Is Free Will Possible in a Deterministic Universe?

[brainstorm]

My basic point here is again that thinking about complexity in terms of simplicity is the source of most modern philosophical errors.

To see how "freewill" (anticipation, autonomy, etc) can arise in complex adaptive systems, it is better to start from simple examples of complexity (ie: simple forms of life), rather than simple examples of simplicity (ie: Newtonian deterministic mechanics).

One really cute little example is the way a flagella-driven bacterium like E. coli makes intelligent choices.

E. coli swims along, driven by the anti-clockwise cork-screw paddling of its flagella, seeking food. While spinning anti-clockwise, the flagella are all tangled together and the bacterium swims straight.

Covering its surface are receptors that can scent sugars and amino acids. While the receptors are picking up traces of food, the instruction to the flagella is to keep rotating anti-clockwise. But if the concentrations start to fall off, then the flagella are told to reverse. This then untangles the flagella and sends E. coli into a random tumbling spin until the scent begins to pick up again, at which point straight-line swimming can resume towards the source of the food.

So we have here a beautifully simple feedback mechanism. And no philosophical problem at all about how a bacterium switches from a determined, directed, action to an undetermined, randomly exploratory, undirected one.

Extract the principles, scale them up to more complex animals like cats and humans, and we have naturalistic explanations of "freewill".

You won't find anything sensible to latch on to while you stay stuck down at the level of atoms and wavefunctions (or binary computer circuits and information). But a training in biology just makes freewill a non-issue philosophically. There is still the complexity of brains to explain, but no big deal about animals making intelligent choices as a result of fundamental asymmetries (dichotomies) embedded in their design.

Brains work one way when they are smoothly anticipating the world, then switch to a different approach when they encounter errors or suprises. There does not have to be a little homunculus compartment in the brain that does the chosing. The world is always out there to drive things along.

What you described in these microscopic organisms was not freewill but rather a command-protocol that causes them to switch algorithms when sensory data drops below a certain threshold. When does the organism make a concerted random choice to do anything in your scenario?

Freewill is neither determined by a particular cue, nor completely random. It is a choice made at a particular moment based on chosen criteria. It is a modus operandi of human consciousness in a sense. I don't know whether it could be observed except from a first-person perspective.

I will only add to this that I don't think freewill is limited to human cognition. I suspect that the cat goes through a process of "what should I do now?" . . . "hmmm, I guess I'll go ahead and meow to go inside, get food, etc." I don't think it is constantly reacting reflexively to biological drives. I could be wrong, though. How could I know?

I do know, however, that I was about to post this response and then suddenly went ahead and added this concluding paragraph. I could have gone ahead and posted it without doing that. I could have even stopped in the middle of a

 

[apeiron]

I suspect that the cat goes through a process of "what should I do now?" . . . "hmmm, I guess I'll go ahead and meow to go inside, get food, etc." I don't think it is constantly reacting reflexively to biological drives. I could be wrong, though. How could I know?

We know cats don't talk, and we know that humans do have an interior dialogue. These are not hard questions.

 

[brainstorm]

We know cats don't talk, and we know that humans do have an interior dialogue. These are not hard questions.

How are either of these observations related to how freewill plays a roll in the decisions of either humans or cats? This is completely random association as far as I can tell. Are you an AI algorithm?

 

[apeiron]

How are either of these observations related to how freewill plays a roll in the decisions of either humans or cats? This is completely random association as far as I can tell. Are you an AI algorithm?

Freewill is a social construct. Social constructs are scaffolded by language. Therefore only humans can employ the social construct of freewill.

Cats, like all examples of bios, do display autonomy. That is a biological systems property. And you could call it "will" but not "freewill".

 

[brainstorm]

Freewill is a social construct. Social constructs are scaffolded by language. Therefore only humans can employ the social construct of freewill.

Cats, like all examples of bios, do display autonomy. That is a biological systems property. And you could call it "will" but not "freewill".

You are mis-constructing the concept, "social construct." Social construction means that things are constructed socially in a certain way. It has nothing to do with whether they exist or not in a real sense. Berger and Luckmann's book was called "the social construction of reality" not because they believed that reality had to be socially constructed but because they recognized that "real" was a social status in human perception and interaction.

I provided clear examples of the exercise of free will on this thread. If you don't want to address those directly, you are probably just grasping at straws to renounce the possibility of free-will because you are a desperate social-determinist.

 

[JoeDawg]

What do you mean by "another question entirely."

Whether the universe itself is a random event, is a different question from whether there is randomness in the universe.

Essentially, events in-the-universe do not appear to be random, but its origin maybe a random event, either intrinsic or apparent.

If the birth of universe was a random event, then the 'probability' of this universe existing is somewhat meaningless, even if, every event since is predictable.

 

[JoeDawg]

I've been thinking about this soul-business for quite some time but it seems impossible to find the right framework(or even any framework at all) to try to make a case on it.

The people who maintain a soul position generally don't have much interest in framing it. As an atheist, discarding it was a no brainer, but others are more attached.

Alfred Whitehead's views of 'blobs of perception' being fundamental do not address the seeming free will issue(they are consistent with relativity and probability though).

Interesting, as an epistemological metaphor, but if that is idealism peaking through, no so much.

I have not read him.

 

[GeorgCantor]

Freewill is a social construct. Social constructs are scaffolded by language. Therefore only humans can employ the social construct of freewill.

You need freewill to be self-aware and to know that you exist.

If you mean to imply that you don't exist, say it upfront so that we don't talk to non-existent persons.

Cats, like all examples of bios, do display autonomy. That is a biological systems property. And you could call it "will" but not "freewill".

Yes, but what is "cats display autonomy"? I know what you observe but we are interested in what is going on behind "cats/humans display autonomy", not what is observed, which is self-evident.

 

[GeorgCantor]

You are mis-constructing the concept, "social construct." Social construction means that things are constructed socially in a certain way. It has nothing to do with whether they exist or not in a real sense. Berger and Luckmann's book was called "the social construction of reality" not because they believed that reality had to be socially constructed but because they recognized that "real" was a social status in human perception and interaction.

I provided clear examples of the exercise of free will on this thread. If you don't want to address those directly, you are probably just grasping at straws to renounce the possibility of free-will because you are a desperate social-determinist.

I agree entirely but these freewill issues are related to self-awareness and the existence of the self. If the self is an illusion, then freewill is also an illusion but it makes no sense to me. It's the same as saying "god did it".

 

[GeorgCantor]

I do know, however, that I was about to post this response and then suddenly went ahead and added this concluding paragraph. I could have gone ahead and posted it without doing that. I could have even stopped in the middle of a

That must have been the emergent ghost in the machine which is dependent on the bodily processes but is not the processes themselves. As an example yogis can slow down their heartbeat when they(the ghost in the machine) decide.


http://www.springerlink.com/content/pq5x25042l38u885/

 

[apeiron]

You need freewill to be self-aware and to know that you exist.

References please.

 

[apeiron]

You are mis-constructing the concept, "social construct."

You're thinking of PoMo. I'm talking about Mead and Vygotsky. Different things, even if the same name. I realize it can be confusing.

 

[GeorgCantor]

You need freewill to be self-aware and to know that you exist.

References please.

Self-awareness is the awareness of the existence of the self(the "I"). How do you propose YOU are self-aware except through the self that has freewill?

"We don't have free will", "everything is an illusion", "it's all predetermined" does not even begin to explain self-awareness. Unless you posit that self-awareness is also an illusion, which would mean you are an illusion too along with the PF and all of its users. This is a suicidal way of reasoning.

 

[imiyakawa]

Apeiron and brainstorm, can you guys define free will? I think that's critical because there's lots of interpretations of what free will means.

You need freewill to be self-aware and to know that you exist.

Under what definition of free will?

 

[GeorgCantor]

Under what definition of free will?

The ghost in the machine, as in that which appears to emerge in a particular physical configuration and can think, dream, be self-aware, control heartbeats, resist physical urges, etc.

Are you an AI algorithm?

I wonder what apeiron thinks on this.


It's not that the mind and free don't will exist. Quite the opposite - the ONLY things we can ever be sure to exist are mind and free will. All the rest about a physical body and an external world is ultimately an assumption(belief). The whole personal experience does not take place in the physical body but in the mind/consciousness(that appears to be an emergent property of the physical body and dependent on the body)

 

[apeiron]

Apeiron and brainstorm, can you guys define free will? I think that's critical because there's lots of interpretations of what free will means.

It's just the ability to imagine doing something other than circumstances would say it is sensible to be doing. The circumstances could be biological or social.

 

[GeorgCantor]

It's just the ability to imagine doing something other than circumstances would say it is sensible to be doing. The circumstances could be biological or social.

I agree, but who/what is it that imagines?

 

[apeiron]

Self-awareness is the awareness of the existence of the self(the "I"). How do you propose YOU are self-aware except through the self that has freewill?

"We don't have free will", "everything is an illusion", "it's all predetermined" does not even begin to explain self-awareness. Unless you posit that self-awareness is also an illusion, which would mean you are an illusion too along with the PF and all of its users. This is a suicidal way of reasoning.

I've said often enough that self-awareness is socially constructed, language scaffolded, and provided you the references.

Society teaches you to be aware of the fact you are "a self" so that you can play your part in the construction of society.

And different societies teach somewhat different images of this self. Western society plays up this idea of a "freely willing self" - a self that is not in fact socially created but intrinsic, biological, a soul-stuff. It is basically a Christian idea (you, your sin, your personal relationship with god).

You have been indoctrinated to believe something. So naturally you believe it. But really, even for those who consider they are not religious, it is a modern religion.

Just look at how everyone here is so desperately attached to the idea they must have freewill (and can't just call it intelligent choice making or something else more prosaic sounding).

It should be enough that humans can weigh up the pros and cons of a variety of potential courses of action. Animals (lacking language as an imagery scaffolding tool, and society as an idea creating library) just don't have the same range of imaginative ability. Why should freewill be treated as something essentially anti-physical, beyond the scope of material explanation in principle?

Again, because it is at root a religious belief, reincarnated in still more intense fashion as part of the Romantic response to the arch-materialism of Enlightenment science.

 

[brainstorm]

I agree entirely but these freewill issues are related to self-awareness and the existence of the self. If the self is an illusion, then freewill is also an illusion but it makes no sense to me. It's the same as saying "god did it".

The self is an illusion to the extent that it is a representational construct, but that doesn't impede your ability to observe humans exhibiting self-oriented behavior toward themselves and others. I don't see what this has to do with the existence of free will, though. Free will is simply the ability to make decisions outside of command-protocols or other deterministic mechanisms. Is it that you think that your brain is operating according to totally deterministic programming and it just gives you the impression that you are making choices? If you can't trust your empirical observation of your own decision-making process as being free or governed by involuntary determination, what observational basis could you have for claiming subconsciousdetermination of your apparent free will?

You're thinking of PoMo. I'm talking about Mead and Vygotsky. Different things, even if the same name. I realize it can be confusing.

You should cite a specific text and describe, at least superficially, a specific idea that you are referring to. That way, someone unfamiliar with your citation can engage you on it. Of course, if your intent in citing is to avoid engagement by deferring authority elsewhere, your strategy is effective. I just don't know why you would engage in a discussion forum if you don't want to actually discuss the things you post about.

I've said often enough that self-awareness is socially constructed, language scaffolded, and provided you the references.

Are you talking about the construction of identity-narratives such as, "I am a friendly person" as self-awareness or are you talking about the ability to perceive and observe ones own subjective thoughts and feelings? "Selves" may be social-constructions, but that doesn't mean that the actual activities and behaviors that result from self-orientation are not empirically observable realities. Even when social-constructs themselves are just props, the processes of socially-constructing them are real interactions.

Society teaches you to be aware of the fact you are "a self" so that you can play your part in the construction of society.

Well, I wouldn't black-box it as "society," although the super-ego develops as an internal representation of various external disciplinary impulses. What you are talking about is what I would call the "ego-leash" method of behavioral control. Pride and shame are induced relative to a socially-recognized personal identity, which leads people to seek pride as a reward and avoid shame as a punishment.

And different societies teach somewhat different images of this self. Western society plays up this idea of a "freely willing self" - a self that is not in fact socially created but intrinsic, biological, a soul-stuff. It is basically a Christian idea (you, your sin, your personal relationship with god).

Are you referring here to the social-construction of "freedom" as a source of pride or reason for gratitude toward authority that is deemed to grant such freedom? If so, these are different issues than the issue of when and how people exercise free will. The fact that it is possible to ignore social-cues and make decisions independently of them is another indication of free will's existence. Even a person not engaged in self-discourse (e.g. a person totally immersed in their work) utilizes free-will to make decisions regarding the work they're doing.

You have been indoctrinated to believe something. So naturally you believe it. But really, even for those who consider they are not religious, it is a modern religion.

Maybe, and I'd be interested to consider serious reasoning that identifies how this is possible. But it sounds like you don't really dissect the things you're talking about. You just label things "religion," "indoctrination," or whatever and then react against them as something bad. They may be bad, but you should at least investigate more thoroughly how they work at the level of (social) subjectivity.

Just look at how everyone here is so desperately attached to the idea they must have freewill (and can't just call it intelligent choice making or something else more prosaic sounding).

You may be right that (some) people are desperately attached to the idea, but what bearing does that have on whether people actually have or exercise free will? Are you claiming that the desire to believe in free will blinds people's ability to ever discern whether their will is actually free or determined in some way? If so, how can you claim that your will is not free?

It should be enough that humans can weigh up the pros and cons of a variety of potential courses of action. Animals (lacking language as an imagery scaffolding tool, and society as an idea creating library) just don't have the same range of imaginative ability. Why should freewill be treated as something essentially anti-physical, beyond the scope of material explanation in principle?

It may be the result of something material. It may be that there is something inherent about living nerve tissue that gives it enough flexibility to engage in fuzzy logic and switch between and synthesize various paths of thought at will. It may be something about the relationship between emotions, physiological desire, and cognition that require interdependency between thought and feeling in such a way that neither can drive decision-making without consulting the other. Somehow individuals mediate between reacting reflexively to intuitive impulses and reflecting and controlling their choices on the basis of estimates of their consequences. And ultimately they have the ability to undertake actions at various levels of uncertainty, from tentative belief to total leaps of faith.

Again, because it is at root a religious belief, reincarnated in still more intense fashion as part of the Romantic response to the arch-materialism of Enlightenment science.

I am curious why you feel so driven to historicize and deconstruct the very possibility of belief in free will. What do you think a totally socially-determined consciousness would feel like? Do you experience yourself as a robot incapable of diverging in any way from some operating system that controls all your thoughts and actions?

 

[GeorgCantor]

The self is an illusion to the extent that it is a representational construct, but that doesn't impede your ability to observe humans exhibiting self-oriented behavior toward themselves and others.

This description doesn't capture the essence of the 'entity' - the ability to be autonomous.

I don't see what this has to do with the existence of free will, though. Free will is simply the ability to make decisions outside of command-protocols or other deterministic mechanisms.

I agree but it's neither trivial nor simple and this is evidenced by the inability of the current scientific approaches within the current paradigm to account for this very evident process.

Is it that you think that your brain is operating according to totally deterministic programming and it just gives you the impression that you are making choices? If you can't trust your empirical observation of your own decision-making process as being free or governed by involuntary determination, what observational basis could you have for claiming subconsciousdetermination of your apparent free will?

In my opinion, free will and self-awareness cannot be part of the physical realm and science will never account for them, except to deny their existence or provide a simple and sketchy description without actual explanation as to who/what makes the decisions. It's a relief that the old Newtonian picture of physicality of solid objects in fixed space and time is now completely gone and a new, more promising view is taking shape among physicists based on relationism, contextuality, holism and emergence. The old scientific approach (that is still used) to the problem of freewill and self awareness is like forcing a cube through a round hole. But let them keep on trying, oh well, we don't exist, it's an illusion of freewill and self-awareness. "I know that i don't have freewill" makes as much sense as "Look at me, I don't exist".

Good thing courts of law don't take seriously such viewpoints.

 

[brainstorm]

"I know that i don't have freewill" makes as much sense as "Look at me, I don't exist".

And ironically, it takes freewill to assert such irrational claims while actually having them make sense within some organically-emerging logical process.

 

[GeorgCantor]

I've said often enough that self-awareness is socially constructed, language scaffolded, and provided you the references.

No, i am not a robot. Robots cannot be self-aware, cannot think, cannot dream and certainly cannot wonder about the miracle of existence.

Society teaches you to be aware of the fact you are "a self" so that you can play your part in the construction of society.

Yep, society teaches me. There is a me and that me is my self. If there were no 'me', who would the society teach? Or is this an illusion of teaching an illusory "me" in an illusory world by an illusory society of robots?

You have been indoctrinated to believe something. So naturally you believe it. But really, even for those who consider they are not religious, it is a modern religion.

Actually that is ALL i have(the "me"). I am not willing to make a dozen additional assumptions that deny my existence and the choices I make. It's NOT obvious to me that this is a purely physical universe of solid objects with definite properties in fixed space and time. It's more likely that there is no machine in "The ghost in the machine" than the belief that there is no ghost in the machine.

 

[GeorgCantor]

And ironically, it takes freewill to assert such irrational claims while actually having them make sense within some organically-emerging logical process.

Agreed. I am curious if supporters of the freewill-is-an-illusion theory consider emotional pain an illusion. This obviously cannot be a purely physical phenomenon, how do you define emotional pain in physical terms and units?

 

[apeiron]

Agreed. I am curious if supporters of the freewill-is-an-illusion theory consider emotional pain an illusion. This obviously cannot be a purely physical phenomenon, how do you define emotional pain in physical terms and units?

Calling freewill language-scaffolded and socially constructed is not calling it an illusion. If you believe it is, then you have not understood the argument.

Again, the animal, biological, brain comes with all sorts of genetic encoded capacities such as anticipation, choice, autonomy. Then the socialised human brain can use the memetic power of a different code, language, to extend each of these biological capacities. So from anticipation we get imagination, from representation we get re-representation, from willed action we get self-willed action - action more internally debated and rationalised, action actively negotiated between our personal, bodily inclinations, and any higher goals, longer term plans.

There are no illusions here - except the one that treats freewill as a unitary innate function rather than a learned skill with a clear cultural history.

 

[apeiron]

You should cite a specific text and describe, at least superficially, a specific idea that you are referring to. That way, someone unfamiliar with your citation can engage you on it.

Well I asked you for references to support your belief that the brain employs command protocols and algorithms, and failed to get them.

But anyway...

Aitchison, J. (1994) Words in the Mind (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).

Bain, A. (1977) The Senses and the Intellect and The Emotions and the Will, edited by Robinson, D. (Washington, DC: University Publications of America).

Bartlett, F. (1932) Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Berger, P. and Luckmann, T. (1979) The Social Construction of Reality (London: Penguin).

Bickerton, D. (1995) Langauge and Human Behaviour (London: University College London Press).

Blackmore, S. (1999) The Meme Machine (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Burr, V. (1995) An Introduction to Social Constructionism (London: Routledge).

Buruma, I. (1984) A Japanese Mirror (London: Jonathan Cape).

Clark, A. (1998) 'Magic words: how language augments human computation', in Langauge and Thought, edited by Carruthers, P. and Boucher, J. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Clark, A. and Thornton, C. (1997) 'Trading spaces: computation, representation and the limits of uniformed learning', Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 20, pp. 57-92.

Condillac, E.B.de (1930) Treatise on the Sensations, translated by Carr, G. (Los Angeles, California: University of California Press).

Conway, M. (1990) Autobiographical Memory (Milton Keynes, Buckingham: Open University Press).

Cooley, C.H. (1912) Human Nature and the Social Order (New York: Charles Scribner).

Coulter, J. (1979) The Social Construction of Mind (London: Macmillan).

Danziger, K. (1997) Naming the Mind (London: Sage).

Deacon, T. (1997) The Symbolic Species (London: Allen Lane, Penguin).

Dennett, D. (1998) 'Reflections on language and mind', in Langauge and Thought, edited by Carruthers, P. and Boucher, J. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Dewart, L. (1989) Evolution of Consciousness (Toronto: University of Toronto Press).

Diaz, R.M. and Berk, L.E. (1992) Private Speech (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum).

Donald, M. (1991) Origins of the Modern Mind (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press).

Elman, J., Bates, E., Johnson, M., Karmiloff-Smith, A., Parisi, D. and Plunkett, K. (1996) Rethinking Innateness (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press).

Gergen, K.J. and Davis, K.E. (1985) The Social Construction of the Person (New York: Springer-Verlag).

Goffman, E. (1969) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (London: Penguin).

Graybiel, A.M. (1998) 'The basal ganglia and chunking of action repertoires', Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 70, pp. 119-136.

Harré, R. (1983) Personal Being (Oxford: Basil Blackwell)

Harré, R. (1986) The Social Construction of Emotions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).

Harré, R. and Gillett, G. (1994) The Discursive Mind (London: Sage).

Hobbes, T. (1951) Leviathan (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).

Jahoda, G. (1992) Crossroads Between Culture and Mind (Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf).

Jackendoff, R. (1996) 'How language helps us think', Pragmatics and Cognition, 4, pp. 1-34.

Lane, H. (1976) The Wild Boy of Aveyron (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press).

Locke, J. (1975) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited by Nidditch, P. (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Luria, A. (1973) The Working Brain (London: Penguin).

Luria, A. (1976) Cognitive Development (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press).

Luria, A. (1982) Langauge and Cognition, edited by Wertsch, J. (Chichester, Sussex: John Wiley).

Luria, A. and Yudovich, F. (1956) Speech and the Development of Mental Processes in the Child (London: Penguin).

Lutz, C. (1986) 'The domain of emotion words on Ifaluk', in The Social Construction of Emotions, edited by Harré, R. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).

Lutz, C. (1988) Unnatural Emotions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

Mead, G.H. (1934) Mind, Self and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

Mithen, S. (1996) The Prehistory of the Mind (London: Thames and Hudson).

Mueller, R-A. (1996) 'Innateness, autonomy, universality? Neurobiological approaches to language', Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 19, pp. 611-675.

Müller, M. (1888) The Science of Thought (Chicago: Open Court).

Neisser, U. (1967) Cognitive psychology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts).

Neisser, U. (1976) Cognition and Reality (New York: WH Freeman, 1976).

Passingham, R. (1993) The Frontal Lobes and Voluntary Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Pulvermüller, F. (1999) ' Words in the brain's language', Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, pp. 253-336.

Singh, J. and Zingg, R. (1941) Wolf Children and Feral Man (New York: Harper).

Sokolov, A.N. (1972) Inner Speech and Thought (New York: Plenum Press).

Sorabji, R. (1993) Animal Minds and Human Morals (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press).

Vygotsky, L. (1986) Thought and Language, edited by Kozulin, A. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press).

Vygotsky, L. (1978) Mind in Society, edited by Cole, S. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press).

Vygtotsky, L. and Luria, A. (1994) 'Tool and symbol in child development', in The Vygotsky Reader, edited by van der Veer, R. and Valsiner, J. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).

de Waal, F. (1982) Chimpanzee Politics (London: Jonathan Cape).

Walker, S. (1983) Animal Thought (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul),

Wertsch, J. (1991) Voices of the Mind (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press).

Whorf, B. (1956) Language, Thought and Reality (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press).

Zivin, G. (1979) The Development of Self-Regulation Through Private Speech (New York: John Wiley).

 

[brainstorm]

There are no illusions here - except the one that treats freewill as a unitary innate function rather than a learned skill with a clear cultural history.

No, this is a subtle attempt to deny the innate existence of free-will in cognitive processes. Free-will was discovered, with a clear cultural history, but that doesn't mean it did not function in human decision-making, and possibly that of other animals, prior to its recognition and study. In fact, I think the only way the exercise of free-will can totally repressed is through total pacification of desires. A human or animal whose desires are fully satisfied loses the interest to make any choices that endanger the source of its sustenance. It not only resists biting the hand that feeds it, it is overwhelmed by so much love and devotion that it desires only to do the will of the benevolent master. Actually, though, I suppose you could say that doing a mater's will out of devotion still involves exercising free-will. There exists compulsive behavior on the basis of unmanageable fears, but I don't think that free-will can be suppressed completely in favor of reacting to fear. There's still something inside that searches for hope of escaping that fear and reflex-determinism.

 

[apeiron]

No, this is a subtle attempt to deny the innate existence of free-will in cognitive processes. Free-will was discovered, with a clear cultural history, but that doesn't mean it did not function in human decision-making, and possibly that of other animals, prior to its recognition and study.

You can go on and on but your arguments are counter to the evidence. The references I provided track the development of self-regulation in children, its very different social framing across cultures, etc, etc.

You are speaking merely for your opinion. Or can you produce citations that back up your position?

I have the benefit of studying this area in depth. Hence my impatience with people who just spout personal opinions or express cultural biases rather than dealing with the anthropological, psychological, and neurological facts.

 

[brainstorm]

You can go on and on but your arguments are counter to the evidence. The references I provided track the development of self-regulation in children, its very different social framing across cultures, etc, etc.

You are speaking merely for your opinion. Or can you produce citations that back up your position?

I have the benefit of studying this area in depth. Hence my impatience with people who just spout personal opinions or express cultural biases rather than dealing with the anthropological, psychological, and neurological facts.

You're not citing facts. You're citing the fact that you have lots of experience studying secondary research. What evidence do you provide of that? Instead of insisting on your authority to make evidence-based claims, why don't you actually put some piece of evidence on the table for review?

You seem to ignore the fact that posts on this thread have not been baselessly speculating but have cited numerous instances of cognitive behavior that indicate the necessity of freewill. If you care to review our interpretation of the evidence we have provided, you are free to do so. What you are doing though, which is to deny that the evidence we provide is evidence at all, is insufficient to undermine any claims or substantiate your own.

In other words, you are engaging in posturing.

 

[apeiron]

In other words, you are engaging in posturing.

I'm the one who has studied the subject and provided the references to the literature.

You have waffled on about command protocols and algorithms but have not provided any back-up material to explain your position.

 

[nismaratwork]

You're not citing facts. You're citing the fact that you have lots of experience studying secondary research. What evidence do you provide of that? Instead of insisting on your authority to make evidence-based claims, why don't you actually put some piece of evidence on the table for review?

You seem to ignore the fact that posts on this thread have not been baselessly speculating but have cited numerous instances of cognitive behavior that indicate the necessity of freewill. If you care to review our interpretation of the evidence we have provided, you are free to do so. What you are doing though, which is to deny that the evidence we provide is evidence at all, is insufficient to undermine any claims or substantiate your own.

In other words, you are engaging in posturing.

He's not posturing from what I read, he's citing his opinions and you're not. There are sources which contradict them, although I don't hold with them, so you really have no excuse to ignore the rules and fail to source your beliefs when asked.