News Is Amendment XXVIII a Radical Restriction on Freedom of Speech?

[russ_watters]

How would rewriting the legal definition of a corporation to specify the exact rights that they are afforded, including limitations on free speech, be a direct overturn of the decision? The constitution does not define the rights of corporations. The law does. Even this amendment does nothing but specify that congress has the authority to make such laws (which ought to be evident) to prevent further contrary court decisions.

It sounds like you are suggesting that congress could pass a law redefining corporations and following that, re-pass the McCain Feingold act and the next time it comes up for challenge, the USSC would be compelled by the law to uphold it.

That's just so wrong. The legal definition of a corporation was crafted through hundreds of years of jurisprudence and exists as a direct extension of individual rights. If Congress tried what you suggest, the USSC would just get a strike-down two-fer, striking down two laws at once. That definition that you are saying can be rewritten is the entire issue the USSC is dealing with in the case in question and rewriting it would be a violation of the 1st and 14th amendments, not to mention hundreds of years of legal precident!

 

[russ_watters]

Someone posted this in the first thread on the subject:

Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 1885

The decision famously implied that equal protection laws provided by the Fourteenth Amendment applied to corporations, but the opinion did not explicitly state this.

http://www.oyez.org/cases/1851-1900/1885/0

And more to the point, here is the majority opinion of the court for the Mc-F case:

Federal law prohibits corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech defined as an “electioneering communication” or for speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate. 2 U. S. C. §441b. Limits on electioneering communications were upheld in McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n , 540 U. S. 93, 203–209 (2003) . The holding of McConnell rested to a large extent on an earlier case, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce , 494 U. S. 652 (1990) . Austin had held that political speech may be banned based on the speaker’s corporate identity.

In this case we are asked to reconsider Austin and, in effect, McConnell . It has been noted that “ Austin was a significant departure from ancient First Amendment principles,” Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. , 551 U. S. 449, 490 (2007) (WRTL) ( Scalia , J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). We agree with that conclusion and hold that stare decisis does not compel the continued acceptance of Austin . The Government may regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether.

http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/08-205.ZO.html

As it clearly says, the applicability of the 1st amendment to corporations was the very heart of the issue they were ruling on. You can't just insert a new law in between that case and the first amentment in an attempt to block the first amendment's applicability.

 

[russ_watters]

I must admit to not having read up on the recent court decision, but starting into it, it becomes clear that few people here have either. The claimant, Citizens United, is exactly the sort of grassroots political organization that people should want to protect. It isn't a Merck or GM or the UAW, it is an organization that exist precisely for the purpose of pooling individual political influence. It's the sort of thing that people here typically want to exist to counter the power of the corporations and unions.

This is all good stuff. You may want to read the part where they describe the logic behind and the regulations creating PACs:

Before the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), federal law prohibited—and still does prohibit—corporations and unions from using general treasury funds to make direct contributions to candidates or independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, through any form of media, in connection with certain qualified federal elections. 2 U. S. C. §441b (2000 ed.); see McConnell, supra, at 204, and n. 87; Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. , 479 U. S. 238, 249 (1986) (MCFL) . BCRA §203 amended §441b to prohibit any “electioneering communication” as well. 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(2) (2006 ed.). An electioneering communication is defined as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election. §434(f)(3)(A). The Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) regulations further define an electioneering communication as a communication that is “publicly distributed.” 11 CFR §100.29(a)(2) (2009). “In the case of a candidate for nomination for President … publicly distributed means” that the communication “[c]an be received by 50,000 or more persons in a State where a primary election . . . is being held within 30 days.” §100.29(b)(3)(ii). Corporations and unions are barred from using their general treasury funds for express advocacy or electioneering communications. They may establish, however, a “separate segregated fund” (known as a political action committee, or PAC) for these purposes. 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(2). The moneys received by the segregated fund are limited to donations from stockholders and employees of the corporation or, in the case of unions, members of the union. Ibid. [emphasis added]

In other words, corporate money used for political speech must be explicitly earmarked for that purpose by those who provide the money. I didn't know that, but that covers most of the objections being raised in this thread: the idea that a corporation could use general funds to pay for political ads. The union part seems like a little bit of a loophole to me...

It is interesting how many different arguments they tried and how some of them failed, such as:

In MCFL , the Court found unconstitutional §441b’s restrictions on corporate expenditures as applied to nonprofit corporations that were formed for the sole purpose of promoting political ideas, did not engage in business activities, and did not accept contributions from for-profit corporations or labor unions...

Citizens United does not qualify for the MCFL exemption, however, since some funds used to make the movie were donations from for-profit corporations.

Though CU didn't qualify for that exemption, it is exactly the sort of exemption I think people here would favor.

This is an important point, to me:

Third is the primary importance of speech itself to the integrity of the election process. As additional rules are created for regulating political speech, any speech arguably within their reach is chilled. See Part II–A, supra . Campaign finance regulations now impose “unique and complex rules” on “71 distinct entities.” Brief for Seven Former Chairmen of FEC et al. as Amici Curiae 11–12. These entities are subject to separate rules for 33 different types of political speech. Id. , at 14–15, n. 10. The FEC has adopted 568 pages of regulations, 1,278 pages of explanations and justifications for those regulations, and 1,771 advisory opinions since 1975.

Now the heart of the ruling - it is straightforward 1st Amendment infringement:

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech.” Laws enacted to control or suppress speech may operate at different points in the speech process. The following are just a few examples of restrictions that have been attempted at different stages of the speech process—all laws found to be invalid: restrictions requiring a permit at the outset, Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N. Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton , 536 U. S. 150, 153 (2002) ; imposing a burden by impounding proceeds on receipts or royalties, Simon & Schuster , Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd. , 502 U. S. 105, 108, 123 (1991) ; seeking to exact a cost after the speech occurs, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , 376 U. S., at 267; and subjecting the speaker to criminal penalties, Brandenburg v. Ohio , 395 U. S. 444, 445 (1969) (per curiam) .

The law before us is an outright ban, backed by criminal sanctions. Section 441b makes it a felony for all corporations—including nonprofit advocacy corporations—either to expressly advocate the election or defeat of candidates or to broadcast electioneering communications within 30 days of a primary election and 60 days of a general election. Thus, the following acts would all be felonies under §441b: The Sierra Club runs an ad, within the crucial phase of 60 days before the general election, that exhorts the public to disapprove of a Congressman who favors logging in national forests; the National Rifle Association publishes a book urging the public to vote for the challenger because the incumbent U. S. Senator supports a handgun ban; and the American Civil Liberties Union creates a Web site telling the public to vote for a Presidential candidate in light of that candidate’s defense of free speech. These prohibitions are classic examples of censorship.

Section 441b is a ban on corporate speech notwithstanding the fact that a PAC created by a corporation can still speak. See McConnell , 540 U. S., at 330–333 (opinion of Kennedy , J.). A PAC is a separate association from the corporation. So the PAC exemption from §441b’s expenditure ban, §441b(b)(2), does not allow corporations to speak. Even if a PAC could somehow allow a corporation to speak—and it does not—the option to form PACs does not alleviate the First Amendment problems with §441b. PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations...

PACs have to comply with these regulations just to speak. This might explain why fewer than 2,000 of the millions of corporations in this country have PACs...

Section 441b’s prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is thus a ban on speech. As a “restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign,” that statute “necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”...

Were the Court to uphold these restrictions, the Government could repress speech by silencing certain voices at any of the various points in the speech process. See McConnell , supra , at 251 (opinion of Scalia , J.) (Government could repress speech by “attacking all levels of the production and dissemination of ideas,” for “effective public communication requires the speaker to make use of the services of others”). If §441b applied to individuals, no one would believe that it is merely a time, place, or manner restriction on speech. Its purpose and effect are to silence entities whose voices the Government deems to be suspect... [someone made precisely that point earlier in the thread]

Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. , 529 U. S. 803, 813 (2000) (striking down content-based restriction). Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others. See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti , 435 U. S. 765, 784 (1978) . As instruments to censor, these categories are interrelated: Speech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content...

Next comes the part TSE and I were talking about above: the very applicability of the 1st amendment to corporations:

The Court has recognized that First Amendment protection extends to corporations.(citing Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro , 431 U. S. 85 (1977) ; Time, Inc. v. Firestone... [then follows a laundry list of cases]

This protection has been extended by explicit holdings to the context of political speech. See, e.g., Button , 371 U. S., at 428–429; Grosjean v. American Press Co. , 297 U. S. 233, 244 (1936) . Under the rationale of these precedents, political speech does not lose First Amendment protection “simply because its source is a corporation.”...

(“The identity of the speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected. Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to foster” (quoting Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 783)). The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not “natural persons.” Id., at 776; see id. , at 780, n. 16. Cf. id. , at 828 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)...

The dissent concluded that deeming a particular group “too powerful” was not a “justificatio[n] for withholding First Amendment rights from any group—labor or corporate.” Id. , at 597. The Court did not get another opportunity to consider the constitutional question in that case; for after a remand, a jury found the defendants not guilty...

There is simply no support for the view that the First Amendment , as originally understood, would permit the suppression of political speech by media corporations. The Framers may not have anticipated modern business and media corporations. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n , 514 U. S. 334, 360–361 (1995) ( Thomas , J., concurring in judgment). Yet television networks and major newspapers owned by media corporations have become the most important means of mass communication in modern times. The First Amendment was certainly not understood to condone the suppression of political speech in society’s most salient media. It was understood as a response to the repression of speech and the press that had existed in England and the heavy taxes on the press that were imposed in the colonies. See McConnell , 540 U. S., at 252–253 (opinion of Scalia , J.); Grosjean , 297 U. S., at 245–248; Near , 283 U. S., at 713–714. The great debates between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists over our founding document were published and expressed in the most important means of mass communication of that era—newspapers owned by individuals. See McIntyre , 514 U. S., at 341–343; id. , at 367 ( Thomas , J., concurring in judgment). At the founding, speech was open, comprehensive, and vital to society’s definition of itself; there were no limits on the sources of speech and knowledge. See B. Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 5 (1967) (“Any number of people could join in such proliferating polemics, and rebuttals could come from all sides”); G. Wood, Creation of the American Republic 1776–1787, p. 6 (1969) (“t is not surprising that the intellectual sources of [the Americans’] Revolutionary thought were profuse and various”). The Framers may have been unaware of certain types of speakers or forms of communication, but that does not mean that those speakers and media are entitled to less First Amendment protection than those types of speakers and media that provided the means of communicating political ideas when the Bill of Rights was adopted.

It's a great read. The decision directly addresses virtually all of what has been discussed in this thread.

 

[TheStatutoryApe]

It sounds like you are suggesting that congress could pass a law redefining corporations and following that, re-pass the McCain Feingold act and the next time it comes up for challenge, the USSC would be compelled by the law to uphold it.

That's just so wrong. The legal definition of a corporation was crafted through hundreds of years of jurisprudence and exists as a direct extension of individual rights. If Congress tried what you suggest, the USSC would just get a strike-down two-fer, striking down two laws at once. That definition that you are saying can be rewritten is the entire issue the USSC is dealing with in the case in question and rewriting it would be a violation of the 1st and 14th amendments, not to mention hundreds of years of legal precident!

The defined rights of corporations are different in different locales from country to country and state to state (province to province) despite hundreds of years of precedent in common law. Corporations receive rights only so far as the law that defines them in any given legal jurisdiction allows them such rights. Redefining a corporations rights can only be a violation of the 1st amendment if you cede defacto individual rights to a corporation but the law need not even recognize the existence of the corporation let alone any rights it supposedly has except that it has already agreed to do so by its own laws. And as I already noted the origin of the corporation was in the need to resolve issues of the equitable disposition of accounts and debt in the associated contract law. It has nothing what ever to do with individual rights. It was born of a financial issue, not a rights issue so I have no idea where this concept of it being a 'natural extension of individual rights' comes from.

 

[russ_watters]

There is also some scathing criticism of the dissenting opinion in one of the concurring opinions:

I write separately to address Justice Stevens ’ discussion of “ Original Understandings ,” post , at 34 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (hereinafter referred to as the dissent). This section of the dissent purports to show that today’s decision is not supported by the original understanding of the First Amendment . The dissent attempts this demonstration, however, in splendid isolation from the text of the First Amendment. It never shows why “the freedom of speech” that was the right of Englishmen did not include the freedom to speak in association with other individuals, including association in the corporate form...

Though faced with a constitutional text that makes no distinction between types of speakers, the dissent feels no necessity to provide even an isolated statement from the founding era to the effect that corporations are not covered, but places the burden on petitioners to bring forward statements showing that they are (“there is not a scintilla of evidence to support the notion that anyone believed [the First Amendment ] would preclude regulatory distinctions based on the corporate form,” post, at 34–35)...

The dissent says that when the Framers “constitutionalized the right to free speech in the First Amendment , it was the free speech of individual Americans that they had in mind.” Post, at 37. That is no doubt true. All the provisions of the Bill of Rights set forth the rights of individual men and women—not, for example, of trees or polar bears. But the individual person’s right to speak includes the right to speak in association with other individual persons . Surely the dissent does not believe that speech by the Republican Party or the Democratic Party can be censored because it is not the speech of “an individual American.” It is the speech of many individual Americans, who have associated in a common cause, giving the leadership of the party the right to speak on their behalf. The association of individuals in a business corporation is no different—or at least it cannot be denied the right to speak on the simplistic ground that it is not “an individual American.” [emphasis added]

Ouch.

The dissenting opinion itself is very long... I may go through it later.

 

[russ_watters]

The defined rights of corporations are different in different locales from country to country and state to state (province to province) despite hundreds of years of precedent in common law.

As are a host of other laws - yet all must conform to the intent of the Constitution.

Corporations receive rights only so far as the law that defines them in any given legal jurisdiction allows them such rights.

Yes, but what you are missing here is that "the law" in this case is the Constitution itself and "the jurisdiction" is The United States.

Redefining a corporations rights can only be a violation of the 1st amendment if you cede defacto individual rights to a corporation but the law need not even recognize the existence of the corporation let alone any rights it supposedly has except that it has already agreed to do so by its own laws. And as I already noted the origin of the corporation was in the need to resolve issues of the equitable disposition of accounts and debt in the associated contract law. It has nothing what ever to do with individual rights. It was born of a financial issue, not a rights issue so I have no idea where this concept of it being a 'natural extension of individual rights' comes from. [emphasis added]

I know you're just replying to things in order, but read what I've posted from the decision - it is in there, clear as day: It is a simple matter of logic that in order for a single person's freedom of speech to be protected, you must also protect his right to team up with a second (or third or thirty-thousandth) person to pool their resources to excercise that right more loudly, collectively. Re-quoted from above:

But the individual person’s right to speak includes the right to speak in association with other individual persons . Surely the dissent does not believe that speech by the Republican Party or the Democratic Party can be censored because it is not the speech of “an individual American.” It is the speech of many individual Americans, who have associated in a common cause, giving the leadership of the party the right to speak on their behalf. The association of individuals in a business corporation is no different—or at least it cannot be denied the right to speak on the simplistic ground that it is not “an individual American.”

 

[TheStatutoryApe]

There is also some scathing criticism of the dissenting opinion in one of the concurring opinions: Ouch.

The dissenting opinion itself is very long... I may go through it later.

He ignores that a corporation is not merely the 'association of individuals', that a corporation is legally an individual itself with limited rights, and that the issue does not regard individuals in association with one another but rather the corporate individual. This really seems to show that they were ignoring legal nuances in their decision more than anything. I have no idea where he comes to the conclusion that Stevens is wrong to place the burden on those wishing to claim the constitution protects rights for non-natural persons to show evidence of that protection. Again the odd idea that fictitious persons possesses defacto individual rights.

 

[TheStatutoryApe]

As are a host of other laws - yet all must conform to the intent of the Constitution. Yes, but what you are missing here is that "the law" in this case is the Constitution itself and "the jurisdiction" is The United States. I know you're just replying to things in order, but read what I've posted from the decision - it is in there, clear as day: It is a simple matter of logic that in order for a single person's freedom of speech to be protected, you must also protect his right to team up with a second (or third or thirty-thousandth) person to pool their resources to excercise that right more loudly, collectively. Re-quoted from above:

My last response mostly covers this, I was typing while you were posting. The only thing I add is that 'legal persons' do not receive defacto constitutional rights. It is what separates 'legal persons' from 'natural persons'. Legal persons receive rights only so far as the legal fiction defines them, the constitution is irrelevant except where applied to rights enumerated by the laws establishing the legal fiction which of course are not part of the constitution.

 

[mheslep]

I don't think anyone has addressed the operation of the corporate media at large in these (two) threads, which Scalia also draws attention to:

And the notion which follows from the dissent’s view, that modern newspapers, since they are incorporated, have free-speech rights only at the sufferance of Congress, boggles the mind.6

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-205.pdf, page 84

 

[TheStatutoryApe]

I don't think anyone has addressed the operation of the corporate media at large in these (two) threads, which Scalia also draws attention to:

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-205.pdf, page 84

It has been brought up to some degree. The media is a different issue. They are theoretically providing a service (reporting the news). Theoretically if they were found to not be providing a service (not just reporting the news) but rather running a political campaign then they would be at the mercy of the same laws as any other corporation. Interpretations of freedom of the press are heavily slanted in favour of the press so it would probably be difficult to nail anyone on this.

 

[mheslep]

It has been brought up to some degree. The media is a different issue. They are theoretically providing a service (reporting the news). Theoretically if they were found to not be providing a service (not just reporting the news) but rather running a political campaign then they would be at the mercy of the same laws as any other corporation. Interpretations of freedom of the press are heavily slanted in favour of the press so it would probably be difficult to nail anyone on this.

That was Scalia's point - there is no difference under the 1st amendment - you, me, you and me, press. See footnote 6. The amendment doesn't say 'that provide a important service', or the 'institution' of the press. Whether or not the media provide some role, or what dispensation Congress might give this or that organization is irrelevant.

 

[Skyhunter]

Thanks for the link Russ. I had read the Courts Opinion, but not the partial dissent.

The question of corporate personage is not IMO a Constitutional question. I am still agnostic about the proposed amendment. I think there is a deeper question that should be resolved. I do agree with the Court that speech must not be artificially chilled by the government. But I completely disagree with the idea that legal persons are automatically entitled to the same rights and privileges as natural persons under the Constitution.

That question has not been resolved, and this case does not resolve it. The XXVIII Amendment as written, does not resolve it. I think I would prefer an Amendment that addresses the deeper question, not an over broad reaction to a single ruling.

The defined rights of corporations are different in different locales from country to country and state to state (province to province) despite hundreds of years of precedent in common law. Corporations receive rights only so far as the law that defines them in any given legal jurisdiction allows them such rights. Redefining a corporations rights can only be a violation of the 1st amendment if you cede defacto individual rights to a corporation but the law need not even recognize the existence of the corporation let alone any rights it supposedly has except that it has already agreed to do so by its own laws. And as I already noted the origin of the corporation was in the need to resolve issues of the equitable disposition of accounts and debt in the associated contract law. It has nothing what ever to do with individual rights. It was born of a financial issue, not a rights issue so I have no idea where this concept of it being a 'natural extension of individual rights' comes from.

The http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/08-205.ZX.html" agrees with TSA.

The real issue in this case concerns how, not if, the appellant may finance its electioneering. Citizens United is a wealthy nonprofit corporation that runs a political action committee (PAC) with millions of dollars in assets. Under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), it could have used those assets to televise and promote Hillary: The Movie wherever and whenever it wanted to. It also could have spent unrestricted sums to broadcast Hillary at any time other than the 30 days before the last primary election. Neither Citizens United’s nor any other corporation’s speech has been “banned,” ante , at 1. All that the parties dispute is whether Citizens United had a right to use the funds in its general treasury to pay for broadcasts during the 30-day period. The notion that the First Amendment dictates an affirmative answer to that question is, in my judgment, profoundly misguided. Even more misguided is the notion that the Court must rewrite the law relating to campaign expenditures by for-profit corporations and unions to decide this case.

The basic premise underlying the Court’s ruling is its iteration, and constant reiteration, of the proposition that the First Amendment bars regulatory distinctions based on a speaker’s identity, including its “identity” as a corporation. While that glittering generality has rhetorical appeal, it is not a correct statement of the law. Nor does it tell us when a corporation may engage in electioneering that some of its shareholders oppose. It does not even resolve the specific question whether Citizens United may be required to finance some of its messages with the money in its PAC. The conceit that corporations must be treated identically to natural persons in the political sphere is not only inaccurate but also inadequate to justify the Court’s disposition of this case.

In the context of election to public office, the distinction between corporate and human speakers is significant. Although they make enormous contributions to our society, corporations are not actually members of it. They cannot vote or run for office. Because they may be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their interests may conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters. The financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation of corporations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the electoral process. Our lawmakers have a compelling constitutional basis, if not also a democratic duty, to take measures designed to guard against the potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and national races.

Next, Stevens addresses the scope of the case.

The first reason is that the question was not properly brought before us. In declaring §203 of BCRA facially unconstitutional on the ground that corporations’ electoral expenditures may not be regulated any more stringently than those of individuals, the majority decides this case on a basis relinquished below, not included in the questions presented to us by the litigants, and argued here only in response to the Court’s invitation. This procedure is unusual and inadvisable for a court. 2 Our colleagues’ suggestion that “we are asked to reconsider Austin and, in effect, McConnell ,” ante , at 1, would be more accurate if rephrased to state that “we have asked ourselves” to reconsider those cases.

In the District Court, Citizens United initially raised a facial challenge to the constitutionality of §203. App. 23a–24a. In its motion for summary judgment, however, Citizens United expressly abandoned its facial challenge, 1:07–cv–2240–RCL–RWR, Docket Entry No. 52, pp. 1–2 (May 16, 2008), and the parties stipulated to the dismissal of that claim, id. , Nos. 53 (May 22, 2008), 54 (May 23, 2008), App. 6a. The District Court therefore resolved the case on alternative grounds, 3 and in its jurisdictional statement to this Court, Citizens United properly advised us that it was raising only “an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of … BCRA §203.” Juris. Statement 5. The jurisdictional statement never so much as cited Austin , the key case the majority today overrules. And not one of the questions presented suggested that Citizens United was surreptitiously raising the facial challenge to §203 that it previously agreed to dismiss. In fact, not one of those questions raised an issue based on Citizens United’s corporate status. Juris. Statement (i). Moreover, even in its merits briefing, when Citizens United injected its request to overrule Austin , it never sought a declaration that §203 was facially unconstitutional as to all corporations and unions; instead it argued only that the statute could not be applied to it because it was “funded overwhelmingly by individuals.” Brief for Appellant 29; see also id., at 10, 12, 16, 28 (affirming “as applied” character of challenge to §203); Tr. of Oral Arg. 4–9 (Mar. 24, 2009) (counsel for Citizens United conceding that §203 could be applied to General Motors); id., at 55 (counsel for Citizens United stating that “we accept the Court’s decision in Wisconsin Right to Life ”).

It may be just my limited perception, but it seems there is a disproportionate amount of judicial activism on behalf of corporate rights.

 

[CRGreathouse]

I think I would prefer an Amendment that addresses the deeper question, not an over broad reaction to a single ruling.

Suggestions?

 

[BobG]

As are a host of other laws - yet all must conform to the intent of the Constitution. Yes, but what you are missing here is that "the law" in this case is the Constitution itself and "the jurisdiction" is The United States. I know you're just replying to things in order, but read what I've posted from the decision - it is in there, clear as day: It is a simple matter of logic that in order for a single person's freedom of speech to be protected, you must also protect his right to team up with a second (or third or thirty-thousandth) person to pool their resources to excercise that right more loudly, collectively. Re-quoted from above:

He ignores that a corporation is not merely the 'association of individuals', that a corporation is legally an individual itself with limited rights, and that the issue does not regard individuals in association with one another but rather the corporate individual. This really seems to show that they were ignoring legal nuances in their decision more than anything. I have no idea where he comes to the conclusion that Stevens is wrong to place the burden on those wishing to claim the constitution protects rights for non-natural persons to show evidence of that protection. Again the odd idea that fictitious persons possesses defacto individual rights.

TSA is exactly right. Saying a corporation is an association of individuals ignores the entire purpose of corporations - to separate the individual stockholders from the liabilities that accompany owning a company. A corporation is not an association of individuals that all share the risk of being personally sued, personally held liable to honor contracts they agreed to, etc. The "corporation", the fictional legal person, assumes all of these risks. The stockholders are practically just creditors that loan a corporation money in return for a profit - with the difference being they do have a say in what contracts, what risks, the corporation can undertake.

That was Scalia's point - there is no difference under the 1st amendment - you, me, you and me, press. See footnote 6. The amendment doesn't say 'that provide a important service', or the 'institution' of the press. Whether or not the media provide some role, or what dispensation Congress might give this or that organization is irrelevant.

The press does not have "freedom of speech". Freedom of speech applies to individuals. The press is covered by "freedom of the press", which is a completely different statement that also happens to be in the First Amendment. Being covered in the same amendment doesn't make them the same thing, no more than "freedom of religion", yet another completely separate concept covered in the 1st Amendment, is the same thing as "freedom of speech" or "freedom of the press".

In other words, the 1st Amendment guarantees three completely separate issues:

1) Freedom of speech
2) Freedom of the press
3) Freedom of religion

 

[mheslep]

Freedom of speech applies to individuals.

Says you BobG. SOTUS says it also applies collectively to groups of people acting in concert.

 

[BobG]

Says you BobG. SOTUS says it also applies collectively to groups of people acting in concert.

Perhaps. It's beside the point.

The point is that the press have special rights that are spelled out in the First Amendment regardless of whether it's owned by an individual, a partnership, or a corporation. Scalia's comments about the press were irrelevant at best.

You seemed concerned that no one had addressed why the press had "freedom of speech" while other corporations didn't. The press doesn't have "freedom of speech". It has "freedom of the press", which is spelled out specifically in the Amendment.

 

[mheslep]

Perhaps. It's beside the point.

The point is that the press have special rights that are spelled out in the First Amendment regardless of whether it's owned by an individual, a partnership, or a corporation. ...

There is no special dispensation for partnerships and corporations regarding the press that do not equally apply to speech from others:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances

It's just not there.

 

[BobG]

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances

How is this part, "... or of the press;..." , to be interpreted?

 

[mheslep]

How is this part, "... or of the press;..." , to be interpreted?

I think it is straight forward - no abridgement by Congress of anyone, any company, or any group set up in any manner what so ever that allows that entity to act as an agent of 'the press'. I contend the same type of unrestricted description necessarily applies to speech, at least that's how I read the opinion.

 

[BobG]

I think it is straight forward - no abridgement by Congress of anyone, any company, or any group set up in any manner what so ever that allows that entity to act as an agent of 'the press'. I contend the same type of unrestricted description necessarily applies to speech, at least that's how I read the opinion.

In other words, any company or group has freedom of speech, making the "of the press" part irrelevant and unnecessary? Or was the "of the press" part put in the amendment for a reason, since the "freedom of speech" part wouldn't cover a newspaper publisher?

 

[Ivan Seeking]

Bill Moyer addressed this issue on his Journal, this week.

Here is one excerpt that addresses a rather salient point, in my not so humble opinion. Like Obama, Lessig is Constitutional scholar.

... LAWRENCE LESSIG: I'm not against corporations. I think corporations are great. All kinds of corporations. And of course I think corporations ought to have certain rights. But there's a "Bladerunner" moment to this, where all of a sudden the rights that they have are not the rights that we give them, but rights that they have, certain inalienable rights as the Declaration of Independence put it. They've magically been given.

Look, you agree, we agree, that corporations are associations of individuals. But the mere fact that I have a right to vote and you have a right to vote, and we associate with a corp-- and make a corporation, doesn't mean that the corporation should have a right to vote.

NICK GILLESPIE: That's right. And they don't.

LAWRENCE LESSIG: So- well, but the question is-

NICK GILLESPIE: That's not on the table, is it?

LAWRENCE LESSIG: But the question is why? Because if the mere fact that I'm an individual, and I have a right to speak. And you're an individual and you have a right to speak. Associating together means that entity has the right to speak. Why doesn't that extend to the full range of quote "rights" that you and I have because our creator endowed us with them. And we have these unalienable rights?

NICK GILLESPIE: You know, we understand that a corporation is a legal term. One of the things that is problematic is to say, and again, in the Citizens United case, we have a clear cut example of a corporate entity that was shot down, it was censored, it was repressed by the government, because it was making speech that was not tolerated by the government. That's a big problem. And it can only get worse if we start coming up with even more nuanced and intricate schemes to control electioneering communication...

http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/02052010/transcript5.html

Watch online
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/02052010/profile2.html

As always, a worthy discussion regardless of your point of view.

 

[Skyhunter]

Suggestions?

Clear up the ambiguity and confusion surrounding the status of corporations that has led to the usurpation of rights by corporate entities over the last 140 years.

I am not a lawyer, so I wouldn't know how to go about it. But amending the Constitution is a bit drastic IMO.

 

[Ivan Seeking]

I am not a lawyer, so I wouldn't know how to go about it. But amending the Constitution is a bit drastic IMO.

According to the legal scholars that I've been following, there is no other way. The SC overturned a century's worth of law and is the final authority given the existing framework. The only other option would be to wait until there is another lefty on the court and reverse the decision, again.

 

[Skyhunter]

According to the legal scholars that I've been following, there is no other way. The SC overturned a century's worth of law and is the final authority given the existing framework. The only other option would be to wait until there is another lefty on the court and reverse the decision, again.

I would prefer to put the matter to rest once and for all. Probably not a better time than now. Corporations are not particularly popular ATM, and if we wait, they will be up to speed on gaming and controlling the system in order to get their way.

 

[Ivan Seeking]

I would prefer to put the matter to rest once and for all. Probably not a better time than now. Corporations are not particularly popular ATM, and if we wait, they will be up to speed on gaming and controlling the system in order to get their way.

That is an interesting point. Due to the nature of the problem - excessive influence in elections by non-human "persons" - it is conceivable that we have a finite window of opportunity to reverse the damage before it's too late.

Hey, isn't a "person" defined to be a human? [Heh, I checked and it is the first definition.] ... not according to the SC. There is neoconservative logic for you.

 

[drankin]

The government cannot limit the free speech of an individual or an association of individuals (a corporation). Foreign or domestic, for that matter. It's not the function of our government to limt free speech, period.

 

[Ivan Seeking]

The government cannot limit the free speech of an individual or an association of individuals (a corporation). Foreign or domestic, for that matter. It's not the function of our government to limt free speech, period.

The government doesn't have a right to limit foreign influence in US elections? How do you justify that claim? Where does the Constitution protect the rights of Chinese manufacturers to determine the outcome of US elections? That IS the sort of implication in play here.

Why doesn't a corporation have the right to vote? Also, if a corporation is a person, I want to see one imprisoned for crimes. A corporation can stand trial, but are they subject to the same laws as everyone else. Obviously not!

 

[Ivan Seeking]

Does the corporation have a right to religious freedom. Can a corporation hold public office?

Could we see Halliburton on the ballot in the next Presidential election? [Oh wait, we already did in 2000 ]

A "Bladerunner moment" is right.

 

[drankin]

The government doesn't have a right to limit foreign influence in US elections? How do you justify that claim? Where does the Constitution protect the rights of Chinese manufacturers to determine the outcome of US elections? That IS the sort of implication in play here.

Why doesn't a corporation have the right to vote? Also, if a corporation is a person, I want to see one imprisoned for crimes. A corporation can stand trial, but are they subject to the same laws as everyone else. Obviously not!

Don't put words in my mouth. The government cannot limit the free speech of anyone. Corporations are made up of people. I don't care whether a corporation is a "person" or not. Why do we want the government to limit the speech of anything or anyone? I think this is the whole point. It's not the function of our government to limit speech regardless of where it comes from.

 

[Ivan Seeking]

In times of crisis, a President can nationalize a corporation - thus revoking its so-called Constitutional rights. What is the equivalent legal action wrt to a person?

 

[Ivan Seeking]

Don't put words in my mouth. The government cannot limit the free speech of anyone. Corporations are made up of people. I don't care whether a corporation is a "person" or not. Why do we want the government to limit the speech of anything or anyone? I think this is the whole point. It's not the function of our government to limit speech regardless of where it comes from.

The words coming out of your mouth are what lead to my statements. What you are arguing is ideology regardless of consequences. It was never intended that we be ideological robots. We have brains and we need to use them.

We cannot yell "FIRE!" in a crowded theater. One is not free to incite a riot. Free speech IS limited by the government. This is true when free speech is a threat to the welfare of all people. In this case, democracy itself is in jeopardy. This abberation in the law represents perhaps the most dangerous and insidious threat of all because it undermines the foundation of our system of government - the democratic process.

To say a corporation is made up of people is not the same as saying a corporation is a person. Also, a corporation is not a representitive entity. They don't hold elections for the employees to determine the actions of the company. It is a hierarchical entity, not a democratic one. By your logic, the vote of a slave owner was representitive of the wishes of the slaves.

 

[Ivan Seeking]

If a corporation is a person entitled to the same rights as everyone else, since it cannot be jailed, it becomes a defacto supercitizen that is subject to some but not all laws.

Recall that no one is above the law. How do we rectify that problem?

 

[drankin]

The words coming out of your mouth are what lead to my statements. What you are arguing is ideology regardless of consequences. It was never intended that we be ideological robots. We have brains and we need to use them.

We cannot yell "FIRE!" in a crowded theater. One is not free to incite a riot. Free speech IS limited by the government. This is true when free speech is a threat to the welfare of all people. In this case, democracy itself is in jeopardy. This abberation in the law represents perhaps the most dangerous and insidious threat of all because it undermines the foundation of our system of government - the democratic process.

To say a corporation is made up of people is not the same as saying a corporation is a person. Also, a corporation is not a representitive entity. They don't hold elections for the employees to determine the actions of the company. It is a hierarchical entity, not a democratic one. By your logic, the vote of a slave owner was representitive of the wishes of the slaves.

I'm not talking about fires and I'm not talking about voting. I'm talking about the ability for anyone or any"thing" the ability to speak, via newspaper, internet, commercial, or any other media without government restriction. Particularly during elections! Period.

 

[TheStatutoryApe]

I'm not talking about fires and I'm not talking about voting. I'm talking about the ability for anyone or any"thing" the ability to speak, via newspaper, internet, commercial, or any other media without government restriction. Particularly during elections! Period.

Does my car get freedom of speech? My computer? Apparently you have no problem with free speech for Mickey Mouse and Joe Camel. So where is the line drawn? I mean if we can allow nonexistant persons free speech then we should allow freedom of speech for animals too right? How about dolls? Some guy in Japan is trying to marry his sex doll. Should his 'wife' be allowed free speech and the right to vote if he were an American citizen?

Speech comes from people, not 'things', so there is no reason to allow such unlimited rights for 'things'. The full legal responsibility and liability for any speech made should be placed entirely on the shoulders of the actual human 'speakers' rather than allowing them this proxy with supposed rights of its own.

 

[CRGreathouse]

If a corporation is a person entitled to the same rights as everyone else, since it cannot be jailed, it becomes a defacto supercitizen that is subject to some but not all laws.

Don't be ridiculous. Corporations lack most of the rights of natural persons (voting, petition, etc.) and are subject to dissolution rather than imprisonment. But it's not really useful to view them as persons; the legal fiction exists for convenience only.

 

[CRGreathouse]

The full legal responsibility and liability for any speech made should be placed entirely on the shoulders of the actual human 'speakers' rather than allowing them this proxy with supposed rights of its own.

Let's say that a corporation yells "Fire!" in a crowded theatre -- or more to the point, it makes absurd and damaging false claims that incite panic. I would want to be able to hold the corporation responsible for that act, not just the board of directors and the corporate scapegoats. Are you suggesting that the corporation be granted immunity in such cases?

 

[BobG]

The government cannot limit the free speech of an individual

True in general. There can be limits, though. Can't libel a person, can't lie to incite panic, etc.

... or an association of individuals (a corporation).

False. A coporation is not an association of individuals. The stockholders are not joining together to share a common situation. They're creating a legal entity to stand between them and the real world.

I could buy this argument for a political party, and maybe even a union; but not for a corporation. Corporations are a different type of organization.

They are more like a firewall than an association of individuals.

It's not the function of our government to limt free speech, period.

True. Any communication (i.e. speech) has three components - the transmitter, the medium, and the receiver. Freedom of speech doesn't just mean the right to say anything you want. It also means the freedom to hear or read the things you want.

Focusing on the rights of the corporation is a red herring, even if hard to resist since it's an interesting subject. You also need to focus on the rights of the listeners and how denying free speech of a corporation, union, etc will affect the listeners' rights to access information.

In fact, it's the rights of the listeners that justify putting limits on what a speaker can say (yelling "fire" in a crowded theater, libel, etc).

 

[mheslep]

In other words, any company or group has freedom of speech, making the "of the press" part irrelevant and unnecessary? Or was the "of the press" part put in the amendment for a reason, since the "freedom of speech" part wouldn't cover a newspaper publisher?

I'd say it is the actions or behavior of the press that makes it the press; those actions are different from the common speaker. Thus for instance the collection of information from a source for publication has more or less been protected from inquiry by the state. The average speaker has to give that information up if called to court (the dock).

 

[BobG]

Differences between a corporation and an association of individuals.

1) Married couple. They can contribute to a campaign via a single check with the contribution being evenly split between them (unless they've attached some documentation stating a different distribution). The contribution of each would count against the limits for an individual's contribution limits. In other words, they couldn't each send in a $2400 check for a candidate in an election and then send in a joint check for another $2400. Being a married couple doesn't increase the contribution limit for each individual.

Additionally, a married couple can't donate money in their kids' name. (Each kid may voluntarily donate money to a campaign out of their own money, but they aren't considered to share in the parents' joint assets, so can't donate from them.)

2) A company partnership. A check can be sent in the company name with the contribution being split among the partners in proportion to their ownership percentage - i.e. each partner's share of the profits, since only profits can be used for the donation (which only means a campaign contribution cannot be considered a business expense since there may be no way to know whether the company will have a net profit or loss when the contribution is made). Whatever is contributed counts against each individual's contribution limits. In other words, if a company with two equal partners donates $4800 to a campaign, then each partner has hit his limit on campaign contributions. They can't each donate another $2400 in their own name.

3) Corporations can't donate money to a campaign (at least until the recent SCOTUS decision). If they could, and were considered to be an association of individuals instead of a separate legal entity, then their contributions would have to be split up among shareholders (excluding foreign shareholders prohibited from donating to US elections) and those contributions would be counted against each individual shareholder's limits. In the case of a shareholder holding a large amount of stock in many corporations, you'd have a problem in that the corporations wouldn't know if their contributions caused him to exceed contribution limits, in which case, the contributions would have to be resplit among shareholders still having room under contribution limits, etc.

In other words, if you have individual contribution limits (which may have effectively been struck down by the SCOTUS decision), then corporate donations create an intractable problem. The individual can't control his own donations and the corporation can't know if its individual shareholders are exceeding contribution limits.

1) Married couples. They buy a house together, then divorce. Thanks to the housing crash, they're upside down on their mortgage. They agree the husband gets the house and will continue to make payments. The husband bails and flees the country. The wife now gets to make the payments. Both agreed with the bank to make payments. Their divorce agreement is between them, not with the bank. Both are personally liable for that loan until it's paid off.

2) Individual business owner. Takes out a loan to start a business with his business as collateral. His business fails, he sells off his equipment, but still owes money to the bank. He still has to pay that loan even though he no longer has the business. The loan was a personal agreement between him and the bank; not his business and the bank.

3) Business partners taking a loan. Both partners are cosignors and equally personally liable to pay off the loan, same as if they took individual personal loans for the business.

4) Corporations. A corporation takes out a loan, then goes out of business. The individual stockholders are out whatever money they invested, but outstanding debt is not split among individual stockholders. The debts belong to the corporation, not the stockholders. If a corporation were an association of individuals, each stockholder would be delegating authority to the corporation to act in their behalf and they would be personally liable for any outstanding obligations if the corporation went out of business.

It's nice to argue that corporations are an association of individuals when it comes to freedom of speech. You do so knowing that common law denying corporations are an association of individuals when it comes to liabilities is older than the country itself and knowing the SCOTUS has to respect stare decisis in this case or bring the US economy to a complete and crashing halt. In other words, you can safely argue that a corporation is an association of individuals when it comes to free speech because you know there is no danger at all of a corporation being considered an association of individuals in any other way.

Note: It's still illegal for corporations to donate money directly to a campaign. This is just to show the difference between corporations and "an association of individuals". However, the impact of the decision guts contribution limits since a corporation can broadcast the campaign commercials on its own instead of giving a candidate money to broadcast his own commercials. (Not that current law prevents that from happening with PACs and 527s.)

 

[TheStatutoryApe]

Let's say that a corporation yells "Fire!" in a crowded theatre -- or more to the point, it makes absurd and damaging false claims that incite panic. I would want to be able to hold the corporation responsible for that act, not just the board of directors and the corporate scapegoats. Are you suggesting that the corporation be granted immunity in such cases?

As it stands only the corporate 'person' and just maybe some scapegoat, or person who was not effectively able to shield their activities behind the corporation, will be held responsible. It is quite possible that no actual individual will be held legally responsible even though we know that it was obviously individuals who perpetrated the act and not a fictitious person.

In an 'association of individuals' all persons involved in the 'association' may be held responsible in some degree corresponding to their involvement and all persons will be investigated. Actual people would be held legally accountable for their actions.

I am uncertain why it is that you would prefer to hold a fictitious person liable for the crimes of real individuals.

 

[Hurkyl]

That is an interesting point. Due to the nature of the problem - excessive influence in elections by non-human "persons" - it is conceivable that we have a finite window of opportunity to reverse the damage before it's too late.

Hey, isn't a "person" defined to be a human? [Heh, I checked and it is the first definition.] ... not according to the SC. There is neoconservative logic for you.

http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sa33.pdf

(I do not know if there is older law defining the term "person")

What was the point of that second paragraph anyways?

 

[BobG]

http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sa33.pdf

(I do not know if there is older law defining the term "person")

I'm sure there is. Laws often have to define the terms they use, since they're using the terms for one specific purpose within that particular law. That doesn't establish a new definition for the word itself. In other words, that definition is only valid within that particular text.

It's similar to defining the variables in a physics problem.

In this case, for this law, ...

Let "person" = "an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, any unincorporated organization, or a government or political subdivision thereof"

It makes the text easier to read if you only use one word instead of writing out all 9 entities the law pertains to over and over throughout the document.

A more general definition from an 1856 law dictionary (A Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States. By John Bouvier. Published 1856). The example you gave would fall under item 3.

PERSON. This word is applied to men, women and children, who are called natural persons. In law, man and person are not exactly synonymous terms. Any human being is a man, whether he be a member of society or not, whatever may be the rank he holds, or whatever may be his age, sex, &c. A person is a man considered according to the rank he holds in society, with all the rights to which the place he holds entitles him, and the duties which it imposes. 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 137.
2. It is also used to denote a corporation which is an artificial person. 1 Bl. Com. 123; 4 Bing. 669; C. 33 Eng. C. L R. 488; Woodes. Lect. 116; Bac. Us. 57; 1 Mod. 164.
3. But when the word "Persons" is spoken of in legislative acts, natural persons will be intended, unless something appear in the context to show that it applies to artificial persons. 1 Scam. R. 178.
4. Natural persons are divided into males, or men; and females or women. Men are capable of all kinds of engagements and functions, unless by reasons applying to particular individuals. Women cannot be appointed to any public office, nor perform any civil functions, except those which the law specially declares them capable of exercising. Civ. Code of Louis. art. 25.
5. They are also sometimes divided into free persons and slaves. Freemen are those who have preserved their natural liberty, that is to say, who have the right of doing what is not forbidden by the law. A slave is one who is in the power of a master to whom he belongs. Slaves are sometimes ranked not with persons but things. But sometimes they are considered as persons for example, a negro is in contemplation of law a person, so as to be capable of committing a riot in conjunction with white men. 1 Bay, 358. Vide Man.
6. Persons are also divided into citizens, (q.v.) and aliens, (q.v.) when viewed with regard to their political rights. When they are considered in relation to their civil rights, they are living or civilly dead; vide Civil Death; outlaws; and infamous persons.
7. Persons are divided into legitimates and bastards, when examined as to their rights by birth.
8. When viewed in their domestic relations, they are divided into parents and children; husbands and wives; guardians and wards; and masters and servants son, as it is understood in law, see 1 Toull. n. 168; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 1890, note.

Obviously, "older" is not always better, since quite a few of these definitions are obsolete, except in the context of understanding laws, or constitutional wording, that's even older than these definitions.

 

[CRGreathouse]

I am uncertain why it is that you would prefer to hold a fictitious person liable for the crimes of real individuals.

That's not what I said at all.

 

[BobG]

Let's say that a corporation yells "Fire!" in a crowded theatre -- or more to the point, it makes absurd and damaging false claims that incite panic. I would want to be able to hold the corporation responsible for that act, not just the board of directors and the corporate scapegoats. Are you suggesting that the corporation be granted immunity in such cases?

I am uncertain why it is that you would prefer to hold a fictitious person liable for the crimes of real individuals.

That's not what I said at all.

It's not clear at all as to what you mean by "hold the corporation responsible for that act". Who, exactly, is being held responsible? Is there some specific persons facing prison time or fines? Or is the corporation facing a fine, which, in effect, indirectly fines every stockholder in the company? (A fine is about the only punishment you can enforce against a corporation).

 

[BobG]

In times of crisis, a President can nationalize a corporation - thus revoking its so-called Constitutional rights. What is the equivalent legal action wrt to a person?

The draft.

 

[Ivan Seeking]

The draft.

True in a sense, but higly constrained. Also, I don't think a company can refuse nationalization. It has no rights in that sense. A person can opt to serve their time in jail.

I wanted to post this response from one of my Senators. Apparently he has received enough emails to justify a specific response.

Thank you for contacting me to share your views about the recent United States Supreme Court decision that affects our campaign finance laws. It is an honor to serve as your Senator, and I appreciate hearing from you.

I strongly disagree with the five Supreme Court justices who decided in the Citizens United v. F.E.C. to reverse long-standing precedent by ruling that corporate spending on campaign ads is entitled to the same protections as citizens' free speech. I have been troubled for many years by the widespread perception that campaign contributors have greater influence in our democracy than ordinary citizens. Therefore, I am deeply concerned that the court's decision validates this view and will open the floodgates for political spending by corporations and special interest groups.

Our Founders understood that the success of our democracy requires ensuring that special interest voices do not drown out those voices of American citizens. I am committed to working with my colleagues to respond to this ruling and protect the integrity of our elections.

Thank you, again, for sharing your thoughts with me. I hope you will continue to keep me informed about the issues that matter most to you.

All my best,
Jeff Merkley
United States Senate

Go Senator Merkley!

 

[Hurkyl]

Yuck. He disagrees with the legal ruling because it doesn't suit his politics?

 

[Hurkyl]

Attempting to preempt misunderstanding... for the purpose of this (and my previous) post, I don't care what his politics are.

The role of the SCOTUS is, in principle anyways, to judge what the law actually says in the most difficult court cases.

But look at the reason Senator Merkley gives for disagreeing -- it's because he's troubled by perceptions and consequences, and has nothing to do with the law.

 

[mheslep]

Go Senator Merkley!

Go and do what? He doesn't suggest any action other than that you should keep writing to him.

 

[Ivan Seeking]

Attempting to preempt misunderstanding... for the purpose of this (and my previous) post, I don't care what his politics are.

The role of the SCOTUS is, in principle anyways, to judge what the law actually says in the most difficult court cases.

But look at the reason Senator Merkley gives for disagreeing -- it's because he's troubled by perceptions and consequences, and has nothing to do with the law.

He is troubled for the same reason that I am: This threatens the democratic process. This is not just politics; it is about protecting the essence of democracy. This is why there are calls for a Constitutional Amendment to protect our system of government by The People. It may be that the five SC justices indeed honored the letter of the law; that all who came before, including other SC justices, were in error, however that is not the point. We do have the right and the responsibility to amend the Constitution when needed. What is your point, exactly, that we should yield power to corporations and even foreign interests based on some bizarre interpretation of the right to free speech?

The Constitution is all about consequences. "Consequences" are why we have Constitutional protections.

Go and do what? He doesn't suggest any action other than that you should keep writing to him.

He clearly understands the problem - that there is a HUGE problem - and intends to act. It may be foolish for him to engage in discussion of any specifics until some sort of consensus has been reached among the Dems in Congress. Whether he acts or not, we will see. The fact is that his website specifically asked if a response is requested. I checked the "No" option. Yet, not only did I receive an acknowledgment of my email, it was a highly targeted response. For now, I could hardly ask for more beyond a personal letter or phone call.

If he follows through, it will count heavily in his favor in the next election. If he leads the charge, I may becomes a loyal fan and do what I can to help to fund his next election; provided that contributions from us real people still matter.