A Does superdeterminism undermine the scientific method?

[wittgenstein]

TL;DR Summary

I think superdeterminism does not.

Anton Zeilinger, wrote, " "We always implicitly assume the freedom of the experimentalist... This fundamental assumption is essential to doing science. If this were not true, then, I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are, and that could guide our questions such that we arrive at a false picture of nature"

So, a computer that has no free will cannot solve problems? Why can't we lack free will and figure out things? If one objects by saying that our free will created the computer that argument also applies to our brain. Our brain was created by evolution not conscious reasoning.

I understand the objection that if our thoughts are determined they cannot be rational, but I see no reason to think that. If our thoughts are not determined how can that be called free will. That is just randomness. Also, to say that there is no reason something happened (free will) seems to me the opposite of science. Is Zeilinger the core of the objection to superdeterminism? If so the objection seems silly to me. Is there a deeper and more profound objection?

If that is the only reason superdeterminism is rejected by modern physics then superdeterminism should not be rejected. Is there another reason?

 

[wittgenstein]

Order can arise from disorder. https://www.lockhaven.edu/~dsimanek/philosop/design.htm#:~:text=Other%20examples%20of%20natural%20processes%20that%20produce%20order,act%20of%20creation%20of%20a%20linked%2C%20stable%20structure.

 

[wittgenstein]

In other words from the initial conditions at the big bang order and information can evolve. Do those that endorse a information belief about matter also believe in God (that a free will conscious being is required)? Probably not but they would be inconsistent if like Zeilinger they require free will for information to exist because free will requires consciousness.

 

[wittgenstein]

IMHO The rejection of superdeterminism implies an embrace of supernatural (beyond materialism) consciousness.

 

[kith]

I don't think you need to get this metaphysical to see the problem with superdeterminism.

The choices of the experimentalist can indeed be outsourced: Alice and Bob might let dice or even cosmic rays decide which angles to use in a Bell test. For local realistic theories, Bell's theorem predicts that Bell's inequality holds if the angle settings of Alice and Bob are uncorrelated. Observed is a violation of Bell's inequality. So the angle settings and therefor the dice or cosmic rays of two arbitrarily distant places need to be correlated in a very peculiar way.

 

[Jarvis323]

In other words from the initial conditions at the big bang order and information can evolve. Do those that endorse a information belief about matter also believe in God (that a free will conscious being is required)? Probably not but they would be inconsistent if like Zeilinger they require free will for information to exist because free will requires consciousness.

You should make an effort to understand the difference between superdeterminism and determinism. Everything could be deterministic without superdeterminism.

In my view, superdeterminism actually would very strongly suggest the universe was designed by an omnipotent supernatural being. And one that had a special interest in messing with us by fixing our measurement outcomes in a misleading way. It would be hard to fathom superdeterminism explaining the violation of Bell's inequality otherwise.

Zellinger's opinion is a person philosophical one. The idea is that if our universe was organized by a God that has specifically made an effort to fool us by fixing our scientific measurements in such particular ways, then of course our scientific results would be open to question because everything we do could be have been rigged from the start by a higher power.

 

[CoolMint]

The shadows in Plato's cave

 

[wittgenstein]

Please explain where I am misunderstanding. Is it that the Zeilinger quote is taken out of context? He seems to be saying that rationality requires free will. That is obviously not true. If it were true computers ( since they lack free will ) would be incapable of performing logical operations. Is he saying that according to superdeterminism we would have to know the outcome of an experiment before we performed it? That is obviously absurd. I am grateful for your time. I really want to understand this.

 

[wittgenstein]

I mean that since knowing the outcome of an experiment before we perform it is obviously absurd superdeterminism is obviously absurd. Is that the argument against superdeterminism?

 

[wittgenstein]

I read this, "The problem with Superdeterminism from the perspective of most physicists is that it seems to invalidate the process of science itself. That is, if the scientists’ own thoughts, ideas, and judgments are just as determined as the behavior of inanimate matter, then science itself has no claim to seek or find the truth."
Is that the objection to superdeterminism? If so it is silly. What is the real reason for rejecting superdeterminism?

 

[StevieTNZ]

I read this, "The problem with Superdeterminism from the perspective of most physicists is that it seems to invalidate the process of science itself. That is, if the scientists’ own thoughts, ideas, and judgments are just as determined as the behavior of inanimate matter, then science itself has no claim to seek or find the truth."
Is that the objection to superdeterminism? If so it is silly. What is the real reason for rejecting superdeterminism?

You really need to provide references.

 

[Jarvis323]

I mean that since knowing the outcome of an experiment before we perform it is obviously absurd superdeterminism is obviously absurd. Is that the argument against superdeterminism?

No, but super-determinism is believed by some to be equivalent on some level to a deterministic retro-causal interpretation, in where future events are causes for past events. Actually, the time-travel interpretation is considered by many to still be more plausible than super-determinism.

 

[wittgenstein]

What is the objection to superdeterminism? Is it that scientists think that if we are determined by natural laws, we cannot discover natural laws? That makes no sense. Free will and logic are not related.

 

[Fra]

From a pragmatic perspective, the problem I see with "superdeterminism" is that it's a fictional causal mechanism that does not provides no explanatory value not decison guidance for a real agent. For this to have any value, the causal rules must be known and computable in timely manners, and the complete initial values must be know with perfect precison. This is not how "learning" proceeds.

/Fredrik

 

[wittgenstein]

Here is that source. Is it what physicists really think? I doubt it because that is silly. https://evolutionnews.org/2022/01/does-superdeterminism-resolve-dilemmas-around-free-will/

 

[wittgenstein]

If that is what physicists really think (I STRONGLY DOUBT THAT) they are implying that we are beyond natural laws and in a sense a supernatural entity.

 

[wittgenstein]

I really cannot believe that anyone thinks that if we are determined by natural laws, we cannot be rational.

 

[wittgenstein]

I am probably misunderstanding the Zeilinger quote but it seems to imply that science must be based on something outside of nature. I strongly disagree with that conclusion.

 

[wittgenstein]

You guys are much more informed than I so bear with me. I have concentrated on that Zeilinger quote. Is he saying what I think he is saying? That we cannot be a part of nature if we understand nature? That is silly. Here is that quote again, "We always implicitly assume the freedom of the experimentalist... This fundamental assumption is essential to doing science. If this were not true, then, I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are, and that could guide our questions such that we arrive at a false picture of nature" OK so our thinking cannot come from nature, our brains. That seems way too mystical for me.

 

[wittgenstein]

Zeilinger is obviously not a serious objection to superdeterminism. I need help to understand the actual objection to superdeterminism. Let's use the worst possible scenario, at the big bang was total chaos. Can realistic and rational thinking evolve out of that? I say yes. I believe in evolution and that order can come from chaos thru a totally natural process. Does rational realistic thinking require something outside nature? I do not think so. But are the demands of superdeterminism more than that? Does superdeterminism require something unreasonable?

 

[wittgenstein]

To accept Zeilinger's objection is to believe that we are outside nature, and our thinking is not caused by our brains (a biological and natural organ). I find that too mystical. I want science not Zeilinger's metaphysics.

 

[wittgenstein]

No, but super-determinism is believed by some to be equivalent on some level to a deterministic retro-causal interpretation, in where future events are causes for past events. Actually, the time-travel interpretation is considered by many to still be more plausible than super-determinism.

Why does it have to be retro-causal? I am more advanced than the one celled organism that began life on earth. Does that mean that the one celled organism is a more advanced life form than me because everything I am evolved from it?

 

[Fra]

To accept Zeilinger's objection is to believe that we are outside nature, and our thinking is not caused by our brains (a biological and natural organ). I find that too mystical. I want science not Zeilinger's metaphysics.

I think I see your issue!. It touches upon the philosophy of science and some interpretation of foundations of physical law, people may view this differently, but I think one problem in Zeilingers scentence is this...

"then nature could determine what our questions are, and that could guide our questions such that we arrive at a false picture of nature"

I think the solution to the confusion is to see that there is no, and need not be any, objective answer to what is the "true picture of nature". Nature may very wel be simply a game of interacting pictures. All that can be checked, is wether they are in tune with each other, and that mates well with evolutionary ideas. No need or mystics or outside nature.

I think the confusion from our simplistic understanding of the nature of law, knowledge and truth.

IMO, this is related to this

Precedence and freedom in quantum physics​

"A new interpretation of quantum mechanics is proposed according to which precedence, freedom and novelty play central roles. This is based on a modification of the postulates for quantum theory given by Masanes and Muller. We argue that quantum mechanics is uniquely characterized as the probabilistic theory in which individual systems have maximal freedom in their responses to experiment, given reasonable axioms for the behavior of probabilities in a physical theory. Thus, to the extent that quantum systems are free, in the sense of Conway and Kochen, there is a sense in which they are maximally free.
We also propose that laws of quantum evolution arise from a principle of precedence, according to which the outcome of a measurement on a quantum system is selected randomly from the ensemble of outcomes of previous instances of the same measurement on the same quantum system. This implies that dynamical laws for quantum systems can evolve as the universe evolves, because new precedents are generated by the formation of new entangled states.
"
https://arxiv.org/abs/1205.3707

/Fredrik

 

[wittgenstein]

The question that torments me is if superdeterminism is true (yes that is a big "IF" but let's take that as a provisional assumption) what consequences are outrageously unreasonable? That we have no free will? Most reasonable people think our thoughts are determined and if they are not determined that is randomness not free will). Free will is a very mystical concept. That science is impossible without free will? As I proved that is silly. I have a feeling that there is a serious objection to superdeterminism . I am not saying that it has not been mentioned. I just need more details to understand that objection.

 

[Fra]

For me superdeterminism is an extrinsic concept which seems noninferrable for a real observer. Thus it is fictional and not obasrvable. To say its wrong would be as weird as to i. Even if it was true, i see no reason why it couldn't give the illusion of free will. But it would not have any constructive value as i see it. I also for that reason think its the wrong way to understand causation. Its like to say that there is a hidden rule (which is unknown and likely not computable) that would predict things. That is clearly an answer to the wrong question.

/Fredrik

 

[wittgenstein]

The initial condition of the universe did not conspire to create us or the current state of the universe. That is a misunderstanding of the anthropic argument. By analogy my parents did not conspire to create me and all my characteristics. Similarly, someone that wins the lottery cannot say that the universe conspired to make him win. There is no need for retro causality!

 

[kurt101]

Here is Sabine Hossenfelder's video in support of superdeterminism:

 

[wittgenstein]

I agree with her! What I am asking for is a real reason (Not Zellinger's mysticism) that superdeterminism is wrong.

 

[PeterDonis]

What I am asking for is a real reason (Not Zellinger's mysticism) that superdeterminism is wrong.

You can't prove that superdeterminism is wrong, any more than you can prove that it is right. Which one you prefer is up to you, but it's just a personal preference.

 

[PeroK]

You can't prove that superdeterminism is wrong, any more than you can prove that it is right. Which one you prefer is up to you, but it's just a personal preference.

That's what the superdeterminists would have you believe: that they have an irrefutable theory that has as much scientific validity as any other.

The main issue, I believe, is what happens if we accept SD and ask what we do next? Let's do all science from now on assuming SD is correct. There is nothing to do. There is no substance behind the theory - not even a hint of how the laws of physics actually work. SD is indistinguishable from believing that everything is controlled by an unknowable and capricious deity. And, therefore, SD is (IMO) fundamentally anti-scientific. At best it's pseudo-science.

Moreover, for a superdeterminist, there is no hard scientific work to be done. Hossenfelder has a paper where she plays about with a few concepts from QM and some statistics. But, it's no more than that. It bears no relation to the hard science and complex experiments that underpin conventional physics - such as the muon anomaly saga.

Everything, of course, is personal choice. Creationism, flat-Earth, solipsism, superdeterminism. But, these are not scientific choices. These are a personal choice to abandon science.

 

[PeterDonis]

That's what the superdeterminists would have you believe: that they have an irrefutable theory that has as much scientific validity as any other.

Something that is just a personal preference is not a theory. A theory makes testable predictions. So if they are claiming it's a theory, I would say they are incorrect.

Everything, of course, is personal choice.

I didn't say personal choice. I said personal preference. As contrasted with a theory that actually makes testable predictions. Of course you can ignore testable predictions that have been tested and found to be true (or false), as creationists, flat earthers, etc. do), but that's not the kind of "personal preference" I was talking about.

Let's do all science from now on assuming SD is correct. There is nothing to do.

But no superdeterminists actually do this. Sabine Hossenfelder hasn't stopped doing science because she believes superdeterminism is correct. You might not think she is doing "hard scientific work", but from your description I would say most theoretical (as opposed to experimental) physics is not "hard scientific work" by your criterion.

 

[PeterDonis]

That's what the superdeterminists would have you believe: that they have an irrefutable theory that has as much scientific validity as any other.

Note, btw, that in the post of mine that you were responding to here, I was not responding to superdeterminists; I was responding to the OP, who was asking for a "real reason" to believe that superdeterminism is wrong. Since superdeterminism makes no testable predictions, there isn't one. That was my point.

 

[WernerQH]

If that is the only reason superdeterminism is rejected by modern physics then superdeterminism should not be rejected. Is there another reason?

Sabine Hossenfelder argued that there is no evidence for the statistical independence "assumption". She might as well have said that there is no evidence for probability theory. Common sense demands an explanation for correlations, not for their absence. Superdeterminists claim a special license to disregard probability if they dislike the results. It is logically possible to eschew probability theory, but it means giving up most of science.

Free will is a bit of a red herring. (It's a meaningful concept, but not in physics.) One could base the settings in Bell-type experiments on a play by Shakespeare, or on Bach's music. The experiments would involve rather long causal chains, and superdeterminists haven't explained why deviations from statistical independence would have to be taken into account in this case, but can be ignored in drug trials, for example. Hossenfelder offers only a rather vague criterion that the effects show up only in the "quantum world"; obviously she doesn't want to jettison probability theory altogether.

Superdeterminism is an attempt at restoring locality and determinism to the description of one single class of experiments. But it fails badly with respect to locality, because in principle one would have to consider possible correlations of any experiment with the entire universe. In my view it makes more sense to give up locality and determinism, which are preconceptions firmly rooted in classical physics.

 

[PeroK]

Note, btw, that in the post of mine that you were responding to here, I was not responding to superdeterminists; I was responding to the OP, who was asking for a "real reason" to believe that superdeterminism is wrong. Since superdeterminism makes no testable predictions, there isn't one. That was my point.

Hossenfelder has written a paper where she claims (among other things) that SD is not an interpretation of QM and if enough effort went into SD research (!), then a new theory would emerge with testable predictions.

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2010.01324.pdf

To be fair to her, she is not trying to hide behind an unchallengeable theory that is impossible to test and cannot be disproved by definition.

 

[PeterDonis]

To be fair to her, she is not trying to hide behind an unchallengeable theory that is impossible to test and cannot be disproved by definition.

I agree she is not trying to, since she says that if enough effort were put into research in this area, it would result in a new theory with testable predictions. But that's an "if". Unless and until the "if" gets realized, the claimed new theory with testable predictions does not exist.

 

[Jarvis323]

The main issue, I believe, is what happens if we accept SD and ask what we do next? Let's do all science from now on assuming SD is correct. There is nothing to do. There is no substance behind the theory - not even a hint of how the laws of physics actually work. SD is indistinguishable from believing that everything is controlled by an unknowable and capricious deity. And, therefore, SD is (IMO) fundamentally anti-scientific. At best it's pseudo-science.

The thing is though that SD doesn't say anything at all could be explained with SD, it just says that correlations between the measurement device settings and the particle's state would be. And that would imply some kind of repeatable deterministic pattern. Maybe it would be a hopelessly complex and seemingly implausible one, but at least a consistent one. That's different from a deity being able to just change or control things at a whim at any instant.

Moreover, for a superdeterminist, there is no hard scientific work to be done. Hossenfelder has a paper where she plays about with a few concepts from QM and some statistics. But, it's no more than that. It bears no relation to the hard science and complex experiments that underpin conventional physics - such as the muon anomaly saga.

She does propose an approach for looking for evidence of the hypothesized correlations. Since those correlations would probably be highly complex and non-linear, and probably beyond our ability to de-tangle on paper, she thinks that big data and deep learning might be able to discover some hidden correlations linking the measurement device and the particles state somehow. But if you suppose we one day did find some of these hypothesized hiding non-linear correlations, however, I don't think we could use that as very strong evidence of SD specifically, because they wouldn't necessarily imply locality or determinism. Maybe the consciousness causes collapse people could somehow make the same kind of claim from that evidence for example. But it does seem potentially possible that evidence against the assumption of statistical independence of the measurement device settings and the particle could be found, if they truly are dependent. And if we did find that they are not independent, then it would beg further work to try to figure out how that happens.

 

[wittgenstein]

I feel a little intimidated by the expertise here. So please accept my questions even tho they may seem stupid to you.
1. Do you agree that Zellinger's objection is silly? He basically says that if we have no free will there can be no science. Computers solve problems all the time and they have no free will. Also, that implies that our thoughts are not the result of a biological computer (our brains). Zellinger implies that if our thoughts do not come from a source outside nature, they cannot be rational.
2. Please explain why superdeterminism requires a cosmic conspiracy. That seems to me to be based on a misunderstanding of the anthropic principle. Some people think that the anthropic principle puts humans at the center of reality. It does not. The fact that our Earth is in the goldilocks zone (not too hot and not to cold) is why there is life on earth. Did physics "conspire" to create us? NO! Also, evolution shows that order can arise from disorder. The fact that I can make rational decisions does not mean that some super intelligent agency at the big bang designed and conspired to create the rationality of some of my decisions.
I am sure I am misunderstanding something. Please show me where I am misunderstanding. This site has many interesting debates in it , but it is also about answering questions from intelligent but less informed people (such as myself) . To be honest I am not a fan of superdeterminism. I want someone to prove it wrong to me or at least make it seem outrageously improbable. Obviously, I am open to the possibility (though reluctantly) that superdeterminism is true.

 

[Fra]

Some additional reflections:

1. I personally disagree with Sabines analysis to use superdeterminism to escape Bells inequality: I don't think statistical independence is the problem, for me the more likely problem is our incomplete understanding of the nature of causality.

But Einsteins quest for a casaul mechanism is IMO rational. Correlations begs an explanation. But IMO the partitioning of probabilities into the sum over hidden variable is contains implicitly preconceptions on the nature of causality, not sure why, but this is rarely mentioned. It sticks out to me. But the alternative causal mechanism is not yet understood. But I think it's the place to look for progress. Superdeterminism itself has to me no mechanisms with explanatory value, as has been mentioned by others as well, it's more like an excuse to keep a loophole open, that will not be useful. I think it's the wrong hole.

2. Also generally, not having statistical independence does not imply superdeterminism. They other way is true though. There is a middle path, where the choices are partly free (ie guided) but not deterministically determined; this is how I see it. And agents "freedom" is to me similar to a random walk; or making a decision based on incomplete information. One can think of it as a free decision, but I see it just as a random choice - but a guided one. So it's not black or white for me.

/Fredrik

 

[PeterDonis]

Do you agree that Zellinger's objection is silly?

No.

He basically says that if we have no free will there can be no science.

No, that's not what he's saying. What he's saying is that if what Hossenfelder calls the assumption of Statistical Independence is false, we cannot draw inferences about what the laws of nature are from experimental results. By "freedom of the experimentalist" Zeilinger does not mean any mystical concept of "free will" but the straightforward assumption that there are no hidden correlations between measurement settings and preparations of systems to be measured that affect the measurement results. Superdeterminism denies that assumption; and if you deny that assumption, then you can't, for example, infer that QM is correct from experimental results that violate the Bell inequalities, because hidden superdeterministic correlations between the measurement settings and the preparations of the measured systems could have affected the results, so that they appear to us to support QM but are actually produced by a completely different underlying theory.

 

[Jarvis323]

1. Do you agree that Zellinger's objection is silly?

Here is my take, and I should prefsce it with the fact thst I'm not an expert on this and might have misconceptions.

Yes and no, depending on how you read it. If you read it literally, I think it's a bad argument. But in context, it makes some sense. It's just one person's philisophical opinion though.

My understanding is this: in science you usually can assume independence even though it's only approximately independent. For example, you might ignore Pluto's effect on the Earth's orbit around the Sun, or ignore the air pressure's effect on the fairness of a dice roll.

When we assume statistical independence of the measurement settings and the quantum particle, we think we can do so because we can try to decide those settings through as random of a process as possible. And we even have something called deterministic chaos which can be indishinguishable from true randomness. So you would think even if the universe were fully deterministic, our best attempt to randomize the measurement settings would lead to independence. If not, you have to figure out how the particles state can depend on a persons decisions, the flip of a coin miles away, etc.

Superdeterminism is saying, maybe we don't know how that is possible, but let's assume that the particle's future state can depend on those kinds of things in the events they are used to set up the device settings, even though we don't know how. And that would violate the assumption of the Bell test and invalidate it, opening up new possibilities to explain the results.

Doing this kind of thing in general seems problematic, because you could apply the same kind of thing to any case where an important unexplained scientific result that depends on what seems we would commonly think of as a valid assumption, in order to invalidate the unexplained result. So if you use ans accept superdeterminism argument frivilously, you can invalidate any scientific result.

So IMO this isn't necessarilly an argument just about determinisn or free will. It's about using these things as loopholes.

That said, questioning an assumption isn't such a bad thing, even if it seems valid. And thst is at the heart of what Sabine us advocating I think.

 

[wittgenstein]

I am confused. Zellinger said, " "We always implicitly assume the freedom of the experimentalist... This fundamental assumption is essential to doing science. If this were not true, then, I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are, and that could guide our questions such that we arrive at a false picture of nature" It seems to me that he is saying that if our questions are predetermined (by nature/ our brains) they lack validity because they are not objective. You wrote, " but the straightforward assumption that there are no hidden correlations between measurement settings and preparations of systems to be measured that affect the measurement results. Superdeterminism denies that assumption; " I sincerely apologize but can you explain that to me, a university educated person, but physics is not my specialty. I value " Physics forum" because it is an opportunity for an interested layman to ask questions.

 

[wittgenstein]

I do have some speculations as to what you meant but it would be presumptuous for me to include them.

 

[Jarvis323]

I am confused. Zellinger said, " "We always implicitly assume the freedom of the experimentalist...

Right, but it doesn't mean that making the assumption necessitates it being completely true. Pluto does affect the Earth's orbit, but we can usually assume it doesn't. Even if we can't say that the experimentalist can do completely unbiased science, we can make the assumption (even if it is an approximation) that they can do unbiased enough science to get reliable results.

SD is claiming that in some particular case, that assumption isn't valid, and that no matter what we do, our results for this particular experiment become biased, and that invalidates the Bell test result, which opens up the possibilities the Bell test result would otherwise rule out.

So the problem here is using such a loophole could theoretically be done to invalidate any scientific result. But we would have to decide when is appropriate to use the loophole.

In the QM case, though, we are struggling to understand the results of the Bell test. And it makes some sense to just consider the possibility the assumption of independence isn't valid and explore the possibilities. Why not. But it isn't really usefull for making any solid conclusions. Unless at some point, some proof of that dependence springs up (even though some would seriously doubt that).

The issue is an issue in the philosophy of science, which is really more about, in this case I think, how we make decisions what is worth pursuing or not. I'm not sure belief or disbelief itself should be the real goal, just a proxy for confidence we're on the right track or not in future work.

We can certainly use the loophole here, to motivate a new look, and it doesn't break science. It's not an all or nothing type of thing, so yes the criticism is a bit silly if taken too seriously, but there is a point to it.

 

[PeterDonis]

It seems to me that he is saying that if our questions are predetermined (by nature/ our brains) they lack validity because they are not objective.

He's not saying superdeterminism says our brains are predetermined. (That would just be determinism.) He's saying that superdeterminism says that whatever it is that determines the measurement settings has some hidden connection with whatever it is that determines the state preparation of the system being measured. And according to superdeterminism, this must be true no matter what precautions we take to keep those two things independent. For example, even if we use random noise from distant pulsars to determine the measurement settings (which, note carefully, is a process that does not involve human brains at all, and can be set up to depend entirely on events outside the past light cone of the state preparation event, so there is no possibility of signals of any kind passing between the two), according to superdeterminism, the measurement settings still have hidden connections to the state preparation process. When he talks about "the freedom of the experimentalist", he means we assume that such outlandish hidden connections don't exist. But superdeterminism says they do.

 

[PeroK]

No, that's not what he's saying. What he's saying is that if what Hossenfelder calls the assumption of Statistical Independence is false, we cannot draw inferences about what the laws of nature are from experimental results. By "freedom of the experimentalist" Zeilinger does not mean any mystical concept of "free will" but the straightforward assumption that there are no hidden correlations between measurement settings and preparations of systems to be measured that affect the measurement results. Superdeterminism denies that assumption;

It's also to be noted that these outlandish hidden connections fail to manifest themselves anywhere else! The whole concept of SD is designed purely to avoid accepting QM. It serves no other purpose, or sheds any light on any aspect of physical phenomena.

It may also be worth contrasting SD with simple determinism - for example in a comparison between Earth and Mars. In simple determinism, the laws of physics determine the evolution of both planets largely independently. In SD, every particle on Earth is correlated with every particle on Mars. It very difficult to see how any amount of research could produce a mathematical basis for that. If the Earth and Mars have no independent physical processes, it's difficult to see how evolution of any plant or animal life is possible, let alone the apparently rational behaviour of intelligent life.

This is why I believe it's an empty theory that serves no purpose other than to allow some people to say that they don't believe QM.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

1. Do you agree that Zellinger's objection is silly? He basically says that if we have no free will there can be no science.

He is completely right. Scientists who make a lot of noise about a “superdeterministic world” often don’t realize that they themselves are an included part of this world. When using the term "superdeterminism", one should know how it is defined. Gerard 't Hooft in "The Cellular Automaton Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics":

"If a theory is deterministic all the way, it implies that not only all observed phenomena, but also the observers themselves are controlled by deterministic laws. They certainly have no ‘free will’, their actions all have roots in the past, even the distant past. ... The notion that, also the actions by experimenters and observers are controlled by deterministic laws, is called superdeterminism." [Italics in original, LJ]

At the end, one can stop here if one assumes that we have superdeterminism. All what one does, writes or thinks has at the end no influence on the future course of events. Superdetermism actually tells you that what you are doing is futile anyway. And even when you believe that what you are doing isn’t futile, you are simply pre-determined to believe in this way.

 

[wittgenstein]

So you are saying that we cannot be rational if we lack free will. I disagree. Computers are rational and lack free will. Also that requires that we do not get our ideas from our brains since they are part of nature and not supernatural. It is a common mistake to believe that a lack of free will means that nothing matters. Many things act on the world that have no free will. I hope you are wrong because that makes Zellinger's objection silly.

 

[wittgenstein]

You wrote," He is completely right. Scientists who make a lot of noise about a “superdeterministic world” often don’t realize that they themselves are an included part of this world" I disagree. That is exactly what scientists know. Zellinger however, implies that we are separate from nature. Evolution is not based on free will and yet it "designed" our brains a problem solving computer.

 

[kith]

@wittgenstein: Could you briefly outline your understanding of what superdeterminism is and why physicists are talking about it?

 

[Jarvis323]

Whether determinism excludes free will or not is a matter of philosophy and there are two schools, one which thinks it does and one whoch thinks it doesn't.

Anyway, some people have a personal philosophical issue with determinism, which should be separated from the debate in SD.

Many people would be very fine with, actually even strongly prefer, pure determinism and maybe only very reluctantly accept non-determinism, but still think SD is too much of a stretch.