Does Perception Equal Reality in Epistemology and Identity?

[Royce]

Here for example, what "I" said that "she said" is taken out of context.

I have read 3 of Rand's books, some of her essays and a bit on objectivity over the years. She is IMO more of a dualist than materialist or physicalist.
Her philosophy is again IMHO inconsistant in this way. In the new anniversary edition of "Atlas Shrugged" She opened her section with the logic axioms starting of course with the Identity axiom, A=A. In the context of that book I they she was saying more like "call a spade a spade." Something is what it is no matter what you call it.

It may be quite a leap but I think that the only way for us to gain knowledge and understanding is through thinking about what we perceive, real, objective, imaginary or mystical. Obsevation and experimentation, the scientific method is all about gathering and varifying information. Only after mentally digesting this information does it become theory or knowledge.

In this way I am more of a Platoist and think Aristotle was right but not completely nor exclusively right as was thought for so long. I think reductive thinking is a tool that has specific uses but it is not a universal do everything
tool for all applications.

 

[Rade]

Fifty years after Godel, people are still searching for something that has been proved not to exist.

First, I do greatly appreciate the time you took in your last post on the issue of A=A and its place in philosophy. As an aside, quantum mechanics may have solved Godel's problem. The current theory states that quarks, although "things" with a unique wavefunction, have been proved not to exist as free entities--that is, they are always observed in pairs. Further, QM theory indicates that it is impossible for humans to ever see them as free entities, e.g., they do not exist yet we know via experimentation that they are "something". Perhaps too far out of the box thinking here ?

 

[Rade]

I feel the best way forward is to ignore Rand. Most other philosophers do, commonly on the grounds that Objectivism, like Christianity, has no coherent metaphysic underlying it...Your questions are more rational than Rand's answers.

First, let me say that Rand does not need anyone to defend her thinking, least not me--thus from that angle--I will not bring up Ayn Rand again. Folks will just have to read about Objectivism and reach conclusions. I do greatly appreciate the time and great detail you took in your answers to my questions.

But, censorship of another person's thinking ?--when there is no moral aspect to fault, only definitions of axioms ? (e.g., let's all ignore Rand and surely she will melt away). I just cannot agree with this position. Ayn Rand is one of the 20th Century most read novelists, that she is also a trained philosopher (in Russia, by her teacher, N. O. Lossky, author of History of Russian Philosophy>) makes her writings somewhat unique, but not really, many Russian philosophers were also literary artists (Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Gogol to name a few).

And to suggest that Rands philosophy has no underlying metaphysics and is thus not studied by professional "philosophers", is, well, just plain false. Have you read the essay by philosophers Den Uyl and Rasmussen (1986) titled "Ayn Rand's Realism"--here you will find the underlying metaphysics that you claim does not exist.

Below is a list of professional philosophers that will be happy to disagree with your statement that there is no valid philosophy within the thinking of Ayn Rand. These names are from books I have, I apologize if any are no longer living--I have done enough damage to Rands thinking, it is time for me to move on:

David Kelly, Philosopher, Vassar College as of 1986
Douglas J. Den Uyl, Philosopher, Bellarmine College as of 1986
Douglas B. Rasmussen, Philosopher, St. John's University as of 1986
Chris M. Sciabarra, Philosopher, Penn State University, as of 1995
Harry Binswanger, Philosopher, Hunter College
Leonard Peikoff, Philosopher, State University of New York as of 1991

 

[Canute]

Yes, sorry, I overstated my case there. In the USA Rand has some following. But the observation that Rand's philosophy has no metaphysical underpinning is made by many and should be easy to confirm just by examining how metaphysical questions are dealt with in Objectivism.

Johann - I'm a bit late but wanted to compliment your earlier post. Your comment that "It is impossible to say anything that is both meaningful and absolutely true" deserves a discussion of its own. Perhaps it should even be a 'sticky'. Any sensible philosophy/philosopher should take this fact on board. It relates to Lao-Tsu's comment that true words are paradoxical. There is a proviso however. It assumes that tautologies are meaningless, and I feel that there's a perspective from which this is not the case.

You also say - "All forms of mysticism that I know of insist, in one way or another, on the point that any linguistic description of reality is bound to be paradoxical. Surely you can argue that all forms of mysticism are false philosophies, but I doubt you would get mystics to agree with you."

I'd just add that the mystical view is not only not a false philosophy, it is not a philosophy at all. As for the paradoxes and contradictions that occur in formal systematic descriptions of reality as they near completion, it is not just mystics that say these are inevitable. Philosophers, mathematician and physicists say the same.

 

[Rade]

What plays the role of eggs in the metaphysical omelet are not principles or laws, but language itself. Philosophy is basically molded by the rules of grammar, syntax and semantics. Laws and principles come much later in the game, but people seldom realize that because they take language for granted and seldom think about it.

I need some help understanding this. Of course, language is needed as a starting point for communication between two humans, but "philosophy" is by definition not an action between two humans--it is an introspective action caused by the faculty called consciousness within each individual human. For example, Webster has as one definition of the word philosophy: "a particular system of principles for the conduct of life". Do humans really need "language" to form this set of principles in their consciousness ? I don't think so.

For example, it is known (rare but known) that some humans were raised by primates, never having interacted with humans. Thus their language was that of the primate species that raised them, and if your hypothesis holds as true, then they cannot have a "philosophy", they cannot think about reality as humans do, because they clearly would never have been exposed to human "rules of grammar, syntax, semantics". But this makes no sense to me. Such a human raised by primates clearly would have a "philosophy" developed outside human "language". They would have a "philosophy" because they would, by human nature as determined by genetics of development of consciousness, first (1) perceive that which exists external to them (i.e., lion), (2) integrate that perception to form a concept (i.e., stay away from lion--it kills things). Such a human would then form what we call a naive realistic philosophy, without any "language", but based on a basic philosophic "Law of Identity", that is lion = lion, it exists, it can harm me, etc.

 

[Johann]

I need some help understanding this. Of course, language is needed as a starting point for communication between two humans, but "philosophy" is by definition not an action between two humans--it is an introspective action caused by the faculty called consciousness within each individual human.

You need concepts to philosophize. If your language were not sophisticated enough to have concepts such as "law" and "identity", it would never occur to you to think about it. I very much doubt you can explain the law of identity to a savage in the Amazon.

For example, Webster has as one definition of the word philosophy: "a particular system of principles for the conduct of life". Do humans really need "language" to form this set of principles in their consciousness ? I don't think so.

Well, for one thing we need a sophisticated language to have Webster dictionaries

Now seriously. The problem of language is that we are so immersed in it, it's really difficult to understand it's importance. We tend to take it for granted.

For example, it is known (rare but known) that some humans were raised by primates, never having interacted with humans. Thus their language was that of the primate species that raised them, and if your hypothesis holds as true, then they cannot have a "philosophy", they cannot think about reality as humans do, because they clearly would never have been exposed to human "rules of grammar, syntax, semantics". But this makes no sense to me.

This is a bit difficult to discuss, as the concepts of "language" and "philosophy" are too vague, and depending on how you define them you may end up with contradictory conclusions. I was specifically addressing the validity of the law of identity as a foundation for thought.

Such a human would then form what we call a naive realistic philosophy, without any "language", but based on a basic philosophic "Law of Identity", that is lion = lion, it exists, it can harm me, etc.

I seriously doubt anyone would be startled at discovering that a lion is a lion. Can you imagine them saying "gosh, how come I didn't understand it before... a lion is a lion! Now the world suddenly makes so much more sense".

But even this law of identity itself is a statement about language, not about reality. It tells you you are supposed to express your thoughts in a way that they can be demonstrated to be a tautology.

 

[Rade]

I seriously doubt anyone would be startled at discovering that a lion is a lion.

Exactly my point, the reason why nobody would be startled is that it is self-evident to all humans that the Law of Identity (lion = lion, A=A, etc) is an axiom of reasoning, (e.g., the process of forming concepts). Because it is an axiom that is self evident, it is outside the use of reason to try to understand it--it just is accepted--and we move on. I just cannot understand how anyone could argue that the Law of Identity is in fact not an axiom of philosophic thinking

I also would not agree that the axiom (A=A) is a tautology, but I would like to develop your idea attempting to link "axoim" with "tautology", and here is where it led me.

My Webster defines tautology as being "needless repetition of an idea in a different word". And I see that in chemistry, a tautomerism is "a substance being in condition of equilibrium between two isomeric forms and reacting to form either". Thus the statement A=A cannot be a tautology, for the simple reason that we do not have two different words (two isomeric forms). So, here then I would suggest we have a very important reasoning tool that we can use to determine if in fact a proposed axiom is valid--that is, we look to see if the axiom is in fact a tautology. If yes, we reject such philosophic thinking, if no, we continue to develop the philosophy.

Which leads me to Hegel, and his dialectic approach which claims that matter does not exist, that all is "Idea", and that this "Idea" operates such that contradictions are the Law of Identity, that A = non-A, which I see does in fact meet the definition of a tautology. So, here then I suggest a formal logical rejection of the philosophy of Hegel based on your linkage of "axiom" with "tautology" and I conclude that Hegel's philosophy being based on a axiom that is a tautology, must be rejected as a false system for humans to follow.

 

[Tournesol]

First, I do greatly appreciate the time you took in your last post on the issue of A=A and its place in philosophy. As an aside, quantum mechanics may have solved Godel's problem. The current theory states that quarks, although "things" with a unique wavefunction, have been proved not to exist as free entities--that is, they are always observed in pairs.

That has nothing to do with Goedel.

 

[Johann]

I just cannot understand how anyone could argue that the Law of Identity is in fact not an axiom of philosophic thinking

Because, as such, it is useless and does not allow you to say much about anything at all. If we are to stick to it, we can never say things like A=B, which are the really interesting things to do with philosophy.

To take the case of lions, there's nothing relevant in the statement that a lion is a lion; the only relevant facts about lions come in the form of statements like "a lion is an animal", "a lion is a mammal", "a lion is a carnivoire", and so on.

My Webster defines tautology as being "needless repetition of an idea in a different word".

This is funny. If Webster is correct, then its own definition of "tautology" is needless.

Regardless, if A=B and B=C and A=C, then why do we need B and C? B and C can only be meaningful if they are equal to A but also different. Just like "tautology" and "needless repetition of a different word"; the fact that they are the same but also different is what makes your Webster dictionary useful.

the statement A=A cannot be a tautology

I didn't say (or at least didn't mean) that A=A is a tautology, what I said was that the only ideas you can develop by following such a principle would be tautologies.

I suggest a formal logical rejection of the philosophy of Hegel based on your linkage of "axiom" with "tautology" and I conclude that Hegel's philosophy being based on a axiom that is a tautology, must be rejected as a false system for humans to follow.

Not sure what you mean here. I'm basically saying language is ambiguous, and in that case no philosophical system can be shown to be false or true. The only reason I'm criticizing your approach is because you seem to be denying the ambiguity of language, or advocating the end of it. The former is not possible, the latter not desirable.

 

[Rade]

Because, as such, it is useless and does not allow you to say much about anything at all. If we are to stick to it, we can never say things like A=B, which are the really interesting things to do with philosophy.
To take the case of lions, there's nothing relevant in the statement that a lion is a lion; the only relevant facts about lions come in the form of statements like "a lion is an animal", "a lion is a mammal", "a lion is a carnivoire", and so on.

OK, I am just very slow, finally I understand. Of course when I say A=A is an axiom of philosophic thinking I do not in any way negate the possibility and great importance that A=B, or x = (2y+3z), or E = Mc^2 ! What I an saying is that never can A = non-A, never can philosophy that is worthy of humans to follow begin as an axiom with a contradiction. Thus my reference to Hegel. So, I guess I need to ask, do you hold that A = non-A is an axiom of your philosophic thinking ? If the answer is no, then you do place ultimate value of the Law of Identity, and that is all I have been trying to say, obviously not very clearly.

 

[Johann]

I guess I need to ask, do you hold that A = non-A is an axiom of your philosophic thinking ?

Actually, I do think a thing can often be the same as its opposite. I believe the universe is fundamentally ambiguous, so the best way to think about it is to allow for some ambiguity. I would perhaps agree that the less ambiguity, the better, but I wouldn't refrain from exploring an idea simply because I can't express it in formal logic.

I suppose that attitude is called "mysticism", but I'm not sure.

 

[Rade]

Actually, I do think a thing can often be the same as its opposite.

I need some help here. For example, consider the electron (e-) and its antimatter opposite the positron (e+). While I can see how you would hold that many quantum aspects of (e-) and (e+) can be "the same" (such as mass, gravitational effect, etc.), they cannot be the same in "all" quantum ways, that is, they must differ by the quantum number called "charge". So, can you provide an example where a thing can be the same as its opposite in "all" ways ?

 

[Canute]

I think maybe Johann is suggesting that the opposites that are built into our language and into our minds are not necessarily opposites in fact. Thus, for instance, we normally consider waves and particles to be opposites, but in QM they are two aspects of one thing. In mysticism, to which Johann refers, this is a fundamental principle. The law of identity holds, but as everything is ultimately identical to everything else there is a sense in which A=A=B=C=D... This gives rise to ambiguities in discussions of ontology, since there are two ways of talking about reality, one in which reality consists of an infinity of different things, and one in which all things share the same identity. When it comes to the law of identity this can cause a little confusion. Perhaps one could say that in mysticism (Buddhism, Taoism etc) identity distinctions are epistemilogical rather than ontological. Thus, to take an extreme case, 'something' is identical with 'nothing'. So if something is A and nothing is B then yes, A=A, but also A=B. This gives rise to some confusion when it comes to discussing formal logic, since the law of the excluded middle cannot be applied in the usual way. A=A and A=~A can hold simultaneously in some cases, as two ways of looking at or expressing a situation, with the actual truth being more subtle. Again, we see this in QM, perhaps by coincidence, for we have found that we need to suspend the 'tertium non datur' rule when it comes to fundamental entities. Similarly, there is talk of suspending it in cosmology, where we are faced with similar problems over background dependence. (You'll find that all metaphysical questions can be solved by suspending the law of the excluded middle). All this has implications for the law of identity.