How physicists handle the idea of Free Will?

[pftest]

When talking about the mind<>body relationship, i think the first thing a physicalist position needs, is a matching example of a physical<>physical relationship. Is the mind<>brain relationship the same as the water<>riverbed relationship? A rock<>its molecules?

If a physicalist cannot find any relationship in the physical world that matches their ideas of the mind<>body relationship, then by definition it is not a physical relationship and it cannot have arisen in a physical manner.

 

[madness]

When talking about the mind<>body relationship, i think the first thing a physicalist position needs, is a matching example of a physical<>physical relationship. Is the mind<>brain relationship the same as the water<>riverbed relationship? A rock<>its molecules?

If a physicalist cannot find any relationship in the physical world that matches their ideas of the mind<>body relationship, then by definition it is not a physical relationship and it cannot have arisen in a physical manner.

I think its useful to distinguish between the psychological and phenomenal aspects of mental states. For example, perception and sensation are both aspects of the same mental state. Perception involves the recognition and interpretation of something, whereas sensation is the conscious experience of redness or the smell of a flower. In general, physicalism seems to be on the right track to explaining most psychological mental states (e.g. memory, perception, learning) but there is no hint of a solution to the phenomenal states in terms of physical interactions. As far as I know, the standard approach of a physicalist is to simply deny the existence of any phenomenal states.

 

[Ferris_bg]

There is a difference (psychological vs phenomenal) for sure and the Knowledge Argument is still a serious challenge for physicalism.

 

[madness]

There is a difference (psychological vs phenomenal) for sure and the Knowledge Argument is still a serious challenge for physicalism.

I agree that the knowledge argument shows a gap in our understanding about how phenomenal states arise or what they even are, but I'm not sure there is any real knowledge or information in a qualia like the experience of redness. I can tell you I am seeing red, but I can't give you any information on what that means.

 

[pftest]

I just read the functionalism quote, from Ferris_bg, and i noticed the bold bit:

Type physicalism says that pain is C-fiber excitation. But that implies that unless an organism has C-fibers or a brain of an appropriate biological structure, it cannot have pain. But aren't there pain-capable organisms, like reptiles and mollusks, with brains very different from the human
brain? Perhaps in these species the neurons that work as nociceptive neurons--pain-sensitive neurons--aren't like human C-fibers at all. Can the type physicalist reply that it should be possible to come up with a more abstract and general physiological description of a brain state common to all organisms, across all species, that are in pain state? This is highly unlikely, but how about inorganic systems? Could there not be intelligent extraterrestrial creatures with a complex and rich mental life, one that is very much like ours, but whose biology is not carbon-based? And isn't it conceivable--in fact, at least nomologically if not practically possible--to build intelligent electromechanical systems (that is, robots) to which we would be willing to attribute various mental states? Moreover, the neural substrates of certain mental functions can differ from person to person and may change over time even in a single individual through maturation, learning, and injuries to the brain. We should keep in mind that if pain is identical with physical state C, then pain is identical with state C not only in actual organisms and systems but in all possible organisms and systems.

These considerations are usually taken to show that any given mental state is "multiply realizable" in a large variety of physical/biological structures, with the consequence that it is not possible to identify a mental state with a physical state. If pain is identical with a physical state, it must be identical with some particular physical state; but there are indefinitely many physical states that can "realize" (or "instantiate," "implement," etc.) pain in all sorts of pain-capable organisms and systems. So pain, as a type of mental state, cannot be a neural-state type or any other physical-state type.

This, in brief, is the influential "multiple realization" argument against type physicalism Hilary Putnam advanced in the late 1960s (we will recur to multiple realization in the next chapter). It had a critical impact on the way philosophy of mind has developed since then: It effectively retired type physicalism as the reigning doctrine on the mind-body problem, throwing the very term "reductionism" into disrepute and ushering in the era of "nonreductive physicalism." Further, it inspired a new conception of mentality, "functionalism," which has been highly influential since the 1970s and which is arguably still the most widely accepted view on the nature of mind.

What i see in the bold bit, is that functionalism or multiple realization, cannot be a physicalist position. It holds an abstract entity (abstract functional similarities between physical systems such as brains and computers) to be the cause of consciousness. But abstractions are by definition conceptual in nature, so they cannot be the origin of consciousness. For example, my mind can recognise the abstract similarities between 2 apples and 2 pears, namely that there are 2 of both. But if i claim that such a "twoness" is what brought the first abstraction into existence, it would be the equivalent of saying the first egg came from a previous egg.

 

[Ferris_bg]

Functionalism falls in the property dualism category (aka non-reductive physicalism). As you can see from the picture in wiki, the mental is considered a "property" of the physical substance. The problem with these types of theories is that they can't account for mental causation aka the mental is epiphenomenal. And epiphenomenalism is considered by many as not logically coherent (search the forum for Q_Goest posts about the "knowledge paradox").

 

[sophiecentaur]

This is all, pretty clearly 'angels-on-pinheads' stuff. I justify this remark on the grounds that, every time a question is asked, a brand new word is coined with which to answer it. I have read more 'new' words on this thread than on all the QM and GR threads put together.
The way Philosophy is going seems to be highly divergent, which is directly against the reductionist aims of yer proper Science. It doesn't surprise me that emotional states, sensations and ideas cannot be linked coherently with physical states simply because the system is trying to examine itself with the very tools that it is examining.

At the simplest level, we look around us and see a whole range of physical arrangements that achieve the same functions amongst animals - think of the number of alternative eye structures that have developed to achieve 'vision' of some sort. We say that a fly has "seen us" without mentioning the fact that its eye and image processing is entirely different from ours.
So, in the context of brain / mind studies, how can it be claimed that mental states can be associated with one particular physical structure when there is no way, even, of equating mental states between one individual and another? As with the earlier example of colour vision and sensation, we can only compare mental states by reference to some external physical setup (a questionaire, Ishihara Colour test etc.) and by communication between individuals. This is just not good enough to produce any more than an arm waving theory, although humans are more than capable of making do with this limitation in their everyday dealings with each other and when selecting paints for their houses.
It seems to me that there is an equivalent of the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle at work here between the Physical and the Mental situation. As long as Philosophers want it to be otherwise then their 'faith' will keep them attempting the unattainable and generating yet more new terms in the process.

 

[Darken-Sol]

why look at the process? free will is simply the ability to change our mind. i can decide to flip a coin and roll with the out come on a certain question. bam. heads. i didnt want heads maybe ill flip again. or i can decide this whole coin thing is stupid. i cud even decide to do nothing. where do i lack free will?

 

[Pythagorean]

The question is whether your choices were predetermined. We k ow we can do what we want, but is what we want predetermined? I think so, I think there's a mechanism for liking and not liking things.

For instance, people can like or dislike food as the pertain to deficiencies in their biochemistry or people will fear things if those things have presented trauma in the past. Other preferences may just be a matter of chance ("how the molecules fell").

 

[Darken-Sol]

The question is whether your choices were predetermined. We k ow we can do what we want, but is what we want predetermined? I think so, I think there's a mechanism for liking and not liking things.

For instance, people can like or dislike food as the pertain to deficiencies in their biochemistry or people will fear things if those things have presented trauma in the past. Other preferences may just be a matter of chance ("how the molecules fell").

i get that. but i do things i don't like almost daily. i have a sense of duty. i choose to do these things, yet some times i choose not to. the coin thing is helpful, to me it is the universes opinion. choices are influenced, not predetermined.

 

[Pythagorean]

Functionalism falls in the property dualism category (aka non-reductive physicalism). As you can see from the picture in wiki, the mental is considered a "property" of the physical substance. The problem with these types of theories is that they can't account for mental causation aka the mental is epiphenomenal. And epiphenomenalism is considered by many as not logically coherent (search the forum for Q_Goest posts about the "knowledge paradox").

I don't know. I think, for the most part, most humans experience (for instance) yellow the same way. Especially when it has a light background

There's also a whole subject of color psychology that shows how colors influence psychological states and it's fairly consistent across humans.

And we don't need to account for mental causation... it doesn't seem to exist.

 

[Darken-Sol]

why is it called free will any way? it seems to me any decision has a cost. whether we factor that in or disregard it is still our choice.

 

[Q_Goest]

When talking about the mind<>body relationship, i think the first thing a physicalist position needs, is a matching example of a physical<>physical relationship. Is the mind<>brain relationship the same as the water<>riverbed relationship? A rock<>its molecules?

If a physicalist cannot find any relationship in the physical world that matches their ideas of the mind<>body relationship, then by definition it is not a physical relationship and it cannot have arisen in a physical manner.

To your point, we would generally say there is a mind<>brain relationship in the same way there is a relationship between any phenomena which supervenes on its base. As madness points out:

I think its useful to distinguish between the psychological and phenomenal aspects of mental states. For example, perception and sensation are both aspects of the same mental state. Perception involves the recognition and interpretation of something, whereas sensation is the conscious experience of redness or the smell of a flower. In general, physicalism seems to be on the right track to explaining most psychological mental states (e.g. memory, perception, learning) but there is no hint of a solution to the phenomenal states in terms of physical interactions. As far as I know, the standard approach of a physicalist is to simply deny the existence of any phenomenal states.

I presume madness is using the terms "psychological" and "phenomenal" aspects in the same way Chalmers and others in philosophy do. In which case, our psychological states (ie: those objectively observable behaviors) supervene on the physical states of the body and brain. Similarly, we would typically accept that our phenomenal states or mental states supervene on the brain.

I would agree there is no solution to how phenomenal states come about in terms of physical interactions. Some would certainly deny the existence. Dennett is famous for that. He says "So contrary to what seems obvious at first blush, there simply are no qualia at all."

Others, especially those in the scientific world who study the brain for example, simply don't care and don't appreciate the huge logical dilemmas that they overlook. Why should science claim a need for objective observations and then illogically consider subjective phenomena as being physical? Clearly that position is laughable and shows a clear lack of understanding. The knowledge argument as mentioned by Ferris hits the nail on the head.

There is a difference (psychological vs phenomenal) for sure and the Knowledge Argument is still a serious challenge for physicalism.

Agreed. And as Jackson points out, no amount of physical information can describe qualia. However, there is a problem with the physicalist position (and Jackson's position) that qualia are epiphenomenal. This problem seems to get discovered and rediscovered as people study the problem. On more than one occasion, I've seen people 'discover' this problem for themselves, thinking they're the first person who ever considered it. That problem is called the Knowledge paradox as pointed out by Rosenberg in "A Place for Conciousness" who quotes Shoemaker.

I agree that the knowledge argument shows a gap in our understanding about how phenomenal states arise or what they even are, but I'm not sure there is any real knowledge or information in a qualia like the experience of redness. I can tell you I am seeing red, but I can't give you any information on what that means.

The thing about qualia is that it's a phenomena. It is something that occurs. It has some qualitative and quantitative properties to it. But those phenomena are not objectively observable. That's a real problem. If everything is physical, and if everything is caused by something which is objectively observable, then how can any phenomena which is NOT objectively observable, have any influence? How can that phenomena even make itself known? Any phenomena we can't measure or put any physical description to such as ghosts and spirits, should be per physicalism, unable to influence a damn thing. They should be utterly incapable of making their presense known since the only thing that makes its presence known must be the objectively observable, physical interactions.. . right?

 

[madness]

The thing about qualia is that it's a phenomena. It is something that occurs. It has some qualitative and quantitative properties to it. But those phenomena are not objectively observable. That's a real problem. If everything is physical, and if everything is caused by something which is objectively observable, then how can any phenomena which is NOT objectively observable, have any influence? How can that phenomena even make itself known? Any phenomena we can't measure or put any physical description to such as ghosts and spirits, should be per physicalism, unable to influence a damn thing. They should be utterly incapable of making their presense known since the only thing that makes its presence known must be the objectively observable, physical interactions.. . right?

I seem to have a warped viewpoint on this. As far as I'm concerned, nothing is objectively knowable, and qualia are the only things I can be sure exist - everything you ever experience is an internal representation, and that's all you will ever know. It's not a popular viewpoint in science, but I just read My view of the world by Erwin Schrodinger and he strongly supports idealism against materialism. I just don't understand how someone can deny the existence of the one thing that they can directly know and replace it with something that can never be experienced directly (i.e. an external world independent of any of our experiences).

 

[Q_Goest]

I seem to have a warped viewpoint on this. As far as I'm concerned, nothing is objectively knowable, and qualia are the only things I can be sure exist - everything you ever experience is an internal representation, and that's all you will ever know. It's not a popular viewpoint in science, but I just read My view of the world by Erwin Schrodinger and he strongly supports idealism against materialism. I just don't understand how someone can deny the existence of the one thing that they can directly know and replace it with something that can never be experienced directly (i.e. an external world independent of any of our experiences).

I don't disagree. But I'm not trying to defend my position, I'm just trying to follow through on the logic, explaining how that logic might go depending on the assumptions we defend. I'm just trying to point out the discrepency in the standard, physicalist view taken by most of science.

Thanks for the reference, I'll have to check up on Schrodinger's work.

 

[Pythagorean]

I agree with madness. There is no true objectivity or subjectivity in the same way there is no true conductor or insulator. Everything exists somewhere in between and we use these ideals to target the dominate features of a particular object (or concept).

Measuring the same length with the same yard stick only applies to humans in the same inertial frame with the same set of perceptions. It's still highly objective (i.e. it's empirically consistent across a large population of humans) but it's ultimately a matter of consensus reality.

Color can be described consistently via spectrum (not a single frequency, so that adds thousands of dimensions to the problem... there are thousands of shades and hues and different people are more sensitive to particular shapes of spectra). A single person may even experience this between their two eyes.

But it doesn't really matter to a living system, how they store symbols, as long as they can reliably store them. An evolutionary instinct is built up around particular colors in the animal world; they are associated with poisonous animals. It becomes advantageous then, for other animals to take up poisonous colors to "bluff" about being poisonous (of course, none of this is done intentionally, it exists because it persisted... reproduction of the fittest).

There is nothing intrinsically poisonous about such colors, but they tend to have similarities: they are bright, so they grab attention. But these are the colors that, inadvertently, became associated with poisonous animals, so biological systems have built a semiotic relationship with the color.

As a human society, we build more sophisticated semiotic relationships with colors. Marketers and graphics designers know a bit about color psychology and how to apply it to better communicate (or persuade people of) their point.

But make no mistake, color is the result of a physical process between the very objective optics, and the very objective neural processes in the brain. The only thing that makes it very subjective is that neural processes and environmental lighting conditions can vary. However, we expect, for most of the population, a consistent qualitative result... and we see that. Which is why we have standards and defaults (soft, light background with dark, usually black font).

 

[Goodison_Lad]

Dennett is famous for that. He says "So contrary to what seems obvious at first blush, there simply are no qualia at all."

Are we all talking about the same thing when we use the word 'qualia'? To me, it means the direct, personal, subjective conscious pereception or experience of a phenomenon. I can confirm that these qualia exist in me.

So, his statement intrigues me because he also wrote "qualia is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to me." That's true for me! And the rest of us, no?

So unless he's using different definitions of the words 'are, 'no' and 'qualia', or has perhaps been taken out of context, I can't imagine a sillier statement.

 

[madness]

But make no mistake, color is the result of a physical process between the very objective optics, and the very objective neural processes in the brain. The only thing that makes it very subjective is that neural processes and environmental lighting conditions can vary. However, we expect, for most of the population, a consistent qualitative result... and we see that. Which is why we have standards and defaults (soft, light background with dark, usually black font).

But do you agree that the experience of colour has a phenomenal element that is not explained through the optical and neural processes? You seem to be using the word subective to mean variable between people, but I would take it in the much stronger sense that there is a private experience which seems to elude any physical explanation. The experience of red is still mysterious after the neural and optical experiences are accounted for. Your analysis would seem to apply the same type of subjectivity to an imperfect mechanical signal detector as it does to a person.

 

[Q_Goest]

Are we all talking about the same thing when we use the word 'qualia'? To me, it means the direct, personal, subjective conscious pereception or experience of a phenomenon. I can confirm that these qualia exist in me.

So, his statement intrigues me because he also wrote "qualia is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to me." That's true for me! And the rest of us, no?

So unless he's using different definitions of the words 'are, 'no' and 'qualia', or has perhaps been taken out of context, I can't imagine a sillier statement.

Good question. And yes, we are all talking about the same qualia. If you click on the link you can read his paper.

I had the same question on first reading that statement. I think his intent is not that he should be taken literally since he clearly says qualia exist elsewhere in the paper. What I think he means is that qualia don't exist in any kind of way that can be defined. In other words, qualia can't be described in any way, they can't be compared, they don't cause anything, etc... so in any sense of the term "exist", they don't exist.

"... there simply are no qualia at all." for Dennett means qualia don't exist in any meaningful way as we use the term that something objectively observable exists.

Which is fine, but that concept doesn't hold water for the vast majority of people who would describe qualia as having some qualitative feel to it and that we should be able to explain how qualia arise in some way.

 

[Pythagorean]

But do you agree that the experience of colour has a phenomenal element that is not explained through the optical and neural processes?

I don't agree. But realize also that you're using a loaded word: explain. Ask a physicalist to explain how gravity works... you won't get a mechanism, you'll just get an equation describing its effects on objects. We don't know a mechanism for gravity, and once we find it, we won't know the mechanism of that mechanism.

So yes, we can explain phenomenology in the same way we can explain gravity or electromagnetism. Every time we find mechanisms though, we just get more questions. For a scientist, this is merely job security.

I don't think qualia elude any physical explanation; that seems to be an exaggeration. I do agree that the explanations lose objectivity, but that is not quite the same. We use physical metaphors like warmth and intensity to describe the experience, and we can describe ensemble interactions of color with words like 'contrast', 'geometric structure', or 'gradient'. And we can model these properties mathematically.

Realize that the ensemble is really the important thing. Red is only meaningful to you in the context of other colors. If everything we saw was red, then we would not know about color, only lightness and darkness, and our vision and ability to describe things would be considerably diminished.

 

[Pythagorean]

Which is fine, but that concept doesn't hold water for the vast majority of people who would describe qualia as having some qualitative feel to it and that we should be able to explain how qualia arise in some way.

Of coursre, causation != correlation: you may have a "feeling" and perceive "qualia" at the same time because they are both internal physical effects of a single external physical stimulus, not necessarily that they are in a cause and effect relationship with each other.

And in deed, we can influence "feeling" states on people without them experiencing the qualia, the work of subliminal stimuli.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subliminal_stimuli

 

[Goodison_Lad]

Ask a physicalist to explain how gravity works... you won't get a mechanism, you'll just get an equation describing its effects on objects. We don't know a mechanism for gravity, and once we find it, we won't know the mechanism of that mechanism.

This is true. We do now have a mechanism for gravity – the curvature of spacetime by mass-energy. But the obvious next question, ‘how does mass-energy cause the curvature of spacetime?’ has no answer. We just know the mathematical relationship between the two.

"... there simply are no qualia at all." for Dennett means qualia don't exist in any meaningful way as we use the term that something objectively observable exists. Which is fine, but that concept doesn't hold water for the vast majority of people who would describe qualia as having some qualitative feel to it and that we should be able to explain how qualia arise in some way.

I agree. Qualia is the single megafact of a person’s life – by definition, it is the only thing they can experience, since it is the essence of experience itself. This makes me think it is a subject worthy a serious consideration, notwithstanding the seemingly insuperable obstacle of examining it in a scientific way.

I don't think qualia elude any physical explanation; that seems to be an exaggeration. I do agree that the explanations lose objectivity, but that is not quite the same. We use physical metaphors like warmth and intensity to describe the experience, and we can describe ensemble interactions of color with words like 'contrast', 'geometric structure', or 'gradient'. And we can model these properties mathematically.

The thing about explanations of qualia is that, because of the fact that it is qualitatively completely different to everything else, they tend towards the descriptive.

I can’t imagine how qualia can be studied other than through associations between subjective reports of internal experience and external stimuli. But, of course, would be no explanation as to the nature of qualia. While good science is always chasing the next explanation, this problem seems to me to be of a completely different order to the rest, and will be particularly intractable.

So as indicated by Q_Goest, maybe this is why some have said it doesn’t exist - and if it doesn't exist, there’s no need to explain it!

 

[Pythagorean]

The thing about explanations of qualia is that, because of the fact that it is qualitatively completely different to everything else, they tend towards the descriptive.

It actually isn't completely different; that's exaggerative rhetoric. Every model we have requires qualitative descriptions. If we remove qualitative descriptions, we no longer have physics or science. We just have mathematics. 1+1 = 2 is false if you put units of apple, orange, and apple, respectively. Mathematics is necessary but insufficient for quantitative analysis. We need qualitative descriptions for everything we do.

In the same light, aspects of phenomenology can be quantified, but it requires qualitative descriptions. For instance, you can count how many objects you experience vs. the next person. And you can get a different answer depending on your focus (and there can be a third, more objective answer).

We can also quantify what kind of blindness people have and how it impacts their perception. We can also quantify the effects of drugs on people and choose a limit beyond which their perceptions are so messed up, they shouldn't operate heavy machinery or drive.

 

[Maui]

It actually isn't completely different; that's exaggerative rhetoric.

I think he means losing objectivity - how do you objectively describe 'feeling pain' or what it is that is feeling pain? Or 'i understand the meaning of what he says?' or how would you objectify my inner world? You can't. This isn't even a scientific question, no matter what one would like to believe science implies.

BTW, it's impossible to prove to a sceptic that i am not a p-zombie(most of the time) in the same way that it's impossible to technically prove beyond any doubt that an outside world exists. I think your reasoning was completely correct until 30-40 000 BC when the first cave paintings emerged laying the foundations of primitive human arts. Art has no connection with survival, i find it rediculous that some researches would push the TOE to explain away everything, from cold beer to CERN and my late arrival at the hotel tonight.

 

[madness]

I think he means losing objectivity - how do you objectively describe 'feeling pain' or what it is that is feeling pain? Or 'i understand the meaning of what he says?' or how would you objectify my inner world? You can't. This isn't even a scientific question, no matter what one would like to believe science implies.

I think this is putting things back to front. We are well aware of our subjective experiences, literally everything you have ever known has been a subjective experience. The whole notion of an objective viewpoint is incoherent. If you take your subjective experiences out of the picture, there's nothing left.

 

[Maui]

I think this is putting things back to front. We are well aware of our subjective experiences, literally everything you have ever known has been a subjective experience. The whole notion of an objective viewpoint is incoherent. If you take your subjective experiences out of the picture, there's nothing left.

Very true. As soon you discard the mental images we all agree upon as a random side-effect of natural evolution, science shoots itself in the foot. It's the mental images that we agree upon that brought forth the theory of nonexistent mental causation, not the Big Bang or the infinity of Big Bangs that suposedly existed forever. What exists if not the mental? The Grand delusion? He can't frame objectively what exists according to his philosophy, so he must believe it's indescribable, unknowable and completely beyond human reach. I guess that's the end of science.

BTW, it seems impossibe to explain the mental experience through the events that unfold within it. I have seen no good argument or scientific theory so far. Nothing even close to making a coherent argument, esp. in view of the weakening and poorly understood causality that's supposed to explain everything from within the mental experience as a chain reaction of something as oscure as the Big Bang.

 

[Goodison_Lad]

It actually isn't completely different; that's exaggerative rhetoric.
We can also quantify what kind of blindness people have and how it impacts their perception. We can also quantify the effects of drugs on people and choose a limit beyond which their perceptions are so messed up, they shouldn't operate heavy machinery or drive.

You’re talking about the ‘easy’ problems of consciousness. I’m talking about the ‘hard’ one.

The very nature of the subjective experience immediately sets it apart from objectively investigable phenomena. How you would go about quantifying conscious subjective experience to any degree is beyond me. This experience is not simply the correlation it may or may not have with some other brain functions. You might be able to probe somebody’s tolerance to sound levels – you’ve got a measure of the input (decibels) and they can tell you, with some degree of accuracy you might accept, how much they can stand it. But you’ve gone no way to describe, let alone explain, the nature of the actual conscious experience of sound itself.

So it is this that puts the problem in an entirely different category to everything else science investigates, and this is why David Chalmers has called it the ‘hard problem of consciousness’. The other stuff is ‘easy’.

 

[Pythagorean]

Right, but you missed my point in the previous post about the hard problem existing in gravity, too. Above, I was demonstrating they both have an easy problem. The point is that all rational studies have a hard and easy side to them. Remember that the problem is with the loaded word, "explain".

If you want to reject physicalism approaches to consciousness, your arguments would apply to physicalism approaches to gravity as well. Physicalists reject dualist arguments because they move forward and make grounds in prediction with the core physicalist assumption (cause and effect).

So no, we can't explain how the right arrangement of matter can have a subjective experience, but we can't explain how gravity arises either. But we know rules and operations for both (what arrangements are more likely to produce what effects).

 

[Pythagorean]

I think your reasoning was completely correct until 30-40 000 BC when the first cave paintings emerged laying the foundations of primitive human arts. Art has no connection with survival, i find it rediculous that some researches would push the TOE to explain away everything, from cold beer to CERN and my late arrival at the hotel tonight.

Nobody's pushing TOE and phenotypes don't have to have anything to do with survival to persist. In fact, the less they have to do with survival, the more inert they are. They're not going to get pushed or pulled by evolutionary forces; It's called a "spandrel" and all biological systems have them. (Not that art is necessarily a spandrel, but you paint it to be one in your post. Evolutionary psychology is a difficult realm to talk about evolutionary story's in.)

Interestingly, higher consciousness could have initially just been a spandrel, as most of our survival functions are handled by unconscious processes. Obviously, though, it's become a huge advantage to us, allowing us the largest expanse of habitat and diet of any other animal.

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi madness,

I think this is putting things back to front. We are well aware of our subjective experiences, literally everything you have ever known has been a subjective experience. The whole notion of an objective viewpoint is incoherent. If you take your subjective experiences out of the picture, there's nothing left.

You might be interested in reading http://anti-matters.org/articles/46/public/46-41-1-PB.pdf, "There are no easy problems of consciousness". Your views seem to parallel his, so I suspect you'll enjoy reading his paper.

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi Pythagorean,

Right, but you missed my point in the previous post about the hard problem existing in gravity, too.

Not everyone in these philosophy forums has a good background in philosophy, so it's difficult sometimes to distinguish between knowledgeable arguments and those that come from the perspective of a non-expert, say someone with a background in engineering or a background in biology. Those folks with no background in philosophy are sometimes difficult to identify, especially if you have little or no background in the field yourself. There is an entire branch of scientists who specialize in the logical arguments made to conceptually understand topics such as consciousness. They call themselves philosophers. Some of us frown upon their work because we don't understand it. They use words we're not familiar with and say things in a way that confuses us. At times, we ridicule them because what they say makes no sense to us. But what they're discussing has everything to do with the science.

I wouldn't walk into a microbiology forum and, as an engineer not understanding what they're talking about, tell them they are missing my point. I wouldn't tell them they don't need all those words to describe molecular interactions since I obviously understand chemistry and don't use those words. Unfortunately, many people tend to feel that their background in some other area of science has prepared them for discussions regarding the philosophy of mind.

It's diffucult to explain to someone without the background why there is no "hard problem" of gravity, dark matter or even of dark energy. It's difficult without the background to explain why subliminal stimuli has nothing to do with the topic at hand. Because there's an entire field of research and logic that can't be funneled into a single post just as it would be impossible for a microbiologist to explain to an engineer such as myself, details regarding microbiology.

I have no doubt you could understand this topic if you really wanted to understand it. But it seems like you really aren't interested in understanding it, and that makes it frustrating for anyone with a background in philosophy to try and measure up to your expectations.

 

[Pythagorean]

Insinuating ignorance isn't a solution to the problem. That's not what we do in the biology forums. We might even report somebody for trying to slip a subtle ad hominem in. Your post makes no argument and contributes nothing to the understanding of the problem.

In the science forums, we do patiently break it down and explain it as long as we can. You should expect us to not "need all those words to describe molecular interactions" because that's the point of the forum. To explain things without jargon because it helps exclude silent pretense.

The only reason you would say "oh I can't explain it to you, you're ignorant" is if you don't have any real substance.

 

[Pythagorean]

I realize that the "hard problem" is specifically defined for consciousness, but what I'm arguing is that it's analogous to "problems" in gravity. We don't know why matter has gravitational or electromagnetic fields in the same way we don't know why subjective experience can arise from matter. These are all enigmatic properties that we just accept to be true.

 

[madness]

Right, but you missed my point in the previous post about the hard problem existing in gravity, too. Above, I was demonstrating they both have an easy problem. The point is that all rational studies have a hard and easy side to them. Remember that the problem is with the loaded word, "explain".

If you want to reject physicalism approaches to consciousness, your arguments would apply to physicalism approaches to gravity as well. Physicalists reject dualist arguments because they move forward and make grounds in prediction with the core physicalist assumption (cause and effect).

So no, we can't explain how the right arrangement of matter can have a subjective experience, but we can't explain how gravity arises either. But we know rules and operations for both (what arrangements are more likely to produce what effects).

I agree with this to a large extent. What we need is a theory which can relate physical or informational quantities to conscious experience or qualia. The only real attempt that I'm aware of is Tononi's Integrated Information Theory (http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42). We may never understand how subjective experiences arise or what they are, but we can describe observed relationships mathematically just as we have done for gravity and electromagnetism. For me though, there is a big difference between applying this type of explanation to gravity and qualia. For gravity, we are modelling the correlation between very similar physical quantities (basically speed, position, acceleration). For consciousness, we are modelling the correlation between entirely different categories, physical (possibly informational) and experiential.

 

[Pythagorean]

For me though, there is a big difference between applying this type of explanation to gravity and qualia. For gravity, we are modelling the correlation between very similar physical quantities (basically speed, position, acceleration). For consciousness, we are modelling the correlation between entirely different categories, physical (possibly informational) and experiential.

But to me it appears to me that you are comparing:
1) only the easy problems of gravity
to
2) the gap between the easy and hard problems of consciousness.

The hard problem of gravity is essentially the same as for consciousness: there's an explanatory gap: we know about speed/position/acceleration just fine, but that doesn't explain why gravity exists in the first place. How this property (gravity) can emerge from particles and their interactions. We can't even explain why there are particles and interactions in the first place. We can't explain why there's something instead of nothing. These are all hard problems of science. Science doesn't just fail at explaining consciousness, it fails explaining a lot of human questions about the universe.

But it's possible that the questions are meaningless, too. It's easy to see why "does fist eat orange?" is a nonsensical question. But other questions that are more emotionally appealing to us might seem more reasonably when they're really not.

One huge difficulty is that it is an ill-defined question in the first place: there's no reliable definition of consciousness.

 

[micromass]

Hi Pythagorean,

Not everyone in these philosophy forums has a good background in philosophy, so it's difficult sometimes to distinguish between knowledgeable arguments and those that come from the perspective of a non-expert, say someone with a background in engineering or a background in biology. Those folks with no background in philosophy are sometimes difficult to identify, especially if you have little or no background in the field yourself. There is an entire branch of scientists who specialize in the logical arguments made to conceptually understand topics such as consciousness. They call themselves philosophers. Some of us frown upon their work because we don't understand it. They use words we're not familiar with and say things in a way that confuses us. At times, we ridicule them because what they say makes no sense to us. But what they're discussing has everything to do with the science.

I wouldn't walk into a microbiology forum and, as an engineer not understanding what they're talking about, tell them they are missing my point. I wouldn't tell them they don't need all those words to describe molecular interactions since I obviously understand chemistry and don't use those words. Unfortunately, many people tend to feel that their background in some other area of science has prepared them for discussions regarding the philosophy of mind.

It's diffucult to explain to someone without the background why there is no "hard problem" of gravity, dark matter or even of dark energy. It's difficult without the background to explain why subliminal stimuli has nothing to do with the topic at hand. Because there's an entire field of research and logic that can't be funneled into a single post just as it would be impossible for a microbiologist to explain to an engineer such as myself, details regarding microbiology.

I have no doubt you could understand this topic if you really wanted to understand it. But it seems like you really aren't interested in understanding it, and that makes it frustrating for anyone with a background in philosophy to try and measure up to your expectations.

Right, so if I get you right, then you are saying that philosophers know more about science then the scientists themselves. If I want to ask people about gravity, then I'll ask the physicists, not the philosophers.

This entire argument is an argument by authority and is a logical fallacy.

 

[madness]

But to me it appears to me that you are comparing:
1) only the easy problems of gravity
to
2) the gap between the easy and hard problems of consciousness.

The hard problem of gravity is essentially the same as for consciousness: there's an explanatory gap: we know about speed/position/acceleration just fine, but that doesn't explain why gravity exists in the first place. How this property (gravity) can emerge from particles and their interactions. We can't even explain why there are particles and interactions in the first place. We can't explain why there's something instead of nothing. These are all hard problems of science. Science doesn't just fail at explaining consciousness, it fails explaining a lot of human questions about the universe.

But it's possible that the questions are meaningless, too. It's easy to see why "does fist eat orange?" is a nonsensical question. But other questions that are more emotionally appealing to us might seem more reasonably when they're really not.

One huge difficulty is that it is an ill-defined question in the first place: there's no reliable definition of consciousness.

But the problem is that there is no "gravity" that emerges from the particles and their accelerations. All there is are the particles and their speeds, positions and accelerations. Gravity is a piece of conceptual machinery to model their evolution in time. With consciousness, there is something else other than the particles and their speeds and positions. This is what the fundamental difference is. The gravitational field is just a mathematical trick to explain the observables, which are fundamentally just position and time.

 

[Q_Goest]

Insinuating ignorance isn't a solution to the problem. That's not what we do in the biology forums. We might even report somebody for trying to slip a subtle ad hominem in. Your post makes no argument and contributes nothing to the understanding of the problem.

In the science forums, we do patiently break it down and explain it as long as we can. You should expect us to not "need all those words to describe molecular interactions" because that's the point of the forum. To explain things without jargon because it helps exclude silent pretense.

The only reason you would say "oh I can't explain it to you, you're ignorant" is if you don't have any real substance.

That's a valid response and I do feel bad for not being more helpful. My apologies. I would only say that I have also felt that the way many of your responses and those of others here are worded, they truly frown upon this entire branch of academia. Not understanding the topic and still debating your personal views is why the philosophy forum is under general discussion, and the reason for the new rules started the beginning of last year.

If you feel gravity is somehow parallel to consciousness, you should provide references from philosophical journals and provide some background. Explain your argument not just in your own words and from your own perspective, but utilize the background in the subject and show how it fits into your viewpoint.

If you really want to understand more, I'd suggest Chalmer's book "A Conscious Mind". Chalmers is an encyclopedia of sorts and although his personal contributions are limited, the fact is he manages to provide detailed explanations on a very broad number of topics within cognitive science. Within the first 100 pages you'll find considerable discussion on how things like gravity or EM fields are not like consciousness. These are objectively observable phenomena. Dark matter or dark energy and the problems regarding galaxy dynamics similarly are not "hard problems" as the term is defined. Science relies on objective observations. If none are available, we generally relegate claims of phenomena that are not objectively observable by everyone to be crackpottery. Yet we don't consider that to be the case with consciousness. The kinds of claims made by folks not familiar with the issues can become exhausting. If one isn't familiar with the literature and the field of study, those folks should be asking questions, not insisting they have the answers.

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi micromass,

Right, so if I get you right, then you are saying that philosophers know more about science then the scientists themselves.

Not at all. I'm suggesting that they are not the dolts many here are making them out to be and suggesting they don't have any understanding of the science is an insult. I'm suggesting that to understand the philosophy, then just as physicists, biologists, engineers, etc... have had to study their topic, there is a need to similarly study philosophy in order to comment intelligibly.

 

[Goodison_Lad]

Right, but you missed my point in the previous post about the hard problem existing in gravity, too. Above, I was demonstrating they both have an easy problem.

I did see and understand the point, and I don't disagree with it entirely. Developments in our understanding of, say, gravity, have been step-by-step, and you could say that a 'hard' problem of gravity (ignoring the little one of unification with QM for the time being!) is why stress-energy should cause curvature of spacetime. But this problem is of the never-ending sort that keeps science moving on. We explain this, this generates more questions, we address them and so on. They are about phenomena in the same category.

But the hard problem of consciousness is to do with a categorically different phenomenon to the easy ones that are currently amenable to scientific investigation. It’s all about category.

I'm not suggesting that the elusiveness of qualia means it can never be successfully addressed. But I am suggesting that the difference between the nature of qualia and the 'easy' problems of consciousness is of an entirely different order to the difference between our understanding of the Einstein Field Equations and our lack of understanding of the underlying cause of them. My guess is that physicists will succeed in this hard problem of gravity (only, of course, for it to be replaced by yet another one for them to tackle. That's life). Giving up is no answer.

The why and how of qualia represents a very major challenge for science, and it’s my opinion that recognising the size of the cliff to be scaled would be a useful first step.

 

[Evo]

Hi micromass,

Not at all. I'm suggesting that they are not the dolts many here are making them out to be and suggesting they don't have any understanding of the science is an insult. I'm suggesting that to understand the philosophy, then just as physicists, biologists, engineers, etc... have had to study their topic, there is a need to similarly study philosophy in order to comment intelligibly.

But to be honest, a degree in philosophy does not make them able to comment knowledgeably on topics of science, engineering etc, unless they also happen to have degrees in these subjects. That is a big problem here in the philosophy forum, people that read a few books on philosophy feel that they can post on topics that they know next to nothing about.

The only thing a philosopher can post about is philosophy, unless they actually hold degrees in the other subject they are posting about. it does state in the rules that the same standards of discussing science also applies in the philosophy forum.

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi Evo,

But to be honest, a degree in philosophy does not make them able to comment knowledgeably on topics of science, engineering etc, unless they also happen to have degrees in these subjects. That is a big problem here in the philosophy forum, people that read a few books on philosophy feel that they can post on topics that they know next to nothing about.

The only thing a philosopher can post about is philosophy, unless they actually hold degrees in the other subject they are posting about. it does state in the rules that the same standards of discussing science also applies in the philosophy forum.

I would certainly agree that some philosophers have degrees limiting them to philosophy. Of course, to get a PhD in philosophy, the study of the natural sciences or other sciences is a large part of that. Chalmers for example has a background in mathematics, but there are a tremendous number of philosphers who have a background in physics and especially, quantum mechanics. I've been very surprised to find just how much good information is available about quantum mechanics that's been written by philosophers.

Again, I apologize for the insinuating remarks earlier.

 

[Pythagorean]

That's a valid response and I do feel bad for not being more helpful. My apologies. I would only say that I have also felt that the way many of your responses and those of others here are worded, they truly frown upon this entire branch of academia. Not understanding the topic and still debating your personal views is why the philosophy forum is under general discussion, and the reason for the new rules started the beginning of last year.

If you feel gravity is somehow parallel to consciousness, you should provide references from philosophical journals and provide some background. Explain your argument not just in your own words and from your own perspective, but utilize the background in the subject and show how it fits into your viewpoint.

If you really want to understand more, I'd suggest Chalmer's book "A Conscious Mind". Chalmers is an encyclopedia of sorts and although his personal contributions are limited, the fact is he manages to provide detailed explanations on a very broad number of topics within cognitive science. Within the first 100 pages you'll find considerable discussion on how things like gravity or EM fields are not like consciousness. These are objectively observable phenomena. Dark matter or dark energy and the problems regarding galaxy dynamics similarly are not "hard problems" as the term is defined. Science relies on objective observations. If none are available, we generally relegate claims of phenomena that are not objectively observable by everyone to be crackpottery. Yet we don't consider that to be the case with consciousness. The kinds of claims made by folks not familiar with the issues can become exhausting. If one isn't familiar with the literature and the field of study, those folks should be asking questions, not insisting they have the answers.

You're still insinuating that the problem is with my understanding and mispreresenting my position as "having the answers" (which I never even implied). If that were the case, then you can simply respond to the actual argument I made and counter them. Instead, you rely on arguments from authority, refer to technicalities, and position yourself as the referee (and thus ultimate authority) on both science and philosophy.

This only convinces me that my argument was good and you didn't like the implications of it, so you generated a false sense of controversy.

Exactly opposite of your representation, I actually responded to the typical "science can't explain" with "of course it can't and it's not obliged to, and this problem exists outside of consciousness". I'm not saying I have all the answers.

And I will conclude with agreement: science can't explain everything (that's, in fact, a characteristic of a pseudoscience) but I addendum that science, at least, explains something and that the people that continue to criticize science for not explaining everything aren't able to explain anything. Of course, explain, in this context, very specifically means "can utilize empirically-informed models to predict behavior".

Also, you know my position, it's a fairly common position: it's the physicalist position. Again a misrepresentation, claiming that these are my personal wishes and desires. I also share some views with Lowe.

Lastly, it's unfair to post a reference and expect somebody to read it all. If you have a specific point to make from a reference, quote it, interperet it, and state how its relevant. Otherwise it's just more "oh the answers in there, you're just too ignorant to see it... but don't mind me not being able to state it".

Now let's put these posts in "arguments 101 thread" and get back to discussion... I believe the ball was in your court (unless your just waving your arms for nothing).

 

[Pythagorean]

But the problem is that there is no "gravity" that emerges from the particles and their accelerations. All there is are the particles and their speeds, positions and accelerations. Gravity is a piece of conceptual machinery to model their evolution in time. With consciousness, there is something else other than the particles and their speeds and positions. This is what the fundamental difference is. The gravitational field is just a mathematical trick to explain the observables, which are fundamentally just position and time.

You argument is that there is no gravity. That's really not satisfactory...
I don't see how you can selectively use that argument on gravity and not on consciousness.

They're both products of the same system of perceptions.

I think if you're to take Lowe's view, you can't be selective about it.

 

[Pythagorean]

But the hard problem of consciousness is to do with a categorically different phenomenon to the easy ones that are currently amenable to scientific investigation. It’s all about category.

I'm not suggesting that the elusiveness of qualia means it can never be successfully addressed. But I am suggesting that the difference between the nature of qualia and the 'easy' problems of consciousness is of an entirely different order to the difference between our understanding of the Einstein Field Equations and our lack of understanding of the underlying cause of them. My guess is that physicists will succeed in this hard problem of gravity (only, of course, for it to be replaced by yet another one for them to tackle. That's life). Giving up is no answer.

The why and how of qualia represents a very major challenge for science, and it’s my opinion that recognising the size of the cliff to be scaled would be a useful first step.

Throughout your post, you keep saying "no, no, it's different" in tautology. You still haven't shown me how. It's about category might have been a start? Perhaps you should dive further into that thought for me.

 

[John Creighto]

I know this is slightly off topic but this quote keeps comming up in this thread:

Originally Posted by madness View Post

But the problem is that there is no "gravity" that emerges from the particles and their accelerations. All there is are the particles and their speeds, positions and accelerations. Gravity is a piece of conceptual machinery to model their evolution in time. With consciousness, there is something else other than the particles and their speeds and positions. This is what the fundamental difference is. The gravitational field is just a mathematical trick to explain the observables, which are fundamentally just position and time.

I read about the following in the big bang theory (TV Show) discussion:

"Loop quantum gravity (LQG), also known as loop gravity and quantum geometry, is a proposed quantum hypothesis of spacetime which attempts to reconcile the theories of quantum mechanics and general relativity.
Loop quantum gravity postulates that space can be viewed as an extremely fine fabric or network "woven" of finite quantised loops of excited gravitational fields called spin networks. When viewed over time, these spin networks are referred to as "spin foam" (which should not be confused with quantum foam). The theory of LQG is considered a major quantum gravity contender, along with string theory, but has the perceived advantage of consistently incorporating general relativity without requiring the use of "higher dimensions"."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loop_quantum_gravity

and I think this theory would address these issues, but I do not know what the status of this theory is (in terms of being accepted on the same level as more classical theories in modern physics).

As for the main point of contention in the recent part of this thread, I do think that it is perfectly reasonable to compare the hard problem of consciousness to the question of, "Why does mass curve space time?". However, I can suggest one difference. In the case of qualia, we have reason to believe that there is something which our theories aren't able to explain though laws of nature.

However, when it comes to why does mass curve space. Why can't some laws be fundamental and not need further explanation? Aristotle would refer to this as the concept of a first cause but this does not imply a God. Aristotle thought that there should be some principles which existed at the beginning of the universe. He called these principles, "Unperishable Principles" and he discusses this in his book Metaphysics:
http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/metaphysics/

 

[Pythagorean]

I don't know that it makes them fundamental, or whether there's a need or not, but it always appears that the nature of things (gravity, EM, consciousness, existence) don't have an explanation. But we learn a lot about how to model and control systems of particles involving them when trying to find one.

 

[Goodison_Lad]

Throughout your post, you keep saying "no, no, it's different" in tautology. You still haven't shown me how. It's about category might have been a start? Perhaps you should dive further into that thought for me.

I'm sorry, but I'll have to risk repeating myself: as I said in earlier posts, qualia is different because it is pure experience itself - it is entirely subjective.

It seems to me that no EEG, MRI scan, blood test or any other tool currently at the disposal of neuroscientists is likely to get us any nearer to the understanding the nature of conscious experience. Things that contribute to consciousness – sure. They’ll tell us, I’ve no reason to doubt, about all sorts of systems that combine to produce the content of which we are aware, but not the actual conscious experience itself. Of course, the usual caveat applies: that may change one day.

This is why I think it represents a great challenge for scientists who want to understand it in terms of brain systems.

So I’m afraid I can’t really give you any clearer reason for conscious experience being fundamentally different to objectively investigable phenomena than this.

In the case of qualia, we have reason to believe that there is something which our theories aren't able to explain though laws of nature.
Why can't some laws be fundamental and not need further explanation?

Qualia is certainly merits investigation, but who knows whether it will ever yield to explanation? If it doesn’t, and has to be deemed as fundamental, then it would effectively be a self-contained fundamental property.

I think it’s this that would make it unlike the stress-energy/curvature relationship: if that turns out to be fundamental because it has no underlying explanation, the stress-energy/curvature relationship doesn’t stand alone – it ‘explains’ a higher-level phenomenon, even though it itself has no explanation.

I’m glad I’m not working on either!

 

[Pythagorean]

I'm sorry, but I'll have to risk repeating myself: as I said in earlier posts, qualia is different because it is pure experience itself - it is entirely subjective.

It seems to me that no EEG, MRI scan, blood test or any other tool currently at the disposal of neuroscientists is likely to get us any nearer to the understanding the nature of conscious experience. Things that contribute to consciousness – sure. They’ll tell us, I’ve no reason to doubt, about all sorts of systems that combine to produce the content of which we are aware, but not the actual conscious experience itself. Of course, the usual caveat applies: that may change one day.

This is why I think it represents a great challenge for scientists who want to understand it in terms of brain systems.

So I’m afraid I can’t really give you any clearer reason for conscious experience being fundamentally different to objectively investigable phenomena than this.

I agree with, and have stated in some way, everything you've said here. None of it seems to touch on my argument that the nature of gravity has the same explanatory gap as consciousness. The two phenomena are themselves different (action at a distance vs. subjective experience). But both phenomena can only be characterized, not "explained".

We ask "why" and the only answers we ever really get are "how".

 

[John Creighto]

I agree with, and have stated in some way, everything you've said here. None of it seems to touch on my argument that the nature of gravity has the same explanatory gap as consciousness. The two phenomena are themselves different (action at a distance vs. subjective experience). But both phenomena can only be characterized, not "explained".

We ask "why" and the only answers we ever really get are "how".

May, ask for you in another thread to distinguish between what you mean by "why" vs "how". I suspect this is a big topic in and of itself.