DrChinese said:
I am not impressed by Laudisa, I am loosely familiar with his work as I scan almost every local realistic paper going into the arxiv. And I must say I am rather surprised by your position, it does not seem to follow from your prior statements. But I admit I still may not follow your position as there are some apparent contradictions (which I am sure are not actual contradictions).
Laudisa does ramble a lot.

I also think he overstates the certainty of validity of local models, which object to on the same grounds I object to certainty in ruling local models in general out. It seems your question #3 below contains the issue creating the apparent contradiction. I'll go though the questions.
DrChinese said:
1. Using Bell as a map (which I think is proper): do you think local realistic theories can yield predicitions consistent with QM?
In principle yes, whether cogency can actually pan out for the standard model I can't say. I was recently challenged by one of my favorite skeptics to write a computer program that mimicked EPR correlation statistics. I found this that claims to have done it (haven't looked that close yet):
http://msc.phys.rug.nl/pdf/athens06-deraedt1.pdf
I was considering a variation of an encryption scheme I once wrote, based on some (now defunct) notions of cross frame information embedding. Actually with FTL models I might reconsider a limited version of that. It embedded an encrypted message in a fake encrypted message. Anyway I'm considering these quasirandom sequences and what rules might be needed to mimic detector setting choices. Interesting problem anyway.
DrChinese said:
2. How is the Bell generally acceptede conclusion "grossly overstated"? I mean, after decades of effort there is not ONE single local realistic candidate theory to consider. Every one can, thanks to Bell, be batted out of consideration. You must have seen how the work of Hess, Santos, and numerous others has been systematically dismantled. Not bad for being overstated: QM, 100; LR,0.
I would refer to anything that is stated as 'proof' when it fails to rule out an entire class of possible exceptions grossly overstated. I'll get to that class in your next question. Making a 'proof' claim requires more than just invalidating the special cases on the table. Admittedly it also rules out entire classes of lhv's. It also lend cogency to FTL considerations, but local toy models can and do mimic EPR statistics, including stochastic hidden variables. I can't object to the claim of relatively unlikely, but almost certainly is an overstatement of what has been demonstrated by Bell's Theorem.
DrChinese said:
3. You say "contextual/relational variables can successfully models correlation statistics". To me, a contextual/relational model is not observer independent. Therefore, it is not realistic. So these sound like the words of someone who in fact denies realism. So are you in that camp or not?
I have a bit of confusion how you are defining contextual variables myself. Earlier I seen it referred to as measuring separate realities in this thread. That was a bit ambiguous considering MWI. Here you say the relational model is not observer independent, but fail to specify what it's independent of. There is a difference between a configuration space, and a variable which is dependent on the perspective in which that configuration space is measured. Thus the whole point of contextual variables is that they are not observer independent, but the reality of the configuration space is. Analogs to these types of variables everywhere, the most relevant of which are in GR. What follows is not a claim, but a demonstration of the issues involve in complaining that contextual variables are not observer independent.
Consider what a water wave means to a single water molecule. It's nothing more than a small momentary deflection, not even significant relative to the general random motion. Same thing for air molecules when I say "boo". What part of "boo" is contained in each air molecule? Is the sound "boo" a preexisting property of air molecules? Conjugate variables are common enough in classical physics. What properties are preexisting in this world is a good question, perhaps even the constants?
In GR we make a well justified operational distinction between mass and rest mass. In the general case mass is a contextual variable, but the mass is real. So how relevant is that distinction? Consider a particle in QFT: A particular excitation of a field. Ask what happens if the entire field was uniformly excited by this magnitude. We could assume the total vacuum energy density increases accordingly, but this reasoning lead us to the vacuum catastrophe, and I'd say a prediction 107 orders of magnitude off is trouble for that assumption. Then we have a zero total energy of the universe, GM_t^2/R = M_tc^2. This is pretty strong indication to me that the the entire universe, and everything we empirically measure about it, are purely contextual variables. Could it be that local field variances fully defines all empirical properties contextually, such that uniform absolute magnitudes of anything is meaningless, like gauge fields? This does not mean the configuration space that defined the variables isn't real, and almost certainly covariant. But trying to define reality solely in terms of the variables we measure wouldn't make much sense, in spite of the reality of covariant field variances.
As noted, I'm not trying to convince you that this is the way it is. Significant theoretical issues make this outline problematic. I'm merely trying to point out the issues in assuming that because contextual variables are not observer independent realism is out. Here I described a scenario where *all* variables are contextual, and still maintained realism. Everything you measure gets its metric from you, or some instrument, self referencing. You are a product of the very thing you are measuring, and not even space and time itself, the metric on which measurements are predicated, is non-contextual.