How physicists handle the idea of Free Will?

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Discussion Overview

The discussion revolves around the reconciliation of free will with the determinism inherent in physics, particularly at the macroscopic level. Participants explore the implications of determinism on human choices, the nature of free will, and the potential for downward causation to influence this relationship.

Discussion Character

  • Debate/contested
  • Conceptual clarification
  • Exploratory

Main Points Raised

  • Some participants argue that if determinism holds at the macroscopic level, then free will may not exist, as choices could be seen as predetermined by history, genetics, and environment.
  • Others question the definition of free will, suggesting it may vary among individuals and may not align with deterministic views.
  • A participant provides an example of Joan d'Arc's choice as a demonstration of free will, though this is challenged by others who suggest her actions were influenced by past experiences and beliefs.
  • Some participants propose that if all actions are determined by prior causes, then even responses in discussions could be predicted based on past experiences.
  • There is a suggestion that downward causation could be a framework for understanding free will, with some arguing that rejecting downward causation implies rejecting free will.
  • Others express skepticism about the concept of downward causation, questioning how it could preserve the notion of free will without evidence.
  • A participant asserts that if actions are solely a function of microstates, then free will cannot exist, while suggesting that if macroscopic states can exert downward causation, then free will may be possible.

Areas of Agreement / Disagreement

Participants do not reach a consensus on the existence of free will or its compatibility with determinism. Multiple competing views are presented, with ongoing debate about definitions and implications.

Contextual Notes

Limitations include varying definitions of free will, assumptions about determinism, and the lack of empirical evidence for concepts like downward causation. The discussion also reflects differing perspectives on the influence of past experiences on decision-making.

fbs7
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I have always been quite curious how physicists reconcile the concept free will with the determinism of physics.

By determinism I mean the one at macroscopic level, because I know that at quantum level most of the things are based on probabilities. So there's no free will for an electron.

But, at macroscopic level, everything seems to have some equation that determines its future, even if that's chaotic and very difficult (for us) to predict. So there's no free will for the Moon, as we'll know its exact position million of years in the future; in the same way, there's no free will for a drop of water falling in a waterfall - it's future is pre-determined, even if it is very difficult for us to calculate that.

Similarly, there's no free will for a computer, given for the same set of inputs it will always produce the same outputs.

So if I'm to believe in physics determinism, I should give up on the concept of free will, because like a computer whatever choice I'm going to make has been pre-determined by my history, genetics, inputs, environment and so forth - even if that choice may be, to our current capabilities, unpredictable, because it would depend on a very complicated equation.

That is very depressing, and as I love physics and much as I love my free will, I just don't think about that. So how do physicists answer that dilemma - is there free will in physics?
 
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What do you mean by 'free will'?
 
Doc Al said:
What do you mean by 'free will'?
That's a good question, and I bet every person will have a different answer. I think this one from Merriam-Webster reflects my thinking:

free will (noun)
1. ..
2. freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention
 
Can you give an example of making a choice not determined by prior causes. Not sure what that would mean.
 
Doc Al said:
Can you give an example of making a choice not determined by prior causes. Not sure what that would mean.


I reckon you don't believe in free will.

That's a perfectly good point of view - nothing wrong in that. I understand you don't need to reconcile that with physics determinism.
 
fbs7 said:
I reckon you don't believe in free will.
Still waiting for an example so I can understand what you mean by the term.
 
Doc Al said:
Still waiting for an example so I can understand what you mean by the term.


The way I see it, free will is when Joan d'Arc chose to be burned instead of saving herself by reneging her beliefs. The way I see it, it was her choice.
 
fbs7 said:
The way I see it, free will is when Joan d'Arc chose to be burned instead of saving herself by reneging her beliefs. The way I see it, it was her choice.
Is it possible to choose what you believe? Clearly her beliefs were strong enough so that when she weighed up the possible options to her burning to death was more desirable than condoning her beliefs.

The point being here that when you "make a choice" you unconsciously and consciously weigh up the ramifications of the options. How you judge the options is based on your accumulated life experience which was largely/entirely out of your control. So imagine that Alice is observed her entire life by Bob and that Bob has a team of expert psychologists. If Bob observes Alice presented with a choice he and his team could use the data and knowledge they have to build a predictive model and predict how Alice will make her decision because what she chooses will be based on her judgement which is built from past experience.
 
Are you sure her actions weren't determined by her past and brain wiring?
 
  • #10
So if I write "ABC", then before you read my post it's already pre-determined that you're going to answer "DEF", based on your past experiences, brain wiring, environment, history, etc...?

That is, no quantum processes can modify that, no still-undiscovered factors can influence it, there's nothing else besides working just like a computer - known outputs for known inputs?
 
  • #11
fbs7 said:
So if I write "ABC", then before you read my post it's already pre-determined that you're going to answer "DEF", based on your past experiences, brain wiring, environment, history, etc...?
Yes I don't see why not. My entire personality is a combination of how my biology reacts with my environment over time, what I know and what I can do is also a product of this. Put the two together and no matter what I do there is a reason that has its basis in some past event.
fbs7 said:
That is, no quantum processes can modify that, no still-undiscovered factors can influence it, there's nothing else besides working just like a computer - known outputs for known inputs?
Even if we propose there was some sort of quantum randomness how does that bring back "free will"? If anything that's less free. With regards to the rest yes, the physical brain and it's physical mechanical processes are not only all that we have found they are all that is indicated.

(Also just some advice but you might want to consider asking for the title of this thread to be modified to "How scientists..." and moved to the biology forum. Physics isn't really the discipline you want to study if you are looking into cognition and behaviour)
 
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  • #12
Doc Al said:
What do you mean by 'free will'?

I think in the context of this question free will is best described as downward causation.
 
  • #13
ModusPwnd said:
I think in the context of this question free will is best described as downward causation.
What does that mean?
 
  • #14
Doc Al said:
What does that mean?

Simply that the question of free will from a physics perspective is essentially (IMO) a question about downward causation. Rejecting the possibility of downward causation is rejecting free will and finding a case of downward causation tentatively leaves free will on the table.
 
  • #15
ModusPwnd said:
Simply that the question of free will from a physics perspective is essentially (IMO) a question about downward causation. Rejecting the possibility of downward causation is rejecting free will and finding a case of downward causation tentatively leaves free will on the table.
And what exactly is "downward causation" and how does it factor into this specifically?
 
  • #16
What do you mean by 'downward causation'?
 
  • #17
Oh, sorry. Downward causation is simply cause and effect working from 'top' level complex processes down to the fundamental 'low' level processes. Physicists generally work under the assumption of reductionism which has been (somewhat) fruitful but at the moment universal reductionism is just an assumption. There is no evidence that all complex phenomenon can be reduced to the physics of the basic constituents (though that is our working hypothesis).

Here is one read about it, http://www.ctnsstars.org/conferences/papers/The%20physics%20of%20downward%20causation.pdf Note that I am not supporting the idea of downward causation in this thread, I am simply casting the notion of Free Will as an issue of downward causation.
 
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  • #18
ModusPwnd said:
I am simply casting the notion of Free Will as an issue of downward causation.
The link you provided has no mention of free will. How specifically do you think that downward causation means that free will is left on the table? I'm sorry if I've missed something but so far all I've seen is your assertion that downward causation could preserve free will (whatever that means) with no evidence to back it up.
 
  • #19
If the actions we make are a function of the micro state, then there can be no free will. Will emerges as a macroscopic phenomenon. If that macroscopic phenomenon is completely a function of the micostate, then any action of that will is not free. But if that macroscopic state is capable of exercising a downward cause and effect then that will is free. That is, the macrostate is the cause rather than the effect.
 
  • #20
ModusPwnd said:
If the actions we make are a function of the micro state, then there can be no free will. Will emerges as a macroscopic phenomenon. If that macroscopic phenomenon is completely a function of the micostate, then any action of that will is not free. But if that macroscopic state is capable of exercising a downward cause and effect then that will is free. That is, the macrostate is the cause rather than the effect.
Why is that different from from any form of mechanical feedback? And why can an event be both a cause and an effect?
 
  • #21
Why would it be the same as any form of mechanical feedback? Why would it be both a cause and effect? I am not sure what you are getting at.
 
  • #22
ModusPwnd said:
Why would it be the same as any form of mechanical feedback? Why would it be both a cause and effect? I am not sure what you are getting at.
You are saying that micro state actions lead to emergent effects (I agree here) then you say that the emergent effects feed back to affect the micro state (I agree here) but then you suggest that this allows free will. Why? What is special about emergent effects that they get to opt-out of the fact that they are caused by past actions? Very specifically this is the statement I take issue with:
ModusPwnd said:
if that macroscopic state is capable of exercising a downward cause and effect then that will is free. That is, the macrostate is the cause rather than the effect.
 
  • #23
Modus,this would be a better topic in the philosophy section. You are simply not going to get much thoughtful discussion from this topic here, as evidenced by the direction this thread has taken.
 
  • #24
All emergent effects were not created equal. Some can be reduced to functions of micro states, most cannot. Of those most we just assume that they can be in principle - but that has not been shown. If they cannot be reduced (even in principle) and they can exert a downward causation then that would satisfy as Free Will (IMO).
 
  • #25
ModusPwnd said:
All emergent effects were not created equal. Some can be reduced to functions of micro states, most cannot. Of those most we just assume that they can be in principle - but that has not been shown. If they cannot be reduced (even in principle) and they can exert a downward causation then that would satisfy as Free Will (IMO).
I get that but I completely fail to see how it relates to free will. Perhaps we're operating under different definitions here.
 
  • #26
I think (and correct me if I'm wrong), free will would mean a person chooses A over B without any kind of determining factor. That is, it is totally random which choice is made. The problem with this is you can't scientifically state there are no underlying motivations, since you can never show that scientifically something does not exist, only that it does.

Of course, if the OP means something else by free will, then I'm at a loss to chime in.
 
  • #27
daveb said:
I think (and correct me if I'm wrong), free will would mean a person chooses A over B without any kind of determining factor.
I'd agree that this is the common definition however I don't think it is realistic and as you then go onto say...
daveb said:
That is, it is totally random which choice is made.
This is bizarre to me because if it is random then it is hardly free will either!

Personally I use the term "will" to mean the conscious action of making decisions. The "free" part for me refers to the extent of options the physical and social environment allows me.

EDIT: Good example of this, on the news the presenter just said "industry sources have confirmed that the manager did resign under his own free will and was not pressured by others to go." In other words it was free will because there were no blatant social pressures.
 
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  • #28
daveb said:
I think (and correct me if I'm wrong), free will would mean a person chooses A over B without any kind of determining factor. That is, it is totally random which choice is made.
But why would you call something totally random free will? (I can sort of see the free part, but not the will.)
 
  • #29
Hi Ryan, maybe I can help clear this up.
Ryan_m_b said:
Why is that different from from any form of mechanical feedback? And why can an event be both a cause and an effect?
For downward causation (sometimes called "strong downward causation") to be a reality, neurons would interact not just with neighboring neurons and other immediately local affects, they would also be influenced by the brain as a whole. Rather than neurons being subjected to neurotransmitters acting on it, along with the local electrical field and other direct influences, they would be subjected to additional causes, sometimes called “formal causes”. These additional causes would influence neurons such that the neurotransmitters, the membraine potential and other causal influences acting on the neuron were no longer sufficient to determine how a neuron behaves – a neuron would actually be influenced by an emergent phenomenon. Mental causation as it’s referred to is a form of downward causation. The emergent thoughts and experiences would influence neurons in a way that was above and beyond the influence of those local affects studied by neuroscience.

This type of "downward causation" is favored by some nonlinear dynamicists and others in the "dynamics" crowd, but is obviously not a mainstream view.
 
  • #30
Q_Goest said:
Hi Ryan, maybe I can help clear this up.
Thanks for that :smile:
Q_Goest said:
For downward causation (sometimes called "strong downward causation") to be a reality, neurons would interact not just with neighboring neurons and other immediately local affects, they would also be influenced by the brain as a whole. Rather than neurons being subjected to neurotransmitters acting on it, along with the local electrical field and other direct influences, they would be subjected to additional causes, sometimes called “formal causes”. These additional causes would influence neurons such that the neurotransmitters, the membraine potential and other causal influences acting on the neuron were no longer sufficient to determine how a neuron behaves – a neuron would actually be influenced by an emergent phenomenon. Mental causation as it’s referred to is a form of downward causation. The emergent thoughts and experiences would influence neurons in a way that was above and beyond the influence of those local affects studied by neuroscience.
Hmm I'm still not clear of how this would "keep free will" but more than that I could in principle track the effects of a neuron back to the point where what it has done has contributed to its future behaviour (i.e. the firing of neuron A inhibits neuron B which excites neuron C which excites neuron A. A then fires and the firing of A...).

Either way though I feel like we're straying from the OP's question about free will. Unless someone has something to say regarding the OPs definition of free will and what science has to say about it we're done here.
 

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