DrC,
There's nothing in your response that I factually disagree with, but I'm going to make some points wrt semantics and the importance of dealing with them. Your certainly not the primary audience I have in mind, but hopefully it'll provide food for thought.
DrChinese said:
I realize there may be some differences in what kind of hidden variables might exist. My thing is to avoid getting into a semantic argument (I would rather focus on the physics).
Yes I generally support this sentiment. It's more difficult in the context of EPR because the physics we have merely defines constraints of a presumably unknown model, which is dependent on ontological features which are semantically defined. What I find most distasteful in this context is singling out an ontology, and making ad hoc demands and rejections of the physics we do have on those grounds. People lose winnable debates doing this all the time by overstating both their positive and negative claims.
DrChinese said:
The key to that is to FIRST accept that there cannot be local hidden variables of the type identified by EPR (i.e. no objective elements of reality).
Again I absolutely agree, the constraints imposed by BI are absolutely real, and constitute some real physical constraints we have to work with in this area. Denial should be and is costly for those who do so. However, many people are predisposed to ontologically invert the words used here, as I'll articulate next. Debates that fail to recognize this do get painful.
DrChinese said:
I think you can then move on to extend the scope further, to include hypothetical classical components of elements of reality (i.e. where the element of reality is an observable, but the component may not be).
This is the type of model I like playing with. The semantics issues arise when you ask: Is it the elements postulated to be ontically real and remain unobservable that are the "elements of reality", or is it the measurable variables for which their existence is dependent on the relative configuration space of the ontic elements? Einstein realism is best served by the first, empiricism by the second. In fact there is no physical significants to these ontological distinctions whatsoever, and those seeking Einstein realism would be well served to recognize the empirical perspective. Pure empiricism may have limits, but it forever remains the sole source of cogency, legitimacy, for any theoretical model. Arguing the absolute legitimacy of one ontology over the other in itself is a no-go. If we accepted raw claims like this we'd still be stuck on Aristotle. Hence your focus on the physics is far more than justified, just not entirely feasible in the face of unknowns or what specific constraints on such unknowns actually entails.
DrChinese said:
In Relational BlockWorld, I like to say the the hidden variables lay in the future. RUTA will probably choke on that description.

If you accept that, then you would probably end up concluding that the future influences the past and causality is lost. RUTA would probably be OK with that, because he considers RBW to be acausal.
[PLAIN]https://www.physicsforums.com/images/smilies/laughing.gif
I do find it an ugly distortion of my ontological predispositions, but for the reasons I provided above I'm still undecided how it'll fair under various ontological transforms. RUTA's response was a bit predictable, RUTA appears quiet adept at navigating these ontological mine fields. Makes it all the more fascinating.
DrChinese said:
There also could be all kinds of weird rules at the subatomic level that are hidden from us. But the problem with that "escape" is that where else do they manifest themselves? Were there other evidence, it would make more sense.
Yep, the unknown is a beast. I can't rightly or legitimately get into much detail of my own perspective in this thread, but I generally tend to think complex rule sets indicate the need to look deeper for simpler ones. The range of empirical data involved is extensive, for which EPR is just a small piece. I'm not really happy with any mere interpretation, or anything short of unification. I also tend to find ad hoc rules crafted solely to sweep under the rug, make unobservable, problem issues highly distasteful. Unfortunately I can't honestly yell BS either without something better on empirical, not ontological, grounds.