Einstein thoughts on the quantum

[Matterwave]

I suppose so. Sometimes it's hard to keep the interpretations in check. Each interpretation has had so many different advocates that it's hard to get a nice list of what each interpretation is saying. I wouldn't worry too much about what to call the "standard" QM. Suffice it to say that the Many Worlds interpretation has not become "standard".

 

[Varon]

QM is a set of rules that tells us how to calculate probabilities of possible results of experiments. It doesn't need an interpretation. The statements that tell us how to interpret the mathematics as predictions about results of experiments are part of the theory itself, not of the interpretation.

I would prefer to define the CI as just QM with no additional assumptions, but it seems that no one actually defines it that way. Everyone seems to have their own idea about what the CI is, but almost everyone who uses that term seems to think that it includes the assumption that a state vector describes all properties of a single system. So the closest thing to a standard definition of the CI would be to say that the CI is QM with that additional assumption on top.

However, that assumption is unnecessary and unjustified, and it's probably also inconsistent with the actual theory. (It introduces a "measurement problem", which now needs to be "solved").

So I wouldn't say that the CI is standard. At least not the CI that's defined as above.

Of course, we could argue that the additional assumption shouldn't be included in the definition of the CI. If we drop it, what we have left is just QM, which is often called "the statistical interpretation" or "the ensemble interpretation", but it's really just QM, without any additional assumptions.

The reason your proposal to define CI as just QM with no additional assumptions won't work is because it was Bohr who created CI and there was immediately the Bohr Postulate:

"In the absense of measurement to determine its position, the particle has no position"

This statement alone is enough to open all pandora's box.. so there is no such thing as CI as just QM with no additional assumptions. Defend your proposal.

 

[Fredrik]

The reason your proposal to define CI as just QM with no additional assumptions won't work is because it was Bohr who created CI

I don't know exactly what he said, and I'm not interested enough to find out. I'm guessing that Bohr did assume that a wavefunction describes all the properties of a single system, because what else was the disagreement with Einstein about?

and there was immediately the Bohr Postulate:

"In the absense of measurement to determine its position, the particle has no position"

This statement alone is enough to open all pandora's box..

This is a consequence of QM, not a separate postulate. I wonder if Bohr just said things like this, and his critics just assumed that he was identifying the wavefunction with the particle, i.e. that he was assuming that it represents all the properties of a single particle. It wouldn't surprise me. I have seen critics of the CI make that kind of mistakes before.

so there is no such thing as CI as just QM with no additional assumptions. Defend your proposal.

There's obviously such a thing as QM with no additional assumptions. If it's appropriate to call that "the CI" depends on what exactly Bohr said, and as I already told you, I'm not interested enough to find out. What I do know is that not even Niels Bohr had the right to add an assumption to the theory that makes the whole thing inconsistent, and the additional assumption that everyone seems to think is an essential part of the CI is also what introduces the measurement problem. If this is an actual inconsistency (I can't prove rigorously that it is since there's no formal definition of what it means to identify the wavefunction with the particle), then it doesn't make sense to include it in the definition of the CI.

 

[Varon]

I don't know exactly what he said, and I'm not interested enough to find out. I'm guessing that Bohr did assume that a wavefunction describes all the properties of a single system, because what else was the disagreement with Einstein about?


This is a consequence of QM, not a separate postulate. I wonder if Bohr just said things like this, and his critics just assumed that he was identifying the wavefunction with the particle, i.e. that he was assuming that it represents all the properties of a single particle. It wouldn't surprise me. I have seen critics of the CI make that kind of mistakes before.


There's obviously such a thing as QM with no additional assumptions. If it's appropriate to call that "the CI" depends on what exactly Bohr said, and as I already told you, I'm not interested enough to find out. What I do know is that not even Niels Bohr had the right to add an assumption to the theory that makes the whole thing inconsistent, and the additional assumption that everyone seems to think is an essential part of the CI is also what introduces the measurement problem. If this is an actual inconsistency (I can't prove rigorously that it is since there's no formal definition of what it means to identify the wavefunction with the particle), then it doesn't make sense to include it in the definition of the CI.

Can you explain your position based on the history of the development of QM. Here are what transpired in brief (from memory):

1. Bohr conjectured electrons are positioned in certain orbitals.
2. Einstein conjectured that photons which were thought of as wave were also particles.
3. de Broglie conjectured matter were also waves.
4. Schrödinger created the wave equation and conjecture the wave represenedt the particle either as charge or mass density.
5. Lorentz criticized Schroedinger's by emphasing wave packet spreads and couldn't be particle.
6. Born proposed the amplitude square was the probability of the particle location
7. Einstein proposed the wave function was just for the ensemble but Dirac and Heisenberg complained how it could describe individual system like an electron in the hydrogen atom.
8. von Neumann created the formal Hilbert Space mathematical formulation.

All of this are latter referred to as the Copenhagen Interpretation.

From the above. It is automatic that the wave function or state vector represents the properties of a system.. and the amplitude square is the probability of the particle location.

Now I'm perplexed how you could say CI is just QM without the wave function assumption as this is part of the history of QM. What part of the development of QM do you think the situation got confused and what should have occurred so CI become pure QM without mentioning about the wave function? Pls. elaborate as what you said didn't make much sense.

 

[Fredrik]

1. Bohr conjectured electrons are positioned in certain orbitals.
2. Einstein conjectured that photons which were thought of as wave were also particles.
3. de Broglie conjectured matter were also waves.
4. Schrödinger created the wave equation and conjecture the wave represenedt the particle either as charge or mass density.
5. Lorentz criticized Schroedinger's by emphasing wave packet spreads and couldn't be particle.
6. Born proposed the amplitude square was the probability of the particle location
7. Einstein proposed the wave function was just for the ensemble but Dirac and Heisenberg complained how it could describe individual system like an electron in the hydrogen atom.
8. von Neumann created the formal Hilbert Space mathematical formulation.

All of this are latter referred to as the Copenhagen Interpretation.

From the above. It is automatic that the wave function or state vector represents the properties of a system..

I'm sure that's how people were thinking at the time of (3) and (4), but it's not implied by the theory we ended up with. I'm not sure if that was already clear at step (8), but it certainly is in many modern textbooks. See e.g. this definition of QM. It certainly leaves the door open for an ensemble interpretation.

Now I'm perplexed how you could say CI is just QM without the wave function assumption as this is part of the history of QM. What part of the development of QM do you think the situation got confused and what should have occurred so CI become pure QM without mentioning about the wave function? Pls. elaborate as what you said didn't make much sense.

I don't know how you can say that it didn't make sense, but I can also tell that you read me wrong. You're saying that I said that the CI is QM without the assumption that a wavefunction describes all the properties of a single system. I didn't say that. I've been saying that a) there's no standard definition of the CI, b) everyone seems to include that assumption as a part of their definition of the CI, and c) I would prefer not to, since that assumption is what introduces the measurement problem. If we do include it, the CI is (very likely) logically inconsistent, and I don't see the point of assigning a name to something that's logically inconsistent.

I have to get some sleep, so I won't be answering any more posts for at least 8 hours.

 

[Varon]

I'm sure that's how people were thinking at the time of (3) and (4), but it's not implied by the theory we ended up with. I'm not sure if that was already clear at step (8), but it certainly is in many modern textbooks. See e.g. this definition of QM. It certainly leaves the door open for an ensemble interpretation.

Maybe we should blame it on Born. He was the one who proposed that the amplitude square is the probability of A PARTICLE being there. Had Born not been born and you took his place. Maybe the world of QM interpretations would be less chaotic (assuming you are correct).

I don't know how you can say that it didn't make sense, but I can also tell that you read me wrong. You're saying that I said that the CI is QM without the assumption that a wavefunction describes all the properties of a single system. I didn't say that. I've been saying that a) there's no standard definition of the CI, b) everyone seems to include that assumption as a part of their definition of the CI, and c) I would prefer not to, since that assumption is what introduces the measurement problem. If we do include it, the CI is (very likely) logically inconsistent, and I don't see the point of assigning a name to something that's logically inconsistent.

I have to get some sleep, so I won't be answering any more posts for at least 8 hours.

What I should have said was "Now I'm perplexed how you could say CI SHOULD BE just QM without the wave function assumption as this is part of the history of QM". When you wake up. Pls. explain why you said that if we do include the assumptions, the CI is (very likely) logically inconsistent.. are you referring to collapse which conflicts with the deterministic development of the Schroedinger Equation?

 

[Varon]

Btw.. Fredrik, if you state collapse is what made CI logically inconsistent. It is not. Here comes the magic of the observers (either particles sensing other particles or bigger environment or system). It has got to do with Information Theory and information exchange between the quantum. This is actually quite elegant. Your namesake Fra has even formulated a complete theory of it. So no. Adding the state vector to single particle assumptions to QM doesn't make CI logically inconsistent.

 

[Demystifier]

Varon, in your comparison of QM and spacetime, you seem to mix two different definitions of "realism". Einstein was a realist in one of these senses, according to which "something exists even if nobody observes it".

Now the crucial question is: Is spacetime real in THAT sense?
Two answers compatible with Einstein as a realist are possible:

1. It is real, but there is something more not described by spacetime and matter. It is consciousness which is responsible for our experience of the flow of time, which is not described by the known laws of physics.

2. It is not real, it is only an incomplete mathematical description. But there is something else, we don't know yet what, which is real.

 

[Varon]

Varon, in your comparison of QM and spacetime, you seem to mix two different definitions of "realism". Einstein was a realist in one of these senses, according to which "something exists even if nobody observes it".

Now the crucial question is: Is spacetime real in THAT sense?
Two answers compatible with Einstein as a realist are possible:

1. It is real, but there is something more not described by spacetime and matter. It is consciousness which is responsible for our experience of the flow of time, which is not described by the known laws of physics.

2. It is not real, it is only an incomplete mathematical description. But there is something else, we don't know yet what, which is real.

Yeah. I already know about the realism thing and the distinctions and won't focus on that aspect from hereon.

Let's focus on something more important. It's good you understood that consciousness is not described by space and matter and even the quantum. What kind of physics do you think can explain consciousness? Beside Penrose. Who are the reliable physicists who actually studied them? Along what lines or approach do you think should the research be focus on (for example.. can we get a clue what it is by quantum gravity... or what must be the theoretical tool to investigate it)? Maybe if we have a Manhattan Project or CERN efforts to study consciousness. We will have incredible advances that can make the higgs discovery pale in comparison.

 

[Demystifier]

What kind of physics do you think can explain consciousness?

I believe that such kind of physics does not exist. Or at least not yet.

See my essay
http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Nikolic_FQXi_time.pdf

 

[alxm]

Yeah right. Human consciousness needs special physics. Even though known physics works perfectly fine for every single biological phenomenon yet known.

So your experimental evidence for this is, what exactly? Because as far as "scientific" theories created to stroke the human ego go, they have a lousy track record. We're not the center of the universe. We're not made out of different stuff than everything else. We're not even particularly distinct from a sea sponge.

 

[Varon]

I believe that such kind of physics does not exist. Or at least not yet.

See my essay
http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Nikolic_FQXi_time.pdf

Neuroscience can find no answer about it too.. and unfortunately we only have Penrose and Stapp and a few others with wrong theories. They are stuck to them and have invested so much pride that they can't no longer get out even if they realize their theories is false. This is true for Dr. William Tiller who tried Bohmian Mechanics to model consciousness. Search for him in the website and you can know how he is wrong because of incorrect understanding of the Maxwell Equations.

We need a multidisciplinary scientific effort on the scale of the Manhattan Project or LHC to nail the correct theory on consciousness and I guess we would venture into this after physicists discover the higgs and quantum gravity and got bored with nothing new to understand. Then they would proceed to understand the physics of consciousness. Unfortunately. This can happen maybe 50 years from now and not many of us would bear witness to this golden age of physics... unless someone of Einsteinian luck initiated it and nail the theory within 20 years. Who knows, the person could even be you so try to seek deeper in understanding it.

 

[Demystifier]

Yeah right. Human consciousness needs special physics. Even though known physics works perfectly fine for every single biological phenomenon yet known.

So your experimental evidence for this is, what exactly?

Maybe you misunderstood me. I'm pretty sure that physics can explain the behavior of biological systems, including the behavior that we usually think of as a "conscious" behavior. But that's exactly what the problem is. We can explain the BEHAVIOR in terms of known PHYSICAL mechanisms. But these mechanisms do not involve anything like subjective conscious experiences. Subjective conscious experiences are simply not needed to explain the objective behavior. In fact, the whole scientific method explores the objective, not the subjective. I can measure your voice when you cry, I can measure your EEG waves in the brain when I torture you, but I cannot measure your FEELING of pain. I cannot even conceive how to measure someone's feeling of anything.

Because as far as "scientific" theories created to stroke the human ego go, they have a lousy track record. We're not the center of the universe. We're not made out of different stuff than everything else. We're not even particularly distinct from a sea sponge.

It's even more egoistic than you think. It's not about humans, but about myself (or yourself). I feel only my feelings, and nobody else's. If I could experience someone else's feelings, then they would no longer be purely subjective, but objective phenomena researchable by the scientific method. But I can't.

 

[Fredrik]

Maybe we should blame it on Born. He was the one who proposed that the amplitude square is the probability of A PARTICLE being there.

I think you're emphasizing the wrong word. He proposed that \int_S |\psi(\vec x)|^2 d^3x is the probability of a particle being somewhere in the region S. Modern texts will say something like "\int_S |\psi(\vec x)|^2 d^3x is the probability of getting a detection signal from a perfect detector covering the region S".

Pls. explain why you said that if we do include the assumptions, the CI is (very likely) logically inconsistent.. are you referring to collapse which conflicts with the deterministic development of the Schroedinger Equation?

The main assumption of the CI is that state vectors can be identified with physical systems, i.e. that each state vector describes all the properties of the system it represents. Let's label that assumption (1). I said that if we add this on top of QM, we get a contradiction, but that's not quite right. What we get is many worlds. So QM+(1) contradicts the assumption that there's only one world. Let's label that assumption (2). Obviously, (2) should also be considered part of the definition of the CI.

So I'm not going to argue that QM+(1) is logically inconsistent, I'm going to argue that CI=QM+(1)+(2) is. The argument can't be made rigorous, since the assumptions (1) and (2) aren't mathematical statements. An informal argument is the best anyone can do.

The Schrödinger's cat thought experiment has taught us that the linearity of the SE implies that if microscopic systems can be in superpositions, then so can macroscopic systems. The details of this part of the argument are included both in Ballentine's 1970 article and in his more recent textbook. (Section 9.2).

(A calculation that includes decoherence effects would change the argument somewhat, but not enough to solve the problem).

Suppose that we prepare a large and complicated system, e.g. a system that includes you, in a state like |this>+|that>, where |this> and |that> describe two different experiences you can have in there. Now the problem is that (1) says that |this>+|that> is a complete description of the physical system. Clearly this means that neither |this> nor |that> can be a complete description of the physical system, and this means that what you actually experience as a part of that system is no more than half the story. If the complete description includes both of your possible experiences, then so does reality. Otherwise it wouldn't be a complete description.

Therefore QM+(1) implies that there are many worlds. This means that QM+(1)+(2) is inconsistent.

 

[Varon]

I think you're emphasizing the wrong word. He proposed that \int_S |\psi(\vec x)|^2 d^3x is the probability of a particle being somewhere in the region S. Modern texts will say something like "\int_S |\psi(\vec x)|^2 d^3x is the probability of getting a detection signal from a perfect detector covering the region S".

So Born was referring to single particle, not ensemble. Hence the state vector is about single particle.

The main assumption of the CI is that state vectors can be identified with physical systems, i.e. that each state vector describes all the properties of the system it represents. Let's label that assumption (1). I said that if we add this on top of QM, we get a contradiction, but that's not quite right. What we get is many worlds. So QM+(1) contradicts the assumption that there's only one world. Let's label that assumption (2). Obviously, (2) should also be considered part of the definition of the CI.

But in Copenhagen, each state vector represents (not "describes" as you implied) all the properties of the system. In other words:

Many Worlds = each state vector describes all the properties of the system it represents

Copenhagen = each state vector REPRESENTS all the properties of the system

Comments? If one uses the right word "Represents" then all the rest of your arguments is pure vintage Copenhagen. Unless you can show or prove that this statement "each state vector REPRESENTS all the properties of the system" doesn't make sense.

So I'm not going to argue that QM+(1) is logically inconsistent, I'm going to argue that CI=QM+(1)+(2) is. The argument can't be made rigorous, since the assumptions (1) and (2) aren't mathematical statements. An informal argument is the best anyone can do.

The Schrödinger's cat thought experiment has taught us that the linearity of the SE implies that if microscopic systems can be in superpositions, then so can macroscopic systems. The details of this part of the argument are included both in Ballentine's 1970 article and in his more recent textbook. (Section 9.2).

(A calculation that includes decoherence effects would change the argument somewhat, but not enough to solve the problem).

Suppose that we prepare a large and complicated system, e.g. a system that includes you, in a state like |this>+|that>, where |this> and |that> describe two different experiences you can have in there. Now the problem is that (1) says that |this>+|that> is a complete description of the physical system. Clearly this means that neither |this> nor |that> can be a complete description of the physical system, and this means that what you actually experience as a part of that system is no more than half the story. If the complete description includes both of your possible experiences, then so does reality. Otherwise it wouldn't be a complete description.

Therefore QM+(1) implies that there are many worlds. This means that QM+(1)+(2) is inconsistent.

 

[Fredrik]

So Born was referring to single particle, not ensemble. Hence the state vector is about single particle.

That's what everyone assumed at the time. It was wishful thinking.

But in Copenhagen, each state vector represents (not "describes" as you implied) all the properties of the system. In other words:

Many Worlds = each state vector describes all the properties of the system it represents

Copenhagen = each state vector REPRESENTS all the properties of the system

I'm not sure I understand what distinction you're making between those two words. You seem to consider "represents" a lesser thing, i.e. that "describes" implies "represents", but not vice versa. That turns your CI into an ensemble interpretation. Think about it. Regardless of how strong we assume the identification between wavefunctions and systems to be, we can always identify wavefunctions with statistical properties of ensembles. If we haven't assumed the strongest possible identification between wavefunctions and systems, i.e. that the wavefunction exactly corresponds to the system, have we really said anything at all?

I don't think it makes sense to say that wavefunctions "represent" single systems, unless we identify them in the strongest possible way. To make a weaker identification is to pad the ensemble interpretation with meaningless words and pretend that it's a different interpretation.

(Last post of the day).

 

[Varon]

I believe that such kind of physics does not exist. Or at least not yet.

See my essay
http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Nikolic_FQXi_time.pdf

I just read this paper. Very interesting. So using our time versus SR time, it is possible to get in touch with something 100 billion light years away instantaneously with no causality problem? This can even solve the Horizon problem without Inflation.. because the universe is connected at all times. This can even explain why entanglement works from across the universe because it is using a component of our time instead of SR time. And whereas the quantum uses randomness in entanglement. We can transfer information non-randomly instantaneously across the universe.

Next step is to try to propose experiments to prove it. Then you are the next Einstein :)
Pls. recommend books that most influence you. I think I have to focus on the secret of time.
I've spent many years on the quantum and seem to be on the end of the tunnel and in darkness and I saw the light in your paper.

 

[Demystifier]

I just read this paper. Very interesting.

I'm glad that you liked it.

So using our time versus SR time, it is possible to get in touch with something 100 billion light years away instantaneously with no causality problem? This can even solve the Horizon problem without Inflation.. because the universe is connected at all times. This can even explain why entanglement works from across the universe because it is using a component of our time instead of SR time. And whereas the quantum uses randomness in entanglement. We can transfer information non-randomly instantaneously across the universe.

I don't think I said anything like that in this paper.

Next step is to try to propose experiments to prove it. Then you are the next Einstein :)

I believe I'm still very far from it. :shy:

Pls. recommend books that most influence you. I think I have to focus on the secret of time. I've spent many years on the quantum and seem to be on the end of the tunnel and in darkness and I saw the light in your paper.

Well, if you want more, see the references (books and papers) cited in that paper. The references [5,6,7,10] are popular books, while other references are more technical. For my own works on the "secret of time" see e.g.
http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/gr-qc/9901045
http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/gr-qc/0403121 [Found.Phys.Lett. 19 (2006) 259-267]
http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/0811.1905 [Int. J. Quantum Inf. 7 (2009) 595-602]
http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/1011.4173
http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/1102.1539

 

[Demystifier]

The main assumption of the CI is that state vectors can be identified with physical systems, i.e. that each state vector describes all the properties of the system it represents.

Your argument that "CI" defined as above is inconsistent (or leads either to MWI or ensemble interpretation) is very interesting, but I think that it only shows that such a definition of CI is inappropriate. Indeed, in
https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=332269
I discussed 4 different consistent variants of CI, neither of which assumes that state vectors can be identified with physical systems.
In particular, 1., 2. and 4. are agnostic on that assumption, while 3. implicitly assumes a notion of "measurement" not identified with the state vector.

 

[Fredrik]

Your argument that "CI" defined as above is inconsistent (or leads either to MWI or ensemble interpretation) is very interesting, but I think that it only shows that such a definition of CI is inappropriate.

Yes, I agree.

Indeed, in
https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=332269
I discussed 4 different consistent variants of CI, neither of which assumes that state vectors can be identified with physical systems.
In particular, 1., 2. and 4. are agnostic on that assumption, while 3. implicitly assumes a notion of "measurement" not identified with the state vector.

1. Sounds like the statistical intepretation, plus an attitude problem.
2. Sounds like the statistical interpretation, plus perhaps something else. I'm not sure what that would be though.
3. Isn't the whole point of introducing "collapse" to try to avoid the conclusion that assumption (1) implies many worlds? It might avoid the contradiction I mentioned above, but it introduces another one by saying that some systems with component parts that obey the laws of QM, do not obey the laws of QM.
4. Sounds like the statistical interpretation, restated to try to hide what it really is.

I think 3 can be dismissed because of the artificial quantum/classical border, and I think 1,2 and 4 are only adding confusion to the statistical/ensemble interpretation.

This is why I'm flip-flopping about whether the CI and the SI are two different interpretations or one and the same. The only definition of the CI that I'm comfortable with is CI=SI, but almost no one seems to define it that way.

 

[Demystifier]

This is why I'm flip-flopping about whether the CI and the SI are two different interpretations or one and the same. The only definition of the CI that I'm comfortable with is CI=SI, but almost no one seems to define it that way.

Yes, I understand why do you think so. One might say that SI is a refined version of CI, with controversial and/or vague aspects of CI removed. Or more formally
SI = CI - BF
where "BF" stands for Bad Philosophy.

 

[Varon]

Yes, I agree.


1. Sounds like the statistical intepretation, plus an attitude problem.
2. Sounds like the statistical interpretation, plus perhaps something else. I'm not sure what that would be though.
3. Isn't the whole point of introducing "collapse" to try to avoid the conclusion that assumption (1) implies many worlds? It might avoid the contradiction I mentioned above, but it introduces another one by saying that some systems with component parts that obey the laws of QM, do not obey the laws of QM.
4. Sounds like the statistical interpretation, restated to try to hide what it really is.

I think 3 can be dismissed because of the artificial quantum/classical border, and I think 1,2 and 4 are only adding confusion to the statistical/ensemble interpretation.

Not correct. In 3 which is mentioned thus:

"3. Collapse interpretation - when the measurement is performed, then the wave function collapses. (von Neumann)"

Note von Neumann was proposing that all is quantum.. that is why there is Process 1 (Collapse) and Process (2) Deterministic and one can insert the cut anywhere (remember von Neumann cut) because he considered everything is quantum in contrast to Bohr's who distinguishes between classical and quantum system. So in von Neumann, there is no artificial quantum/classical border.

Anyway. After reading many strings of threads with your messges and thoughts. I think what you are trying to say is that if wave function describes single system, it's Many Worlds. If multiple system, it's Ensemble Interpretation.

Consequence of this is that. If there is no Many worlds and it's single system. Wave function is invalid since it's for ensemble. So it's like we need a new law of physics to describe single system in ensemble (statistical) interpretation. Hmm...

This is why I'm flip-flopping about whether the CI and the SI are two different interpretations or one and the same. The only definition of the CI that I'm comfortable with is CI=SI, but almost no one seems to define it that way.

 

[Fredrik]

Not correct. In 3 which is mentioned thus:

"3. Collapse interpretation - when the measurement is performed, then the wave function collapses. (von Neumann)"

Note von Neumann was proposing that all is quantum.. that is why there is Process 1 (Collapse) and Process (2) Deterministic and one can insert the cut anywhere (remember von Neumann cut) because he considered everything is quantum in contrast to Bohr's who distinguishes between classical and quantum system. So in von Neumann, there is no artificial quantum/classical border.

I disagree with this. I think any kind of "cut" is inconsistent with QM, unless of course all the talk about a "cut" is just another way to express the ideas of the statistical interpretation in a more confusing way. I don't know exactly who said what, but I don't believe that Bohr believed that there are truly classical objects. This seems to be an opinion attributed to him only by people who misunderstood what he actually said.

After reading many strings of threads with your messges and thoughts. I think what you are trying to say is that if wave function describes single system, it's Many Worlds. If multiple system, it's Ensemble Interpretation.

Yes, that's how I think of it.

 

[Varon]

I disagree with this. I think any kind of "cut" is inconsistent with QM, unless of course all the talk about a "cut" is just another way to express the ideas of the statistical interpretation in a more confusing way. I don't know exactly who said what, but I don't believe that Bohr believed that there are truly classical objects. This seems to be an opinion attributed to him only by people who misunderstood what he actually said.

For over half a century, the following words from John von Neumann's 1932 "Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics" haunted our mind. Here he described that the cut is arbibrary, and there is no division between classical and quantum. Yet you said you disagree. Pls. comment and elaborate why you think such a cut is inconsistent with QM.

von Neumann said in 1932:

In a simple example, these concepts might be applied about as follows: We wish to measure a temperature. If we want, we can pursue this process numerically until we have the temperature of the environment of the mercury container of the thermometer, and then say: this temperature is measured by the thermometer. But we can carry the calculation further, and from the properties of the mercury, which can be explained in kinetic and molecular terms, we can calculate its heating, expansion, and the resultant length of the mercury column, and then say: this length is seen by the observer.

Going still further, and taking the light source into consideration, we could find out the reflection of the light quanta on the opaque mercury column, and the path of the remaining light quanta into the eye of the observer, their refraction in the eye lens, and the formation of an image on the retina, and then we would say: this image is registered by the retina of the observer.

And were our physiological knowledge more precise than it is today, we could go still further, tracing the chemical reactions which produce the impression of this image on the retina, in the optic nerve tract and in the brain, and then in the end say: these chemical changes of his brain cells are perceived by the observer. But in any case, no matter how far we calculate -- to the mercury vessel, to the scale of the thermometer, to the retina, or into the brain, at some time we must say: and this is perceived by the observer. That is, we must always divide the world into two parts, the one being the observed system, the other the observer. In the former, we can follow up all physical processes (in principle at least) arbitrarily precisely. In the latter, this is meaningless.

The boundary between the two is arbitrary to a very large extent. In particular we saw in the four different possibilities in the example above, that the observer in this sense needs not to become identified with the body of the actual observer: In one instance in the above example, we included even the thermometer in it, while in another instance, even the eyes and optic nerve tract were not included. That this boundary can be pushed arbitrarily deeply into the interior of the body of the actual observer is the content of the principle of the psycho-physical parallelism -- but this does not change the fact that in each method of description the boundary must be put somewhere, if the method is not to proceed vacuously, i.e., if a comparison with experiment is to be possible. Indeed experience only makes statements of this type: an observer has made a certain (subjective) observation; and never any like this: a physical quantity has a certain value.

 

[Fredrik]

I agree with all of that, so I probably shouldn't have said "any kind of cut". I'm really just opposed to the idea that there are systems that QM simply can't be applied to. I guess that no one significant ever actually believed that there are such systems. If von Neumann's "collapse" is just an application of the idea described in that quote, I have to change my assessment of Demystifier's list of versions of the CI from

1. This is the SI in disguise.
2. This is the SI in disguise.
3. This is nonsense.
4. This is the SI in disguise.

to

1. This is the SI in disguise.
2. This is the SI in disguise.
3. This is the SI in disguise.
4. This is the SI in disguise.

 

[Varon]

I agree with all of that, so I probably shouldn't have said "any kind of cut". I'm really just opposed to the idea that there are systems that QM simply can't be applied to. I guess that no one significant ever actually believed that there are such systems. If von Neumann's "collapse" is just an application of the idea described in that quote, I have to change my assessment of Demystifier's list of versions of the CI from

1. This is the SI in disguise.
2. This is the SI in disguise.
3. This is nonsense.
4. This is the SI in disguise.

to

1. This is the SI in disguise.
2. This is the SI in disguise.
3. This is the SI in disguise.
4. This is the SI in disguise.

Besides you. What do you think is the mainstream thought about the idea of collapse say in your colleagues? Do they think the collapse is just in the calculation or do they think the collapse is actual? Can you think of an experimental setup where different observers can have different wave functions yet there is only one true wave function of the systems? I'm still a bit confused about what the mainstream think about collapse and all this. Before trying to sort all this out. I want to know first what you think most physicists believe as in actually believing when it comes to collapse and wave function. Most pop-sci books I read doesn't mention about this distinction, so we the public are not aware of the subtle distinctions and inconsistency.

 

[Varon]

Maybe you misunderstood me. I'm pretty sure that physics can explain the behavior of biological systems, including the behavior that we usually think of as a "conscious" behavior. But that's exactly what the problem is. We can explain the BEHAVIOR in terms of known PHYSICAL mechanisms. But these mechanisms do not involve anything like subjective conscious experiences. Subjective conscious experiences are simply not needed to explain the objective behavior. In fact, the whole scientific method explores the objective, not the subjective. I can measure your voice when you cry, I can measure your EEG waves in the brain when I torture you, but I cannot measure your FEELING of pain. I cannot even conceive how to measure someone's feeling of anything.


It's even more egoistic than you think. It's not about humans, but about myself (or yourself). I feel only my feelings, and nobody else's. If I could experience someone else's feelings, then they would no longer be purely subjective, but objective phenomena researchable by the scientific method. But I can't.

Demystifier. About this subjective conscious experience which you said is not part of our current physics. Don't you think the quantum is related to it? At this point. Let me emphasize I know quantum coherence has nothing to do with the brain and classical states is sufficient for the mechanical brain. But qualia, are you absolutely certain it has nothing at all to do with the quantum? What's your killer arguments?

Also why are you biased about liking Bohmian mechanics which is quite mechanical. At least in a variant of Copenhagen, observers create reality. This has more degrees of freedom for subjective conscious experience. But Bohmiam, what you would have are just boring classical particles and balls... unless you believe Bohm implicate order can override and control them? But still you can't transmute or interchange matter and energy by this Bohmian mechanics.

Also since you believe subjective conscious experience or qualia has more to do with time. What if it has more to do with quantum spacetime? Do you think there is a possibility that physicists won't be able to unite quantum mechanics and general relativity without taking subjective conscious experience into account? or are they unrelated? What's your proof that they are not related at all? this Qualia and quantum spacetime (I prefer calling it this rather than quantum gravity because gravity is just a specific case.. the general case of the unification of qm and gr is really quantum spacetime).

So in this message. Try to prove that:

1. Subjective conscious experience is not related to anything quantum
2. Subjective conscious experience is not related to quantum spacetime (or quantum gravity) [although it may be related only to time in your case]

(For those fellows not updated with neuroscience. Try to read up books like Jeffrey Grey "Creeping up the Hard Problem" where you would be exposed to the science inability to explain subjective conscious experience and latest one like Antonio Damacio "Self comes to Mind". We who discuss brains and quantum mechanics are not ignorant or not unaware of neuroscience. We are updated more than the man on the street)

 

[Demystifier]

Demystifier. About this subjective conscious experience which you said is not part of our current physics. Don't you think the quantum is related to it?

No, I don't.

But qualia, are you absolutely certain it has nothing at all to do with the quantum?

I'm not absolutely certain, but I don't see compelling evidence for it.

But Bohmiam, what you would have are just boring classical particles and balls...

Sure, it's boring. But note that my nick name (partially explaining why I like this boring approach) is not Entertainer.

Try to prove that:

1. Subjective conscious experience is not related to anything quantum
2. Subjective conscious experience is not related to quantum spacetime (or quantum gravity) [although it may be related only to time in your case]

As I said, I cannot prove it, but I don't see compelling evidence for it.

 

[unusualname]

Sure, it's boring. But note that my nick name (partially explaining why I like this boring approach) is not Entertainer.

That is really funny, I do like a cool sense of humour.

Varon. Varon Varon, what the hell do you expect here? The Ultimate answers? geez, calm down man.

It is very probable that we are going through a stage where science comes to terms with an ontological probability in nature. In retrospect all the interpretations will be "ahh that's why" type moments, except for the deterministic ones which will be seen like 19th century aether theories.

But it will take time, until someone proposes a scheme which predicts something new, or reformulates everything known so simply that Occam has to apply. I think once it is correctly formulated it will predict something new (and pretty amazing stuff we can do), but "qualia" will be seen to be a new area of science which doesn't immediately appy to the "Standard Model" for example.

 

[Varon]

No, I don't.


I'm not absolutely certain, but I don't see compelling evidence for it.


Sure, it's boring. But note that my nick name (partially explaining why I like this boring approach) is not Entertainer.


As I said, I cannot prove it, but I don't see compelling evidence for it.

Without subjective conscious experience (qualia). The world would simply be populated by Zombies.. here we won't see smiles, joy, meaning. There would be no arts, no poetry, no paintings, no literature, no movies, In such deprived world, sex would be mechanical, and only missionary position would be possible since zombies only know this positions. Likewise, in Bohmian mechanics, the boring particles are like zombies, going their ways in deterministic manner. Hmm... is this why Bohm proposed the Implicate Order which is like qualia?

But in this Implicate order. Wave particle duality comes back in full force. I think Bohm mentioned how when everything is in implicate order, all is wave, and when they are expressed in explicit order, they become particles. So maybe in the latter part of his life. Bohm tried to put away his earlier all particle approach and got back to this wave-particle approach like Bohr. Therefore what you Bohmians may be doing is reviving Bohm earlier approach which he already disowned. Well? Try to refute that Implicate/Explicate Order is not Wave/Particle duality being reintroduced by Bohm later in his life.