Is free will possible in Conway and Kochen's FW theorem?

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Descartz2000
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Can anyone give any feed back on Conway and Kochen's free-will theorem? I thought the particle in area B knows instantaneously that its' separated partner in area A has altered, and as a result changes. Yet, the free-will theorem requires if free-will experiments are true, then particles must maintain some form of free will as well. But, how would the particle display free will if it is correlated with A? It seems this would be the result of A and FTL? Any help out there? If I've got it all wrong, please let me know-
 
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Descartz2000 said:
Can anyone give any feed back on Conway and Kochen's free-will theorem? I thought the particle in area B knows instantaneously that its' separated partner in area A has altered, and as a result changes. Yet, the free-will theorem requires if free-will experiments are true, then particles must maintain some form of free will as well. But, how would the particle display free will if it is correlated with A? It seems this would be the result of A and FTL? Any help out there? If I've got it all wrong, please let me know-

1. The FWT makes no attempt to "explain" why the particles response is identical if the experimenters happen to (freely and independently) choose the same orientation of their magnets.

2. What it does claim is that the responses are not functions of properties of the universe which are earlier than the actual experiment at each location. Specifically, the experimenters spacelike separation allows an inertial frame where A's experiment is before B's and also one in which B's experiment is before A's.

Skippy
 
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skippy1729 said:
1. The FWT makes no attempt to "explain" why the particles response is identical if the experimenters happen to (freely and independently) choose the same orientation of their magnets.

2. What it does claim is that the responses are not functions of properties of the universe which are earlier than the actual experiment at each location. Specifically, the experimenters spacelike separation allows an inertial frame where A's experiment is before B's and also one in which B's experiment is before A's.

Skippy

I think to maintain the true value of 'free-will', the theory must take into account the correlation between the free choice experimenter and the identical reponse in the particles. If this can not be explained or reasoned then I would be inclined to question a 'free-will' approach. However, I do agree that if the experimenter does in fact have free-will then so do particles. Yet, I would be more likely to buy into FTL of some kind or superdeterminism and leave the notion of 'free-will' to the birds.
 
Descartz2000 said:
I think to maintain the true value of 'free-will', the theory must take into account the correlation between the free choice experimenter and the identical reponse in the particles. If this can not be explained or reasoned then I would be inclined to question a 'free-will' approach. However, I do agree that if the experimenter does in fact have free-will then so do particles. Yet, I would be more likely to buy into FTL of some kind or superdeterminism and leave the notion of 'free-will' to the birds.
I fully agree. :approve: