Undergrad Einstein & Bohr Debate: Epistemological Paradox

[bhobba]

My question is, what was their “stand” in regards to this epistimological paradox?

To answer the question head-on, the epistemological difference between Einstein and Bohr is Einstein was a realist. He believed in an objective world out there independent of anyone’s beliefs, linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, and so on. Within that view of the world, there are many different nuanced positions. Einstein was also an epistemological opportunist; he simply took the one that served his purpose the best. The point to take away, though, is he was a realist. Bohr was an instrumentalist believing science reveals nothing except what is observable. Science is just a tool allowing the prediction of observations but does not reveal any hidden aspects of nature that may explain those laws.

Feynman, too was an opportunist - believing it to be just one 'trick' that scientists can try to unlock natures secrets. He was quite anti-philosophy - which is rather strange because it is philosophy itself.

In modern times I think most (but not all - see the writings of Penrose, for example) scientists are really neither; they are like Stephen Hawking believing in some form of Model-dependent realism:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model-dependent_realism

I, too, am in that camp, although I was once in Prenose's camp. But like Feynman, as far as nuances go, I am an opportunist.

Thanks
Bill

 

[RUTA]

It's ironic that Einstein insisted on a "constructive" account of entanglement when he could have produced a "principle" account using his relativity principle. He gave up on "constructive efforts" for explaining time dilation and length contraction, so I wonder why he never considered doing likewise for entanglement. I read some quotes indicating that perhaps he was not really happy with special relativity in the absence of a constructive counterpart, so maybe he didn't even want to go that way with EPR? https://sciencex.com/news/2020-10-einstein-opportunity-spooky-actions-distance.html

 

[Andrew Mason]

Einstein was also an epistemological opportunist; he simply took the one that served his purpose the best. The point to take away, though, is he was a realist. ...

Feynman, too was an opportunist - believing it to be just one 'trick' that scientists can try to unlock natures secrets. He was quite anti-philosophy - which is rather strange because it is philosophy itself.

Feynman is hard to categorize. He wasn't 'anti-philosophy': he was just opposed to a non-scientific philosophy posing as science (which to him was like people arguing over whether an interpretation of a Rorschach diagram was correct). His entire career was an attempt to explain nature so his motivation in that sense was a philosophical one. He was fascinated by the fact that nature seemed be explainable in different ways without contradiction. He remarked on this in his Nobel lecture:

​

"I would like to interrupt here to make a remark. The fact that​

electrodynamics can be written in so many ways - the differential​

equations of Maxwell, various minimum principles with fields,​

minimum principles without fields, all different kinds of ways, was​

something I knew, but I have never understood. It always seems​

odd to me that the fundamental laws of physics, when​

discovered, can appear in so many different forms that are not​

apparently identical at first, but, with a little mathematical​

fiddling you can show the relationship. An example of that is the​

Schrödinger equation and the Heisenberg formulation of quantum​

mechanics. I don't know why this is - it remains a mystery, but it​

was something I learned from experience. There is always​

another way to say the same thing that doesn't look at all like the​

way you said it before. I don't know what the reason for this is. I​

think it is somehow a representation of the simplicity of nature. A​

thing like the inverse square law is just right to be represented​

by the solution of Poisson's equation, which, therefore, is a very​

different way to say the same thing that doesn't look at all like​

the way you said it before. I don't know what it means, that​

nature chooses these curious forms, but maybe that is a way of​

defining simplicity. Perhaps a thing is simple if you can describe it​

fully in several different ways without immediately knowing that​

you are describing the same thing."​

AM

 

[stevendaryl]

In modern times I think most (but not all - see the writings of Penrose, for example) scientists are really neither; they are like Stephen Hawking believing in some form of Model-dependent realism:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model-dependent_realism

I, too, am in that camp, although I was once in Prenose's camp. But like Feynman, as far as nuances go, I am an opportunist.

What does Penrose believe that is different from most scientists?

("Prenose" means you were born before noses were invented...)