How physicists handle the idea of Free Will?

[Q_Goest]

Hi Pythagorean,

Right, but you missed my point in the previous post about the hard problem existing in gravity, too.

Not everyone in these philosophy forums has a good background in philosophy, so it's difficult sometimes to distinguish between knowledgeable arguments and those that come from the perspective of a non-expert, say someone with a background in engineering or a background in biology. Those folks with no background in philosophy are sometimes difficult to identify, especially if you have little or no background in the field yourself. There is an entire branch of scientists who specialize in the logical arguments made to conceptually understand topics such as consciousness. They call themselves philosophers. Some of us frown upon their work because we don't understand it. They use words we're not familiar with and say things in a way that confuses us. At times, we ridicule them because what they say makes no sense to us. But what they're discussing has everything to do with the science.

I wouldn't walk into a microbiology forum and, as an engineer not understanding what they're talking about, tell them they are missing my point. I wouldn't tell them they don't need all those words to describe molecular interactions since I obviously understand chemistry and don't use those words. Unfortunately, many people tend to feel that their background in some other area of science has prepared them for discussions regarding the philosophy of mind.

It's diffucult to explain to someone without the background why there is no "hard problem" of gravity, dark matter or even of dark energy. It's difficult without the background to explain why subliminal stimuli has nothing to do with the topic at hand. Because there's an entire field of research and logic that can't be funneled into a single post just as it would be impossible for a microbiologist to explain to an engineer such as myself, details regarding microbiology.

I have no doubt you could understand this topic if you really wanted to understand it. But it seems like you really aren't interested in understanding it, and that makes it frustrating for anyone with a background in philosophy to try and measure up to your expectations.

 

[Pythagorean]

Insinuating ignorance isn't a solution to the problem. That's not what we do in the biology forums. We might even report somebody for trying to slip a subtle ad hominem in. Your post makes no argument and contributes nothing to the understanding of the problem.

In the science forums, we do patiently break it down and explain it as long as we can. You should expect us to not "need all those words to describe molecular interactions" because that's the point of the forum. To explain things without jargon because it helps exclude silent pretense.

The only reason you would say "oh I can't explain it to you, you're ignorant" is if you don't have any real substance.

 

[Pythagorean]

I realize that the "hard problem" is specifically defined for consciousness, but what I'm arguing is that it's analogous to "problems" in gravity. We don't know why matter has gravitational or electromagnetic fields in the same way we don't know why subjective experience can arise from matter. These are all enigmatic properties that we just accept to be true.

 

[madness]

Right, but you missed my point in the previous post about the hard problem existing in gravity, too. Above, I was demonstrating they both have an easy problem. The point is that all rational studies have a hard and easy side to them. Remember that the problem is with the loaded word, "explain".

If you want to reject physicalism approaches to consciousness, your arguments would apply to physicalism approaches to gravity as well. Physicalists reject dualist arguments because they move forward and make grounds in prediction with the core physicalist assumption (cause and effect).

So no, we can't explain how the right arrangement of matter can have a subjective experience, but we can't explain how gravity arises either. But we know rules and operations for both (what arrangements are more likely to produce what effects).

I agree with this to a large extent. What we need is a theory which can relate physical or informational quantities to conscious experience or qualia. The only real attempt that I'm aware of is Tononi's Integrated Information Theory (http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42). We may never understand how subjective experiences arise or what they are, but we can describe observed relationships mathematically just as we have done for gravity and electromagnetism. For me though, there is a big difference between applying this type of explanation to gravity and qualia. For gravity, we are modelling the correlation between very similar physical quantities (basically speed, position, acceleration). For consciousness, we are modelling the correlation between entirely different categories, physical (possibly informational) and experiential.

 

[Pythagorean]

For me though, there is a big difference between applying this type of explanation to gravity and qualia. For gravity, we are modelling the correlation between very similar physical quantities (basically speed, position, acceleration). For consciousness, we are modelling the correlation between entirely different categories, physical (possibly informational) and experiential.

But to me it appears to me that you are comparing:
1) only the easy problems of gravity
to
2) the gap between the easy and hard problems of consciousness.

The hard problem of gravity is essentially the same as for consciousness: there's an explanatory gap: we know about speed/position/acceleration just fine, but that doesn't explain why gravity exists in the first place. How this property (gravity) can emerge from particles and their interactions. We can't even explain why there are particles and interactions in the first place. We can't explain why there's something instead of nothing. These are all hard problems of science. Science doesn't just fail at explaining consciousness, it fails explaining a lot of human questions about the universe.

But it's possible that the questions are meaningless, too. It's easy to see why "does fist eat orange?" is a nonsensical question. But other questions that are more emotionally appealing to us might seem more reasonably when they're really not.

One huge difficulty is that it is an ill-defined question in the first place: there's no reliable definition of consciousness.

 

[micromass]

Hi Pythagorean,

Not everyone in these philosophy forums has a good background in philosophy, so it's difficult sometimes to distinguish between knowledgeable arguments and those that come from the perspective of a non-expert, say someone with a background in engineering or a background in biology. Those folks with no background in philosophy are sometimes difficult to identify, especially if you have little or no background in the field yourself. There is an entire branch of scientists who specialize in the logical arguments made to conceptually understand topics such as consciousness. They call themselves philosophers. Some of us frown upon their work because we don't understand it. They use words we're not familiar with and say things in a way that confuses us. At times, we ridicule them because what they say makes no sense to us. But what they're discussing has everything to do with the science.

I wouldn't walk into a microbiology forum and, as an engineer not understanding what they're talking about, tell them they are missing my point. I wouldn't tell them they don't need all those words to describe molecular interactions since I obviously understand chemistry and don't use those words. Unfortunately, many people tend to feel that their background in some other area of science has prepared them for discussions regarding the philosophy of mind.

It's diffucult to explain to someone without the background why there is no "hard problem" of gravity, dark matter or even of dark energy. It's difficult without the background to explain why subliminal stimuli has nothing to do with the topic at hand. Because there's an entire field of research and logic that can't be funneled into a single post just as it would be impossible for a microbiologist to explain to an engineer such as myself, details regarding microbiology.

I have no doubt you could understand this topic if you really wanted to understand it. But it seems like you really aren't interested in understanding it, and that makes it frustrating for anyone with a background in philosophy to try and measure up to your expectations.

Right, so if I get you right, then you are saying that philosophers know more about science then the scientists themselves. If I want to ask people about gravity, then I'll ask the physicists, not the philosophers.

This entire argument is an argument by authority and is a logical fallacy.

 

[madness]

But to me it appears to me that you are comparing:
1) only the easy problems of gravity
to
2) the gap between the easy and hard problems of consciousness.

The hard problem of gravity is essentially the same as for consciousness: there's an explanatory gap: we know about speed/position/acceleration just fine, but that doesn't explain why gravity exists in the first place. How this property (gravity) can emerge from particles and their interactions. We can't even explain why there are particles and interactions in the first place. We can't explain why there's something instead of nothing. These are all hard problems of science. Science doesn't just fail at explaining consciousness, it fails explaining a lot of human questions about the universe.

But it's possible that the questions are meaningless, too. It's easy to see why "does fist eat orange?" is a nonsensical question. But other questions that are more emotionally appealing to us might seem more reasonably when they're really not.

One huge difficulty is that it is an ill-defined question in the first place: there's no reliable definition of consciousness.

But the problem is that there is no "gravity" that emerges from the particles and their accelerations. All there is are the particles and their speeds, positions and accelerations. Gravity is a piece of conceptual machinery to model their evolution in time. With consciousness, there is something else other than the particles and their speeds and positions. This is what the fundamental difference is. The gravitational field is just a mathematical trick to explain the observables, which are fundamentally just position and time.

 

[Q_Goest]

Insinuating ignorance isn't a solution to the problem. That's not what we do in the biology forums. We might even report somebody for trying to slip a subtle ad hominem in. Your post makes no argument and contributes nothing to the understanding of the problem.

In the science forums, we do patiently break it down and explain it as long as we can. You should expect us to not "need all those words to describe molecular interactions" because that's the point of the forum. To explain things without jargon because it helps exclude silent pretense.

The only reason you would say "oh I can't explain it to you, you're ignorant" is if you don't have any real substance.

That's a valid response and I do feel bad for not being more helpful. My apologies. I would only say that I have also felt that the way many of your responses and those of others here are worded, they truly frown upon this entire branch of academia. Not understanding the topic and still debating your personal views is why the philosophy forum is under general discussion, and the reason for the new rules started the beginning of last year.

If you feel gravity is somehow parallel to consciousness, you should provide references from philosophical journals and provide some background. Explain your argument not just in your own words and from your own perspective, but utilize the background in the subject and show how it fits into your viewpoint.

If you really want to understand more, I'd suggest Chalmer's book "A Conscious Mind". Chalmers is an encyclopedia of sorts and although his personal contributions are limited, the fact is he manages to provide detailed explanations on a very broad number of topics within cognitive science. Within the first 100 pages you'll find considerable discussion on how things like gravity or EM fields are not like consciousness. These are objectively observable phenomena. Dark matter or dark energy and the problems regarding galaxy dynamics similarly are not "hard problems" as the term is defined. Science relies on objective observations. If none are available, we generally relegate claims of phenomena that are not objectively observable by everyone to be crackpottery. Yet we don't consider that to be the case with consciousness. The kinds of claims made by folks not familiar with the issues can become exhausting. If one isn't familiar with the literature and the field of study, those folks should be asking questions, not insisting they have the answers.

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi micromass,

Right, so if I get you right, then you are saying that philosophers know more about science then the scientists themselves.

Not at all. I'm suggesting that they are not the dolts many here are making them out to be and suggesting they don't have any understanding of the science is an insult. I'm suggesting that to understand the philosophy, then just as physicists, biologists, engineers, etc... have had to study their topic, there is a need to similarly study philosophy in order to comment intelligibly.

 

[Goodison_Lad]

Right, but you missed my point in the previous post about the hard problem existing in gravity, too. Above, I was demonstrating they both have an easy problem.

I did see and understand the point, and I don't disagree with it entirely. Developments in our understanding of, say, gravity, have been step-by-step, and you could say that a 'hard' problem of gravity (ignoring the little one of unification with QM for the time being!) is why stress-energy should cause curvature of spacetime. But this problem is of the never-ending sort that keeps science moving on. We explain this, this generates more questions, we address them and so on. They are about phenomena in the same category.

But the hard problem of consciousness is to do with a categorically different phenomenon to the easy ones that are currently amenable to scientific investigation. It’s all about category.

I'm not suggesting that the elusiveness of qualia means it can never be successfully addressed. But I am suggesting that the difference between the nature of qualia and the 'easy' problems of consciousness is of an entirely different order to the difference between our understanding of the Einstein Field Equations and our lack of understanding of the underlying cause of them. My guess is that physicists will succeed in this hard problem of gravity (only, of course, for it to be replaced by yet another one for them to tackle. That's life). Giving up is no answer.

The why and how of qualia represents a very major challenge for science, and it’s my opinion that recognising the size of the cliff to be scaled would be a useful first step.

 

[Evo]

Hi micromass,

Not at all. I'm suggesting that they are not the dolts many here are making them out to be and suggesting they don't have any understanding of the science is an insult. I'm suggesting that to understand the philosophy, then just as physicists, biologists, engineers, etc... have had to study their topic, there is a need to similarly study philosophy in order to comment intelligibly.

But to be honest, a degree in philosophy does not make them able to comment knowledgeably on topics of science, engineering etc, unless they also happen to have degrees in these subjects. That is a big problem here in the philosophy forum, people that read a few books on philosophy feel that they can post on topics that they know next to nothing about.

The only thing a philosopher can post about is philosophy, unless they actually hold degrees in the other subject they are posting about. it does state in the rules that the same standards of discussing science also applies in the philosophy forum.

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi Evo,

But to be honest, a degree in philosophy does not make them able to comment knowledgeably on topics of science, engineering etc, unless they also happen to have degrees in these subjects. That is a big problem here in the philosophy forum, people that read a few books on philosophy feel that they can post on topics that they know next to nothing about.

The only thing a philosopher can post about is philosophy, unless they actually hold degrees in the other subject they are posting about. it does state in the rules that the same standards of discussing science also applies in the philosophy forum.

I would certainly agree that some philosophers have degrees limiting them to philosophy. Of course, to get a PhD in philosophy, the study of the natural sciences or other sciences is a large part of that. Chalmers for example has a background in mathematics, but there are a tremendous number of philosphers who have a background in physics and especially, quantum mechanics. I've been very surprised to find just how much good information is available about quantum mechanics that's been written by philosophers.

Again, I apologize for the insinuating remarks earlier.

 

[Pythagorean]

That's a valid response and I do feel bad for not being more helpful. My apologies. I would only say that I have also felt that the way many of your responses and those of others here are worded, they truly frown upon this entire branch of academia. Not understanding the topic and still debating your personal views is why the philosophy forum is under general discussion, and the reason for the new rules started the beginning of last year.

If you feel gravity is somehow parallel to consciousness, you should provide references from philosophical journals and provide some background. Explain your argument not just in your own words and from your own perspective, but utilize the background in the subject and show how it fits into your viewpoint.

If you really want to understand more, I'd suggest Chalmer's book "A Conscious Mind". Chalmers is an encyclopedia of sorts and although his personal contributions are limited, the fact is he manages to provide detailed explanations on a very broad number of topics within cognitive science. Within the first 100 pages you'll find considerable discussion on how things like gravity or EM fields are not like consciousness. These are objectively observable phenomena. Dark matter or dark energy and the problems regarding galaxy dynamics similarly are not "hard problems" as the term is defined. Science relies on objective observations. If none are available, we generally relegate claims of phenomena that are not objectively observable by everyone to be crackpottery. Yet we don't consider that to be the case with consciousness. The kinds of claims made by folks not familiar with the issues can become exhausting. If one isn't familiar with the literature and the field of study, those folks should be asking questions, not insisting they have the answers.

You're still insinuating that the problem is with my understanding and mispreresenting my position as "having the answers" (which I never even implied). If that were the case, then you can simply respond to the actual argument I made and counter them. Instead, you rely on arguments from authority, refer to technicalities, and position yourself as the referee (and thus ultimate authority) on both science and philosophy.

This only convinces me that my argument was good and you didn't like the implications of it, so you generated a false sense of controversy.

Exactly opposite of your representation, I actually responded to the typical "science can't explain" with "of course it can't and it's not obliged to, and this problem exists outside of consciousness". I'm not saying I have all the answers.

And I will conclude with agreement: science can't explain everything (that's, in fact, a characteristic of a pseudoscience) but I addendum that science, at least, explains something and that the people that continue to criticize science for not explaining everything aren't able to explain anything. Of course, explain, in this context, very specifically means "can utilize empirically-informed models to predict behavior".

Also, you know my position, it's a fairly common position: it's the physicalist position. Again a misrepresentation, claiming that these are my personal wishes and desires. I also share some views with Lowe.

Lastly, it's unfair to post a reference and expect somebody to read it all. If you have a specific point to make from a reference, quote it, interperet it, and state how its relevant. Otherwise it's just more "oh the answers in there, you're just too ignorant to see it... but don't mind me not being able to state it".

Now let's put these posts in "arguments 101 thread" and get back to discussion... I believe the ball was in your court (unless your just waving your arms for nothing).

 

[Pythagorean]

But the problem is that there is no "gravity" that emerges from the particles and their accelerations. All there is are the particles and their speeds, positions and accelerations. Gravity is a piece of conceptual machinery to model their evolution in time. With consciousness, there is something else other than the particles and their speeds and positions. This is what the fundamental difference is. The gravitational field is just a mathematical trick to explain the observables, which are fundamentally just position and time.

You argument is that there is no gravity. That's really not satisfactory...
I don't see how you can selectively use that argument on gravity and not on consciousness.

They're both products of the same system of perceptions.

I think if you're to take Lowe's view, you can't be selective about it.

 

[Pythagorean]

But the hard problem of consciousness is to do with a categorically different phenomenon to the easy ones that are currently amenable to scientific investigation. It’s all about category.

I'm not suggesting that the elusiveness of qualia means it can never be successfully addressed. But I am suggesting that the difference between the nature of qualia and the 'easy' problems of consciousness is of an entirely different order to the difference between our understanding of the Einstein Field Equations and our lack of understanding of the underlying cause of them. My guess is that physicists will succeed in this hard problem of gravity (only, of course, for it to be replaced by yet another one for them to tackle. That's life). Giving up is no answer.

The why and how of qualia represents a very major challenge for science, and it’s my opinion that recognising the size of the cliff to be scaled would be a useful first step.

Throughout your post, you keep saying "no, no, it's different" in tautology. You still haven't shown me how. It's about category might have been a start? Perhaps you should dive further into that thought for me.

 

[John Creighto]

I know this is slightly off topic but this quote keeps comming up in this thread:

Originally Posted by madness View Post

But the problem is that there is no "gravity" that emerges from the particles and their accelerations. All there is are the particles and their speeds, positions and accelerations. Gravity is a piece of conceptual machinery to model their evolution in time. With consciousness, there is something else other than the particles and their speeds and positions. This is what the fundamental difference is. The gravitational field is just a mathematical trick to explain the observables, which are fundamentally just position and time.

I read about the following in the big bang theory (TV Show) discussion:

"Loop quantum gravity (LQG), also known as loop gravity and quantum geometry, is a proposed quantum hypothesis of spacetime which attempts to reconcile the theories of quantum mechanics and general relativity.
Loop quantum gravity postulates that space can be viewed as an extremely fine fabric or network "woven" of finite quantised loops of excited gravitational fields called spin networks. When viewed over time, these spin networks are referred to as "spin foam" (which should not be confused with quantum foam). The theory of LQG is considered a major quantum gravity contender, along with string theory, but has the perceived advantage of consistently incorporating general relativity without requiring the use of "higher dimensions"."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loop_quantum_gravity

and I think this theory would address these issues, but I do not know what the status of this theory is (in terms of being accepted on the same level as more classical theories in modern physics).

As for the main point of contention in the recent part of this thread, I do think that it is perfectly reasonable to compare the hard problem of consciousness to the question of, "Why does mass curve space time?". However, I can suggest one difference. In the case of qualia, we have reason to believe that there is something which our theories aren't able to explain though laws of nature.

However, when it comes to why does mass curve space. Why can't some laws be fundamental and not need further explanation? Aristotle would refer to this as the concept of a first cause but this does not imply a God. Aristotle thought that there should be some principles which existed at the beginning of the universe. He called these principles, "Unperishable Principles" and he discusses this in his book Metaphysics:
http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/metaphysics/

 

[Pythagorean]

I don't know that it makes them fundamental, or whether there's a need or not, but it always appears that the nature of things (gravity, EM, consciousness, existence) don't have an explanation. But we learn a lot about how to model and control systems of particles involving them when trying to find one.

 

[Goodison_Lad]

Throughout your post, you keep saying "no, no, it's different" in tautology. You still haven't shown me how. It's about category might have been a start? Perhaps you should dive further into that thought for me.

I'm sorry, but I'll have to risk repeating myself: as I said in earlier posts, qualia is different because it is pure experience itself - it is entirely subjective.

It seems to me that no EEG, MRI scan, blood test or any other tool currently at the disposal of neuroscientists is likely to get us any nearer to the understanding the nature of conscious experience. Things that contribute to consciousness – sure. They’ll tell us, I’ve no reason to doubt, about all sorts of systems that combine to produce the content of which we are aware, but not the actual conscious experience itself. Of course, the usual caveat applies: that may change one day.

This is why I think it represents a great challenge for scientists who want to understand it in terms of brain systems.

So I’m afraid I can’t really give you any clearer reason for conscious experience being fundamentally different to objectively investigable phenomena than this.

In the case of qualia, we have reason to believe that there is something which our theories aren't able to explain though laws of nature.
Why can't some laws be fundamental and not need further explanation?

Qualia is certainly merits investigation, but who knows whether it will ever yield to explanation? If it doesn’t, and has to be deemed as fundamental, then it would effectively be a self-contained fundamental property.

I think it’s this that would make it unlike the stress-energy/curvature relationship: if that turns out to be fundamental because it has no underlying explanation, the stress-energy/curvature relationship doesn’t stand alone – it ‘explains’ a higher-level phenomenon, even though it itself has no explanation.

I’m glad I’m not working on either!

 

[Pythagorean]

I'm sorry, but I'll have to risk repeating myself: as I said in earlier posts, qualia is different because it is pure experience itself - it is entirely subjective.

It seems to me that no EEG, MRI scan, blood test or any other tool currently at the disposal of neuroscientists is likely to get us any nearer to the understanding the nature of conscious experience. Things that contribute to consciousness – sure. They’ll tell us, I’ve no reason to doubt, about all sorts of systems that combine to produce the content of which we are aware, but not the actual conscious experience itself. Of course, the usual caveat applies: that may change one day.

This is why I think it represents a great challenge for scientists who want to understand it in terms of brain systems.

So I’m afraid I can’t really give you any clearer reason for conscious experience being fundamentally different to objectively investigable phenomena than this.

I agree with, and have stated in some way, everything you've said here. None of it seems to touch on my argument that the nature of gravity has the same explanatory gap as consciousness. The two phenomena are themselves different (action at a distance vs. subjective experience). But both phenomena can only be characterized, not "explained".

We ask "why" and the only answers we ever really get are "how".

 

[John Creighto]

I agree with, and have stated in some way, everything you've said here. None of it seems to touch on my argument that the nature of gravity has the same explanatory gap as consciousness. The two phenomena are themselves different (action at a distance vs. subjective experience). But both phenomena can only be characterized, not "explained".

We ask "why" and the only answers we ever really get are "how".

May, ask for you in another thread to distinguish between what you mean by "why" vs "how". I suspect this is a big topic in and of itself.

 

[Pythagorean]

How is the mechanism for how something works.

It's a lot harder to explain what "why" is because it doesn't have a stable definition. It can be used for "how" or it can be used to assay motivation for humans/animals. The final and third way it's applied, I think, is a misattribution of human motivation to the universe: "why is there entropy?? Why anything at all". Some people will be satisfied with a how answer; others will bring up the hard problem.

 

[Ferris_bg]

It[/PLAIN] is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.

If any problem qualifies as the problem of consciousness, it is this one. In this central sense of "consciousness", an organism is conscious if there is something it is like to be that organism, and a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that state. Sometimes terms such as "phenomenal consciousness" and "qualia" are also used here, but I find it more natural to speak of "conscious experience" or simply "experience".

The difference between the hard problem of consciousness and the other hard problems for science is in the way the questions "why" have arisen. If we have only our cognitive type of experience, we wouldn't ask questions like "how it feels", but we would still ask questions like "why is there gravity, cognition etc". Having the subjective experience of how it feels however totally changes the picture. You are certain about the existence of something, which you can't study objectively.

What[/PLAIN] makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience - perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report - there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? A simple explanation of the functions leaves this question open.

There is no analogous further question in the explanation of genes, or of life, or of learning. If someone says "I can see that you have explained how DNA stores and transmits hereditary information from one generation to the next, but you have not explained how it is a gene", then they are making a conceptual mistake. All it means to be a gene is to be an entity that performs the relevant storage and transmission function. But if someone says "I can see that you have explained how information is discriminated, integrated, and reported, but you have not explained how it is experienced", they are not making a conceptual mistake. This is a nontrivial further question.

 

[pftest]

To your point, we would generally say there is a mind<>brain relationship in the same way there is a relationship between any phenomena which supervenes on its base.

Yes i think that's right. And because physically there are no such things as a "base level" and a "higher level", the whole supervenience relationship is always a conceptual one. Even in the case of a rock that supervenes on its molecules. Physically speaking, the only relationships that exist in a rock are the forces between the particles. Psychologically, a human mind can imagine the rock to exist at several different levels (the whole rock > its molecules > their atoms > their particles). Those latter psychological relationships are what we call supervenience. So my conclusion is that supervenience is to physicalism like what god is to atheism. I wanted to address this because i was under the impression that people generally believe supervenience to be a physicalist view on consciousness, whereas i think it is the exact opposite.

 

[pftest]

I agree with, and have stated in some way, everything you've said here. None of it seems to touch on my argument that the nature of gravity has the same explanatory gap as consciousness. The two phenomena are themselves different (action at a distance vs. subjective experience). But both phenomena can only be characterized, not "explained".

We ask "why" and the only answers we ever really get are "how".

There do exist questions that get "why-answers", for example: why did person X kill person Y (Y insulted him). Or why does person Z drink non-sparkling water (it tastes better). Basically any action that involves consciousness includes a "why-answer".

So "why-answers" do exist just as much as "how-answers". If we have an explanatory gap, we can insert either one. Or both, I think we can see in human beings that both types of answers can be at work at the same time.

And i should note that when science gives a "how-answer" it is agnostic on the presence of a "why-answer", it doesn't state such an answer is absent. A formula may describe how someone moves his legs while walking, but at the same time the person may be walking that way to avoid kneepain. So science may search for a "how-answer" for gravity, and even when it finds one it won't say anything about the involvement of a conscious state (as is the case in human brains). This is true for the most basic physical laws out there.

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi pftest

Yes i think that's right. And because physically there are no such things as a "base level" and a "higher level", the whole supervenience relationship is always a conceptual one. Even in the case of a rock that supervenes on its molecules. Physically speaking, the only relationships that exist in a rock are the forces between the particles. Psychologically, a human mind can imagine the rock to exist at several different levels (the whole rock > its molecules > their atoms > their particles). Those latter psychological relationships are what we call supervenience. So my conclusion is that supervenience is to physicalism like what god is to atheism. I wanted to address this because i was under the impression that people generally believe supervenience to be a physicalist view on consciousness, whereas i think it is the exact opposite.

The discussion around the rock being made of particles is probably not the best example for the term "supervenience". A rock in this case is made of something and that's not really what supervenience is meant to pick out.

Standford encyclopedia of philosophy defines it this way:

A set of properties A supervenes upon another set B just in case no two things can differ with respect to A-properties without also differing with respect to their B-properties. In slogan form, “there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference”.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/

Another good explanation is given by Maudlin, "Computation and Consciousness":

States of awareness and sensory events take place in time; they are fairly precisely datable. One can assert that Sam had a toothach at 12:05 or that Sheila spent five minutes wondering about Fermat's last theorem. A natural, indeed nearly inescapable, explanation for this is that conscious events and episodes supervene on concurrent physical events and processes. One's phenomenal state at a time is determined entirely by one's brain activity at that time. Hence, two physical systems engaged in precisely the same activity through a time will support the same modes of consciousness (if any) through that time. Let us call this the supervenience thesis.

The term 'supervenience' can also be used outside of the philosophy of mind. We can say the pressure of a gas supervenes on the molecules in the gas. The pressure is a property that depends on the molecules in the gas. We can't change the pressure without changing something to do with the molecules. Compressing them isentropically for instance, imparts energy to the molecules and changes the pressure. Expanding the molecules through a restriction in a pipe results in an isenthalpic expansion of the molecules and a subsequent change in the pressure. So the pressure can be said to supervene on the molecules.

We generally say the mind supervenes on the brain because we naturally assume that what we think or experience at any time is because of what's going on in the brain. So these mental states supervene on the physical states.

 

[madness]

You argument is that there is no gravity. That's really not satisfactory...
I don't see how you can selectively use that argument on gravity and not on consciousness.

They're both products of the same system of perceptions.

I think if you're to take Lowe's view, you can't be selective about it.

As I said before, I have direct knowledge of my conscious experiences. There is no way to gain knowledge of any "gravity" above and beyond the trajectories of the particles which it is said to act on. I haven't yet had the time to read the full Lowe paper, so can't know if I agree with him or not.

 

[Diracula]

It seems to me that supervenience is completely compatible with physicalism, and is probably even a necessary condition for a physical interpretation of mind/consciousness. You change the matter in the skull --> you change the mind. You change the mind --> something in the brain matter must change as well. What am I missing?

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi Diracula,

It seems to me that supervenience is completely compatible with physicalism, and is probably even a necessary condition for a physical interpretation of mind/consciousness. You change the matter in the skull --> you change the mind. You change the mind --> something in the brain matter must change as well. What am I missing?

You're not missing anything. That's correct.

 

[Q_Goest]

Also, you know my position, it's a fairly common position: it's the physicalist position. Again a misrepresentation, claiming that these are my personal wishes and desires. I also share some views with Lowe.

Your views clearly don't coincide with Lowe's. Lowe is even less of a physicalist than Chalmers. He says in the very first sentance, that Chalmers "... concedes too much to such physicalists in allowing that some, at least, af these problems..." will fall prey to physicalist methods. Your views of hard physicalism clearly don't match his.

Lastly, it's unfair to post a reference and expect somebody to read it all. If you have a specific point to make from a reference, quote it, interperet it, and state how its relevant. Otherwise it's just more "oh the answers in there, you're just too ignorant to see it... but don't mind me not being able to state it".

Numerous people have now explained for you why gravity is not a "hard problem" as the term is defined in philosophy. You can read the original paper by Chalmers on line here:
http://consc.net/papers/facing.html
or just Google. You and I have discussed things on this forum for years and in my experience, you consistently come up with your own ideas about philosphy of mind instead of learning what is in the literature. Even when people have given you references, you still go back to arguing your own ideas. That results in threads getting hijacked - we end up going off on a tangent that never gets resolved. It's unfair and inconsiderate of you to continually insist on your own ideas about philosophy.

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi John,

However, when it comes to why does mass curve space. Why can't some laws be fundamental and not need further explanation? Aristotle would refer to this as the concept of a first cause but this does not imply a God. Aristotle thought that there should be some principles which existed at the beginning of the universe. He called these principles, "Unperishable Principles" and he discusses this in his book Metaphysics:
http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/metaphysics/

You might be interested in the "psychophysical laws" that Chalmers has suggested. He argues that there must be fundamental laws, similar to relativity or quantum mechanics for example, that have no further explanation.

The question then arises: how do these novel fundamental properties relate to the already acknowledged fundamental properties of the world, namely those invoked in microphysics? In general, where there are fundamental properties, there are fundamental laws. So we can expect that there will be some sort of fundamental principles — psychophysical laws — connecting physical and phenomenal properties. Like the fundamental laws of relativity or quantum mechanics, these psychophysical laws will not be deducible from more basic principles, but instead will be taken as primitive.

Ref: Chalmers, "Consciousness and its place in nature"
http://consc.net/papers/nature.html

The flip side to that comes from the physicalist view that every phenomena can be explained in purely physical terms.