as theoretical possibilities within the mind of the agent?

We cannot attribute UR to computers because one is always substitutable for another, the individuality of the computer makes no difference.

Why should individuality make any difference to UR?
If computers cannot be the source of UR, what IS the source of UR?
Indeterminism?

MF

 

[moving finger]

The Libertarian Illusion

Libertarians often emphasise what they consider to be the two (and related) key features of their philosophy of free will:

Alternative Possiblities (AP), the idea that there is a genuine (ie unconstrained) choice available at a given time

and

Ultimate Responsibility (UR), also known as origination, the idea that there is a genuine sense in which an agent is the originator of its voluntary acts, and therefore bears responsibility for them.

Let us study these features in more detail.

The power to make choices is in fact compatible with determinism – a choice after all is simply “taking two or more inputs and producing one output” – and demonstrably deterministic agents like computers can certainly make such a choice (even though such a choice may be a constrained choice).

Obviously (assuming determinism is true), two identically programmed computers will always make the same 'choice' under the the same circumstances, and (given sufficient knowledge of the programming and data) the 'choice' of each computer is always predictable. The Libertarian would say that the computer brings nothing uniquely “of its own” to the choice, that it does not bear “ultimate responsibility” because its choices are always attributable to external and prior causative factors. But this statement is in fact meaningless (what does “of its own” actually mean?).

The above assumes determinism is true. If we now introduce indeterminism, such that two identical computers do NOT always make the same choices, and these choices are NO LONGER predictable, does that mean these computers suddenly “bring something of their own” to the choice, or that they suddenly “bear ultimate responsibility” for their choices?. How can the introduction of indeterminism render “irresponsible” computers suddenly “responsible”? Clearly it cannot.

Indeterminism is therefore a “will-o-the-wisp” when we are looking for the source of ultimate responsibility. Indeterminism cannot be a source of ultimate responsibility.

Libertarians believe that having chosen, they could have chosen differently under the very same circumstances. In other words, if precisely the same circumstances were to be repeated, the outcome could have been different. This scenario is clearly incompatible with determinism. The only way that identical circumstances can give rise to different outcomes is if indeterminism is true. For this reason, many Libertarians embrace indeterminism. But we have just seen that indeterminism does not endow ultimate responsibility.

Somehow, a Libertarian interprets the introduction of indeterminism as meaning that “they bring something of their own to the choice, they have ultimate responsibility”, but Libertarians fail to explain how “something of their own” can arise from an “indeterministic cause”, which we have already seen has nothing to do with ultimate responsibility.

MF

 

[Billy T]

The Libertarian IllusionLibertarians often emphasise what they consider to be the two (and related) key features of their philosophy of free will:
Alternative Possiblities (AP), the idea that there is a genuine choice available at a given time...

Since the last four post have been by you, and I hope we have become friends enough that I can tease you a little, I though I would break your chain of posts with:

Would you please define what you mean by "genuine choice." How can we have a meaningful discussion if you use undefine terms?

PS glad you liked my poem (post 56)

 

[moving finger]

Since the last four post have been by you, and I hope we have become friends enough that I can tease you a little, I though I would break your chain of posts with:

Would you please define what you mean by "genuine choice." How can we have a meaningful discussion if you use undefine terms?

PS glad you liked my poem (post 56)

Hehehehe - Well spotted!
As an attempt at a "weak" defence, I actually copied & pasted the offending phrase from a website referred to me by Tournesol at : http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/det_compat.html

Now, I would not have chosen the phrase “genuine choice” myself, because I believe there is simply choice, sweet and simple. Yes, that choice can be constrained (inevitable) or it can be unconstrained (evitable), but to my mind both kinds of choice are genuine. What I think the Libertarian who wrote those words actually means by “genuine choice” is probably “uncosntrained choice”, but that is only my guess.

I plead guilty to using ambiguous terms and not defining them.

Any luck on defining GFW?

Cheers

MF