apeiron
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Mr.Samsa said:In the 70s? The "cognitive revolution" was well over by then, according to all accounts. It began in the late 40s with the symposium where Chomsky gave a talk on syntactic structures, and was fully complete by the time Neisser formulated the computational theory of mind. If students at the time were battling amongst themselves, it doesn't seem to have affected the opinions of psychologists at the time - nobody described it as a revolution, and nobody was aware of any particular uprising or overthrowing. It wasn't until the 80s when Baars described it as a "revolution" that subsequent students began to call it such. By that time, most were under the impression that behaviorism was a blank slate theory of behavior that ignored thoughts and feelings - so of course such a ridiculous paradigm needed to be replaced! Even Baars, writing just a few decades after the action supposedly took place, had little understanding of what behaviorism was and is. And now we have writers like Pinker continuing the misunderstanding and misrepresentation.
As I say, I was there. So I watched things unfold in real-time.

Personally I saw a big difference between early cogsci - Neisser, Broadbent and others who were about "information processing" - and late 1970s/early 80s when symbolic processing, schematas, modularity and other strong AI ideas were fashionable.
Neural connectionism was also part of the early wave that got submerged during this symbolic processing period. Then it bounced back a decade later.
Baars' revolution was really the consciousness studies one. This was people in the late 80s/early 1990s saying cogsci was still not working on theories of mind - subjective experience - and so another revolution must be proclaimed.
There was a semi-Vygtoskian revolution that nearly happened in the late 1980s - social constructionist psychology - but this got swamped by evolutionary psychology, effectively the cogsci crowd adopting modern synthesis Darwinism.
Things are always happening. Often they go away for a while then re-emerge as the pendulum swings - as that Leahey paper correctly says. It is not actually one paradigm replacing another, but an ebb and flow between polar views.
But there is always the fighting talk because people really do seek to define themselves tribally. Social psychology even has a theory for it - boundary maintenance.
The philosophy of science historian then has the job of disentangling the ideas actually at stake. And the view is quite different depending on whether you want to be a lumper or a splitter.
I agree that I was taking the usual turf warfare/patch protection view of the history because it is colourful and memorable - it is what people do, what they find engaging. But if you want to take a more dispassionate and considered view, then I can be interested in that too.
As I've said, there are some deep differences here. You do have the materialist's description of causality. And you do have the structuralist's. You can treat this as an either/or polarity - one to be viewed as fundamental or primary, even if the other also exists. Or you can take a systems perspective which seeks to fit both extremes into the one causal model.