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vanesch said:The way one infers causal effects is by observation of correlations, when the "cause" is "independently and randomly" selected.
I disagree. I think we can safely infer that the cause of a supernova explosion is the increase of the star's mass beyond a certain limit, without "randomly" selecting a star, bringing it inside the lab and adding mass to it.
If I "randomly" push a button, and I find a correlation between "pushed button" and "light goes on", then I can conclude normally, that the pushed button is the cause of the light going on.
I fail to see why the push need to be random. The correlation is the same.
But in superdeterminism, one cannot say anymore that "I freely pushed the button".
True.
It could be that I "just happened to push the button" each time the light went on, by previous common cause.
This is self-contradictory. You either "just happen" to push the button at the right time, either the two events (pushing the button and the light going on) are causally related.
The first case is a type of "conspiracy" which has nothing to do with superdeterminism. In a probabilistic universe one can also claim that it just happens that the two events are correlated. There is no reason to assume that a "typical" superdeterministic universe will show correlations between events in the absence of a causal law enforcing those correlations.
In the second case, I see no problem. Yeah, it may be that the causal chain is more complicated than previously thought. Nevertheless, the two events are causally related and one can use the observed correlation to advance science.
So I cannot conclude anymore that there is a causal effect "pushing the button" -> "light goes on". And as such, I cannot deduce anything anymore about closed electrical circuits or anything. There is a causal link, but it could lie in the past, and it is what made at the same time me push the button, and put on the light.
In the same way, I can only conclude from my double blind medical test that there was a common cause that made me "select randomly patient 25 to get the drug" and that made patient 25 get better. It doesn't need to mean that it was the drug that made patient 25 get better. It was somehow a common cause in the past that was both responsible for me picking out patient 25 and for patient 25 to get better.
I understand your point but I disagree. There is no reason to postulate an ancient cause for the patient's response to the medicine. In the case of EPR there is a very good reason to do that and this reason is the recovery of common-sense and logic in physics.