High School Doesn't the choice of measurement prove free will

[entropy2information]

Nonpredictability or nondeterminism. It has nothing to do with "will".

I disagree and so does Conway and Kochen. There not just talking about the appearance of choice as you are. They're saying that the Experimenters choice is determined by his/her will alone and there can't be any mechanism that's an element of physical reality that can determine what the Experimenter chooses to measure.

There's a way out of this but Determinist will not like it. They can say the wave function is real but non physical.

The wave-function is real but nonphysical: A view from counterfactual quantum cryptography

Counterfactual quantum cryptography (CQC) is used here as a tool to assess the status of the quantum state: Is it real/ontic (an objective state of Nature) or epistemic (a state of the observer's knowledge)? In contrast to recent approaches to wave function ontology, that are based on realist models of quantum theory, here we recast the question as a problem of communication between a sender (Bob), who uses interaction-free measurements, and a receiver (Alice), who observes an interference pattern in a Mach-Zehnder set-up. An advantage of our approach is that it allows us to define the concept of "physical", apart from "real". In instances of counterfactual quantum communication, reality is ascribed to the interaction-freely measured wave function (ψ) because Alice deterministically infers Bob's measurement. On the other hand, ψ does not correspond to the physical transmission of a particle because it produced no detection on Bob's apparatus. We therefore conclude that the wave function in this case (and by extension, generally) is real, but not physical. Characteristically for classical phenomena, the reality and physicality of objects are equivalent, whereas for quantum phenomena, the former is strictly weaker. As a concrete application of this idea, the nonphysical reality of the wavefunction is shown to be the basic nonclassical phenomenon that underlies the security of CQC.

https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.7127

Most Determist are Materialist though and this sounds to much like God. Something that's real but non physical that knows and detrmines all things.

So you have the imaginary part of the wave function that's real and non physical and it's encoded with real information. This information becomes an element of physical reality when a measurement occurs.

This is the only way I see out of the conundrum that is determinism. As Kochen Specker theorem and the free will theorem show, the information that includes the choice of the Experimenter and the history of the particle can't be an element of physical reality prior to measurement, therefore the deterministic mechanism can't be physical.

 

[bhobba]

Again, I don't know what else you think they should call it. I asked you this earlier. They published the paper. They came up with the theorem and they explain exactly why they use the term free will. Free will as opposed to determinism.

Free will as the opposite of determinism? Determinism is the idea from things in the past you can, in principle, know things in the future. Chaos theory tells us that in practice, even if true, you can't do it, but we have that in principle here. The opposite of deterministic is not predictable. Now in QM it is a deep question depending on what you mean by predictable if QM is deterministic or not - you will find threads about it on this forum. This shows the whole issue, like many fundamental things, carries a lot of semantic baggage. But the word 'will' used in this context - I just do not get it.

Basically from what I can see the theorem is trivial - if human beings are deterministic then so are quantum objects, and conversely if they are not deterministic then so are quantum objects. That's not really saying anything because human beings are quantum objects.

Thanks
Bill

 

[bhobba]

So you have the imaginary part of the wave function that's real and non physical and it's encoded with real information. This information becomes an element of physical reality when a measurement occurs. This is the only way I see out of the conundrum that is determinism. As Kochen Specker theorem and the free will theorem show, the information that includes the choice of the Experimenter and the history of the particle can't be an element of physical reality prior to measurement, therefore the deterministic mechanism can't be physical.

Physical reality - what's that?

As to the wave function I think you should become acquainted with Gleason's Theroem:
http://kiko.fysik.su.se/en/thesis/helena-master.pdf

The Kochen-Specker theorem is a simple corollary to Gleason which is the more powerful result. What it basically says is proving existence of a state (slightly loosely speaking the same as a wave function but the technical differences are not relevant here), and the Born rule itself, depends on this thing called non-contextuality (there are some other assumptions as well such as the principle of strong superposition - but its the main one). I utterly fail to see how any probability assigned to a state must be basis independent (which is what non-contexctuality is) has anything to do with free will.

Gleason's theorem proves a state must exist but what it means is another matter. It could be simple a calculational device to help a theorist determine probabilities or it could be objectively real - we simply do not know - and nobody as yet has figured an experiment to determine such one way or the other.

It is hard to take science seriously in a universe that in fact controls all the choices experimenters think they make. Nature could be in an insidious conspiracy to “confirm” laws by denying us the freedom to make the tests that would refute them. Physical induction, the primary tool of science, disappears if we are denied access to random samples. It is also hard to take seriously the arguments of those who according to their own beliefs are deterministic automata!

We have defined “free will” to be the opposite of “determinism” despite the fact that since Hume some philosophers have tried to reconcile the two notions – a position called compatibilism. In our view this position arose only because all the physics known in Hume’s day was deterministic, and it has now been outmoded for almost a century by the development of quantum mechanics.

To me this is mumbo jumbo - it may be philosophy but it isn't physics.

I think you have been caught up too much in philosophical discussion about this stuff. The physics however is not really that complicated - the philosophy however is - but that's something we do not discuss on this forum because we do not have people knowledgeable enough in the philosophy of science to moderate such. We did once and they kept such discussions in check, but when they left it got out of hand and the forum now has the rule we do not discuss philosophy except maybe in passing.

Thanks
Bill

 

[entropy2information]

To me this is mumbo jumbo - it may be philosophy but it isn't physics.

This is far from mumbo jumbo. Conway and Kochen have rigorously went through the results in their published paper on the free will theorem and the strong free will theorem. After it was published, they haven't backed down from their results. They have done lectures, interviews, answered questions and more.

I don't think it's right to try and reduce their very powerful results to mumbo jumbo or just philosophy. I understand why it's done because the result can't be refuted so they must be marginalized as not really science but philosophy.

This is selective reasoning guided by a personal bias. We all have them. You tie Kochen Specker to Gleason but you minimize the fact that Kochen tied his Kochen Specker theorem to the free will theorem. The only thing that makes this any less powerful is your subjective bias. Again, we all have them but they can't stop a rigorous result like the free will theorem and it doesn't matter if we personally like the result or not.

This debate is a scientific one and Conway and Kochen's theory severely restrains determinism. They lay out their results in the paper and why they call it the free will theorem. Again, this debate about free will has been going on for years. Here's Einstein talking about this.

Human beings, in their thinking, feeling and acting are not free agents but are as causally bound as the stars in their motion.

I do not believe in free will. Schopenhauer's words: 'Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills,' accompany me in all situations throughout my life and reconcile me with the actions of others, even if they are rather painful to me. This awareness of the lack of free will keeps me from taking myself and my fellow men too seriously as acting and deciding individuals, and from losing my temper.

I am a determinist. As such, I do not believe in free will...Practically, I am, nevertheless, compelled to act as if freedom of the will existed. If I wish to live in a civilized community, I must act as if man is a responsible being.

https://www.azquotes.com/author/4399-Albert_Einstein/tag/free-will

This debate is a scientific one. Einstein was a Determinist not because of Philosophy but because of Science. When Conway and Kochen talk about free will, it's as opposed to determinism. This isn't anything new in scientific circles.

The free will theorem shows that humans are not causally bound but have free choice when the Experimenter is choosing which measurement they will carry out. They talk about this in their paper and things like Einstein's block universe. If the Experimenters measurement is causally bound then so is the history of the particle that's being measured. They say:

One advantage of the Free Will theorem is that by making explicit the necessary Free Will assumption, it replaces all these dubious ideas by a simple consequence, FIN, of relativity. A greater one is that it applies directly to the real world rather than just to theories. It is this that prevents the existence of local mechanisms for reduction.

The world it presents us with is a fascinating one, in which fundamental particles are continually making their own decisions. No theory can predict exactly what these particles will do in the future for the very good reason that they may not yet have decided what this will be! Most of their decisions, of course, will not greatly affect things — we can describe them as mere ineffectual flutterings, which on a large scale almost cancel each other out, and so can be ignored. The authors strongly believe, however, that there is a way our brains prevent some of this cancellation, so allowing us to integrate what remains and producing our own free will.

Einstein could not bring himself to believe that “God plays dice with the world,” but perhaps we could reconcile him to the idea that“God let's the world run free.”

Very important because the free will theorem puts a restraint on any future theories that try to predict what particles will do in the future with any certainty and this includes the free choice of the Experimenter because if you say a physical mechanism determines their choice then it must also determine the choice of the particle before a measurement occurs.

 

[PeterDonis]

Conway and Kochen have rigorously went through the results in their published paper on the free will theorem and the strong free will theorem. After it was published, they haven't backed down from their results. They have done lectures, interviews, answered questions and more.

As I have already pointed out, this is just an argument from authority. It's out of bounds here. To put it bluntly, we don't care about any of these things. If you want to defend their arguments, you need to defend their arguments on the merits, as you have done in some of your previous posts by giving actual quotes from the paper and explaining why you think they support your position. You should keep doing that, not keep reiterating how they've published and haven't backed down, etc., etc.

 

[bhobba]

This is far from mumbo jumbo. Conway and Kochen have rigorously went through the results in their published paper on the free will theorem and the strong free will theorem

They haven't rigorously proven anything because it depends on what is meant by free will. If it is the opposite of determinism, as you and the authors claim, then it does not align with the common sense notion of free wiil - it is better described by unpredictable.

Of course the above is just opinion - as are the views on free will expressed in the paper. This is all nothing but semantics as a number of people have alluded to in this thread. We generally do not have long meandering threads on this forum based on semantics because they will not get anywhere. You have given your view, others have given theirs - if you continue in this vein you will attract the attention of the mentors in their official capacity - just a friendly bit of advice from a mentor.

As Peter explained - we do not care about arguments based on authority here. You can start, for example, by carefully explaining that quote I thought was mumbo jumbo.

Thanks
Bill

 

[entropy2information]

As I have already pointed out, this is just an argument from authority. It's out of bounds here. To put it bluntly, we don't care about any of these things. If you want to defend their arguments, you need to defend their arguments on the merits, as you have done in some of your previous posts by giving actual quotes from the paper and explaining why you think they support your position. You should keep doing that, not keep reiterating how they've published and haven't backed down, etc., etc.

I understand this, I only pointed it out this time as a way to refute the claim that what they were saying was mumbo jumbo. Ido think the Pedigree of the Authors of the theorem come into play in that instant. Throughout most of the thread, I have defended the results based on the merits as you have said and I will try not to appeal to authority. I only did so because their work was reduced to mumbo jumbo and philosophy.

 

[PeterDonis]

I only pointed it out this time as a way to refute the claim that what they were saying was mumbo jumbo. Ido think the Pedigree of the Authors of the theorem come into play in that instant.

No, they don't. "Mumbo jumbo" is just another way of saying "not convinced by their arguments". No amount of reiterating the Pedigree of the Authors is going to convince someone who isn't convinced by their arguments.

 

[entropy2information]

Of course the above is just opinion - as are the views on free will expressed in the paper. This is all nothing but semantics as a number of people have alluded to in this thread. We generally do not have long meandering threads on this forum based on semantics because they will not get anywhere. You have given your view, others have given theirs - if you continue in this vein you will attract the attention of the mentors in their official capacity - just a friendly bit of advice from a mentor.

I haven't talked about semantics. Most of my posts are on the merits of the theorem.

Others have talked about semantics and how they don't like the term free will. The Authors explain why they chose to call it free will. Again, I have not debated semantics, I briefly responded to post that said they didn't like the term free will.

 

[bhobba]

I understand this, I only pointed it out this time as a way to refute the claim that what they were saying was mumbo jumbo.

If you do not think it's mumbo jumbo explain why it isn't - simple. The explanation must not be an appeal to authority, but in your own words what its saying. For example it said - It is hard to take science seriously in a universe that in fact controls all the choices experimenters think they make. I take science just as seriously if its deterministic or not because chaos theory tells us for all practical purposes you can't know the future anyway. If its not true in fact, just FAPP, does not worry me a bit.

Thanks
Bill

 

[black hole 123]

hi, this is slightly off topic, but can someone clarify wat free will is?

obviously determinism means no free will, but non determinism doesn't imply free will. u might then say free will is behaviour that's not deterministic nor conforming to the calculated probability distributions of the system (a human in this case), but that still doesn't capture the meaning of free will. I am not sure free will makes any sense...

 

[entropy2information]

No, they don't. "Mumbo jumbo" is just another way of saying "not convinced by their arguments". No amount of reiterating the Pedigree of the Authors is going to convince someone who isn't convinced by their arguments.

True, but nobody has shown why their arguments are wrong. They just have said that they don't like the term free will and this is philosophy. I have presented the theorem on it's merits as you said. Saying you're not convinced by their arguments is subjective, saying why their arguments aren't convincing is a scientific debate. So far, nobody has explained why they don't make a convincing argument, it 's just they don't like the term free will.

 

[bhobba]

hi, this is slightly off topic, but can someone clarify wat free will is?

I cant. That's part of the problem.

I think most would say if your actions are determined completely by things happening in the past then you do not have free will. But that does not mean the opposite of determinism is free will - I think not predictable is a better description. But I also have to ask in practice exactly what difference to physics does it make if we have free will or not?

Thanks
Bill

 

[PeterDonis]

nobody has shown why their arguments are wrong

You may be misinterpreting the responses. As I understand, for example, @bhobba, he is not saying their formal proof of the theorem is wrong. But their formal theorem only proves a hypothetical: If the experimenters' choices are free, then the results "chosen" by the particles being measured are also free. The additional claim that the experimenters' choices must be free because determinism is not a viable alernative is not proven in the paper; it's just asserted as the authors' opinion. Others' opinions might differ.

 

[entropy2information]

obviously determinism means no free will, but non determinism doesn't imply free will. u might then say free will is behaviour that's not deterministic nor conforming to the calculated probability distributions of the system (a human in this case), but that still doesn't capture the meaning of free will. I am not sure free will makes any sense...

Free will in the context of the free will theorem is two sided. They also say the particle has free will. In this sense, the history of the particle can't be restrained by any physical mechanism that determines the choice of the Experimenter. They say:

f the choice of directions in which to perform spin 1 experiments is not a function of the information accessible to the experimenters, then the responses of the particles are equally not functions of the information accessible to them.

Why do we call this result the Free Will theorem? It is usually tacitly assumed that experimenters have sufficient free will to choose the settings of their apparatus in a way that is not determined by past history. We make this assumption explicit precisely because our theorem deduces from it the more surprising fact that the particles’ responses are also not determined by past history.

 

[PeterDonis]

In this sense, the history of the particle can't be restrained by any physical mechanism that determines the choice of the Experimenter.

That's not what the theorem says. The theorem says (as given in the very passage you quote) that if the choice of the experimenter is not determined, then the particle's "choice" is not determined either. The theorem does not prove anything about what must or must not happen if the choice of the experimenter is determined.

 

[entropy2information]

You may be misinterpreting the responses. As I understand, for example, @bhobba, he is not saying their formal proof of the theorem is wrong. But their formal theorem only proves a hypothetical: If the experimenters' choices are free, then the results "chosen" by the particles being measured are also free. The additional claim that the experimenters' choices must be free because determinism is not a viable alernative is not proven in the paper; it's just asserted as the authors' opinion. Others' opinions might differ.

This is true and this is why Conway says at the beginning of his lecture that it's not his job to disprove determinism. In order for determinism to be a viable alternative though, it's on the shoulders of Determinists to show how their theory doesn't conflict with the free will theorem.

 

[PeterDonis]

it's on the shoulders of Determinists to show how their theory doesn't conflict with the free will theorem.

Determinism can't conflict with the free will theorem, because, as I pointed out in post #46, that theorem says nothing about what must or must not be the case if determinism is true. It only says what must be the case if determinism is false. So if determinism is true, the theorem is irrelevant.

 

[bhobba]

It is usually tacitly assumed that experimenters have sufficient free will to choose the settings of their apparatus in a way that is not determined by past history.

It is? I know Gleason very well and can't find that assumption anywhere.

Just so my position is clear - what I am saying is the theorem is trivial. If free will is the opposite of determinism, since both particles and us are quantum objects, that we have free will implies quantum particles have free will is hardly surprising. But considering the usual usage of the term free will saying a particle has free will is rather strange.

Thanks
Bill

 

[entropy2information]

That's not what the theorem says. The theorem says (as given in the very passage you quote) that if the choice of the experimenter is not determined, then the particle's "choice" is not determined either. The theorem does not prove anything about what must or must not happen if the choice of the experimenter is determined.

Of course it does and Conway talks about this in his lectures.

If the choice is determined then the Determinist must explain what physical mechanism is determining what choice the experimenter makes which which would also restrain what history the particle can be in. It says:

It follows that we cannot prove our Free Will assumption – determinism, like solipsism, is logically possible. Both the non-existence of free agents in determism and the external world in solipsism are rightly conjured up by philosophers as consistent if unbelievable universes to show the limits of what is possible, but we discard them as serious views of our universe.

It is hard to take science seriously in a universe that in fact controls all the choices experimenters think they make. Nature could be in an insidious conspiracy to “confirm” laws by denying us the freedom to make the tests that would refute them. Physical induction, the primary tool of science, disappears if we are denied access to random samples. It is also hard to take seriously the arguments of those who according to their own beliefs are deterministic automata

This is pretty clear. If the choice of the experiment is determined then it's incumbent on the Determist to explain the nature of this mechanism and why it doesn't conflict with the free will theorem.

I have asked for evidence of this mechanism but no response so far.

 

[PeterDonis]

Of course it does and Conway talks about this in his lectures.

What Conway says does not contradict what I said: that his theorem does not prove anything about what happens if determinism is true. His claim that determinism is not viable has nothing to do with his theorem: it has to do with the opinion he states in the second paragraph of what you quoted. Which is just his opinion; it's not a logical proof of anything.

If the choice of the experiment is determined then it's incumbent on the Determist to explain the nature of this mechanism and why it doesn't conflict with the free will theorem.

The mechanism can't conflict with the free will theorem. Conway even admits that in what you quoted; he says determinism is logically possible. If your claim were true, that would not be the case. You are coming close to a warning and a thread ban for failing to respond to what others are actually saying and continuing to make a demonstrably false claim.

As for "it is incumbent on the Determinist", again, that's Conway's opinion. Others' opinions might differ.

 

[bhobba]

If the choice is determined then the Determinist must explain what physical mechanism is determining what choice the experimenter makes which which would also restrain what history the particle can be in.

The determinist does not have to explain exactly what causes the action - they believe its all determined by the initial conditions. That's why to my mind the issue is irrelevant because the mechanism would be so complex we can never know it anyway. Indeed Chaos theory would say you can't in practice know it.

Thanks
Bill

 

[entropy2information]

Just so my position is clear - what I am saying is the theorem is trivial. If free will is the opposite of determinism, since both particles and us are quantum objects, that we have free will implies quantum particles have free will is hardly surprising. But considering the usual usage of the term free will saying a particle has free will is rather strange.

I don't think it's strange because the Authors wanted to go deeper than just unpredictability. You can see this in their lectures. They're not saying that this free choice is just the appearance of free choice and there's some physical mechanism that really determines the choice of the Experimenter.

What they're saying is, this free choice is more fundamental.

 

[bhobba]

What they're saying is, this free choice is more fundamental.

That may be their opinion, but it is not what they proved which is: The axioms SPIN, TWIN and MIN imply that the response of a spin 1 particle to a triple experiment is free—that is to say, is not a function of properties of that part of the universe that is earlier than this response with respect to any given inertial frame.

Thanks
Bill

 

[entropy2information]

What Conway says does not contradict what I said: that his theorem does not prove anything about what happens if determinism is true. His claim that determinism is not viable has nothing to do with his theorem: it has to do with the opinion he states in the second paragraph of what you quoted. Which is just his opinion; it's not a logical proof of anything.
The mechanism can't conflict with the free will theorem. Conway even admits that in what you quoted; he says determinism is logically possible. If your claim were true, that would not be the case. You are coming close to a warning and a thread ban for failing to respond to what others are actually saying and continuing to make a demonstrably false claim.

As for "it is incumbent on the Determinist", again, that's Conway's opinion. Others' opinions might differ.

What claim have I made that's false? I never said nor have Kochen and Conway that they disprove determinism. I have repeatedly said that throughout this thread. So of course determinism is logically possible but as they said so is solipsism.

My point is, the free will theorem does restrain any physical mechanism that can determine the choice of the Experimenter. In fact bhobba just said this:

The determinist does not have to explain exactly what causes the action - they believe its all determined by the initial conditions. That's why to my mind the issue is irrelevant because the mechanism would be so complex we can never know it anyway. Indeed Chaos theory would say you can't in practice know it.

Thanks
Bill

My point exactly. This isn't science. Saying mechanism is so complex we can never know it. How can we probe it? Again, I haven't misrepresented anything and I never made the claim that the free will theorem disproves determinism.

 

[PeterDonis]

The axioms SPIN, TWIN and MIN imply that the response of a spin 1 particle to a triple experiment is free

Actually, those axioms by themselves do not. Those axioms, plus the assumption that the experimenter's choice of which direction to measure in is free, imply that the response of the particle is free.

 

[PeterDonis]

What claim have I made that's false?

This one:

it's on the shoulders of Determinists to show how their theory doesn't conflict with the free will theorem.

I've explained why it's false at least twice now.

the free will theorem does restrain any physical mechanism that can determine the choice of the Experimenter.

This claim is also false. Apparently you haven't fully grasped what I said before: the free will theorem is irrelevant if determinism is true. It only applies to the case where determinism is false. So the theorem can't possibly impose any constrains on what physical mechanisms are present if determinism is true.

bhobba just said this

@bhobba said nothing of the sort. You need to read more carefully.

 

[PeterDonis]

This isn't science. Saying mechanism is so complex we can never know it.

So all of chaos theory isn't science?

 

[bhobba]

Actually, those axioms by themselves do not. Those axioms, plus the assumption that the experimenter's choice of which direction to measure in is free, imply that the response of the particle is free.

Of course. Thanks for picking it up.

Thanks
Bill

 

[entropy2information]

This claim is also false. Apparently you haven't fully grasped what I said before: the free will theorem is irrelevant if determinism is true. It only applies to the case where determinism is false. So the theorem can't possibly impose any constrains on what physical mechanisms are present if determinism is true.

The free will theorem is a clear refutation of determinism. Conway and Kochen makes this clear in their lectures. Here's how Conway ended 1 lecture.



He says there's no reason to believe in determinism because there's no evidence for it. Here's a full lecture:



Saying determinism is logically possible is meaningless. It's just saying determinism can't be disproved but neither can solipsism. Neither can Aliens living underground on Europa. Neither can the simulation hypothesis. These things are logically possible but there's no evidence to support these things as a true description of reality. This is why Kochen says it's not about theories anymore but it's about how the universe works.

“It’s not about theories anymore -- it’s about what the universe does,” said Kochen, a professor of mathematics and the associate chair of the Department of Mathematics. “And we’ve found that, from moment to moment, nature doesn’t know what it’s going to do. A particle has a choice.”

https://www.princeton.edu/news/2009/03/23/high-powered-mathematicians-take-free-will

This debate isn't about semantics of the term free will. This debate is about those who support determinism providing a shred of evidence that a physical mechanism can exist as an element of reality that determines the choice of the Experimenter before a measurement occurs.

bhobba already said this mechanism is too complex for us to know. That's like saying U.F.O.'s are Alien spacecraft but it's too complex for us to know.

It's clear that Conway and Kochen are doing 2 things with the free will theorem as it pertains to determinism.

1. They say determinism can't be disproved therefore it's logically possible. This is just common sense. You can't disprove determinism anymore than you can disprove the existence of Aliens. This doesn't mean there's any evidence to support it. This is why they talked about determinism and solipsism in the paper.

2. The free will theorem makes a physical mechanism that's an element of reality prior to measurement something that's as close to impossible as it gets. They clearly show any such mechanism can't be an element of reality prior to measurement. They say:

The fact that they cannot always predict the results of future experiments has sometimes been described just as a defect of theories extending quantum mechanics. However, if our physical axioms are even approximately true, the free will assumption implies the stronger result, that no theory, whether it extends quantum mechanics or not, can correctly predict the results of future spin experiments. It also makes it clear that this failure to predict is a merit rather than a defect, since these results involve free decisions that the universe has not yet made.

Wow, and this why I keep asking for evidence of a physical mechanism that can predict the choice of the Experimenter and the history of the particle prior to measurement. Determinism can't be true unless you provide evidence that such a mechanism exists.

It also says:

We remark that the Free Will assumption, that the experimenters’ choice of directions is not a function of the information accessible to them, has allowed us to make our theorem refer to the world itself, rather than merely to some theory of the world.

And again:

It follows that we cannot prove our Free Will assumption – determinism, like solipsism, is logically possible. Both the non-existence of free agents in determism and the external world in solipsism are rightly conjured up by philosophers as consistent if unbelievable universes to show the limits of what is possible, but we discard them as serious views of our universe.

We discard them as serious views of our universe. Again, saying something is logically possible requires meeting a very low bar. You can say this about almost any theory with no evidence is logically possible. But they make it crystal clear that there can't be a physical mechanism that can predict these future events prior to measurement if their physical Axioms are even approximately true.