Is Chomsky's View on the Mind-Body Problem Redefining Materialism?

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Chomsky critiques traditional views on the mind-body problem, arguing that it can only be sensibly posed with a clear conception of "body," which has been undermined by modern physics. He suggests that the material world is defined by our scientific theories rather than a fixed notion of physicality, leading to the conclusion that the mind-body problem lacks coherent formulation. Chomsky posits that as we develop and integrate theories of the mind, we may redefine what is considered "physical" without a predetermined concept of materiality. Critics like Nagel argue that subjectivity and qualia cannot be reduced to material entities, regardless of future scientific advancements. Ultimately, Chomsky advocates for a focus on understanding mental phenomena within the evolving framework of science, rather than getting bogged down in the elusive definitions of "mind" and "body."
  • #251
bohm2 said:
I don't think this author will go the full innatist distance though as Chomsky appears to:

The innateness Hypothesis and Mathematical concepts:

http://biblio.ugent.be/input/download?func=downloadFile&fileOId=911487


The cognitive basis of arithmetic:

http://www.cs.mcgill.ca/~dirk/PhiMSAMP-bk_DeCruzNethSchlimm.pdf

Both authors in fact are evidence against innatism.

Correctly, they emphasise the vast chasm between animal capacity for mental grouping (one, two, err, many) and actual formal mathematical reasoning (which piggybacks on language ability and so Vygotskean socioculturally evolved habits of thought).
 
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  • #252
apeiron said:
Both authors in fact are evidence against innatism.

Correctly, they emphasise the vast chasm between animal capacity for mental grouping (one, two, err, many) and actual formal mathematical reasoning (which piggybacks on language ability and so Vygotskean socioculturally evolved habits of thought).

I didn't interpret the papers in that way. Here's the conclusion of the paper:

Our examination of possible relationships between intuitive and formal arithmetic indicates that there are good reasons to think that innate numerical abilities play a significant role in the development of arithmetic competence, even though intuitive number concepts do not correspond to any established set in number theory, and even though children’s learning of number does not clearly follow axiomatizations of number.
 
  • #253
bohm2 said:
I didn't interpret the papers in that way. Here's the conclusion of the paper:

Yes, here is the conclusion.

Our examination of possible relationships between intuitive and formal arithmetic indicates that there are good reasons to think that innate numerical abilities play a significant role in the development of arithmetic competence, even though intuitive number concepts do not correspond to any established set in number theory, and even though children’s learning of number does not clearly follow axiomatizations of number.

The point is you made a claim about strong innatism. So where is the evidence?

No one here is defending its opposite either - naive constructivism. Quite clearly, maths ability, like any ability is a mix of nature and nurture, evolution and development, etc. And the only matter of interest is how to capture that interaction of complementary causes in our scientific modelling.

When it comes to the constraints that shape human learning and thinking, clearly genes capture historical information at one level. And then words, cultural evolution, captures information of a different order.
 
  • #254
bohm2:

much work in the cognitive neurosciences indicates are large role for spatial metaphor in our abstract thinking (such as mathematics). This comes largely from our somatic system (integrating not only visual and audio cues for spatial organization, but also your skin's topographical map and your muscle feedback-control system (that tells you how much you're stretching your body and allowing you to imagine where it's stretching to in your surroundings).

This is largely handled by your parietal lobes, which has a very important junction with the temporal lobes (where semantic memory is thought to be organized). Semantic memory is where we define objects; and we do this largely through the way we can interpret and predict our environment. Even abstract "objects" like numbers can be thought of spatially.

http://pss.sagepub.com/content/13/2/185.short
The roles of body and mind in abstract thought

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027799000736
Metaphoric structuring: understanding time through spatial metaphors

For instant, it's been shown that playing with blocks can increase a toddler's vocabulary:
http://www.redorbit.com/news/education/1112414483/playing-with-blocks-facilitates-development-of-spatial-vocabulary/index.html

And of course, it's well known that instructional DVD's (like "baby einstein") have little to no effect on Toddlers:
http://www.hanen.org/Helpful-Info/Articles/Educational-DVDs--What-Helps-Babies-Learn.aspx

This is why Children's Museums are now springing up everywhere... because Vygotsky had a point. Things that seem trivial to you and me are being deeply processed by our children during play time; the more interactive that play time is, the more spurious is development.

Did you know that just thehttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15766532" ? Compared to sitting at the TV, just the intensity of interaction with our environment from jogging (impact, jerk, center of gravity, navigation, etc.) significantly trumps the effect of a single source of stimulus and processing (a linear TV stream with no choices or feedback required).

Furthermore, it's well known by all neuroscience undergraduates about the experiment performed on baby kittens, where they covered their eyes at birth. These kittens never developed eye sight later (whereas if you do this with an adult cat, the cat will be fine). The idea, in general, is called http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Critical_period" .

So not only is environment influential on neural development, neural development depends on it.
 
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  • #255
bohm2 said:
I disagree. I think there is some debate on Peirce's "abductive instinct" but it seems at least from his own writings that he did come to believe that because we are a product of nature/natural law, we have a natural instinct at somehow being able to arrive at the laws of nature. Some of those quotes are directly from Peirce's later writings: Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce. See p. 415 + 421-422 (604) that is available in link below:

You have to read this in the historical context of Peirce's reaction to Kant.

The interesting idea at the heart of what he says is that the workings of the mind parallel those of reality simply because that is "the way things must work". This is what makes semiosis a general logic or general model of causality. You could call it a principle of self-organisation. The way we make our ideas clear (the triadic process of synechism) is the same way - in a formal sense - as a universe would self-create itself into concrete existence.

And rather than this being instinctual, it is about the development of habits.

In psychology, habits are different from instincts, even if genetics biases development to make some habits far more likely to be acquired than others.

Again, you have to read Peirce in context. Darwin was still a big new idea. Just biologising the capacities of the human mind (as "instincts") was controversial. Psychologising them as "habits" was a step more sophisticated.

So the big idea was that reality develops via semiosis from vague potential to crisply structured worlds. Peirce used psychological terminology for things like the global realm of constraints - calling it "habits of interpretance" - to stress the way even the universe would "self-organise through its experiences". But he also used formal terminology like firstness, secondness and thirdness.

So there is no evidence that Peirce's metaphysics is based on a notion of instinct or innateness, either genetic or Platonic. His primary psychological analogy is the aquisition of habits through experience. And he generalises that to a model of hierarchical self-organisation called semiosis.

Yes, there has to be a reason why humans are already halfway there to making good guesses about the nature of reality - the capacity for abduction. And yes, this does seem biological and evolved.

Rationalism said we could know the truth of things through some kind of inner direct access. Empiricism said the opposite - we blindly grope our way to generalities via some random Darwinian contest of hypothesis and measurement.

But Peirce was acknowledging that our path to truth is both far less certain than rationalism and yet far more efficient than random empiricism. So there has to be some constraint, some prior bias, on our reasoning so that we quite quickly lift ourselves out of the swamp of vagueness and into the sharp interplay of induction and deduction.

Peirce wasn't a Vgotskian. But then he was pre-genetics as well. So he can't be blamed too much for getting only as far as instincts and habits in his discussions.

With the advantage of hindsight, we can say the human brain develops freely via experience under the global constraints offered by 1) historical information captured by genes, and 2) the information present as the actual constraints of an environment "out there".

That accounts for an animal level of abduction, induction and deduction. And so the "maths ability" of chimps, ravens, and humans without a cultural history of maths.

Then the kind of formalised maths ability we are talking about here develops 3) under the constraints of a formal education - enculturation to a history of ideas captured in the symbols of text and diagrams.
 
  • #256
Pythagorean said:
It's also not the same as saying that we aren't easily misled by our brain's clunky, and sometimes primal, way of processing.


Reminds me of a quote i read the other day that goes like this... "the mental reality is the brain's best guess about what happens outside of it" implying that it is often wrong.
 
  • #257
Pythagorean said:
much work in the cognitive neurosciences indicates are large role for spatial metaphor in our abstract thinking (such as mathematics). This comes largely from our somatic system (integrating not only visual and audio cues for spatial organization, but also your skin's topographical map and your muscle feedback-control system (that tells you how much you're stretching your body and allowing you to imagine where it's stretching to in your surroundings).

I wasn't sure what you meant here so and I deleted my previous response because I may have misinterpreted you. So, with respect to our mathematical and linguistic abilities/knowledge are you saying that without proper sensory-motor functioning we are not capable of forming mathematical and linguistic constructs/knowledge?
 
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  • #258
Maui said:
Reminds me of a quote i read the other day that goes like this... "the mental reality is the brain's best guess about what happens outside of it" implying that it is often wrong.

Sounds quite a bit like this quote:

Based on minimal sensory information, the perceptual system generates knowledge-based 'guesses' (hypotheses) about possible targets and internally synthesizes these targets. Matching procedures between the synthesized candidate targets and the input signal ultimately select the best match; in other words, the analysis is guided by internally synthesized candidate representations

Speech perception at the interface of neurobiology and linguistics

http://www.biolinguistics.uqam.ca/Poeppel_Idsardi_vanWassenhove_2008.pdf
 
  • #259
bohm2 said:
I wasn't sure what you meant here so and I deleted my previous response because I may have misinterpreted you. So, with respect to our mathematical and linguistic abilities/knowledge are you saying that without proper sensory-motor functioning we are not capable of forming mathematical and linguistic constructs?

No. For one, because you can always knit-pick about what "proper sensory-motor functioning" is; some "defect" in sensory processing may be beneficial to long-term memory and learning (for example, synesthesia). But also because the concept of space can be learned through visual and audio cues too (in fact, we have a particular set of neurons that correlate audio signals for location detection called the medial superior olive). All one can claim is that the evidence supports spatial experience contributing positively to abstract knowledge. I do not know for certain if it is a necessary condition, but even if it is, it's probably not sufficient. Stable emotional development is probably the most important condition:

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/sce.20010/pdf

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/amp/53/2/205/

Emotional development and emotional intelligence: educational implications By Peter Salovey

Obviously, it's hard to digest and compute new and complicated information if you have constant stressors in your environment; this is the same for any organism. Not having somebody to cuddle with and depend on is generally a giant source of stress for baby mammals, especially humans, who are born very early in their gestational period, because of their big heads. If they are being deprived of basic needs, they will spend time and energy trying to get those needs met (crying for help is about all they can do). However, if their survival needs are being met, they feel more safe and secure and are more willing to experiment with their thoughts and perceptions (which may seem trivial to an adult, but for a baby this is an extremely intense and fascinating experience perceive things). If you encourage them by always interacting with them, they will develop linguistic skills much faster (they actually love facial expressions, and are hardwired to learn from them. I successfully did the Meltzoff experiment with both of my daughters when they were about ten minutes old).
 
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  • #260
Pythagorean said:
No. For one, because you can always knit-pick about what "proper sensory-motor functioning" is; some "defect" in sensory processing may be beneficial to long-term memory and learning (for example, synesthesia). But also because the concept of space can be learned through visual and audio cues too (in fact, we have a particular set of neurons that correlate audio signals for location detection called the medial superior olive).

I was thinking about how our ability for abstract thought, language, mathematics would be affected if we were say blind or were inflicted with major sensory-motor pathology. I think this is one argument that Fodor/Chomsky used to criticize the importance of Piaget's sensory-motor scheme for language learning. Major sensory-motor pathology doesn't have a major impact on linguistic ability, so Piaget's scheme was questioned.
 
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  • #261
bohm2 said:
Major sensory-motor pathology doesn't have a major impact on linguistic ability, so Piaget's scheme was questioned.

What do you think "major sensory-motor pathology" looks like if brain function has a distributed architecture rather than the modular one being supposed by Fodor and Chomsky?

More like Alzheimer's, schizophrenia, Parkinson's, etc.
 
  • #262
apeiron said:
What do you think "major sensory-motor pathology" looks like if brain function has a distributed architecture rather than the modular one being supposed by Fodor and Chomsky?

How do you explain specific language impairment or you don't find the evidence convincing?
 
  • #263
bohm2 said:
How do you explain specific language impairment or you don't find the evidence convincing?

How does that relate to your claims of modularity? Indeed the great variety of developmental problems that get tagged SLI is evidence for the distributed complexity of neurological function.
 
  • #264
apeiron said:
How does that relate to your claims of modularity? Indeed the great variety of developmental problems that get tagged SLI is evidence for the distributed complexity of neurological function.

Well, if there's a dissociation between where language is disrupted and yet other mental abilities are fine, it would suggest language modularity. Some reviews suggest this but it's not universally accepted even though I know it's true. And I also know you will disagree :smile:

Empirical data from numerous SLI (Specific Langauge Impairment) investigations, and particularly from G-SLI, suggest that developmental deficits in grammar are best accounted for by the hypothesis that the brain contains domain-specific systems. I have argued that deficits in each of three components of grammar (syntax, morphology, phonology) can co-exist, and might all dissociate.

http://www.dldcn.org/vdl2005Trends.pdf
 
  • #265
bohm2 said:
Well, if there's a dissociation between where language is disrupted and yet other mental abilities are fine, it would suggest language modularity. Some reviews suggest this but it's not universally accepted even though I know it's true. And I also know you will disagree :smile:

No, what I will inevitably say is that it is never a case of either/or but instead always both.

So brain architecture is two complementary tendencies - lumping and splitting, integration and differentiation, modularity and distributed - in interaction. A good model of this situation is scalefree networks.

This is a view that makes Chomskian-like debates (its innate! no its learnt!) very dated.

You now say here that SLI affects only language skills. Yet it is standard that motor skills are poor also in kids diagnosed under this label. It is also the case that attempts to find locatable brain differences have drawn a blank (ie: the differences are too fine-grain and diffuse to show up as something particular).

Not to mention of course that language is simply "impaired". Not absent.
 
  • #266
I find this stuff interesting because it kind of has some major overlap with the mind-body problem and perhaps other related areas. So, what do you guys think of the arguments put forth by some of these authors who are sympathetic to Chomsky’s position . They basically argue that this uniquely human part of our language faculty (FLN-see links for details) having the properties of recursion (also found in our mathematical abilities) emerged in human brains for “physical” reasons yet to be fully comprehended; but unlike most innatists/ nativists (e.g. Pinker/Jackendoff) the reasons suggested are not due to “natural selection” but instead are guided by principles of elegance and compactness (not “tinkering” in Pinker’s sense, I guess). So to give one example, “why did Helium evolve after Hydrogen in the evolution our universe”, etc. It wasn’t for reasons of “natural selection” in any sense of the term. There were physical laws dictating it that it occur. Same with this uniquely human abstract abilities in language and mathematics (or so, it is argued by this position).

I’m not sure if I fully understand his argument or to what extent Chomsky endorses this position but here’s an interesting quote from Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini:

Still a bridge too far? Biolinguistic questions for grounding language on brains

Early linguistic investigations led to an elegant and compact formulation of the problem of what may be seen as ‘natural knowledge’. Many so-called mental modules thus described already resist any simple-minded emergence in classical adaptationist terms. But the challenge became all the more extreme with the advent of the Minimalist Program, with its suggestion that linguistic structuring obeys some kind of optimum (at any rate, an optimal compromise) at the interface between the interpretation and the externalization of language. Interestingly, optima turn out to be quite important when considering growth patterns in general. We find it natural to conceive that program in terms of broadly construed physics, a dimension that is alien to standard accounts in terms of natural selection. The present paper argues for this approach, illustrating it with the presence of Fibonacci growth patterns in language, which we take to be a signal case. (Space limitations prevent us from going into several other optimal solutions in this realm.) What could it mean to ground such properties on a human brain? We wager that they are the result of the brain’s very physical conditions, in some sense to be fully investigated and understood. Structural properties of linguistic behaviors should then, more generally, follow as a deductive consequence of quite abstract and all-important brain micro-properties.

http://dingo.sbs.arizona.edu/~massimo/publications/PDF/MPP&JU_Bridge_too_farPUBL.pdf

Assuming this position is accurate, what I’m having trouble understanding is this:

1. Does this make it any easier to understand why our ability to do higher mathematics is so useful in studying physical phenomena even though it did not evolve for reasons of “natural selection” (or so, they argue); that is, does evolution of abstract mental structures (from more primitive language and mathematical cognitive structures) that is guided by physical law versus natural selection make it more plausible why mathematics is so useful for doing physics, etc?

2. What would be the implications (if any) on the mind-body problem, if this view is accurate?

3. If accurate would this strengthen, weaken or have no effect on Peirce's notion that "nature fecundates the mind of man with ideas which when those ideas grow up, will resemble their father, Nature". I'm hoping 'strengthen', since Chomsky's more skeptical position with respect to knowledge (ie. match between our mental constructs and "true" laws) is something I would like to avoid, even though I find it pretty convincing.

Links about FLN and debates between Chomsky’s group and Pinker’s group:

Chomsky’s group:
http://www.chomsky.info/articles/20021122.pdf
http://www.punksinscience.org/klean...inker/3a_Fitch-Hauser-Chomsky_Evol Lg Fac.pdf

Pinker’s group:
http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/articles/papers/2005_03_Pinker_Jackendoff.pdf
http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/articles/papers/2005_09_Jackendoff_Pinker.pdf
 
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  • #267
“why did Helium evolve after Hydrogen in the evolution our universe”, etc. It wasn’t for reasons of “natural selection” in any sense of the term.

you go too far with "any sense of the term" Helium and hydrogen share a very special relationship! It would have been very unlikely for helium to come before hydrogen! Can you guess why?

Does this make it any easier to understand why our ability to do abstract mathematics is so useful in studying physical phenomena even though (at least they argue) it did not evolve for reasons of “natural selection”; that is, does evolution of abstract mental structures (from more primitive language and mathematical cognitive structures) that is guided by physical law versus natural selection make it more plausible why mathematics is so useful for doing physics, etc?

I don't hold the position that mathematics arose through natural selection. I'd guide to to a presentation by Gary Marcus about his book Kluge. The human "mind" is still very young in terms of evolution; it hasn't stood the test of time; it could, for all we know, be a flaw that slowly leads to our extinction. Or it could be a spandrel (like your chin!). Obviously, our minds have helped us to expand our territory and population, so it's been beneficial for the most part, but we do note serious flaws (minds bent on destruction or greed) that could potentially lead to a world-wide extinction (i.e. we've built ourselves all kinds of mass-killing devices all around the world). It's still very much in a state of flux.
 
  • #268
Pythagorean said:
you go too far with "any sense of the term" Helium and hydrogen share a very special relationship! It would have been very unlikely for helium to come before hydrogen! Can you guess why?

That's the whole point. It was not driven by "survival of the fittest" (biological adaptive value) as in natural selection. It was bound to happen as dictated by physical laws. As the author writes:

So just as the justified contextual optimality of a given structure may argue for its adaptive value, to the extent that we find structures that can be characterized as optimal irrespective of any functional correlate, the opposite conclusion should be driven: their optimality must obey a different cause, not bio-genetic interactions winnowed by natural selection. In our view, the more that optimality in any biological network can be separated from its putative function, the more we should suspect that the process behind the abstract form follow from physicochemical invariants...The patterns we are after present a characteristic optimality to them, which might suggest that it is, after all, a result of natural selection. However, the sort of optimality that natural selection could yield is tied-up to contextual specifications of a functional sort. A structure, in these terms, is optimal for a function, and therefore it wins the evolutionary race simply because alternative structures are less fit for that function in its context. This is quite different, in principle, from the optimality we seek to understand.
 
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  • #269
I don't understand, are you switching now to a determinism argument?

The point, I thought, was whether the "environment" influenced the evolution of the "particle"; and even in the case of hydrogen fusing into helium, it was only under the conditions produced by the stars that the hydrogen atoms overcame their electroweak interactions and found the more favorable strong interaction. It was a synthesis of both external and internal forces.
 
  • #270
bohm2 said:
They basically argue that this uniquely human part of our language faculty (FLN-see links for details) having the properties of recursion (also found in our mathematical abilities) emerged in human brains for “physical” reasons yet to be fully comprehended;

OK, bear in mind that I consistently explained systems in terms of three principles.

1) They self-organise hierarchically in that you have local constructive degrees of freedom finding some mutual equilibrium balance with downwards acting global constraints.

2) This is thus a dynamical or process view where things develop, starting out as the vaguely potential and becoming crisply realized (as a hierarchical situation of local degrees of freedom~global constraints).

3) Complexity of a higher order (like life and mind) can arise if a system discovers the trick of constructing its own constraints. This requires semiotic mechanism, the epistemic cut, memory structures, etc. A system is no longer helplessly self-organising, it can harness dynamics for a purpose.

This is a view of nature now standard in theoretical biology. It shows through in "new models" of evolutionary theory like evo-devo - the realisation that natural selection can only harness self-organisational potentials, growth gradients. Or what Pattee called rate dependent dynamics.

The shift in biological thought is of course based on the deeper breakthroughs in physics and maths when it comes to modelling dynamics and self-organisation. All the work on criticality, dissipative structure, condensed matter physics, fractal geometry, chaos theory, etc.

So nature does have its fundamental patterns. There is a mathematics of development and self-organisation that we have only quite recently been discovering. And it is anti-reductionist or holistic in spirit because it highlights the causality of downwards-acting constraints.

Reductionist thought views causality only in terms of upward acts of material construction. Complicated things do not develop, they get built. Which then usually leads to the problem of who did the building? It is clear that too much information has gone into the construction of any natural system for something like Darwinian selection to be the designer, for genes to be a simple blueprint.

But the systems view, the evo-devo view, the epistemic cut/semiotic view, says what actually happens is that only a little bit of rate independent information (constraints that a system can construct) is needed to harness or control a whole lot of "order for free" in the shape of naturally-occuring developmental forms. The genes, the hand of natural selection, etc, only have to do a bit of judicious tweaking at the right moments to channel the kind of growth that will happen anyway of its own accord.

You could call this an organic logic, as opposed to the mechanical logic beloved of those whose main interest in life is building machines (systems which actually are over-determined, constrained to the point where they have no free dynamics, and so operate purely from local effective cause). A gardener will understand though the difference between judiciously nudging nature and deterministically trying to control nature. Likewise a parent with a child.

Anyway, to address your point, you can see that the Piattelli-Palmarini/Uriagereka paper is reinventing this particular wheel. Surprise, surprise, nature is mathematical in that developmental processes show general (ie: universal) patterns like log/log growth. When you get hierarchical expansion - with both the local and the global growing at equal rate - the inevitable outcome is powerlaw, scalefree, fractal, etc.

So naked self-organisation is constrained to fall into certain self-consistent (ie: self-constraining!) patterns. Then these natural patterns are what epistemic/semiotic mechanism can harness, so as to channel growth towards goals. And surprise, surprise, even this controlling machinery has certain inevitable characteristics. It looks to be ruled by certain universal mathematical principles (as only certain forms can achieve the resulting effects).

Recursion in grammar is this kind of story.

Nested hierarchical form is a natural outcome of self-organising development. Fractal or Fibonacci patterns are the "order for free" that result from free (ie: "random") local constructive actions within a stable set of global constraints. The animal brain is functionally structured as a nested hierarchy. Take the macaque visual hierarchy as the standard example. (http://www.cse.yorku.ca/~billk/billkPres1b.html)

It is all about differentiation~integration - two mutual processes, one localising, one globalising, going on with equal energy. The result is a tremendously dynamic hierarchical organisation. Whether you are talking about sensory input or motor output, there is a hierarchical process of composition and decomposition going on. Which can look "modular" once you frame it as higher cortical areas doing the broad planning and oversight (setting the general constraints) and the lower cortical areas doing the detailed grunt work (constructing the particular actions to fit within these constraints).

So the animal brain is good at "recursion" in this sense. To move a paw requires the hierarchical composition of the intent coupled to the hierarchical decomposition of its execution.

But there is something still limited about the animal mind. It's thinking is holistic, entirely patterned according to the demands and possibilities of the moment, not able to step back and think self-consciously, reflectively, objectively, about the moment. The animal cannot construct a recursive structure of such moments where this moment is seen within a dynamically/deliberately selected context of such moments. There is no secondary life story concerning a "me" who is having "this experience".

The reason is the animal mind/brain has the semiotic machinery (genes, synapses, other dynamic-tweaking memory devices) to develop hierarchical states of experience. But it is missing the mechanism for constructing the constraints necessary to go up that further level of recursion.

This is what language brings. And again, in terms of systems causality, it is only in fact a small difference that can produce a very big effect.

The key to language evolution (in my view, after Leiberman, etc) is the development of serial utterance - a palate and throat which broke vocalisation into a syntactic stream. As Piattelli-Palmarini/Uriagereka point out, Fibonacci type recursive growth needs the emergence of digital codes - the 0/1 of onset and coda in their "F-game". The human vocal tract does that, breaking the flow of sound into vowels and cosonants. Once that simple trick emerges, then unlimited recursion - an endlessly growing nested hierarchy - can be constructed.

So the animal brain was naturally a hierarchy, able to compose~decompose. But only in response to the very immediate world. There was no way to construct a back-story of thought and meaning. The recursive capacities of their brains could not be exploited to do this higher level recursion because there was not the further machinery to harness it.

Humans stumbled into such a machinery with simple changes to the vocal tract. Yes, undoubtedly all this was connected to changes also going on in the brain - selective pressure for machavellian sociality, theory of mind, tool-use - which were making Homo capable of more elaborate recursion anyway. So it is a complex paleoanthropological tale.

But essentially the problem was finding a tool to unlock the potential. The animal brain was very good at self-organising mental states of anticipation, intent, etc. But only as a response to constraints largely given by the world around them. Langauge was a way to code for constraints - to construct them "at will" (or rather, by social learning and habit) - and so harness the moment-to-moment personal development of states of mind. I speak therefore I can control what I think. (and having found I spoke too hastily, I can then correct that) :smile:

So there is recursion here on the grand scale. Development has a systems logic. It is the natural and inevitable patterns that result from dynamical self-organisation. It is both physical (what happens in reality) and mathematical (how we model what happens in terms of formal causality). And it looks to have the form of a nested hierarchy when it is optimal or otherwise extremal - the max ent principle, the reason powerlaws are ubiquitous in natural structures.

But evo can harness devo. Syntax can harness semantics. Give a system a memory, some kind of epistemic mechanism to construct its own constraints, and freely-occuring dynamics can be chanelled to achieve localised purpose. You get life and mind. Genes were the first level great breakthrough, words the second.

The complex structure of a sentence was inevitable just as soon as some mechanism arose to break a flow of sound into discrete chunks. Syntax is the construction of constraints on semantics. A cat is a general idea. Which can be made hierarchically more constrained by adding qualifiers such as [cat [sat [mat]]]. Or [cat [kitten [cute]]]. Or [cat [cartoon [Krazy Kat]]].

What matters in the mind is that an idea, an anticipatory image, forms. This is going to happen every moment anyway because that is how brains are structured. But states of mind can be constructed via acts of verbally-base, recursively nested, constraint.

Sure, you can get obsessed about the hunt for a brain module which does "syntactic constraint". Stick a person's head in a scanner, ask them to generate regular and irregular verbs, and you will find different parts of the brain working hard. Perhaps the left dorsolateral prefrontal for regular verbs, and the left superior frontal gyrus for the irregular (until the next study using german rather than english speakers contradicts you).

But this is missing the point. Brains are already hierarchically organised. And the cause that is making such a "neuroscientific" difference in humans is not the addition of some novel brain module/genetic modification but another level of the epistemic cut. That is what needs to be the focus of attention.
 
  • #271
apeiron said:
Complexity of a higher order (like life and mind) can arise if a system discovers the trick of constructing its own constraints.What matters in the mind is that an idea, an anticipatory image, forms. This is going to happen every moment anyway because that is how brains are structured. But states of mind can be constructed via acts of verbally-base, recursively nested, constraint.

Isn't "constructing it's own constraints" just the nativist position?

apeiron said:
Sure, you can get obsessed about the hunt for a brain module which does "syntactic constraint". Stick a person's head in a scanner, ask them to generate regular and irregular verbs, and you will find different parts of the brain working hard. Perhaps the left dorsolateral prefrontal for regular verbs, and the left superior frontal gyrus for the irregular (until the next study using german rather than english speakers contradicts you).

But this is missing the point. Brains are already hierarchically organised. And the cause that is making such a "neuroscientific" difference in humans is not the addition of some novel brain module/genetic modification but another level of the epistemic cut. That is what needs to be the focus of attention.

Maybe I'm mistaken but I don't think they are suggesting a "brain module". I think the argument is for "mental" module. It's not clear if such modules can be accommodated within neural mechanisms as presently understood. I think that's why Chomsky writes:

The familiar slogan about the mental and the neurophysiological has the matter backwards: it should not be taken as a characterization of the mental, but rather as a hypothesis about neurophysiology: perhaps the neurophysiological is the mental at a “lower” level, perhaps not. As of now, we have more reason to feel secure about the mental than about the neurophysiological.

Pythagorean said:
The point, I thought, was whether the "environment" influenced the evolution of the "particle"; and even in the case of hydrogen fusing into helium, it was only under the conditions produced by the stars that the hydrogen atoms overcame their electroweak interactions and found the more favorable strong interaction. It was a synthesis of both external and internal forces.

Nobody is claimimg that the environment plays no role just a secondary, minor role. With respect to language, the environment just can't deliver the goods or so goes the argument for reasons as the following:

An important argument in favor of the generative approach is the Poverty of the stimulus argument. The child's input (a finite number of sentences encountered by the child, together with information about the context in which they were uttered) is in principle compatible with an infinite number of conceivable grammars. Moreover, few if any children can rely on corrective feedback from adults when they make a grammatical error. Yet, barring situations of medical abnormality or extreme privation, all the children in a given speech-community converge on very much the same grammar by the age of about five years. An especially dramatic example is provided by children who for medical reasons are unable to produce speech, and therefore can literally never be corrected for a grammatical error, yet nonetheless converge on the same grammar as their typically developing peers, according to comprehension-based tests of grammar. Considerations such as these have led Chomsky, Jerry Fodor, Eric Lenneberg and others to argue that the types of grammar that the child needs to consider must be narrowly constrained by human biology (the nativist position).These innate constraints are sometimes referred to as universal grammar, the human "language faculty," or the "language instinct"

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_acquisition
 
  • #272
bohm2 said:
Maybe I'm mistaken but I don't think they are suggesting a "brain module". I think the argument is for "mental" module. It's not clear if such modules can be accommodated within neural mechanisms as presently understood. I think that's why Chomsky writes:

Chomsky has always been wedded to the notion of organs of the mind, suggesting the brain would be organised in a functionally compartmented way like the body's organ system.

So yes, it may have only been a hypothesis - a move from the supposed evidence for mental modularity to the expectation of actual neurophysiological modularity. But it was the hypothesis.

And it was a hypothesis broadly shared by many cogsci folk in the early days of brain scanning. Despite the jokes about cognitive phrenology.

The hypothesis of course collapsed pretty quickly - about 1988 to be precise, when the Washington PET group reported the cerebellum (along with many other areas) lighting up during word processing tasks.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/3277066
 
  • #273
bohm2 said:
Nobody is claimimg that the environment plays no role just a secondary, minor role. With respect to language, the environment just can't deliver the goods or so goes the argument for reasons as the following:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_acquisition

I so no good reasons for you to quantify who plays the bigger role and I really don't understand how you're quantifying it. If we take the environment away, there can be little to no development. How do you tally up contributions, how do you weigh contributions? Do you really think that paragraph did a sufficient job of making any quantifiable argument? It was a bunch of hand-waving. All it does it outline (and quite qualitatively, I may add) the fact that environment is not sufficient which we all agree on already.
 
  • #274
Pythagorean said:
I so no good reasons for you to quantify who plays the bigger role and I really don't understand how you're quantifying it. If we take the environment away, there can be little to no development. How do you tally up contributions, how do you weigh contributions? Do you really think that paragraph did a sufficient job of making any quantifiable argument? It was a bunch of hand-waving. All it does it outline (and quite qualitatively, I may add) the fact that environment is not sufficient which we all agree on already.

This is his argument. Take a simple example. A human embryo. It grows to develop hands and not wings in comparison to a bird embryo. One assumes that's due to heredity (nativist position). Environmental factors are considered to play a minor role. Do you agree with that?
 
  • #275
bohm2 said:
This is his argument. Take a simple example. A human embryo. It grows to develop hands and not wings in comparison to a bird embryo. One assumes that's due to heredity (nativist position). Environmental factors are considered to play a minor role. Do you agree with that?

In the very specific case of morphology of wing vs. bird, yes, it's obviously based on internal genetic programming, but I don't see how this is relevant to the discussion at large.
 
  • #276
Pythagorean said:
In the very specific case of morphology of wing vs. bird, yes, it's obviously based on internal genetic programming, but I don't see how this is relevant to the discussion at large.

Okay, given that you agree with this and we don't know the details how that occurs, why do you believe that such an internal genetic programming does apply with respect to the bird embryo example and not the human language case? That's his basic argument:

In fact, if someone came along and said that a bird embryo is somehow "trained" to grow wings, people would just laugh, even though embryologists lack anything like a detailed understanding of how genes regulate embryological development...The gene-control problem is conceptually similar to the problem of accounting for language growth. In fact, language development really ought to be called language growth because the language organ grows like any other body organ.
 
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  • #277
bohm2 said:
Okay, given that you agree with this and we don't know the details how that occurs, why do you believe that such an internal genetic programming does apply with respect to the bird embryo example and not the human language case? That's his basic argument:

I didn't say the internal genetic programming isn't there, I said environment plays a significant role. I'd appreciate if you stopped trying to paint my arguments black or white, because you're mischaracterizing my position.

On example: the language you speak depends on the region you live in. Another example, bilingual have an intellectual edge on unilinguals, which supports the weak http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity" .

Diane Poulin-Dubois, Agnes Blaye, Julie Coutya, Ellen Bialystok. The effects of bilingualism on toddlers’ executive functioning. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 2010; DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2010.10.009
 
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  • #278
Pythagorean said:
I didn't say the internal genetic programming isn't there, I said environment plays a significant role. I'd appreciate if you stopped trying to paint my arguments black or white, because you're mischaracterizing my position.

My mistake. I didn't mean to imply that you don't think genetics isn't important. I lost track of the argument. It happens a lot to me when I'm doing multiple tasks. I apologize.
 
  • #279
Wow, don't see that much in philosophy forums; apology accepted.
 
  • #280
Pythagorean said:
even in the case of hydrogen fusing into helium, it was only under the conditions produced by the stars that the hydrogen atoms overcame their electroweak interactions and found the more favorable strong interaction. It was a synthesis of both external and internal forces.

I'm not very well read on cosmology and this is a total aside, but isn't it believed that most of Helium existed before star formation or am I mistaken?
 
  • #281
I think you're right; I think on the way down from very very hot, there was some fusion going on.
 
  • #282
They basically argue that this uniquely human part of our language faculty (FLN-see links for details) having the properties of recursion (also found in our mathematical abilities) emerged in human brains for “physical” reasons yet to be fully comprehended; but unlike most innatists/ nativists (e.g. Pinker/Jackendoff) the reasons suggested are not due to “natural selection” but instead are guided by principles of elegance and compactness (not “tinkering” in Pinker’s sense, I guess). So to give one example, “why did Helium evolve after Hydrogen in the evolution our universe”, etc. It wasn’t for reasons of “natural selection” in any sense of the term. There were physical laws dictating it that it occur. Same with this uniquely human abstract abilities in language and mathematics (or so, it is argued by this position).

I thought this recent analysis seems to offer some support by the scheme outlined by Gould/Chomsky/Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, I think?

Due to such constraints, selection for localized shape change in a single part of a structure can produce widespread morphological changes because relative constraints deflect the evolutionary response in a direction of morphological space that differs from the direction of selection...Because relative constraints can produce substantial deflections of the evolutionary response from the direction of selection, inferring the selective pressures from observed changes in the fossil record is fraught with difficulty. It is conceivable that the derived characters of modern humans may not have arisen independently by adaptive evolution in response to separate selection pressures, but that the origin of one trait may have facilitated the evolution of the entire suite of characters.

"As much as possible, we simulated each of these changes as a localised shape change limited to a small region of the skull. For each of the simulations, we obtained a predicted response that included not only the change we selected for, but also all the others. All those features of the skull tended to change as a whole package. This means that, in evolutionary history, any of the changes may have facilitated the evolution of the others."

Human Skull Is Highly Integrated: Study Sheds New Light On Evolutionary Changes
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/12/111220102248.htm

Pervasive Genetic Integration directs the evolution of human skull shape
http://www.flywings.org.uk/PDF%20files/Evol2012.pdf
 
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  • #283
bohm2 said:
I thought this recent analysis seems to offer some support by the scheme outlined by Gould/Chomsky/Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, I think?

Given that fossil endocasts suggest very little evidence of significant brain reorganisation - local or global - it seems more likely that the telling change was a redesign of the vocal tract for articulate vocalisation.

Studies of Neanderthals, for instance, argue for only slight differences. Of these, the ones like the shortening of frontal and temporal areas in humans look due to changes in jaw-line - so an imposed change in the shape of the brain case that is unlikely to have changed the brain functionally. While others, such as a possible expansion of cerebellum and parietal lobes, would be in the "wrong" place so far as grammar ability goes.

http://www.paleoanthro.org/journal/content/PA20080093.pdf

So - as I've already argued in post #270 - the brain looks to have kept doing what it was doing, and a new constraint was put upon its output in the form of serial articulation. Which in turn created the possibility of the elaborate recursion that underpins grammatical structure.

It has been pointed out that the radical modification of the hominid vocal tract involves a whole hierarchy of dichotomies in itself. So just to control the equipment demands a recursive motor capacity.

http://zimmer.csufresno.edu/~chrisg/index_files/EvolHierar.pdf

Brown and Golston note how there is a first divide between the larynx and the supralaryngeal filter (or voice box and basically the rest), then the filter divides in turn into its oral vs nasal paths, the oral into its lips vs tongue, the tongue into its front vs back, the front of the tongue into its pointy tip vs broad blade configuration. There is a whole tree of sub-divisions.

To get an idea of how much happens in articulation, compare saying bat and mat. Pinch your nose shut to really see how one is oral, the other nasal. So once the machinery existed - probably evolved just to make complicated expressive social noises (the old "singing ape" hypothesis) then you have all the exaptation for recursive grammar you really need. The cultural habit of associating semantics to this syntactical capacity could then eventually develop.

This is a simpler story. Any major reorganisation of the brain itself is a problem for evolutionary theory. But a change to some other bit of the body which had a major rebound effect on the brain, that is more parsimonious.
 
  • #284
From where I stand Holism and its emergence or irreducible complexity, as an anti mechanical approach to reality is unacceptable...the best I can make for a case, is to say that any valid conception of Holism must be symmetrically proportional to Reductionism or in turn be abandoned...on that regard one might just as well give up any hope of rational thought, Philosophy, Mathematics, or Science altogether, if we are to indulge ourselves in such appetites, as from this point on concepts become a word salad, and of course, through it, any thing can be made up to fit our observational needs...

...precisely in this sense I am lead to not believe in "minds" as agents of causal constrains upon a body of parts any more than I believe in parts as the causal justification of a mind...in fact if applying the principles of a non linear relativistic time to it, the all idea of agency falls down as meaningless...to me Holism or Reductionism are then constrained to perspective place holders from where we can build a symmetrically proportional understanding of reality but nothing else...the cause of much confusion is the permanent lack of "resolution" or "detail" in detecting what can be described as parasite hidden variables in the correct framing of the problems at hand...

A correct Reductionist approach must account for the dynamic unfolding of functions when making the bottom up stack of parts onto a system as means of explaining it...in turn the Holistic approach cannot give up a mechanical exact account on the phenomena it tries to describe. Same is to say the last must be undressed from its magical pretensions while the first must re-equate its notion of parts without contextual dynamics...that is, "things" must do/perform, in order to be things, just as systems must be functionally accountable to parts in order for "systems" make any sense at all !
 
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  • #285
apeiron said:
Given that fossil endocasts suggest very little evidence of significant brain reorganisation - local or global - it seems more likely that the telling change was a redesign of the vocal tract for articulate vocalisation.

I'm not very knowledgeable about evolutionary theory but I think that these authors don't believe that language has much to do with vocal tract redesign. Here's an interesting assessment of Chomsky's position from one blog:

Chomsky thinks language should be seen as a “spandrel” of some other structural change. The

“answers may well lie not so much in the theory of natural selection as in molecular biology, in the study of what kinds of physical systems can develop under the conditions of life on Earth and why, ultimately because of physical principles” .

Though he does not deny that evolution played a role in the development of language, he stresses that it possibly emerged only via a small mutation and that ultimately only unknown operations of “physical laws applying to a brain of a certain degree of complexity” could explain the origin of the language faculty and its properties...The only speculation he expressed before his Science paper with Fitch and Hauser was that

"It may be that at some remote period a mutation took place that gave rise to the property of discrete infinity, perhaps for reasons that have to do with the biology of cells, to be explained in terms of properties of physical mechanisms, now unknown...At that point evolutionary pressures might have shaped the further development of the capacity, at least in part. Quite possibly other aspects of its evolutionary development again reflect the operation of physical laws applying to a brain of a certain degree of complexity. We simply do not know. (Chomsky 1988: 170)...

With the rise of Chomsky’s Minimalist Program this view became more concrete: if only few principles ultimately comprise Universal Grammar (Pinker/Jackendoff 2005: 219),

“one does not need to advance incremental, adaptationist arguments with intermediate steps to explain much of natural language's specific syntactic design”.

http://sharedsymbolicstorage.blogspot.com/2008/02/language-evolution-i-noam-chomskys.html

But he doesn't think it has much to do with the vocal tract for some reasons that can be found in these passages:

Langauge can of course be used for communication, as can any aspect of what we do: style of dress, gesture, and so on. And it can be and commonly is used for much else. Statistically speaking, for whatever that is worth, the overwhelming use of language is internal – for thought. It takes an enormous act of will to keep from talking to oneself in every waking moment – and asleep as well, often a considerable annoyance. The distinguished neurologist Harry Jerison (1977:55) among others expressed a stronger view, holding that “language did not evolve as a communication system…. the initial evolution of language is more likely to have been…for the construction of a real world,” as a “tool for thought.” Not only in the functional dimension, but also in all other respects – semantic, syntactic, morphological and phonological – the core properties of human language appear to differ sharply from animal communication systems, and to be largely unique in the organic world.

Anatomically modern humans are found in the fossil record several hundred thousand years ago, but evidence of the human capacity is much more recent, not long before the trek from Africa. Paleoanthropologist Ian Tattersall reports that “a vocal tract capable of producing the sounds of articulate speech” existed over half a million years before there is any evidence that our ancestors were using language. “We have to conclude,” he writes, “that the appearance of language and its anatomical correlates was not driven by natural selection, however beneficial these innovations may appear in hindsight” – a conclusion which raises no problems for standard evolutionary biology, contrary to illusions in popular literature (Tattersall, 1998). It appears that human brain size reached its current level recently, perhaps about 100,000 years ago, which suggests to some specialists that “human language probably evolved, at least in part, as an automatic but adaptive consequence of increased absolute brain size” (neuroscientist Georg Striedter, 2004).

http://www.punksinscience.org/klean...L/material/Berwick-Chomsky_Biolinguistics.pdf
 
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  • #286
Albuquerque said:
A correct Reductionist approach must account for the dynamic unfolding of functions when making the bottom up stack of parts onto a system as means of explaining it...in turn the Holistic approach cannot give up a mechanical exact account on the phenomena it tries to describe.

I agree and have always argued that reductionism and holism are complementary views of reality. Both are "right". Although it is also clear which is the simpler model, which the larger model. :wink:
 
  • #287
bohm2 said:
But he doesn't think it has much to do with the vocal tract for some reasons that can be found in these passages:

Again, to be frank, Chomsky's views cut little ice in paleolinguistic circles. Why do you treat him as such an authority here?

Gould, likewise, is not exactly state of the art in evo-devo theory.

Both these guys seem to have reputations for challenging the uber-reductionist approaches of their days - Chomsky vs behaviourism, Gould vs Darwinism. So they were good critics - putting things in blunt and simple-minded fashion - but then poor at creating the alternative theories because of the same rhetorical qualities.

Yes, a broadly human brain organisation judging by endocasts has been around 1.8 million years, an articulate vocal tract for perhaps 400,000 years, Homo sapiens has been around about 120,000years, the symbolic explosion in human culture happened about 40,000 years ago. So theories about the rise of the human mind are constrained by a basic timeline.

In broad terms, this can be explained by, first the rise of tool-use and brain lateralisation in H.erectus (so the reorganisation seen in endocasts), then the rise of expressive vocalisation/emotional calls in the highly social late erectus period (a smart chimp who now made fire, used spears to hunt, chipped hand axes, but had no symbolic culture and so no evidence of actual language), then at some point there was the invention of actual language and the sudden explosion of symbolic culture because of the feedback advantages of speech-scaffolded thought.

You could say that for a long time there was the hardware (a capable brain and articulate vocal tract). But the software of an actual language had to be invented socially (it could not evolve biologically). And you can then speculate about why it took a while, or why it happened when it eventually did.

But you can see why people can't take Chomsky seriously on the subject. He is focused on the abruptness of the emergence of symbolic culture circa 40kya. And seeks some strange "spontaneous genetic reorganisation due to Platonic principles" explanation - a view which is utterly handwavy and lacking in biological specifics. Where is the evidence for this kind of thing to happen? Well, how can we even attack this as a theory when it is just handwaving without the detail to contradict?

Chomsky seems to be ignoring the evidence of actual steady biological change - the early reorganisation of the brain and greater laterality for tool-use, the medium term reorganisation of the vocal tract, probably for expressive communication.

And then he discounts the cultural evolution of the software to make use of the gradually exapted hardware. He believes human-level thought to be "innate" rather than socioculturally evolved and language scaffolded. So the very rapid pace of cultural evolution cannot be used to explain the sudden appearance of symbolic culture. Chomsky has to appeal to some genetic "hopeful monster".

OK, the later Chomsky has tried to trim down universal grammar to a minimal core that biological evolution could implement rapidly. But the leaner the mechanism, the more definite should be its imprint. The genetics, the brain architecture, should be damn obvious. And yet the Chomskian approach can't even explain the differences in the way the brain handles regular and irregular verbs.

Can you state what you actually think Chomsky's theory is here? Summarise its essentials? To be honest, I felt I was always chasing shadows when trying to deal with what Chomsky believes. He had a description of the structure of grammar. Fine. He had a critique of Behaviourism and associative learning. Again fine. But has he ever had a sensible theory of the evolution of human language and thought? I have always felt most definitely not. I can't even see an actual theory there, just some hand-waving coupled to a grumpy refusal to engage with the actual science that has been going on.
 
  • #288
apeiron said:
I agree and have always argued that reductionism and holism are complementary views of reality. Both are "right". Although it is also clear which is the simpler model, which the larger model. :wink:

...well, agreed but then I would argue that a sub-set will never compute a "master-set"...
...a master-set if everything, is not computable or "repeatable", at least while unfolding as an ensemble within itself, if repeatable, it will be cyclic repeatable, one after the other and obviously without memory of the other...a sub-set as an epistemic description will therefore always lack "resolution" in relation to its master domain (reality) once the demonstration is the domain itself...what I informally in my own vague language am clumsily trying to convey is that epistemologically Holism serves as analogy from our perspective limited frame of reference downwards and not upwards...Reality is upwards ! Hence sub-set minds do not exist and an ultimate reality/system taken for a mind does not need to think/search...its done, and its not an agent !

...note that my conceptual frame of reference permanently will avoid terms like "nothingness" or any degrees of "freedom" whatever they are...there is no "creative somethingness" to be added to the power set which is everything that can truly be mechanically and "causally" separated and then randomly emerge in this wholeness...if anything "my" wholeness, which include from our point of view, conception of potential states, does not grow nor does it shrink...as time is relative, whatever is the case is NOW the case...

(...I apologise for the messy amateurish "free form thinking" presentation of would be ideas, as for my unforgivable bad English, hope nevertheless there is some content to explore around...:wink:)
 
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  • #289
(above edited)
...in sum, in neither case, human like or god like, regarding minds, one can account for valid full agency..."agency" here, is seen as more of an illusory effect and not so much as a thing in its own right...as I put it and timely speaking, all there is is process, and curiously the process is done !
 
  • #290
Albuquerque said:
(...I apologise for the messy amateurish "free form thinking" presentation of would be ideas, as for my unforgivable bad English, hope nevertheless there is some content to explore around...:wink:)

It would indeed help if you could supply a reference that explains your epistemological position here. If your ideas are based on anything, it won't be to hard to cite the relevant source.

But as far as I can make out what you are saying, you seem to be muddling the map and the territory.

Both reductionism and holism are formal styles of map-making. Reality is always going to be something else, complete and entire, and not actually divided in any of the ways we may talk about.

Reductionism is indeed a subset of the master set of holism, I would argue. But both then stand apart from reality as our models.
 
  • #291
Albuquerque said:
(above edited)
...in sum, in neither case, human like or god like, regarding minds, one can account for valid full agency..."agency" here, is seen as more of an illusory effect and not so much as a thing in its own right...as I put it and timely speaking, all there is is process, and curiously the process is done !

Again, reality is certainly "done!". But our models of reality are another matter.

This goes to the OP in that our minds are models of reality. And that modelling keeps progressing. The shift from the informal modelling of speechless animals to the formal modelling of symbol-handling humans is a significant step in the history of reality modelling.

The mind-body "problem" as traditionally posed focuses on the fact that there is "something it is like to be" to be modelling reality. Well, surely it had to be like something :smile:. The real question is how has that process of modelling evolved? And once the basics of modelling are understood, the apparent distance between mind and world is no longer a problem but a necessary quality.

If reality is "holistic", then the only way to be an observer of reality is to (pretend) to stand outside it. A separation - an epistemic cut - must be manufactured.
 
  • #292
apeiron said:
It would indeed help if you could supply a reference that explains your epistemological position here. If your ideas are based on anything, it won't be to hard to cite the relevant source.

But as far as I can make out what you are saying, you seem to be muddling the map and the territory.

Both reductionism and holism are formal styles of map-making. Reality is always going to be something else, complete and entire, and not actually divided in any of the ways we may talk about.

Reductionism is indeed a subset of the master set of holism, I would argue. But both then stand apart from reality as our models.

...well it seams fair to reckon there is this idea going around on reality being an open ended ongoing process in permanent construction...how many current contemporary philosophers or scientists in mainstream oppose this conception in your view ?

...and of course holism and reductionism regard map making, I just accessed the real constrains each approach presents as its implications regarding my own perspective upon minds, there are no citations to be made here...:wink:
 
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  • #293
apeiron said:
Can you state what you actually think Chomsky's theory is here? Summarise its essentials? To be honest, I felt I was always chasing shadows when trying to deal with what Chomsky believes. He had a description of the structure of grammar. Fine. He had a critique of Behaviourism and associative learning. Again fine. But has he ever had a sensible theory of the evolution of human language and thought? I have always felt most definitely not. I can't even see an actual theory there, just some hand-waving coupled to a grumpy refusal to engage with the actual science that has been going on.

What science? I thought there is very little science in this area. If his papers and that of people like Ian Tattersall, Hauser, etc. aren't convincing then it's unlikely that a non-expert like myself can do justice to their arguments but two very good papers giving these arguments are the following:

An Evolutionary Framework for the Acquisition of Symbolic Cognition by Homo sapiens
http://psyc.queensu.ca/ccbr/Vol3/Tattersall.pdf

Three Factors in Langauge Design
http://www.biolinguistics.uqam.ca/Chomsky_05.pdf
 
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  • #294
apeiron said:
Again, reality is certainly "done!". But our models of reality are another matter.

This goes to the OP in that our minds are models of reality. And that modelling keeps progressing. The shift from the informal modelling of speechless animals to the formal modelling of symbol-handling humans is a significant step in the history of reality modelling.

The mind-body "problem" as traditionally posed focuses on the fact that there is "something it is like to be" to be modelling reality. Well, surely it had to be like something :smile:. The real question is how has that process of modelling evolved? And once the basics of modelling are understood, the apparent distance between mind and world is no longer a problem but a necessary quality.

If reality is "holistic", then the only way to be an observer of reality is to (pretend) to stand outside it. A separation - an epistemic cut - must be manufactured.

I am trying to make a point that ultimately goes against agency evolution and causality as things in their own right as I don´t see nor primal nor last agents no start nor end...I am absolutely sure you understand what I mean as lack of intelligence does not seam to be one of your attributes...I guess I am trying to reduce minds to compelled systems without agency, to question open randomness in evolution whatever randomness intends to mean, and ultimately to regard causality as a correlation on non free events in which the LAW of what is to be the case at all times is the very source of Logic and reason from where causality is later wrongly inferred...necessarily my position goes against the status quo as it presents a very undigested raw approach to such problems...
 
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  • #295
...even squids and octopus are capable of symbolic representation through mental mapping of their surroundings, I would say our uniqueness is more related with complexity then with any emergent extra feature...oral language was useful for conveying complex systems of relations in the world to our weak infants in which our increasingly developed brain require a great deal of time to fully grow to adulthood...

...now my question is would you consider Earth an Intelligent being on its own ? You see taken huge lengths of time Earth adapts as any other system in this universe adapts in their own way...at this light "awareness" seams more the product of progressive complexity where increasingly degrees of awareness arise then it looks like an all or nothing situation...still I don´t see "agency" in none of cases...
 
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  • #296
Albuquerque said:
...even squids and octopus are capable of symbolic representation through mental mapping of their surroundings, I would say our uniqueness is more related with complexity then with any emergent extra feature...

The argument is that there is a qualitative difference between the symbolic systems of man vs other animals:

In symbolic systems of other animals, symbols appear to be linked directly to mind-independent events. The symbols of human language are sharply different. Even in the simplest cases, there is no word-object relation, where objects are mind-independent entities. There is no reference relation, in the technical sense familiar from Frege and Peirce to contemporary externalists. Rather, it appears that we should adopt something like the approach of the seventeenth and eighteenth century cognitive revolution, and the conclusions of Shaftesbury and Hume that the “peculiar nature belonging to” the linguistic elements used to refer is not something external and mind-independent. Rather, their peculiar nature is a complex of perspectives involving Gestalt properties, cause-and-effect, “sympathy of parts” directed to a “common end,” psychic continuity, and other such mental properties. In Hume’s phrase, the “identity, which we ascribe” to vegetables, animal bodies, artifacts, or “the mind of man”—the array of individuating properties— is only a “fictitious one,” established by our “cognoscitive powers,” as they were termed by his seventeenth century predecessors. That is no impediment to interaction, including the special case of communication, given largely shared cognoscitive powers. Rather, the semantic properties of words seem similar in this regard to their phonetic properties. No one is so deluded as to believe that there is a mind-independent object corresponding to the internal syllable [ba], some construction from motion of molecules perhaps, which is selected when I say [ba] and when you hear it. But interaction proceeds nevertheless, always a more-or-less rather than a yes-or-no affair.”

N. Chomsky in THE MYSTERIES OF NATURE: HOW DEEPLY HIDDEN? p. 199-200.

And I'm probably being a big-time hypocrite here because in some of my other misanthropic posts I often refer to man as nothing more than a socially-obsessed linguistic ground chimp. But I guess perspective is important.
 
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  • #297
Have you seen latest TED video from Antonio Damasio on mind ? its worth take a look although not directly linked to the issue here...any way our symbolic representations in language are abstract, if that was what you meant...their are systematizations of functions in themselves, and they can represent multiple tasks in one simple concept...as I see it, the complexity of such representations justified by the very integrated working of the neo-cortex with other systems in the brain does not have any emergent special feature but rather a complex inter-relational increment on multiple cognitive tasks seen more loosely in other animals in nature...even the all mighty Culture, paradigm of the 70´s mentality can be tracked today to killer wales and other species...I don´t think a strong case can be made regarding the human special case for minds and language not even regarding Civilization emerging in the past 20.000 years, although I can see Anthropologists Sociologists and the likes embarking all the way in such sunken ship...
 
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  • #298
Albuquerque said:
...and of course holism and reductionism regard map making, I just accessed the real constrains each approach presents as its implications regarding my own perspective upon minds, there are no citations to be made here...:wink:

Unfortunately, this forum does expect you to be able to provide references to back up opinions, to stay on topic, and to write in understandable fashion to boot.

Your choice if you want to play by these minimal standards.
 
  • #299
I commonly use to say that there is no bigger hypocrisy then pointing out an hypocrite...so no worries there, I sympathise with playing devils advocate if we are to seriously question anything...my problem here goes far beyond humans versus animal, aiming high I want a fundamental analogy between organic and inorganic systems, go figure...that´s why agency must go out of the window specially when one starts to associate this problem with other fundamental problems like compatiblist free will (foxy approach) and abstruse concepts like randomness and the like...it is my feeling there is allot that must be purged from our conceptual frames if we are to develop anything new from the Greeks on...
 
  • #300
apeiron said:
Unfortunately, this forum does expect you to be able to provide references to back up opinions, to stay on topic, and to write in understandable fashion to boot.

Your choice if you want to play by these minimal standards.

...my opinions, if new or even partially new, can be backed up through an increment in internal consistency and a progressive clarification on the terms and concepts I provide if intending a useful fruitful communication with you guys which I honestly do, although the appeal of shortcuting extensive arguments with analogies and metaphors hoping for an intuitive reading may be tempting given my poor control of the language or the extenuating collection of evidence that such complex issues require when bringing out of the box thinking up to the table...nevertheless extraordinary claims require extraordinary profs and I fully appreciate the constructive intention of your remarks.
 
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