News Is Offshore Oil Drilling Truly Safe?

[mheslep]

Anyways, my point remains. What is safe for Exxon isn't necessarily safe for BP, and so how do you work this out? The laws have to apply equally to all right. So maybe there should be a three strikes rule of some kind and BP should just be ousted. I think all of their assets should be seized as U.S. property and auctioned off to other companies, profits should go to those affected, cleanup, and restoration.

No, you want to brush by doing the homework and have your point remain. You may very well be right about BP's record and what we can deduce from that, but so far the background checking is a bit sloppy here. Suppose most of the 'Egregious Willful Violations' were charged against one serious refinery fire? Suppose in the category of 'Serious Citations' other refineries had ~1521 violations and BP had 30? Suppose that one or two managers in BP are at the root of BP's supposed bad safety record and leave tomorrow to go to work for Exxon?

[PLAIN]http://www.publicintegrity.org/assets/img/RefineriesChart2.png

 

[jreelawg]

Interesting. Thanks for finding that. You should note though, that other refineries are many, so BP's 30 serious violations may or may not be significant compared to other companies individually.

 

[stewartcs]

Neither of us is an expert in the subject of deepwater exploratory drilling (nor is anyone else on this forum AFAIK),...

Actually, I am.

CS

 

[stewartcs]

In the video linked, Mike Sawyer, the whistle-blowing engineer from the Atlantis, states that a similar failure on the Atlantis would make the Deep Horizon look like a hiccup. The number of 200,000 barrels per day was stated in the original CNN report commentary. I will try to find additional references. As is usual, CNN is way ahead of everyone else on this story.



They screwed up the cut. I don't really care why. For once I get to judge someone else by the results. In the real world, excuses don't matter - a fact that I live with every day as an independent contractor and engineer.

Ivan, the Atlantis isn't an exploratory drilling vessel. It is a production platform that has the capability to produce, from multiple wells, up to 200,000 BPD.

CS

 

[stewartcs]

Deep drilling itself is clearly not safe at this time. So the deep-drillling ban should continue at least until a method to handle a disaster like this one...

Well that's just not true. One incident by one company doesn't mean the entire industry is unsafe.

CS

 

[magpies]

BP is such a large corp I highly doubt anything bad will happen to them over this.

 

[stewartcs]

BP is such a large corp I highly doubt anything bad will happen to them over this.

It already is...stock is down 50%...public approval is near 0, likely to cost several billions of dollars for the cleanup/lawsuits/fines...

CS

 

[stewartcs]

Unless a single failure represents damage too great to be borne. I don't think that's the case here, but until the environmental fallout can be assessed, it's a (forgive the pun) platform like any other.

The methods and practices used by the industry are safe. If one company violates those practices then it is unsafe...not the industry.

CS

 

[Mech_Engineer]

Russ has basically answered everything that I would have, but I though I'd mention a few things...

First and foremost, the victims of this spill, like you, should quit making excuses for a company that may have literally killed the entire gulf of Mexico.

I'm not making excuses for anybody, I'm simply trying to stay rational and away from the "regulate them to death!" mentality which wouldn't solve anything. As Russ has already pointed out it was the ENFORCEMENT of existing regulations that were the problem (much like the border situation we are faced with).

So the deep-drillling ban should continue at least until a method to handle a disaster like this one, is clearly demonstrated. Next, put the Republicans and their deregulation hysteria to bed, once and for all.

I agree that we shouldn't think we are dependent on deep-water drilling, we have much better solutions available to us on land in the country! take for example, the Alaskan National Petroleum Reserve.

It is more clear than ever that heavy regulation of this industry is required. Clearly, when BP signs a contract making promises, it means nothing.

It seems to me that the government's "promise" of enforcing existing regulation holds little more water than BP. The problem is we need regulation for the regulators! but then who will regulate the regulators of the regulators?

When enviromentalists tell us a danger exists, instead of putting on the blinders and calling them tree huggers, instead of turning up the nose and accusing them of fear-mongering, shut up and listen. Then take the appropriate action.

The environmentalists have to prove that the danger actually exists first! You're saying we should just accept that the environmentalists are right, and act upon their fears (correct or not) without quesioning their validity first. This is a problem we're running into with "global warming" as well- taking action wihout definitive proof that the problem exists or that the proposed "fix" with actually fix it.

A relief well drilled in parallel with the original well, as is required in Norway and Canada, could have prevented this nightmare.

Actually that's no guarantee since if both blowout preventers were in equal states of disrepair we'd have a leak that was twice as big as now. If we simply required the blowout preventer to function properly we wouldn't be in this mess right now... oh wait that's already required by regulation! And what would you say if both wells failed simultaneously? We should have seen it coming? More regulation requiring 3 wells to be drilled simultaneously? Where does it end, and at what point do you look at the tradeoffs and decide "that's safe enough?"

The difference between 99% safe and 100% safe is infinity when you're always only dividing the difference by two...

 

[magpies]

Well imo I wouldn't trade a forest for a parking lot and that's basically what this comes down to. Do we want more parking lots and how many forests are we willing to give up for it.

 

[magpies]

Oh I was more speaking to the point about how much risk can we afford. To me it isn't really about risk but more about how many wendy's and mcdonalds with fun play areas we want. As a race of course.

I mean look at what good a couple trees in a forest do for the Earth in total and compare that to what a mcdonalds does for the Earth in total. The trees protect the soil and make clean air while the mcdonalds does the opposite.

 

[mheslep]

I am of the opinion that I've provided sufficient evidence,

Sufficient evidence for what? I.e., I'm suggesting your post will clearer if you state your thesis completely.
[...]

If the end result is a poor record for BP, that is what we are discussing.

'Poor' doesn't aid the discussion much unless it is done in context.

 

[magpies]

Man I remember when this thread was only 4 pages in now its 44 wow...

 

[Astronuc]

By now, most of the important facts of what led-up to the disaster are pretty well known. There were multiple failures at multiple levels by multiple companies, and if anyone of several failures hadn't happened, we wouldn't be in the mess we are in today. What that tells us in answer to the questions above:

1. Yes, the "prevent" instead of reacting after the fact approach is reasonable, but it requires that the "prevent" approach is being faithfully followed. This is where (2) regulation comes in.
2. It failed because employees of the companies involved cut corners and there was inadequate regulation (enforcement) in place to catch the corner-cutting.

I'm sorry, but if you built a LWR without the ability to kill the reaction, who would accept "we're learning as we go" as an excuse?

Invalid analogy, since what you are describing for a LWR is exactly the approach taken here. You want to prevent a meltdown, not deal with it after it has already happened, just like you want to prevent a blowout, not deal with it after it has already happened.

There are a lot of good points in this post, but I'll focus on the one's I quoted.

It's not clear to me who cut corners. I've only heard bits and pieces, sound bites, and contradictory testimony. I've heard that a BP manager over-ruled a Haliburton or Transocean engineer with respect to the plugging and drill string cover - I don't know who to believe.

Somebody made the decision to replace drilling mud with seawater - if what I heard is correct. That's negligence - IMO.

Apparently the methane clathrate formation was unexpected. Well then perhaps BP et al needs to do more research.

As for LWR technology, the industry now has about 40+ year experience, so we have a lot of lessons learned, e.g., don't use Inconel-600 for steam generator tubing!

In the 60's and 70's, it really was learn as you go!

The original plants were designed with plenty of margin, but some significant events (snafus), e.g., TMI-2, demonstrated that even plants with well designed margins can be severely damaged when people screw up.

As for the space shuttle, due to the complexity, it really did have a high potential failure rate ~ 1:100. But that doesn't necessarily mean that it is expected. It means that one better be d@mn careful - don't take chances! Well - several somebodies at NASA didn't heed the warnings, and they weren't careful with Challenger and then Columbia - and good people died as a result.


Once the well is capped and the leaking stopped, then it will be time for lessons learned.

 

[Ivan Seeking]

Rule number 1: No system is failsafe.

Any reasonable risk evaluation requires the assumption that some risks have not been recognized. It is widely agreed [based on reports] that the only sure means of shutting down a runaway well, is to bottom fill the well, using relief well. No matter the level of confidence wrt failsafe equipment, I would demand that one, and perhaps even that two relief wells be drilled in parallel with any deep primary well.

If a successful means of controlling a runaway well is demonstrated, perhaps the requirement for relief wells could be waived. But first we would have to know for a fact that a situation like this, or worse, could be quickly controlled, with less than some maximum acceptable volume of oil escaping per unit time.

What makes me furious is that, imo, given the risk, any reasonable person would have demanded this up front. Deep-water drilling may be akin to rocket science, but demanding that we have a tested and effective means to control a catastrophic failure, is and always was a no-brainer; and even more so given that deep-water drilling is so complicated. It is terrifying that such incompetence occurred at this level - a world-class company and one that I used to admire. Whle BP may or may not be responsible for the rig failing, these sorts of things do happen. But it is a crime, imo, to put an entire region at risk, by assuming that any device or set of devices, won't fail.

 

[turbo]

If a successful means of controlling a runaway well is demonstrated, perhaps the requirement for relief wells could be waived. But first we would have to know for a fact that a situation like this could be quickly controlled, with some maximum acceptable volume of oil escaping.

What makes me furious is that, imo, given the risk, any reasonable person would have demanded this up front. Deep-water drilling may be akin to rocket science, but demanding that we have a tested and effective means to control a catastrophic failure, is a no-brainer. And it always was. It is terrifying that such incompetence as allowed at this level. Whle BP may or may not be responsible for the rig failing, it is a crime to put an entire region at risk, by assuming that any device or set of devices, won't fail.

It seems that there are multiple failures in this "unprecedented, unforeseeable" incident, and the worst of them are in basic requirements.

Drill a relief well in parallel with every deep-water well.

Require that every block valve on a BOP fail to the closed position on a loss of signal from the surface. Not every valve may provide full blockage, but in real-life situations every valve that is at least partially closed provides a lower total pressure-differential that other valves farther along in the flow can attempt to overcome. Test the valves routinely and document that they are operable.

Require that in the case of a catastrophic failure, the BOP's pipe-shearing mechanism activate automatically.

Require that every single BOP's pipe-shear mechanism be tested and certified to successfully cut modern high-strength steel pipe before deployment. If the shear-mechanism cannot be certified, the BOP will not be deployed.

IMHO, deep-water drilling will not be "safe" unless we adopt these standards.

 

[Mech_Engineer]

Require that every block valve on a BOP fail to the closed position on a loss of signal from the surface. Not every valve may provide full blockage, but in real-life situations every valve that is at least partially closed provides a lower total pressure-differential that other valves farther along in the flow can attempt to overcome. Test the valves routinely and document that they are operable.

Require that in the case of a catastrophic failure, the BOP's pipe-shearing mechanism activate automatically.

Require that every single BOP's pipe-shear mechanism be tested and certified to successfully cut modern high-strength steel pipe before deployment. If the shear-mechanism cannot be certified, the BOP will not be deployed.

I agree with all of your proposed requirements for a BOP, they seem logical for certifying it's proper function. I'm curious though, which of those requirements are currently in place? Does the law simply require that a BOP be in place, or does it also state it must be able to meet [X] requirements?

 

[stewartcs]

Rule number 1: No system is failsafe.

Any reasonable risk evaluation requires the assumption that some risks have not been recognized. It is widely agreed [based on reports] that the only sure means of shutting down a runaway well, is to bottom fill the well, using relief well. No matter the level of confidence wrt failsafe equipment, I would demand that one, and perhaps even that two relief wells be drilled in parallel with any deep primary well.

If a successful means of controlling a runaway well is demonstrated, perhaps the requirement for relief wells could be waived. But first we would have to know for a fact that a situation like this, or worse, could be quickly controlled, with less than some maximum acceptable volume of oil escaping per unit time.

What makes me furious is that, imo, given the risk, any reasonable person would have demanded this up front. Deep-water drilling may be akin to rocket science, but demanding that we have a tested and effective means to control a catastrophic failure, is and always was a no-brainer; and even more so given that deep-water drilling is so complicated. It is terrifying that such incompetence occurred at this level - a world-class company and one that I used to admire. Whle BP may or may not be responsible for the rig failing, these sorts of things do happen. But it is a crime, imo, to put an entire region at risk, by assuming that any device or set of devices, won't fail.

Drilling a relief well simultaneously is no more of a sure of a way to contain it than is drilling the primary well. Either one could fail just as well as the other if the operator makes the same mistake or if the well control equipment fails to operate.

The moral of all of this is to just make damn sure none of the fundamental cannons of well control are ignored or violated.

CS

 

[stewartcs]

It seems that there are multiple failures in this "unprecedented, unforeseeable" incident, and the worst of them are in basic requirements.

Drill a relief well in parallel with every deep-water well.

Require that every block valve on a BOP fail to the closed position on a loss of signal from the surface. Not every valve may provide full blockage, but in real-life situations every valve that is at least partially closed provides a lower total pressure-differential that other valves farther along in the flow can attempt to overcome. Test the valves routinely and document that they are operable.

Require that in the case of a catastrophic failure, the BOP's pipe-shearing mechanism activate automatically.

Require that every single BOP's pipe-shear mechanism be tested and certified to successfully cut modern high-strength steel pipe before deployment. If the shear-mechanism cannot be certified, the BOP will not be deployed.

IMHO, deep-water drilling will not be "safe" unless we adopt these standards.

All of the choke and kill valves are fail safe close already.

In case of catastrophic failure, the BOP's blind shear ram does activate automatically already.

The entire BOP control system is fully function tested prior to drilling every new well and every two weeks there after while drilling. The stack (all of the BOP's) are also pressure tested every two weeks and prior to drilling any new well. This is currently required by MMS and to my knowledge never been violated on any of the 50+ offshore drilling vessels I've been on.

The shear rams are currently tested by the OEM to determine which grade of drill pipe and other tubulars they are capable of shearing. They perform actual shear tests and log the results. They also ensure that the empirical results match up with their theoretical shearing capacities. Prior to drilling any new well they are required to verify the capacity of the blind shearing rams.

As I stated before, the industry has the proper safeguards in place. However, as with any safeguard, they are only effective if used.

I would also caution everyone that we do not know of what exactly has occurred yet. Until then all of the recommendation by the DOI and others are subjective and most likely will be revised as the investigation unfolds.

CS

 

[stewartcs]

I agree with all of your proposed requirements for a BOP, they seem logical for certifying it's proper function. I'm curious though, which of those requirements are currently in place? Does the law simply require that a BOP be in place, or does it also state it must be able to meet [X] requirements?

Yes, all of those requirements are in place and required per MMS.

CS

 

[turbo]

Yes, all of those requirements are in place and required per MMS.

CS

If the requirements were in place and required, why do we have this gusher a mile down? I think we'll find that inspections, testing, and certification were not up to the gold-standard of reasonable precautions and standards. If BP ever releases relevant records (faint hope) we might get some light on this.

 

[stewartcs]

If the requirements were in place and required, why do we have this gusher a mile down? I think we'll find that inspections, testing, and certification were not up to the gold-standard of reasonable precautions and standards. If BP ever releases relevant records (faint hope) we might get some light on this.

We have a gusher a mile down because a fundamental cannon of well control was violated by a human. That is, they allowed the well to become under-balanced and it blew out.

Apparently, something is in the wellbore of the stack that is not shearable by the blind shear rams. The blind shear rams are only capable of shear and sealing a limited size of tubular. If it is too large they will not shear and seal due to geometric limitations. Presumably, something was blown into the cavity that is unshearable - but that's just a guess until they retrieve the stack and open it up.

Remember though, if a human would not have allowed the well to become underbalanced, this would not have happened.

CS

 

[magpies]

That human being the ceo of BP imo. That or obama.

 

[WhoWee]

Anyways, my point remains. What is safe for Exxon isn't necessarily safe for BP, and so how do you work this out? The laws have to apply equally to all right. So maybe there should be a three strikes rule of some kind and BP should just be ousted. I think all of their assets should be seized as U.S. property and auctioned off to other companies, profits should go to those affected, cleanup, and restoration.

The takeover of GM aside, Obama doesn't have the legal authority.

 

[drankin]

BP blew it. So let's the competition drill. "Drilll Baby Drill!"

 

[Ivan Seeking]

BP blew it. So let's the competition drill. "Drilll Baby Drill!"

Those who are incapable of learning from history are sure to doom us all.

 

[Ivan Seeking]

Finally, some progress. BP claims to be capturing about 30% of the flow, or 6000 barrels per day [their numbers].

 

[Borg]

Finally, some progress. BP claims to be capturing about 30% of the flow, or 6000 barrels per day [their numbers].

That's great news but it makes me wonder. Is that the percentage of before or after they cut the top off and increased the flow? Is the total being spilled now actually less than before they cut it? Hope that number gets to 90% or better.

 

[Ivan Seeking]

That's great news but it makes me wonder. Is that the percentage of before or after they cut the top off and increased the flow? Is the total being spilled now actually less than before they cut it? Hope that number gets to 90% or better.

Unfortunately, that's a good point! The flow was expected to increase by 20% when they cut the pipe. What worries me is that, just watching the video, most of the oil escaping seems to be coming from the seal, and not the vents.

 

[mheslep]

Apparently, something is in the wellbore of the stack that is not shearable by the blind shear rams.

CS

That may be the case (something in the stack), but my understanding per the press reports is that the ram mechanism failed to ever activate (not because it had insufficient sheer force). Reports are that crew members on the rig were about to engage the BOP moments before the surface explosion, and later ROVs were unable to activate the rams.