Is Cartesian Dualism Logically Consistent with Modern Philosophy?

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
But "static data" just takes the place of phenomenological chairs flying around, since all of material reality is a collection of "static data". In a matrix computer system, there needn't be any such static data, but should instead be a set of programs that are activated by particular activities in the observer's brain, and that produce a chair for his inspection.

So the program produces a chair when the observor is looking. What happens when the observor looks away? In a logically consistent world, when he looks back to where the chair was, it should still be there. How does the computer take this into account? The only way is for it to store information about the chair, even when the observor is not looking at it. If this were not done, the computer would not be able to reliably reproduce the chair in that same location every time the observor looked there.

By way of analogy, the information that represents, stands for, codes for-- however you want to say it-- your web browser exists in your computer's hard drive, even when you are not actively running (looking at) your browser's program.

But this means that the observer moves (if the computer must check his location). We cannot remain in the realm of analogy, hypna, we also have to think about what it actually happening. The observer is tied to a chair on some ship near the Earth's core, and he hasn't moved an inch since he was "plugged in". Thus, certain brain activities may translate as part of the "movement" program of the Matrix, but he hasn't moved at all.

No kidding. I didn't say anywhere that the observor was moving in the 'real' world. I meant that the computer must keep track of where the observor is located in the simulated matrix world. This of course is not a literal physical location, just abstract data representing a location in an abstract world made of bits.

But this is like an existentialism in a computer program, and I don't think that's the way computers work. After all, we already have programs that can allow me to see a chair from all possible angles, and in different lighting, but there is no static set of data in the computer for the chair, merely for the program that illicits that particular representation on the monitor.

If the simulated world is to be an interactive one, then there must be some internal representation of the objects within it, or the computer must be able to precisely predict all actions taken by the participants. See my previous post.

Wrong, and that's practically the whole point of Consciousness Explained. Dennett was trying to show that we didn't need this paradoxical dualism in order to have a world with consciousness.

Whoa, hold your horses. I never said we need dualism to explain consciousness. I said we need internal data representation to explain how an interactive world like the matrix can work.

In the matrix, there are programs that elicit certain stimuli due to particular activities in the brain's of the en-matrixed people. As it is, this program would have to be very complex, since it would have to account for all possible factors, but it would not have to do this when there was no observer present[/color]. After all, what good is a static representation of a chair to the computer itself (with no "observers" to stimulate)?

Again, you misunderstand. The computer needn't compute all the necessary things for human perception when an observor is not present. But it does need to store some sort of information in order to retrieve it for when the observor comes around, so that it can then do its appropriate computations.

Assume we play a game where we navigate through a 3 dimensional world, except instead of doing this through a computer, we do it through pencils, paper, and imagination. I have written down on a paper, "Room 17: It is a plain, cubic room. There is a chair in the back left corner of the room." I read this information to you when you have 'entered' Room 17. When you 'come back' to Room 17, I read it to you again, and sure enough, the chair is still in the back left corner.

The paper is like information in the computer database, and my reading the information to you is like an actively running program in the matrix presenting stimuli to an observor. I am not constantly reading the information to you, but I still need to have the paper handy in order to ensure that the Room 17 I present to you is logically consistent.

Say we stop playing and then resume 3 months later, and you remember the details about Room 17 but I do not. I also seem to have lost the paper with the information about Room 17 written on it. So I make something up, and you say, "Hey! That's not an accurate description of Room 17." Without the information stored on the paper, I have lost the ability to make our imaginary world logically consistent. Likewise for your version of the matrix.

And yet this is not (AFAIK) what video games do. For example, if I'm playing Donkey Kong 64, and am in room with the K. Lumsy, there only need be the stimulations to my television - which, in turn, stimulates my retina - to produce certain photonic emissions (which, in turn, stimulate certain triangular arrays in my neocortex)...there needn't be any representation whatsoever of Kranky Kong in his lab, or of Candy Kong in her shop, since I'm not there and the game console has no use for such representations.

This is like saying this very post you're reading needn't be stored as data on a computer somewhere-- after all, your computer only needs to make the appropriate stimulations to your monitor, which in turn stimulates your retina, and so on, to have the experience of reading this post.

How does the computer make those appropriate stimulations to the monitor if it is not drawing it from some stored information? Is it doing it randomly? No, clearly there must be some sort of data in the server hard drive that represents this post, which can be fetched and displayed to you when requested/needed. Likewise with Donkey Kong and the matrix.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
So the program produces a chair when the observor is looking. What happens when the observor looks away?

It stops producing this stimulus, since it has no reason to anymore.

In a logically consistent world, when he looks back to where the chair was, it should still be there.

Indeed. When he looks back the stimulus from his brain to computer, to produce the stimulus from computer to brain of a chair, is re-activated.

How does the computer take this into account? The only way is for it to store information about the chair, even when the observor is not looking at it. If this were not done, the computer would not be able to reliably reproduce the chair in that same location every time the observor looked there.

If it stores information about what a chair is supposed to look like under all of the given circumstances then what you have is a program that deduces, from the stimuli given by the human's brain, which stimulus it should (in turn) give back to his brain to produce the illusion of a chair.

By way of analogy, the information that represents, stands for, codes for-- however you want to say it-- your web browser exists in your computer's hard drive, even when you are not actively running (looking at) your browser's program.

True enough, but all the computer has to remember is the program, it doesn't have a static representation of this particular page at all times.

If the simulated world is to be an interactive one, then there must be some internal representation of the objects within it, or the computer must be able to precisely predict all actions taken by the participants. See my previous post.

Well, that prediction part is more of what Dennett was worried about (which is why he believed it would lead to combinatorial explosion). As it is, there should not be any static representations of chairs in the matrix; but even if there can be, there needn't be since such predictions (or reactions to current stimuli that will cause later stimuli) can occur.

Whoa, hold your horses. I never said we need dualism to explain consciousness. I said we need internal data representation to explain how an interactive world like the matrix can work.

But we don't, since we have the Dennett model of actual interaction, between the brain and the computer. Each new stimulus from the brain causes the computer to produce the proper subsequent stimulus for the brain.

Again, you misunderstand. The computer needn't compute all the necessary things for human perception when an observor is not present. But it does need to store some sort of information in order to retrieve it for when the observor comes around, so that it can then do its appropriate computations.

What if it has a program that dictates only "this stimulus means that that stimulus is the appropriate response; while this stimulus means that that other stimulus is the appropriate response"?

Assume we play a game where we navigate through a 3 dimensional world, except instead of doing this through a computer, we do it through pencils, paper, and imagination. I have written down on a paper, "Room 17: It is a plain, cubic room. There is a chair in the back left corner of the room." I read this information to you when you have 'entered' Room 17. When you 'come back' to Room 17, I read it to you again, and sure enough, the chair is still in the back left corner.

The paper is like information in the computer database, and my reading the information to you is like an actively running program in the matrix presenting stimuli to an observor. I am not constantly reading the information to you, but I still need to have the paper handy in order to ensure that the Room 17 I present to you is logically consistent.

But this is not a correct analogy to a computer's processes. If I were to come to you and you were to re-draw Room 17, then you would be doing what a computer does, since the computer has no use for such static representations until stimulated by an observer, and then only until stimulation ceases.

Say we stop playing and then resume 3 months later, and you remember the details about Room 17 but I do not. I also seem to have lost the paper with the information about Room 17 written on it. So I make something up, and you say, "Hey! That's not an accurate description of Room 17." Without the information stored on the paper, I have lost the ability to make our imaginary world logically consistent. Likewise for your version of the matrix.

But not if the program is written so as to produce each particular pixel of the representation in the order that it is supposed to in response to that particular stimulus.

This is like saying this very post you're reading needn't be stored as data on a computer somewhere-- after all, your computer only needs to make the appropriate stimulations to your monitor, which in turn stimulates your retina, and so on, to have the experience of reading this post.

How does the computer make those appropriate stimulations to the monitor if it is not drawing it from some stored information? Is it doing it randomly? No, clearly there must be some sort of data in the server hard drive that represents this post, which can be fetched and displayed to you when requested/needed.

Clearly you are not speaking from a knowledge of computers, but from a knowledge of what you believe "should" be the case with them (no offense is intended here, btw, I'm just making an observation).

However, I've been talking to some people, and it's becoming more and more apparent to me that the programs that run simulations are set by programs to respond to different stimuli (in this case wherever I might click with my mouse or whatever key I might type on my keyboard) in the appropriate ways, meaning that there is nothing "written on paper" - merely a lot of "paper", a lot of "ink", and a lot of programs that teach it what to do in response to whatever stimulus.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
It stops producing this stimulus, since it has no reason to anymore.

Yes.

Indeed. When he looks back the stimulus from his brain to computer, to produce the stimulus from computer to brain of a chair, is re-activated.

Yes.

If it stores information about what a chair is supposed to look like under all of the given circumstances then what you have is a program that deduces, from the stimuli given by the human's brain, which stimulus it should (in turn) give back to his brain to produce the illusion of a chair.

But the computer can't know what circumstance the chair is in unless it stores information to that effect.

True enough, but all the computer has to remember is the program, it doesn't have a static representation of this particular page at all times.

Nor did I say it (your web browser program) had a static representation of this page at all times.

You seem to still think I am saying that the 'data object' of the chair includes the sensory output characteristic to it. I am not. I saying this data object acts (partially) as a generator of those inputs by storing relevant information about the chair. As I have said, at least the chair's location in 'matrix space' must be recorded, and probably additional information (such as, Bob dropped grape juice on this chair and so it has a stain). This information can then be fetched from the database and used to produce appropriate sensory inputs when an observor is present.

Well, that prediction part is more of what Dennett was worried about (which is why he believed it would lead to combinatorial explosion). As it is, there should not be any static representations of chairs in the matrix; but even if there can be, there needn't be since such predictions (or reactions to current stimuli that will cause later stimuli) can occur.

A logically consistent world cannot be created entirely from information from observors' brains. For instance, say Bob spilled grape juice on the chair yesterday, but forgot about it. Jane saw him spill it, and remembers it vividly. We now have two contradictory sets of information about the chair with no way to decide which is right and which is wrong. The solution is to explicitly store information to the effect that grape juice has been spilled on the chair.

What if it has a program that dictates only "this stimulus means that that stimulus is the appropriate response; while this stimulus means that that other stimulus is the appropriate response"?

Then we can't have a logically consistent world. Jane's expectation that the chair should be stained means the appropriate response is to show her a chair with a stain on it. Bob's expectation that the chair should not be stained means the appopriate response is to show him a chair without a stain. Now Jane says to Bob, "nasty stain there, huh?" and Bob disagrees that there is even a stain on the chair. Logical inconsistency.

But this is not a correct analogy to a computer's processes. If I were to come to you and you were to re-draw Room 17, then you would be doing what a computer does, since the computer has no use for such static representations until stimulated by an observer, and then only until stimulation ceases.

I do 're-draw' Room 17 everytime you re-enter it, by reading aloud the description of it to you. I explicitly said this.

The paper is like information in the computer database, and my reading the information to you is like an actively running program in the matrix presenting stimuli to an observor. I am not constantly reading the information to you, but I still need to have the paper handy in order to ensure that the Room 17 I present to you is logically consistent.

Indeed, I have no use for the piece of paper that has information about Room 17 until you 'enter' it. But once you do enter Room 17, I need that information stored away on the piece of paper to tell you (generate stimuli) about it. Just like the matrix has no use for information about the location of a chair in a room until an observor enters the room; at that point, the matrix fetches information from its database about the room, so that it can use it to generate the proper stimuli for the observor. If the matrix did not do this, it would have no way of 'remembering' where the chair should be located in this room.

But not if the program is written so as to produce each particular pixel of the representation in the order that it is supposed to in response to that particular stimulus.

It doesn't know what it's supposed to do without information to this effect. If it draws this information entirely from human brains, many logical inconsistencies will arise, since everyone has differing internal representations of what the (matrix) world out there looks like. Therefore, to make a logically consistent world, the matrix must store some information about this world on its own database.

Clearly you are not speaking from a knowledge of computers, but from a knowledge of what you believe "should" be the case with them (no offense is intended here, btw, I'm just making an observation).

Clearly I should just hand over my degree in computer science to you right now and be done with this conversation.

However, I've been talking to some people, and it's becoming more and more apparent to me that the programs that run simulations are set by programs to respond to different stimuli (in this case wherever I might click with my mouse or whatever key I might type on my keyboard) in the appropriate ways, meaning that there is nothing "written on paper" - merely a lot of "paper", a lot of "ink", and a lot of programs that teach it what to do in response to whatever stimulus.

There is still informational representation. If you are talking about something like neural nets, the representation is implicit and much more abstract, but it still exists.

Let's say I'm playing a flight simulator. There is a tall red building to my left. I turn right so that I can no longer see the building. Then I turn back around, and I can see the building again. How did the program remember that there was supposed to be a tall red building there? It had information stored that says something to the effect that "there is a tall red building here." When that 'here' is located in the current field of vision, then the computer actively uses the stored information to render the image of the building.

 

[Mentat]

Quote-response didn't seem appropriate in this case, so I'm just going to try to respond to all the points that need responding to on this post, without the use of quotes...

I'd like to first of all say that I didn't mean to sound condescending in any way when I said you didn't sound like you were speaking from an understanding of computer programs...you were just using a lot of "I thinks", IMO, and so it didn't seem like you were basing this on actual knowledge about the way a computer works.

Anyway, I want to concede a little here, but want to be clear as to how much I'm conceding. You see, I understand that a certain bit (no pun intended) of information must exist that indicates that, when a plane is pointed in that direction there must appear a representation of a red building. However, that's not really what I was fighting. I was fighting against the idea that the sensory outputs would remain as a static representation, ready to be used at any given time. This is the only way I could see that you could apply the workings of a matrix computer to the dualistic idea of consciousness.

As it is, I'm willing to admit that these collections of information must exist in "computer language" , but the sensory outputs are re-reproduced (maybe just "reproduced" is correct here, I'm not sure ) every time the stimulus from the brain equals the appropriate cause for that particular effect. In this case, there doesn't appear to be any relevance of this analogy to the dualistic approach to consciousness.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
I'd like to first of all say that I didn't mean to sound condescending in any way when I said you didn't sound like you were speaking from an understanding of computer programs...you were just using a lot of "I thinks", IMO, and so it didn't seem like you were basing this on actual knowledge about the way a computer works.

You could have said "It seems that..." instead of "Clearly..." But in any case, don't sweat it.

Anyway, I want to concede a little here, but want to be clear as to how much I'm conceding. You see, I understand that a certain bit (no pun intended) of information must exist that indicates that, when a plane is pointed in that direction there must appear a representation of a red building. However, that's not really what I was fighting. I was fighting against the idea that the sensory outputs would remain as a static representation, ready to be used at any given time. This is the only way I could see that you could apply the workings of a matrix computer to the dualistic idea of consciousness.

We'll get back to that last point. For now, all I wanted to do was show that it is incorrect to say that (for instance) a matrix chair does not exist. It does exist, insofar as it exists as information in the computer matrix which represent its attributes-- structure, mass, location, etc. I never claimed that this perpetually existent set of data includes the sensory outputs associated with the chair; rather, I tried to make it clear that these sensory outputs were dynamically produced as a function of the observor's reference frame, the information representing the object, and the computer's simulated 'physical laws.'

As it is, I'm willing to admit that these collections of information must exist in "computer language" , but the sensory outputs are re-reproduced (maybe just "reproduced" is correct here, I'm not sure ) every time the stimulus from the brain equals the appropriate cause for that particular effect. In this case, there doesn't appear to be any relevance of this analogy to the dualistic approach to consciousness.

Well, again, I just wanted to clarify that matrix chairs do exist. This is only a side issue for the main argument, which is well buried by now. I will look over the history of this thread and proceed with presenting the argument soon.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
We'll get back to that last point.

I'm going to hold you to that.

For now, all I wanted to do was show that it is incorrect to say that (for instance) a matrix chair does not exist. It does exist, insofar as it exists as information in the computer matrix which represent its attributes-- structure, mass, location, etc. I never claimed that this perpetually existent set of data includes the sensory outputs associated with the chair; rather, I tried to make it clear that these sensory outputs were dynamically produced as a function of the observor's reference frame, the information representing the object, and the computer's simulated 'physical laws.'

So, doesn't that contradict the dualistic approach, which would give a separate (and static) existence to the matrix chair itself, and wouldn't allow it to be nothing but stimulus that the "probe" gives our brain that happens to be directed by an information structure in the computer's programming? IOW, dualism gives a sort of existentialist approach to phenomenological entities, which is what I thought was what was being considered in the matrix analogy.

 

[hypnagogue]

OK, let's clean the slate and start over from the beginning. I'm just going to post some propositions one by one, and hopefully we can come to an agreement on them before we proceed. (By the way, don't go assuming how I am going to use this or that in my argument-- I think that approach caused some confusion previously... just tell me if you agree or disagree with these statements. Hopefully I can make this clear and straightforward.)

Proposition 1:
An object/phenomenon/entity X is physical if and only if it is possible in principle to observe X in the objective world by using objective measurements. Otherwise it is non-physical.

Agree or disagree?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
OK, let's clean the slate and start over from the beginning. I'm just going to post some propositions one by one, and hopefully we can come to an agreement on them before we proceed. (By the way, don't go assuming how I am going to use this or that in my argument-- I think that approach caused some confusion previously... just tell me if you agree or disagree with these statements. Hopefully I can make this clear and straightforward.)

Thank you, hypna. I'm sorry for being so confused in my views, but I just don't see how you can be right here. This approach will probably make it easier for me...

Proposition 1:
An object/phenomenon/entity X is physical if and only if it is possible in principle to observe X in the objective world by using objective measurements. Otherwise it is non-physical.

Agree or disagree?

Disagree. I cannot observe an electron.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
Disagree. I cannot observe an electron.

Sorry, bad phrasing. Replace "observed" with "detected."

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Sorry, bad phrasing. Replace "observed" with "detected."

Then, for the purpose of being a "good sport": Agree.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Mentat
Then, for the purpose of being a "good sport": Agree.

Wait a minute...sorry, but what about the possiblity in principle of multiple Universes? They would be physical, but are impossible (in principle) to observe/detect, since they are seperated/connected by nothing at all.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
Wait a minute...sorry, but what about the possiblity in principle of multiple Universes? They would be physical, but are impossible (in principle) to observe/detect

Why would these things deserved to be called physical? If they are impossible even in principle to detect, then from our perspective, how is their ontology any more physical than a soul, or God, or faries?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Why would these things deserved to be called physical? If they are impossible even in principle to detect, then from our perspective, how is their ontology any more physical than a soul, or God, or faries?

Because they are composed of wavicles and spacetime.