DaveC426913 said:
What I wish I could do is find a good solid article that explains it.
My understanding from reading what I could find on it a while back is that the argument is based on the three premises I stated. More specifically:
That an AI, the "basilisk", will come into existence in the future that will create a being in its time frame that is "you", and that the basilisk will then punish this future "you" if the present you (i.e., you reading this post right now) did not do everything in your power to bring the basilisk into existence.
To me, there are several obvious holes in this argument, corresponding roughly to denying one of the three premises I stated:
(1) Even if we stipulate that
some AI will come into existence in the future, that doesn't mean this AI will be the basilisk AI. I have not seen anyone advance any argument for why such an AI would have to come into existence, or even why one would be more likely than many other possible kinds of AI (including AIs that could do great harm in other ways).
(2) Even if we stipulate that the basilisk AI
will come into existence, that doesn't mean the AI will be able to create a being that is "you" in the required sense. Part of the problem is figuring out
what "the required sense" actually means. Does it mean the basilisk has to create an exact duplicate of you down to the quantum level? That's obviously impossible by the no cloning theorem. Does it mean the basilisk has to create a being that is "enough like" you? What counts as "enough like"? I have not seen anyone give precise and satisfactory answers to these questions; the only answer I've seen is basically handwaving along the lines of "well, we don't understand exactly what would be required but it seems like an AI ought to be able to do it, whatever it turns out to be".
(3) Even if we stipulate that the basilisk AI could create a future "you", that doesn't mean the AI will be able to know what the present "you" did. An AI can be as intelligent as you like and still be unable to know, in whatever future time it exists, what you, here and now in 2022, did or did not do. That would require a level of accuracy in the recording of detailed physical events that does not exist, never has existed, and it's hard to believe ever will exist. So it's extremely difficult to see how anything the present you does or does not do could have any
actual effect on the basilisk; the information simply can't get transmitted from now to the future with that kind of accuracy.
One dodge (which was raised by another poster earlier in the thread) is to assume that the future "you" is actually a
simulation--which raises the possibility that you, here and now in 2022, could actually
be the "future you", in a simulation the basilisk is running of the year 2022 on Earth in order to see what you do. That would require you to believe that you are living in a simulation instead of the "root" reality, which is a whole separate issue that I won't go into here. But even if we stipulate that it's the case, we still have another issue: if you are actually living in the basilisk's simulated reality, then obviously you can't do anything to affect whether or not the basilisk exists. So it makes no sense to act as if you could, and you should just ignore the possibility.