EPR paradox revisited, again. hehehe

[ttn]

You keep saying "not coherent" but you don't justify it. Consider the giant's line in "Jack and the Beanstalk": "Fee Fi Fo Fum! I smell the blood of an Englishman! Be he alive or be he dead, I'll grind his bones to make my bread!". That is a complete description of the hypothetical life-states of a hypothetical Englishman (cf. cat).

You mean: he's either alive or dead? This makes me think you don't understand QM very well. Take a nice 2-state quantum analogue: a measurement of the z-axis-spin of some electron will either result in "up" or "down." So "up" and "down" are the only two possible states? Not according to QM! "up" and "down" merely form a *basis* for a whole infinity of possible states, all of which are surely supposed to be in some sense *different* according to the completeness doctrine, yes? What you're saying (if I understand correctly) makes it sound like the completeness doctrine (combined with a purely epistemic attitude toward the wf) implies the old "ignorance interpretation" -- namely, what it means to be in a superposition is, really, to be in one or the other of the states but we're not sure which. But to say that is precisely to confess that the wave function is *not* a complete description of the real state!

The wavefunction's eigenvalues when acted on by the operator representing a particular experiment give a complete description of the possible outcomes of the experiment. Complete in the sense that if you actualize the experiment correctly, you WILL observe one of the indicated outcomes. The wave function it self is even more complete in that it contains the partial information suitable to determine the possible outcomes of any hypothetical (properly set up) experiment.

The wf doesn't have eigenvalues; the operator does.

This is actually an important point. A list of possible measurement outcomes can be produced without specifying the wf. So if that's what you mean by a "complete description" then you don't even need to specify the wave function to have a complete description. Maybe you want to be able to specify not only the possible outcomes, but also the probabilities for each outcome? But then |+x> and |+y> become "the same state" so long as you're about to measure the z-spin. And that again seems to conflict with any rational meaning of completeness.

But let's come to the fundamental: you say that the wf "contains the ... information suitable to determine the possible outcomes..." Look at the word "information". What do you mean by this? What is this "information" information *about*? Is it information about the really-existing quantum system? If so, then either that information is or isn't complete (in the usual ontological sense) and we just have to argue about whether or not there's some good reason to add additional variables. (I will argue that there is a good reason -- namely, to solve the measurement problem.) But if the "information" you speak of is information about something else, you'd better tell me what the something else is.

That seems coherent enough to me. I may or may not agree with it, but coherent? Yes.

Maybe we've just misunderstood each other. I didn't say that the purely epistemic interpretation wasn't coherent. It is. I said that this interpretation rendered the completeness doctrine (as well as claims about the locality of the "theory") incoherent. One is free to deny that one's calculation recipe is telling us anything about the gears and wheels. But then one cannot go on to claim that one's description of the gears and wheels is complete, nor that the gears and wheels don't affect each other superluminally. That's the point.

 

[selfAdjoint]

"up" and "down" merely form a *basis* for a whole infinity of possible states, all of which are surely supposed to be in some sense *different* according to the completeness doctrine, yes?

Yes. And from the point of view of the giant, the hypothetical englishman is in a superposition of the states alive or dead. But the coefficient field in his case (he is a stupid, classical giant) is Z_2 not C.

The wf doesn't have eigenvalues; the operator does.

True, I should have phrased it differently. But the operator's eigenvalues don't have any issue in reality unless it acts on the wavefunction. The Copenhagen view is that the whole operator-wavefunction apparatus is just a formalism for predicting outcomes; the wave function is like a database of hypothetical conditions, and the operator is like a program that reads the database and instantiates them. Neither amounts to anything without the other, but it is meaningful to say that the database contains what any well set-up program will need to instantiate outcomes of a well-prepared experiment.

If you don't like the term information for what the wave function comprises, and want to avoid the weasel word state, I suggest quantum hypothetical.

 

[ttn]

The Copenhagen view is that the whole operator-wavefunction apparatus is just a formalism for predicting outcomes; the wave function is like a database of hypothetical conditions, and the operator is like a program that reads the database and instantiates them. Neither amounts to anything without the other, but it is meaningful to say that the database contains what any well set-up program will need to instantiate outcomes of a well-prepared experiment.

If you don't like the term information for what the wave function comprises, and want to avoid the weasel word state, I suggest quantum hypothetical.

To avoid historical confusion over terminology, let's call the above view the self-adjoint-interpretation. Then let me ask you: according to this interpretation, does the wave function provide a complete description? And then I hope you can clarify: a complete description *of what*? And also this: does the theory respect relativity's prohibition on superluminal causation?

I still don't see how you can address either of these questions unless you accept that the wave function is a description *of* *something*, i.e., unless you accept that the wf is supposed to be a beable. But since it's you who is apparently making this claim, I'll let you clarify things (i.e., discharge the burden of proof).

BTW, here's why the burden of proof is on you: if you interpret the wf as a beable (and as the only beable, i.e., as providing a complete specification of the real state of things) then there is an absolutely clear meaning to the "completeness" and "locality" claims (though, as proved by EPR, both claims can't be simultaneously true!). I don't see how you can say the wf provides a complete description, and also deny that it describes anything. Same sort of problem with the locality question. But prove me wrong if you can!

 

[alfredblase]

the extreme empiricist idea that a theory must be testable on all counts would simply imply that every theory which is more than a simple catalog of past observations would not satisfy the requirement. Try to account testability of the concept of "force" in Newtonian physics...

[the above quote was from vanesch]

Newton's second law states that:

The rate of change of momentum of a body is equal to the resultant force acting on the body and is in the same direction.

You prove this statement every day vanesch [within well defined limits of course]. Newtonian physics makes no other definition of force.

Next point:

The effects of the "worlds" can be observed, in principle, by quantum interference experiments.

No no no. "in principle" is certainly not good enough. You must first define the term "world" and all other terms involved in this definition. Then you must prove inequivocably that there are "many" of them. Either that or I denounce you as a crackpot physicist for claiming that MWQM [meaning "Many Worlds Quantum Theory" ] is an undeniable physical theory.

Ok; I'm going to going to present my argument fully as I can:

1. Causality must hold in all physical theories [I can provide arguments for this if needed]

2. In view of point 1: QM must have a provable physical interpretation that ensures causality is not violated in order to be accepted as a physical theory.

I ask for a brief description [if there is one] of such an interpretation please

 

[DrChinese]

So... the point is, the first half of this argument is *crucial*. Without it, your left with the muddle-headed view that is so widely held today: Bell proved not that there is any problem with QM itself, but only with attempts to add hidden variables -- i.e., Bell proved that Bohr was right and Einstein was wrong. This view is complete BS.

Well, you have an opinion on that... but the facts are a bit short and hinge on your interpretation of EPR and Bell (that not all of us agree upon).

First, let's agree that there is nothing in particular "wrong" with the current oQM formalism.

Second, Einstein - EPR - *was* wrong - at least in some ways. EPR absolutely felt that experiments would show that the Heisenberg Uncertainty Relations could be beaten. They never knew about Bell or Aspect. They contended that if oQM were complete, that there could not be simultaneous reality to non-commuting observables - a position they considered unreasonable. Of course, they too recognized that if locality were violated, this would provide an escape route. But that too was considered at least as unreasonable.

Third, I would cast doubt that Bohr's position that oQM is complete has not been successfully defended. And of course, by completeness I mean that the WF is complete.

I would agree with you that there is a sense in which oQM is non-local, that being the collapse of the WF. (And I don't mean to step on MWI in that statement because that is not my intention.) However, I do not agree that causality is violated by such non-local collapse; and we already agree there is no non-local signal mechanisms. So the only real disagreement is whether we now call oQM non-local. I don't (because local causality is not violated in the sense that Alice's choice of setting does not affect Bob's result); you do (because WF collapse is FTL).

 

[DrChinese]

1. Causality must hold in all physical theories [I can provide arguments for this if needed]

2. In view of point 1: QM must have a provable physical interpretation that ensures causality is not violated in order to be accepted as a physical theory.

I ask for a brief description [if there is one] of such an interpretation please

1. Causality is not a requirement of all physical theories. QM is a counter-example to that idea. See for instance a paper I wrote: Determinism Refuted[/url].

2. QM *is* generally accepted, and subsequent to Bell I doubt it is considered causal universally.

A theory could consist of voodoo if it worked - and by "worked" I mean: it is useful. Please do not confuse theories with "the truth".

 

[vanesch]

[the above quote was from vanesch]

Newton's second law states that:

The rate of change of momentum of a body is equal to the resultant force acting on the body and is in the same direction.

You prove this statement every day vanesch [within well defined limits of course]. Newtonian physics makes no other definition of force.

The concepts of "momentum", "force" and so on are only helpful quantities in order to EXPLAIN, conceptually, observations (which are usually visual impressions of pointers on a dial, or spots on a photograph or whatever tool you decide to use as experimental apparatus). You cannot observe DIRECTLY a force, you can only observe its pretended consequences. As such it is an organizing principle of your observations.

The "many worlds" (in other words, the wavefunction!) is exactly that too.

No no no. "in principle" is certainly not good enough. You must first define the term "world" and all other terms involved in this definition.

world = term in the wavefunction, when written in a particular basis (usually the one that corresponds to the Schmidt-decomposition between the Hilbert space of the observer and the rest of the world).

I protest against the rejection of "in principle": it is the essence of any theory, to be able to say what would happen in principle, without limitation by the state of experimental technology (as long as that limitation is also not a matter of principle of course, that's the danger...).

Then you must prove inequivocably that there are "many" of them. Either that or I denounce you as a crackpot physicist for claiming that MWQM [meaning "Many Worlds Quantum Theory" ] is an undeniable physical theory.

You can say the same about Newton, then. Or any other person who has set up a physical theory. You can NEVER PROVE the existence of all the theoretical concepts that appear in the theory, you can only argue about its empirical validity or not. Because if what you claim is right, then it would be sufficient to reformulate a theory in an empirically equivalent one to show the "crackpottishness" of both. Newtonian physics (with forces) can be reformulated as a stationarity principle (Lagrange, ...). So both are clearly crackpottish theories according to your criterium (because in the Lagrangian formulation, no concept of "force" appears explicitly).

 

[vanesch]

I can only assume that something is the relevant aspect of the quantum world. What else could the completeness doctrine mean? The whole anti-hidden-variables attitude of the orthodoxy is precisely against the idea of *supplementing* the wf's description of the quantum world with something else.

I think that what's meant is that the WF contains ALL POSSIBLE information that one could ever extract from the system by any conceivable experiment (in other words, that the statistical predictions by quantum theory of the outcomes of experiment contain already the MAXIMUM amount of information (in the information-theoretic sense) about these outcomes, and that no theoretical refinement ever is going to do any better.

Now, of course I share your problems with this view which vehemently refuses to consider the ontology of the microworld and nevertheless claims to know all about it that can be known, but I think that this IS the view that is proposed in the Copenhagen interpretation.

So, I guess I think you shouldn't accept so easily something that is often said but is not actually accepted in practice. Plus, as I've said before, if there is some interpretation in which the wf does not refer to anything actually real (any gears and wheels) then that interpretation is not a theory, and there is therefore no way to apply terms like complete/incomplete/local/nonlocal to it.

I agree with your statement concerning locality ; however, "completeness" in the above sense would make sense.

I also agree with your claim about the schizophreny of its practicians: when they do physics with the wavefunction (when they write out interaction terms and so on, and say they can neglect certain contributions and so on) I have a hard time imagining that they do not give it some kind of ontological status (I don't know how you devellop an intuition for something to which you assign no ontological status at all).

And it is based, in part, on the confusion between Bell Locality (which is a basic requirement for theories) and the Bell Inequalities (which is merely a consequence for a certain class of Bell Local theories).

Probably, but given that everybody already confuses Bell locality with Bell inequalities, why don't we just tag the word "Bell locality" to just that, and we tag the word beable locality to the "locality of interaction by the beables of the theory".

Or otherwise we call it "Bell inequalities induced locality"...

Now we clearly have that, when measurement outcomes are seen as beables (which they are NOT in the MWI view!), then beable locality is equivalent to Bell locality (and that was in fact Bell's reasoning, right ?). So probably because Bell took this statement as so very obvious (that observations are "real", hence, beables) that he didn't even gave it further thought, he could reason the way he did.

 

[ttn]

I think that what's meant is that the WF contains ALL POSSIBLE information that one could ever extract from the system by any conceivable experiment (in other words, that the statistical predictions by quantum theory of the outcomes of experiment contain already the MAXIMUM amount of information (in the information-theoretic sense) about these outcomes, and that no theoretical refinement ever is going to do any better.

But (to repeat an earlier question) what is this "information" information *about*? There is no such thing as free-floating information that isn't information about something. The very concept "information" is literally meaningless without some object (like other concepts such as "awareness").

As I've said, it is possible to deny any micro-ontology and regard the whole QM formalism as simply being about measurement outcomes and nothing else. But then, as I keep arguing, all talk about "completeness" or "locality" becomes meaningless.

Now, of course I share your problems with this view which vehemently refuses to consider the ontology of the microworld and nevertheless claims to know all about it that can be known, but I think that this IS the view that is proposed in the Copenhagen interpretation.

It's one of the views, but the advocates aren't consistent. They go back and forth between the common-sense ontological interpretation of wf-as-complete, and the completely epistemic version. When they want to rail against Bohmian mechanics, they deride the hidden variables as cumbersome metaphysics (or whatever) and insist that the wf alone provides a complete description of quantum states. Then when they want to avoid the charge that their theory (like Bohm's) is nonlocal, they switch to the epistemic version. Well, we shouldn't let them so easily have it both ways. There *are* two ways to think about it, but they're not the same. Each has a virtue and a vice, and it's just not reasonable to let people fuzz up the issue and pick and choose the virtues from mutually inconsistent theories as it suits them.

I agree with your statement concerning locality ; however, "completeness" in the above sense would make sense.

Only if what the "complete" description is a complete description *of* is measurement outcomes. But (a) this claim doesn't really make any sense and (b) it is not at all the same thing that is claimed or denied in the context of debates about "hidden variables".

I also agree with your claim about the schizophreny of its practicians: when they do physics with the wavefunction (when they write out interaction terms and so on, and say they can neglect certain contributions and so on) I have a hard time imagining that they do not give it some kind of ontological status (I don't know how you devellop an intuition for something to which you assign no ontological status at all).

Right, I totally agree.

Probably, but given that everybody already confuses Bell locality with Bell inequalities, why don't we just tag the word "Bell locality" to just that, and we tag the word beable locality to the "locality of interaction by the beables of the theory".

I personally think this confusion over terminology reflects a much deeper and more important/fundamental confusion over what Bell's theorem proves in the first place. So I think it's worth fighting to clarify this terminology, rather than just accepting the confusion and introducing new terminology.

Now we clearly have that, when measurement outcomes are seen as beables (which they are NOT in the MWI view!),

Aren't they as much beables as anything else in MWI? I mean, the measuring appratuses are made out of electrons and whatnot, and hence described by wave functions. It's just that, usually, the apparatus isn't in a definite pointer state. But the formal entities that MWI uses to refer to the apparatuses (namely, wave functions!) are not only beables -- they're the only (kind of) beables. Well, except for those pesky "consciousness tokens"...

then beable locality is equivalent to Bell locality (and that was in fact Bell's reasoning, right ?). So probably because Bell took this statement as so very obvious (that observations are "real", hence, beables) that he didn't even gave it further thought, he could reason the way he did.

That's right. But I object to your making it sound like it was some kind of dubious, uncareful "leap" to just assume (without "giving it further thought") that pointers actually point. I mean, if you can't believe what you see, how the heck are you going to believe anything? Even your precious quantum formalism is ultimately -- historically -- based on putting together a whole bunch of things that a whole bunch of people literally saw!

 

[Sherlock]

Well, it's true that Bohr once said "there is no quantum world" or whatever. But he (and generations of followers) also insisted that the wave function alone provides a *complete* description of... [something]. I can only assume that something is the relevant aspect of the quantum world. What else could the completeness doctrine mean?

... as I've said before, if there is some interpretation in which the wf does not refer to anything actually real (any gears and wheels) then that interpretation is not a theory, and there is therefore no way to apply terms like complete/incomplete/local/nonlocal to it. Those terms refer to gears and wheels, period. So if the copenhagen/orthodox people don't believe their theory provides any gears and wheels, what the heck are they talking about when they keep on insisting decade after decade that OQM is both complete and local?

If assumptions about quantum theory's relationship with an underlying quantum world are avoided, then the expansion theorem-postulate doesn't say anything about nonlocality. The theory is then interpreted as being acausal, and as such makes no statement about the existence, or not, of nonlocal causality in nature. In this view it isn't a locally causal theory either. So, it wouldn't, strictly speaking, be correct to call it a local theory. If OQM is thought of that way (as a local theory), then I would guess that it just has to do with it not violating the principle of local causality (which it doesn't as long as it's not being taken as mirroring an underlying quantum world).

What they are talking about wrt completeness is that the wavefunction is regarded as a complete description of what can be quantitatively determined about a quantum experimental preparation --- that the instrumental output will correspond to the probabilities assigned by the wavefunction for the setup.

The orthodox interpretation is about what the theory is, not what it might be. The theory is a mathematical scheme that assigns probabilities to qualitative instrumental behavior. Attributing some speculative significance (in terms of a correspondence to an underlying quantum world) to the qm algorithm or any part thereof is beyond the scope of the theory itself (and apparently beyond the scope of physics, at least for the foreseeable future).

So, the only interpretation of quantum theory that is clearly meaningful is the orthodox, probabilistic (or Copenhagen) interpretation. Specifying what quantum theory is known to be about (assigning probabilities to experimental results), while avoiding speculation about the theory's relationship to an underlying reality, doesn't make it any less a physical theory. It just can't necessarily be taken as a description of an underlying reality --- and this is maybe the most confounding way in which quantum theory differs from its classical predecessors.

Your two-part argument for nonlocality in nature, ttn, seems solid enough given the assumption that the mathematical gears and wheels of quantum theory are a 1-1 mapping, or at least in very close approximation to, the relevant (to the experimental results) qualitative aspects of an underlying quantum world. However, it seems just as reasonable to assume that they aren't, but rather are just charting the evolution of the instrumental probabilities. Seen from the latter point of view, the gaps in the quantum theoretical picture aren't surprising and don't imply nonlocal causality.

 

[ttn]

If assumptions about quantum theory's relationship with an underlying quantum world are avoided, then the expansion theorem-postulate doesn't say anything about nonlocality. The theory is then interpreted as being acausal, and as such makes no statement about the existence, or not, of nonlocal causality in nature. In this view it isn't a locally causal theory either. So, it wouldn't, strictly speaking, be correct to call it a local theory.

That is exactly the point I keep trying to make. If one's response to the assertion "your theory, if interpreted ontologically, is nonlocal" is to say "oh, well then I guess I won't interpret it ontologically" -- then one is *not entitled* to claim that one's theory is local! The very thing that prevents the accuser from saying it's *nonlocal* -- the very thing that makes people want to take this strategy to avoid what is otherwise an unavoidable accusation -- *also* prevents the advocate from saying it's *local*! That's the whole key point. It's not that it's not nonlocal and therefore local. It's not nonlocal in a different sense. It's not nonlocal in the sense that the whole idea of "nonlocality" is now inapplicable. But guess what? The whole idea of "locality" is also now also inapplicable, for exactly the same reason.

To "go epistemic" as a way of eluding the charge of nonlocality is *not* to defend the locality of one's theory. It's to remove one's theory from the class of things to which concepts like locality/nonlocality are applicable.

If OQM is thought of that way (as a local theory), then I would guess that it just has to do with it not violating the principle of local causality (which it doesn't as long as it's not being taken as mirroring an underlying quantum world).

It's the same issue. It neither violates nor fails to violate "the principle of local causality." It no longer *says* anything causal.

What they are talking about wrt completeness is that the wavefunction is regarded as a complete description of what can be quantitatively determined about a quantum experimental preparation --- that the instrumental output will correspond to the probabilities assigned by the wavefunction for the setup.

On that premise, what should/do they say about something like Bohmian mechanics?

The orthodox interpretation is about what the theory is, not what it might be. The theory is a mathematical scheme that assigns probabilities to qualitative instrumental behavior. Attributing some speculative significance (in terms of a correspondence to an underlying quantum world) to the qm algorithm or any part thereof is beyond the scope of the theory itself (and apparently beyond the scope of physics, at least for the foreseeable future).

What about Bohmian Mechanics? You can't just arbitrarily say it's "beyond the scope of physics for the foreseeable future" when there already exists an empirically viable theory that does precisely this.

So, the only interpretation of quantum theory that is clearly meaningful is the orthodox, probabilistic (or Copenhagen) interpretation.

Bohmian Mechanics is not meaningful?

You'll have to explain what you mean by "meaningful".

Specifying what quantum theory is known to be about (assigning probabilities to experimental results), while avoiding speculation about the theory's relationship to an underlying reality, doesn't make it any less a physical theory.

Refusing on principle to provide a theoretical account of physical reality doesn't make it any less a physical theory? I thought providing some such account was what a physical theory *was*?

It just can't necessarily be taken as a description of an underlying reality --- and this is maybe the most confounding way in which quantum theory differs from its classical predecessors.

It *isn't* taken as a description... But it *can* be.

Your two-part argument for nonlocality in nature, ttn, seems solid enough given the assumption that the mathematical gears and wheels of quantum theory are a 1-1 mapping, or at least in very close approximation to, the relevant (to the experimental results) qualitative aspects of an underlying quantum world. However, it seems just as reasonable to assume that they aren't, but rather are just charting the evolution of the instrumental probabilities.

As I keep saying, it's fine to take them that way. But then you just don't have a theory anymore. If a theory is something that provides an account of the state of the quantum system, then no Bell Local theory can agree with experiment. Of course someone can refuse to put forth a theory, or can put forth a calculation recipe that they *call* a theory but which is not a theory in the sense I've just defined it. That doesn't magically count as a "local theory" though. It's just a calculation recipe, and doesn't effect one whit the two part argument. No theory can be Bell Local and still agree with experiment.

Seen from the latter point of view, the gaps in the quantum theoretical picture aren't surprising and don't imply nonlocal causality.

Sure, in the same sense that if I only say "I like peanut butter" I don't imply any nonlocal causality. But who cares? What we're talking about is not all the possible ways of avoiding making a certain kind of false statement. What we're talking about is whether one can have a *theory* that respects Bell Locality and still agrees with experiment. I claim Bell proved (with the 2 part argument) that we can't. And you don't refute this proof by pointing out that there are other things one could utter (things which aren't theories) which "don't imply nonlocal causality." All sorts of things don't imply it -- by virtue of their not making any causal claims in the first place. But citing a bunch of such things isn't a good strategy for refuting Bell's argument -- it's just a distraction technique! As if I said "all men are mortal" and you tried to refute me by pointing to a rock and saying "that thing isn't mortal". Or really it's more like you point to a rock and say "I like peanut butter".

 

[alfredblase]

1. Causality is not a requirement of all physical theories. QM is a counter-example to that idea. See for instance a paper I wrote: Determinism Refuted[/url].

I looked at your paper but... I disagree. I don't see anything wrong in doing the following: I will define causality [how about calling it Blase Causality? :P ] and from that definition it will be evident that it is inviolate. The definition is merely a description of what can be observed every day.

A_d is a description of reality of A and B_d is a description of B. If when an action is performed on A so that A_d changes, B_d also changes, and if this has been observed to happen every time this action occurs, then I hold that the change in A_d causes the change in B_d. Blase Causality is the principle stating that the causing change should always occur before the resulting change, and always with enough time for the causing change to affect the resulting change. “Enough time” depends upon the mechanism via which the change or causality occurs.

In the case of EPR type experiments I must confess I am ignorant of the actual mechanism [according to QM] via which the evident change in Alice'selectron_d causes the evident change in Bob'selectron_d. Is there an identified mechanism? And if there is I would very much appreciate someone enlightening me on this.

2. QM *is* generally accepted, and subsequent to Bell I doubt it is considered causal universally.

I’m very well aware that QM *is* generally accepted ; This thread began in an effort to find a way of accepting it myself, but in my view has raised many questions that must be answered and which I havn't seen answers to.

A theory could consist of voodoo if it worked - and by "worked" I mean: it is useful. Please do not confuse theories with "the truth".

Yes, you are absolutely right; I was struggling with how to phrase my second point, thanks for finding the words for me. I rephrase the second point as follows:

2. In view of point 1: QM must have a provable physical interpretation that ensures Blase Causality is not violated in order to be accepted as a physical theory describing reality in wholly acceptable way.

 

[alfredblase]

lol, this is hard work interesting tho

The concepts of "momentum", "force" and so on are only helpful quantities in order to EXPLAIN, conceptually, observations (which are usually visual impressions of pointers on a dial, or spots on a photograph or whatever tool you decide to use as experimental apparatus). You cannot observe DIRECTLY a force, you can only observe its pretended consequences. As such it is an organizing principle of your observations.

Ok we express ourselves differently but I see now that we agree about this.

The "many worlds" (in other words, the wavefunction!) is exactly that too.

world = term in the wavefunction, when written in a particular basis (usually the one that corresponds to the Schmidt-decomposition between the Hilbert space of the observer and the rest of the world).

Ok, I must confess I don’t really know what that means, but I am willing to assume that your definition is sound.

I protest against the rejection of "in principle": it is the essence of any theory, to be able to say what would happen in principle, without limitation by the state of experimental technology

we agree on this but...

(as long as that limitation is also not a matter of principle of course, that's the danger...).

is there an actual experiment, that can actually be carried out, that can prove that there are “many worlds”?

You can say the same about Newton, then.

not at all; there are many actual experiments which prove, without a doubt, Newton’s laws within its well defined limits.

You can NEVER PROVE the existence of all the theoretical concepts that appear in the theory, you can only argue about its empirical validity or not.

You have misunderstood what makes a theory. A theory makes a statement such as Newton’s second law. Perfectly valid in my view and merely defines a force as the measurable quantity “rate of change of momentum”; nothing more, nothing less. It does not suggest an unseen thing that can never be observed, just rate of change of momentum, simple enough and more than adequate vanesch.

Because if what you claim is right, then it would be sufficient to reformulat.e a theory in an empirically equivalent one to show the "crackpottishness" of both. Newtonian physics (with forces) can be reformulated as a stationarity principle (Lagrange, ...). So both are clearly crackpottish theories according to your criterium (because in the Lagrangian formulation, no concept of "force" appears explicitly).

Again no! The Lagrangian approach is equivalent to the Newtonian approach but instead of force we talk about the gradient of the potential energy.

You are misunderstanding me Vanesch and you have still to come up with an experiment that can actually be carried out that proves that MWQM is acceptable. Again I repeat: is there one?

 

[vanesch]

is there an actual experiment, that can actually be carried out, that can prove that there are “many worlds”?

Personally, I consider the EPR experiments a good indication, but then there are other interpretations of the same. So no, you cannot *prove* that there are many worlds (in the same way that you cannot prove that there are forces).

You have misunderstood what makes a theory. A theory makes a statement such as Newton’s second law. Perfectly valid in my view and merely defines a force as the measurable quantity “rate of change of momentum”; nothing more, nothing less. It does not suggest an unseen thing that can never be observed, just rate of change of momentum, simple enough and more than adequate vanesch.

I've never seen a momentum. Momentum is a conceptual tool to arrive at predictions of measurements. So is force. After all, in Einsteins GR, there IS no force of gravity! It's geometry. So you see, no matter how "real" force seems to be to you, it is a conceptual entity which is not directly observable (but whose consequences, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE THEORY, are observable ; agreement with such observations then strengthens the belief in the reality of the concept).

Again no! The Lagrangian approach is equivalent to the Newtonian approach but instead of force we talk about the gradient of the potential energy.

Well, "many worlds" are then equivalent to standard quantum theory in its observable predictions too. And note that the Lagrangian approach is conceptually TOTALLY DIFFERENT than Newton's. In the Lagrangian approach, there is a holistic COST FUNCTION which is minimised (or extremalized), and things move (a bit magically) in such a way as to minimize their "Lagrangian taxes". Nothing pulling and pushing. You can then DERIVE that thinking this way will give you the same results AS IF there were forces acting. But there are no forces, just "lagrangian taxes". In the same way, from these "many worlds" you can derive that everything will happen AS IF there were a projection.

You are misunderstanding me Vanesch and you have still to come up with an experiment that can actually be carried out that proves that MWQM is acceptable. Again I repeat: is there one?

MWQM has only one reason of existence: giving a coherent and ontological picture of the formalism of quantum theory, where no distinction is made between "interaction physics" and "measurement physics".

 

[alfredblase]

Personally, I consider the EPR experiments a good

I don't understand the MWI so I guess I can't really judge. Is it generally accepted that EPR experimental experiments are proof that MWQM is a wholy acceptable theory? Perhaps you could point me to an online introductory paper/article on MWI so that I may understand a bit more.

indication, but then there are other interpretations of the same. So no, you cannot *prove* that there are many worlds (in the same way that you cannot prove that there are forces).

In the case of Newtonian force all that is needed is proof that his second law is valid, I maintain you expect too much from the concept of force.

I've never seen a momentum. Momentum is a conceptual tool to arrive at predictions of measurements.

Momentum is mass times velocity. You can measure the mass of an object by directly comparing its weight with other well defined masses. I'm very happy with that measurable defintion, I don't see why you have a problem with it. The metre and the second also have measurable definitions. So you have seen a momentum.

Well, "many worlds" are then equivalent to standard quantum theory in its observable predictions too.

I don't know... I direct you to my reply to Dr Chinese's post [post 102] MWQM presumably has an identified mechanism in EPR experiments which ensures Blase Causality is not violated, I have yet to hear about OQM's such mechanism. Also OQM is generally accepted, is MWQM generally accepted?

And note that the Lagrangian approach is conceptually TOTALLY DIFFERENT than Newton's. In the Lagrangian approach, there is a holistic COST FUNCTION which is minimised (or extremalized), and things move (a bit magically) in such a way as to minimize their "Lagrangian taxes". Nothing pulling and pushing. You can then DERIVE that thinking this way will give you the same results AS IF there were forces acting. But there are no forces, just "lagrangian taxes".

Both are valid interpretations of the same law. Nothing wrong with that.

In the same way, from these "many worlds" you can derive that everything will happen AS IF there were a projection.

again I don't know enough I repeat:

I direct you to my reply to Dr Chinese's post [post 102]. MWQM presumably has an identified mechanism in EPR experiments which ensures Blase Causality is not violated, I have yet to hear about OQM's such mechanism. Also OQM is generally accepted, is MWQM generally accepted?

MWQM has only one reason of existence: giving a coherent and ontological picture of the formalism of quantum theory, where no distinction is made between "interaction physics" and "measurement physics".

If it is generally accepted that MQWM provides such a picture, then being the only such interpretation I have heard of I will adopt it myself =) But I repeat: is MWQM generally accepted?

 

[DrChinese]

A_d is a description of reality of A and B_d is a description of B. If when an action is performed on A so that A_d changes, B_d also changes, and if this has been observed to happen every time this action occurs, then I hold that the change in A_d causes the change in B_d. Blase Causality is the principle stating that the causing change should always occur before the resulting change, and always with enough time for the causing change to affect the resulting change. “Enough time” depends upon the mechanism via which the change or causality occurs.

Yes, sure. But a careful review will indicate that using your idea will indicate that causality does not exist - ever. Because only to the extent that you identify what you seek to label as "causal" can that actual setup be causal.

To be specific: A free falling object accelerates in a gravitational field. Except for chairs, cars, houses, etc. They do not appear to move at all. So our "cause" does applies only when there is nothing to make it not apply. Not very convincing, I'm afraid. The same is true of chance events. The world around us consists of a mixture of apparently chance and causal influences. Sometimes we tend to see one, sometimes the other.

The fact that a occurs before b is hardly sufficient to prove a causes b. By logic, I could use the same argument to prove that the future causes the past. I.e. can you prove that b didn't cause a? In the end, you define a as causing b only because you define a as preceding b - unless of course you give us the specific mechanism. That would be a bit difficult: no one actually knows the mechanisms... whether we are taking about relativity or quantum mechanics...

 

[vanesch]

A_d is a description of reality of A and B_d is a description of B. If when an action is performed on A so that A_d changes, B_d also changes, and if this has been observed to happen every time this action occurs, then I hold that the change in A_d causes the change in B_d. Blase Causality is the principle stating that the causing change should always occur before the resulting change, and always with enough time for the causing change to affect the resulting change. “Enough time” depends upon the mechanism via which the change or causality occurs.

In other words, Blase Causality = observed correlation + order in time, right ?

Order in time in *any* reference frame, or in just a specific one ?
(accepting special relativity...)

 

[vanesch]

I don't understand the MWI so I guess I can't really judge. Is it generally accepted that EPR experimental experiments are proof that MWQM is a wholy acceptable theory?

No, EPR experiments are not in general seen as a proof of MWI. I just see it that way, as do some others, and not even as "proof" but as "indication". As I said before, you're not going to be able to prove MWI. It is an *interpretation*.

Perhaps you could point me to an online introductory paper/article on MWI so that I may understand a bit more.

The Wiki article is not bad:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many_worlds

There's IMO one serious error in it, namely that Hartle "proved" the Born rule. Nobody proved the Born rule without sneaking it in somehow through the back door (that's my heresy in MWI, but I'm pretty convinced of it: I found the "back door" in all derivations I've seen - this has been discussed here already).

I don't know... I direct you to my reply to Dr Chinese's post [post 102] MWQM presumably has an identified mechanism in EPR experiments which ensures Blase Causality is not violated, I have yet to hear about OQM's such mechanism. Also OQM is generally accepted, is MWQM generally accepted?

OQM has an "advantage", that is that it is used as starting point in about all textbooks (and I find that a good idea too: there's no need - or even possibility - to discuss seriously any interpretational issue in QM before one has learned the formalism). So people who somehow are not much interested in foundational issues (I'd say, the majority!), stick to the "default textbook" version. However, amongst people who ARE interested in foundational issues, I think that MWI has higher rates of popularity.

I direct you to my reply to Dr Chinese's post [post 102]. MWQM presumably has an identified mechanism in EPR experiments which ensures Blase Causality is not violated, I have yet to hear about OQM's such mechanism. Also OQM is generally accepted, is MWQM generally accepted?

None are "generally accepted". But if your question is: is MWI a fringe view, helt up by a few lunatics, then I'd say, no, it is taken seriously. It is in fact easier to take seriously than OQM, which is *inconsistent*.
What is inconsistent in OQM is that there are two different rules for describing a physical process, which lead to different descriptions (though, for all practical purposes, lead to identical empirical predictions... except in special cases!). These rules are 1) the Schroedinger equation and 2) the collapse postulate. According to whether something happening, is called a physical interaction, or a measurement, we should use rule 1 or rule 2, and it is clear that rule 1 is going to give a DIFFERENT result than rule 2. And then, the question arises: is a voltmeter acting on the system, going to be a physical interaction between "voltmeter" and "system", or is it NOT a physical interaction, but a "measurement" ? You'll say, both. Well, then now we have two non-equal state descriptions of the voltmeter, and that's an internal inconsistency.

What are the ways out ? The simplest one is to make a list of what happenings are NOT physical interactions, but measurements. Although this can be done, there seems to be no general principle which makes up this list. Not the number of particles involved (like in superconductivity or other condensed matter phenomena), not the spatial extention of the quantum system (EPR experiments over 50 km)...

The way out of an inconsistent theory is to use your gut feeling of when to use one path of reasoning, and when the other. That's actually what most practitioners of quantum theory do, and the "gut feeling" is usually induced by "it becomes too complicated to calculate explicitly".

The other idea is to say that the wavefunction is some kind of statistical mechanics and that there will be an underlying classical theory explaining all this. As such, we should not be surprised that a measurement is a collapse, because it simply updates our knowledge. Then I'd like to see WHAT underlying theory we're talking about. Claiming vague properties of a non-defined theory is too easy to weasel out. And once you DO specify a specific theory (such as Bohmian mechanics), then you do not have the OQM view either anymore.

 

[jackle]

Bury the hatchet

Leandros,

if anyone else can make sense of your objections and put them forward in a clear manner I shall try and answer them. I'm sorry but I do not have a clue what you are talking about.

I think Leandros is saying that if you tried to set up an EPR type experiment, you would encounter relativistic contraints. You would also have to be extremely careful that any information you thought you were transmitting faster than light was actually something you didn't already have to know in advance and could be controlled in a way that it could be used to send actual messages.

His objections made sense to me on this level and I think you were unfair to him.

jackle no one is talking about determinism here... you are confused. I recommend the philosophy forum.

When I skim-read the last few pages, I noticed that the bottom line here (on many recent threads) is about how to interpret quantum mechanics and I see causality coming up again and again. Something you said earlier made me think that you were simply assuming determinism and this is why I tried to challenge this early on. I still think you need to check your assumptions.

I studied QM at university (rather than primary school!) it is a lot of heavy maths that describe nature. I think you will find that a lot of the issues you are raising are in fact philosophy rather than quantum physics. I would be very happy to discuss this with you in the Philosphy forum. I admit I have forgotten the maths.

We can abandon the insults and have a grown up conversation if you like. I'd also be interested to find out your academic background because I am having trouble "placing" you.

 

[alfredblase]

unless of course you give us the specific mechanism. That would be a bit difficult: no one actually knows the mechanisms... whether we are taking about relativity or quantum mechanics...

In other words, Blase Causality = observed correlation + order in time, right ?

Order in time in *any* reference frame, or in just a specific one ?
(accepting special relativity...)

well I always assumed that such mechanisms were identified in all theories,,, well anyway I’ll try to answer both your posts [drchinese and vanesch] with an example of Blase Causality,,

the discussions taking place in this thread and in the “yet another cat question” thread are in my view important and my ideas on the issues raised in these threads are begging to coalesce; I think they answer quite a few unanswered questions,,, I have never claimed that QM is not a completely truthful theory, I have been merely struggling to understand how it is generally accepted when there are so many unanswered, important questions,,

I am going to attempt to write a paper that I hope will express my ideas,,,

I will not continue big discussions on these subjects via this forum until I at least make an attempt to write the paper as it is not a very efficient way,, this forum is titled “Physics Help and Math Help” not “express your new ideas” after all :P ,,, if you are still interested in the discussions taking place and what I may have to say on the subjects, I ask you to wait until my “paper” is written,,, I’ll let you know, xD but you probably have more important things to worry about, hehe; thanks for your attention and patience so far, you have all helped to clarify my ideas about QM, and I have enjoyed the discussions very much, and look forward to continuing them =)

 

[alfredblase]

I think Leandros is saying that if you tried to set up an EPR type experiment, you would encounter relativistic contraints. You would also have to be extremely careful that any information you thought you were transmitting faster than light was actually something you didn't already have to know in advance and could be controlled in a way that it could be used to send actual messages.

His objections made sense to me on this level and I think you were unfair to him.



When I skim-read the last few pages, I noticed that the bottom line here (on many recent threads) is about how to interpret quantum mechanics and I see causality coming up again and again. Something you said earlier made me think that you were simply assuming determinism and this is why I tried to challenge this early on. I still think you need to check your assumptions.

My arguments where no different to EPR arguments, that have been made before by infinately better scientists than myself, I just modified them very slightly in order to take the issue to causality,, I am sorry about being rude, I know I have been, but sometimes I suffer from complete lack of patience :P I'm sure we all agree that what matters in PF is really the physics, not whether I'm nice no? :P heh

I studied QM at university (rather than primary school!) it is a lot of heavy maths that describe nature.

I'd also be interested to find out your academic background because I am having trouble "placing" you.

Our backgrounds are similar then: I am a recent MPhys graduate [2:1] from good uni =) but I honestly believe my background shouldn't matter, one of the great things about PF is that if your posts are sound enough then you can discuss things with some great physicists [not counting myself as such a physicist of course] even if you are a layman,,

If you want to hear my arguments properly watch this space [see my previous post] =)

 

[DrChinese]

if you are still interested in the discussions taking place and what I may have to say on the subjects, I ask you to wait until my “paper” is written,,, I’ll let you know

Looking forward to seeing more...

 

[jackle]

I'm sure we all agree that what matters in PF is really the physics, not whether I'm nice no?

Yeah it is.

If you want to hear my arguments properly watch this space...

OK

 

[Sherlock]

To "go epistemic" as a way of eluding the charge of nonlocality is *not* to defend the locality of one's theory. It's to remove one's theory from the class of things to which concepts like locality/nonlocality are applicable.

I agree. I've thought of this differently in the past, but now I think that concepts like locality-nonlocality don't apply to quantum theory.

The orthodox interpretation is about what the theory is, not what it might be. The theory is a mathematical scheme that assigns probabilities to qualitative instrumental behavior. Attributing some speculative significance (in terms of a correspondence to an underlying quantum world) to the qm algorithm or any part thereof is beyond the scope of the theory itself (and apparently beyond the scope of physics, at least for the foreseeable future).

What about Bohmian Mechanics? You can't just arbitrarily say it's "beyond the scope of physics for the foreseeable future" when there already exists an empirically viable theory that does precisely this.

It's beyond the scope of physics to determine that theory A more closely approximates an underlying quantum world than theory B. Underlying quantum world is undefined --- its meaning is as ambiguous as there are metaphysical visions of it.

If a theory is something that provides an account of the state of the quantum system, then no Bell Local theory can agree with experiment. Of course someone can refuse to put forth a theory, or can put forth a calculation recipe that they *call* a theory but which is not a theory in the sense I've just defined it. That doesn't magically count as a "local theory" though. It's just a calculation recipe, and doesn't effect one whit the two part argument. No theory can be Bell Local and still agree with experiment.

What we're talking about is not all the possible ways of avoiding making a certain kind of false statement. What we're talking about is whether one can have a *theory* that respects Bell Locality and still agrees with experiment. I claim Bell proved (with the 2 part argument) that we can't. And you don't refute this proof by pointing out that there are other things one could utter (things which aren't theories) which "don't imply nonlocal causality." All sorts of things don't imply it -- by virtue of their not making any causal claims in the first place.

I agree that Bell proved that we can't have an empirically viable, locally causal description of underlying reality. But, this has to do with the issue of what can be experimentally determined, rather than locality-nonlocality.

But citing a bunch of such things isn't a good strategy for refuting Bell's argument ...

I think that's true. I also think it's true that Bell's argument doesn't require the conclusion that nonlocality is a fact of nature. The only facts of nature that exist are our qualitative sensory perceptions of it (the material-instrumental output).

OQM quantitatively organizes these facts in a certain way. BM does it in a somewhat different (maybe a clearer and more succinct) way.

There's presently no physical (factual) basis wrt which one can argue that one approach more closely corresponds to the composition and behavior of an underlying reality than the other.

 

[ttn]

It's beyond the scope of physics to determine that theory A more closely approximates an underlying quantum world than theory B. Underlying quantum world is undefined --- its meaning is as ambiguous as there are metaphysical visions of it.

Can you give any reasons why this should be the case for quantum theory, but not for (say) every other apparently-similar situation in the history of science? How come it wasn't "beyond the scope of science" to discover an underlying causal mechanism for Kepler's laws? Or for the macroscopic laws of classical thermodynamics? Or for Mendel's laws of genetic inheritance? and so on and so on...

There's presently no physical (factual) basis wrt which one can argue that one approach more closely corresponds to the composition and behavior of an underlying reality than the other.

I agree (at least partially), but only if you mean this as an assessment of the current state of evidence. I'd be the first to admit that we don't know today that Bohmian Mechanics is true. There are too many unanswered questions, and too many (meaning, at least one) alternative that seems also to be logically coherent and empirically viable. (The one I'm thinking of is the GRW type theories.)

But if (as you seemed to be hinting before) you think this is a deep metaphysical barrier that cannot be crossed, I disagree entirely. Yes, there is not yet sufficient evidence to know which picture of quantum reality is the correct one; but there is nothing whatever to suggest that quantum reality doesn't exist or can never be understood or anything like that. Any such suggestion is pure anti-scientific philosophical nonsense.

Note, by the way, that I see the issue as whether (a) Bohmian mechanics is right, (b) GRW is right, or (c) something not yet known turns out to be right. Orthodox QM *cannot be right*. One doesn't have to know the right theory to know that some proposals are fatally flawed.

 

[Sherlock]

It's beyond the scope of physics to determine that theory A more closely approximates an underlying quantum world than theory B. Underlying quantum world is undefined --- its meaning is as ambiguous as there are metaphysical visions of it.

Can you give any reasons why this should be the case for quantum theory, but not for (say) every other apparently-similar situation in the history of science? How come it wasn't "beyond the scope of science" to discover an underlying causal mechanism for Kepler's laws? Or for the macroscopic laws of classical thermodynamics? Or for Mendel's laws of genetic inheritance? and so on and so on...

These are higher order, more complex (than quantum) phenomena that have been explained in terms of micro, meso, and macroscopic phenomena and organizing principles.

The underlying quantum world remains qualitatively undefined --- (at least for the foreseeable future).

There's presently no physical (factual) basis wrt which one can argue that one approach more closely corresponds to the composition and behavior of an underlying reality than the other.

I agree (at least partially), but only if you mean this as an assessment of the current state of evidence. I'd be the first to admit that we don't know today that Bohmian Mechanics is true. There are too many unanswered questions, and too many (meaning, at least one) alternative that seems also to be logically coherent and empirically viable. (The one I'm thinking of is the GRW type theories.)

Yes, that's what I mean --- an assessment of the current state of evidence.

But if (as you seemed to be hinting before) you think this is a deep metaphysical barrier that cannot be crossed, I disagree entirely. Yes, there is not yet sufficient evidence to know which picture of quantum reality is the correct one; but there is nothing whatever to suggest that quantum reality doesn't exist or can never be understood or anything like that. Any such suggestion is pure anti-scientific philosophical nonsense.

I agree. It isn't known if the current evidentiary barrier can or cannot ever be crossed. I think the evidence suggests that there is an underlying quantum world. There's just not enough of it to form a complete picture.

Note, by the way, that I see the issue as whether (a) Bohmian mechanics is right, (b) GRW is right, or (c) something not yet known turns out to be right. Orthodox QM *cannot be right*. One doesn't have to know the right theory to know that some proposals are fatally flawed.

I don't think enough is known yet to say that the issue is whether (a), (b) or (c) is "right". Hopefully, that will become the issue. For now, OQM is the conventional "workaround".

It's like the situation with light. The evidence suggests a medium, but it isn't known how to detect it or even if it is in any sense detectable. But there's SR.

Some aspects of quantum theory might be "right", but, taken as a whole, and wrt the orthodox interpretation (and the current state of the evidence) it doesn't make much sense to say that it is about an underlying reality.

Quantum theory is, if nothing else, about what can be experimentally determined, and if its principles wrt what can be experimentally determined are correct, then the "rightness" of (a), (b) or (c) isn't the issue.

But, for the foreseeable future, this is all a matter of speculation.

 

[vanesch]

Some aspects of quantum theory might be "right", but, taken as a whole, and wrt the orthodox interpretation (and the current state of the evidence) it doesn't make much sense to say that it is about an underlying reality.

Quantum theory is, if nothing else, about what can be experimentally determined, and if its principles wrt what can be experimentally determined are correct, then the "rightness" of (a), (b) or (c) isn't the issue.

But, for the foreseeable future, this is all a matter of speculation.

Take the spirit of what you say about theory (T) - here, quantum theory - as S(T), that is: "Some aspects of theory T might be right, but taken as a whole ..."

Now, take the time t on the history and future of humanity, and call T(t) the "most fundamental" theory known at moment t. Don't you think, that for ALL future and past t, we can make the statement S(T(t)) ?

 

[Sherlock]

Take the spirit of what you say about theory (T) - here, quantum theory - as S(T), that is: "Some aspects of theory T might be right, but taken as a whole ..."

Now, take the time t on the history and future of humanity, and call T(t) the "most fundamental" theory known at moment t. Don't you think, that for ALL future and past t, we can make the statement S(T(t)) ?

I don't know what you're trying to say. Would you elaborate please ?

 

[vanesch]

I don't know what you're trying to say. Would you elaborate please ?

I meant, doesn't what I quoted in post number 117 apply at all times to the "at that time most fundamental, known, theory" ?
Meaning, you could say that about Newtonian mechanics in the 18th century, you could say it about Maxwellian electrodynamics at the end of the 19th century, you say it now about 20th century quantum theory... and probably you can say it too about just any next theory that will come along.

That said theory will have some aspects "right", but that it doesn't make much sense to say that it is about an underlying reality. And that said theory is, if nothing else, about what can be experimentally determined, and if its principles wrt what can be experimentally determined are correct, then the rightness of any interpretation or view on it isn't the issue.

 

[alfredblase]

but important questions remain to be answered,,,

previously I gave a definition of causality but then I realized that to be able to apply that definition, i had to identify what mechanism collapses a superimposed description,, decoherence seems to be a good candidate for this but then I came up with a scenario which I think refutes the idea,,, regardless of this point I'm having a great deal of trouble identifying the collapse condition in a double slit quantum eraser experiment,,, [walborn, cunha, padua, monken 2002]