Medical Is Kant's Philosophy of Mind Supported by Modern Science?

[Tsunami]

How we think is a question for science, but it's also relevant for philosophy of mind. In this thread I want to see how science reflects certain ideas of the philosophy of Kant. That's why I put it in the science forum, I think this is the most appropriate place; if it is not, I apologize.

Kant states that all sensory experiences reach us as a multitude of impressions, which are then synthesized into representations.

Now Kant says that in order to unite representations it is required to have unity of consciousness in the synthesis of these representations.

If consciousness didn't have synthetic unity, then the multitude of experiences couldn't be united in this consciousness. So, I'm wondering if this is supported by science or not. In split-brain experiments, there is no unity of consciousness: does this mean that experiences can't be united. In normal consciousness, are there occurences where experiences can't be united as well? If so, what is the cause of this?
Conversely too of course: is there any evidence that speaks against the condition of synthetic unity?

 

[Tsunami]

I already found some interesting notes about this in the philosophy section of stanford online:

However, claims such as Kant's that a certain form of synthesis and certain links among the contents of experience are required for unity continue to be ignored in cognitive science, though a few philosophers have done some work on them (Brook 2004). The same is true of Kant's views on consciousness of self; cognitive science has paid no attention to non-ascriptive identification of self and the idea of the essential indexical. Here, too, a few philosophers have worked on these issues, apparently without knowing of Kant's contribution (Brook & DeVidi, 2001), but not cognitive scientists.

In short, the dominant model of the mind in contemporary cognitive science is Kantian, but some of his most distinctive contributions have not been taken into it (Brook, 2004).

If this is true: come on guys, I dare 'ya!