- #1

rajuu

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Before the Allied invasion of France during WWII [bonus point for the month and the year of this invasion ], the Germans had to decide where to place their defenses. They had three choices: They could concentrate their defenses at Calais (GC), concentrate them at Normandy (GN), or split them between the two locations (GS). The Allies had two choices: They could attack at Calais (AC) or at Normandy (AN). Assume that this is a zero-sum game and that the possible outcomes are ranked as in the following matrix (where larger numbers represent outcomes more favorable for the Allies):

GERMANS

GN GC GS

ALLIES AN 1 4 3

AC 6 2 5

Assume that this game is played sequentially, with the Germans’ having to move first.

a) Draw the game tree. What is the rollback equilibrium of this game? [2+2]

b) How many pure strategies (complete plan of action) are available for the GERMANS and for the ALLIES? List out all of the pure strategies for each player. [2 + 3]

c) What would be rollback equilibrium of this game, with the Allies having to move first? Draw the game tree. [2+2]

d) Use the Minimax method to find Nash equilibrium in simultaneous game. [2]

I know how to draw the game trees for both situations. I just can't list out the pure strategies for both players (point b) and don't know how to find NE (points d).

I hope someone will solve this task.