Is Time Merely Constant Change?

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The discussion centers on the perception and nature of time, with participants questioning whether time is an illusion or a fundamental aspect of reality. Many argue that what we perceive as time is merely a measurement of change, suggesting that everything is in a constant state of transformation rather than passing through time. The conversation references philosophical and scientific perspectives, including ideas from notable figures like Stephen Hawking and Julian Barbour, to support the notion of a dimensionless universe where time and space may not exist independently. Participants express a desire for deeper understanding of why change occurs and the implications of perceiving time as an illusion. Ultimately, the dialogue emphasizes the complexity of defining time and its relationship to change in the universe.
  • #331
Well, mosassam, you threw me for a moment there; I couldn't figure out what a "VOE" was. After reading over the thread, I decided that the only reference which made sense was that "VOE" stood for "valid ontological element" so I will presume that is what you meant and (for the moment at least) I will use that shorthand.

Yes indeedy do; the set of "VOE's" relates directly to every possible "flawless epistemological solution" and, no, they are not based on "different" sets. Every solution is explaining exactly the same set of elements, but those elements are not at all necessarily defined the same in different solutions. Remember, their definitions are deduced from the specific solutions.
mosassam said:
Am I right in thinking that reference tags are labels used for each undefined ontological element so that we can communicate about them (i.e.: although they are labeled they are still undefined.)
Absolutely correct, the sole purpose of the labels ai(t) is so that we can refer to a specific "VOE" which has not been defined.
mosassam said:
Does each present (change in knowledge) relate to learning a 'new' ontological element?
If an ontological element is "what exists" and every "epistemological solution" has at its base "what exists" then, so long as those elements are undefined, each present (or change in knowledge) must be something new; so, with regard to our analysis, we must regard it as something new. On the other hand, once you have a "specific epistemological solution" and can use that solution to define those "VOE's" (to use your notation). At that point, your speculative edifice may very well have the same defined element in two different presents.

*** "Ah, you have seen the same thing twice!" [/color]***​

But you certainly cannot prove it; you have to remember, it may be flawless but it is still a speculative edifice.

In fact, the next step is intimately related to that very fact. Having an understood specific flawless epistemological solution, (in this simplified case where all ontological elements are valid) one can place a specific label on every ai(t) for every "present" going to make up the past upon which the solution is based. At this point, the problem can be seen as totally equivalent to interpreting a collection of statements in a language. Every "B(t)" can be seen as a statement in this symbolic language (those specific numerical labels you have placed upon the elements). It is a pure decoding problem; in fact, since you have used your specific epistemological solution to apply those labels, if you understood the solution, you will certainly also understand the meanings of the labels. "Knowing these definitions (which are part and parcel of the solution) makes it a complete expression of that speculative edifice.

Now, tell me how that hits you. If you have any problems with it, we can discuss them.

I'll be back -- Dick
 
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  • #332
Yes, VOE = Valid Ontological Element.
I understand that the set of VOEs can possibly produce numerous flawless Solutions and that for each Solution, the definition for each VOE may change, as the definition is 'embedded' in that particular Solution.
Are there numerous flawless Solutions to this set because we are using different combinations of VOE's, or are there numerous Solutions because we still use the complete set but the definitions for each VOE changes with any given Solution?
I still have a problem with the "presents". The Solution has different 'aspects' (the different part of the Solution each VOE relates to). I may be overcomplicating things here (or more likely barking up the wrong tree) but I imagine that each "present" (change in knowledge) can relate to a complete VOE or PART OF A VOE. What I mean by this is that some changes in knowledge may lead onto other changes in knowledge and so on. This way, a VOE (which describes a certain aspect of the Solution) may consist of a collection of "presents" or, sometimes a change in knowledge may contain a complete VOE.
I'm not explaining this correctly, but the Solution is based on the collection of VOE's, and each VOE can either be a single 'present' or a collection of 'presents'.
If you can understand any of the above questions, let alone answer them, then cool.
PS: I don't understand why the "speculative edifice may very well have the same defined element in two different presents" .
 
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  • #333
I would like to jump in here, to continue my thoughts posted above, and the information about VOEs from the last two posts (I will use the notation of Dr. D so that he can correct my errors in thinking). I will start with a number of "let" type premises (in blue)

1. Let VOE = a single valid ontological element, call it A1
[not sure what a non-valid OE would be, but let us not go there now]

2. Let the set of all possible VOEs in existence = <A1,A2,A3,...An>
[I take it that Dr. D. holds that the individual VOE of existence are "undefined", more importantly they are "outside" the process called "explanation" or "assumption"--I call this the axiom that "existence exists"--he apparently calls it "starting from undefined ontology". Thus I hold that it is not possible for humans to "know" directly any VOE (I think Dr. D also ?, which leads to...]

3. Let a1 = a "reference label" for the VOE A1
[This is a mental process mapping perception to concept formation]

4. Let knowledge of VOE A1 = the dialectic union set (aiA1)
[Here I think I differ from Dr.D--but not yet sure. That is, I hold that because it not possible for humans (or any material thing) to "know" any VOE directly, all knowledge of any VOE is a veiled reality of placing a reference label on a metaphysical given VOE]

5. Let Bt1 = any specific present (t1) from the set of all possible presents B
[This from Dr.D but I modify to clarify that there are an infinite number of specific presents (e.g., <t1,t2,t3...tn>)--here we deal with only one Bt1].

6. Let a set of "known" VOEs in present be: Bt1 = <(a1A1),(a2A2),(a3A3)>
[Here, to save space, I only let three VOEs be known in present, of course this could be any number, but can never be "all possible VOEs". The notation follows from my argument of veiled aspect of reality (the metaphysical given) as known by humans (our undefined epistemology or study of the metaphysical given. Thus we see here how there exists dialectic union between metaphysics and epistemology, but note (very important imo), that the "essence" of any VOE derives from epistemology and not metaphysics.

7. Let Bu, the set of unknown VOE in any solution to explanation of a "specific present" = <A4,A5,A6,...An>
[We see here that, from the set of all possible VOEs in #1 above, there must exist a set of VOEs that have never been mentally transformed in the specific present (Bt1) to form a reference label, that is, they are not "known" in specific present, but do "exist" in specific present]

8. Let the set <Bt1,Bt2,Bt3...Bt7> = (sum of all "specific presents"), which I will condense to the notation (Bt-all).
[This derives from facts of research on knowledge that it is possible for any single human to know more than one specific present at exactly the same time--from research the limit for most humans is ~ 7, that is, you can know at any time (t0) as many as 7 different "sets of VOEs" (what Dr. D is calling his Bt).

Thus, we see that, if from above the specific present Bt1 = <a1A1, a2A2, a3A3>, then specific present Bt2 could be notation of <a4A4, a5A5, a6A6...anAn>, and so on for Bt3...Bt7 (with a limit due to physiology of human brain of 7 specific presents at any single time (t0)).

So, this is where the notation (and philosophy) of Dr.D has taken my thinking in such a way that I see it forming union with my philosophy--perhaps this all just incorrect. (I do hope Dr.D not view this as another attempt to mock--it no such thing--it my attempt to find common ground between two philosophies held).

therefore, I conclude, and I will end here to see if there are any comments by anyone with an interest in such abstract thinking:

The present (t0) = {Bt-all + Bu}​

or in words: The present is the sum total of all the specific sets of VOEs we know at time (t0) derived from past plus what we have yet to learn of VOEs in future time (t0+1).
 
  • #334
Hi mosassam, your response was wonderful as it clarifies your difficulties quite well and I will do my best to clarify my position on each issue you seem to be having trouble with. And yes, you are over complicating things but that is a difficult thing to avoid as most all of us bring way too much baggage to the station (so to speak). It is quite difficult for people to lay aside their beliefs; after all, their very lives depend upon having viable beliefs.
mosassam said:
Are there numerous flawless Solutions to this set because we are using different combinations of VOE's, or are there numerous Solutions because we still use the complete set but the definitions for each VOE changes with any given Solution?
The various solutions I am talking about are all based on exactly the same set of VOE's but I think I should first make something clear. I am not actually claiming there are numerous flawless solutions. It may very well be that, with a sufficiently large set of VOE's, there exists but one flawless solution but one certainly cannot make such an assumption (it implies that solution is truth). In analyzing the problem of finding explanations (that is, of understanding reality, that collection of VOE's one is trying to understand) one must allow for the possibility that there exist more than one unique flawless solution. By the way, is it clear to you that a "flawless solution" need not be a correct solution? The only constraint on a "flawless solution" is that no contradiction to it exists in the available information (the past upon which it is based). The future may very well invalidate any specific solution.

That comment, "but the definitions ... change", kind of puts the emphasis in the wrong place. The point is that a specific "past" can be explained in more than one way given that the "past" consists of a finite number of elements. It is pretty clear that there are an infinite number of ways of explaining a finite set as infinite merely means "no matter how many you have, you are not yet finished enumerating them". It follows that the "past" upon which your solution is base is finite (you cannot acquire an infinite set of VOE's) and no matter how many explanations you have, it is possible another exists. But that's not an issue we should be getting into now. You can simply relate it to your world view as, "there is more than one way to skin a cat".
mosassam said:
I still have a problem with the "presents". The Solution has different 'aspects' (the different part of the Solution each VOE relates to). I may be overcomplicating things here (or more likely barking up the wrong tree) but I imagine that each "present" (change in knowledge) can relate to a complete VOE or PART OF A VOE.
The VOE has no parts. You have lost sight of the definition "valid ontological element" (that's one reason I really don't like "VOE" even though it saves a lot of typing). An "element" cannot be divided by definition; if division is possible, we are not talking about an element. That is the very central issue of the problem of "infinite regress".

There is that word infinite again! People simply seem to lose sight of the fact that "infinite" means you are not finished, no matter how much you have done. Any solution involving infinite regress cannot be flaw free as you cannot finish the job: i.e., it fails to provide an explanation. The "past" upon which your solution (that flaw free solution) is based cannot be infinite or you couldn't acquire the knowledge of it; your solution must be based upon a finite set of ontological elements (which cannot be divided).

Note that reality, the complete set of valid ontological elements, may very well be infinite. In fact, it should be clear that our only option is to presume it is infinite as to do otherwise is to presume one could reach the state of "knowing everything" with no possibility of error. So long as one includes the possibility of error in your knowledge of reality, you are not finished and that is the very definition of infinity.
mosassam said:
What I mean by this is that some changes in knowledge may lead onto other changes in knowledge and so on.
You should recognize that the moment you use the term, "may", you are discussing a speculative edifice. We are discussing a nature of a "flaw free solution" and how that "flaw free solution" is constrained by the fact that it is based upon a finite set of valid ontological elements. What I am getting at here is that, except for specific logical constraints on that "flaw free solution" which can be proved, we have utterly no interest in speculating as to the nature of that solution. I am quite confident that there are many possibilities which will never occur to us in a million years and we must be careful not to exclude one of them. Our solution explains the known past and the known past only. That is to say, there are no changes in knowledge here; the only changes which exist are expressed in that order of presents which define the structure of change in our past. Our solution must provide that structure, including those changes. Essentially, that past includes "changes in knowledge" which "lead onto other changes in knowledge and so on": i.e., you are talking about what you expect of that solution in terms of your current world view -- this is that baggage you are hauling with you.
mosassam said:
I'm not explaining this correctly, but the Solution is based on the collection of VOE's, and each VOE can either be a single 'present' or a collection of 'presents'.
A valid ontological "element" cannot be a collection of anything. It is "an element" and can not be divided. The "past" consists of a collection of "presents" and every "present" consists of a specific set of valid ontological elements (remember, we are working with an ideal problem not necessarily a real problem).
mosassam said:
PS: I don't understand why the "speculative edifice may very well have the same defined element in two different presents" .
Because the definition of those ontological elements is part of the speculative edifice. Let me put it this way (in terms of the speculative edifice most of us carry around as our personal world view) the other day, when you responded to my last post, you were typing in front of a monitor. Today, as you read this post, you are the same entity which read that earlier post. That entity is defined in terms of a number of ontological elements. It is part of your world view (your speculative edifice) that at least some of those ontological elements are the same ontological elements seen in two different "presents". But you certainly cannot prove that as all you have to go on is your memory; you cannot go back to that earlier past (in your understanding of the past) and check it. It is a presumption and very much a part of that speculative edifice called your world view! But it certainly explains your experiences (your past) so it might well be a flaw free solution and might even be a "true" solution; however, there is some difference between that element "then" and that element "now" so, to contend that they are the "same" ontological element is false on the face of it (it can be divided into that element "then" and that element "now").

I am sorry if my thoughts seem complex; I am only trying to express the problem in a manner which covers all the bases.

Back to you -- Dick
 
  • #335
I am sure this is a total waste of time as I don't believe Rade has any interest in understanding what I say; but I will do it anyway!
Rade said:
1. Let VOE = a single valid ontological element, call it A1
[not sure what a non-valid OE would be, but let us not go there now]
Fine, we can call it A1 :rolleyes:
Rade said:
2. Let the set of all possible VOEs in existence = <A1,A2,A3,...An>
[I take it that Dr. D. holds that the individual VOE of existence are "undefined", more importantly they are "outside" the process called "explanation" or "assumption"--I call this the axiom that "existence exists"--he apparently calls it "starting from undefined ontology". Thus I hold that it is not possible for humans to "know" directly any VOE (I think Dr. D also ?, which leads to...]
The definition is part and parcel of a speculative edifice! :cry:
Rade said:
3. Let a1 = a "reference label" for the VOE A1
[This is a mental process mapping perception to concept formation]
Why do you want two labels for the same VOE? :confused:
Rade said:
4. Let knowledge of VOE A1 = the dialectic union set (aiA1)
[Here I think I differ from Dr.D--but not yet sure. That is, I hold that because it not possible for humans (or any material thing) to "know" any VOE directly, all knowledge of any VOE is a veiled reality of placing a reference label on a metaphysical given VOE]
What purpose does it serve to define the union of one reference label with another reference lable for the same thing. :bugeye: Apparently you want to speculate about something ("I hold" seems to be a belief and not a fact!) :wink:
Rade said:
5. Let Bt1 = any specific present (t1) from the set of all possible presents B
[This from Dr.D but I modify to clarify that there are an infinite number of specific presents (e.g., <t1,t2,t3...tn>)--here we deal with only one Bt1].
I would say that to contend that any speculative edifice is based upon "an infinite number of specific presents" is patently false. It is a presumption of your personal speculative edifice (your world view). Intellectual baggage you insist on hauling around. Talk to Paul about it! :zzz:
Rade said:
6. Let a set of "known" VOEs in present be: Bt1 = <(a1A1),(a2A2),(a3A3)>
[Here, to save space, I only let three VOEs be known in present, of course this could be any number, but can never be "all possible VOEs". The notation follows from my argument of veiled aspect of reality (the metaphysical given) as known by humans (our undefined epistemology or study of the metaphysical given. Thus we see here how there exists dialectic union between metaphysics and epistemology, but note (very important imo), that the "essence" of any VOE derives from epistemology and not metaphysics.
Is not the "essence" of a VOE its meaning? Can you give me an epistemological solution without an ontology? Or are you just trying to avoid discussing ontology? I think you just like "mock battles" with speculative edifices. :smile: :smile:
Rade said:
7. Let Bu, the set of unknown VOE in any solution to explanation of a "specific present" = <A4,A5,A6,...An>
[We see here that, from the set of all possible VOEs in #1 above, there must exist a set of VOEs that have never been mentally transformed in the specific present (Bt1) to form a reference label, that is, they are not "known" in specific present, but do "exist" in specific present]
That seems to be an element of your personal speculative edifice (your world view)! A pure presumption and you certainly cannot prove it. You apparently cannot see around all that baggage you carry with you. :biggrin:
Rade said:
8. Let the set <Bt1,Bt2,Bt3...Bt7> = (sum of all "specific presents"), which I will condense to the notation (Bt-all).
[This derives from facts of research on knowledge that it is possible for any single human to know more than one specific present at exactly the same time--from research the limit for most humans is ~ 7, that is, you can know at any time (t0) as many as 7 different "sets of VOEs" (what Dr. D is calling his Bt).
This again is part and parcel of your personal speculative edifice and has utterly no bearing upon what I am talking about. It is no more than intellectual baggage serving no purpose at all.
Rade said:
I will end here ...
I wish you would.
Rade said:
... to see if there are any comments by anyone with an interest in such abstract thinking:
You mean, interested in charging off towards some speculative edifice with no thought as to the ontological foundations? There are plenty of people who just love to do that but I regard it as a major waste of time. :-p

Have fun -- Dick
 
  • #336
Excellent--I see that Dr. D and I finally reach common understand on a fundamental "speculative edifice" from which both of our respective philosophies are derived--thus

Originally Posted by Rade:
1. Let VOE = a single valid ontological element, call it A1

Comment of Dr. D:
"Fine, we can call it A1"

And I find in communication with Dr. D. that one must be very happy indeed with just these small areas of common understanding.

Now, logic demands that if, as stated by Dr. D., A1 = a VOE of a specific type, then A2 must = a VOE of a second type, and A3 a VOE of a third type and so on, thus the set of all VOEs must be the sum total of all such VOEs.

Now, since Dr. D has already made it very clear that he does not agree with this logic--since he :cry: at the very thought of it--I will request that he not waste mine time (nor his) in any second response here--but I would be very interested to see if others that read this thread either (1) do agree or (2) do not agree with the statement below, and their reasons:

Let the set of all possible VOEs in existence = <A1,A2,A3,...An>​

Given that we start with the speculative edifice of Dr. D:
Let VOE = a single valid ontological element, call it A1---Fine, we can call it A1​
 
  • #337
Is there such thing as illusion? Or is it just a misconstrued, neuronal event? I mean, just because a concept like time doesn't exist outside of the horizon of our neuronal awareness doesn't mean it is an illusion.
 
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  • #338
Hi again,

The other day, someone (not on this forum) asked me for clarification on an issue I thought was quite obvious (it certainly wasn't obvious to him and I suspect it might not be obvious to those on this forum). He was talking about the foundations of arguments and I had said to him that an assertion of his was a violation of the limitations which he should be imposing on the problem of understanding "foundations". He said he didn't understand what I meant and my answer to him was as follows:
Doctordick said:
With regard to the limitations which should be imposed on the problem of understanding "foundations", my position is quite simple. If one looks at the fundamental issue of "foundations", foundations are what the arguments are based upon. If those arguments are based on anything at all, the arguments themselves are not foundations (the foundations are what they are based upon).

This is the very source of "infinite regress". As infinite means that (no matter what you have done) you are not finished, "infinite regress" is clearly not a solution. The only rational answer to the question is that philosophical foundations must be based on nothing! Now most people immediately jump to the conclusion that such a position is equivalent to solipsism and presume the only possible result is either infinite regress or solipsism, neither of which is really acceptable. What they miss is that there is another possibility: foundations might exist but they can not be known: i.e., they can not be defined and must be handled as "unknowns", a mathematical concept. Philosophers seem to have a very difficult time understanding the concept of working with unknowns.
I hope you guys can understand what I just said.

Have fun -- Dick
 
  • #339
Just a quick reply...

Paul Martin said:
That also seems to be closer to my worldview than to yours.

That's probably because I was quoting you from post #303 :)

Some time ago, you and I expressed different views of what might be ultimately fundamental. You thought it might be motion; I think it is the ability to know.

Actually I said, in discussion about the nature of time, that it is often useful to think of motion as more fundamental than time (i.e. to assume that time is a concept with which we handle reality in our mind), and I have clarified that this is just another semantical take on this particular aspect of subjective experience that it is "changing". (Of course I understand that any words, including "changing", is implying one particular sort of worldview that is based on assumptions...)

In other words, and I quote you again:
"Of course we know that we are both guessing and that neither of us can prove our hunch. But we can still talk about it and try to make sense of our guesses."

:)

To interpret your statement, I think we should change "We have nothing but" to "Nothing exists but". That way we don't have to define 'We', which gets all bogged down in identity, self, consciousness, etc., and we don't have to define 'have', which must be some kind of process which again only adds complexity.

Well yeah. I mean, it was your statement, but I know what you mean of course, and actually the way I usually see and word it is that it is the subjective experience that exists by the virtue of some "system" making semantic models of reality. I.e. that reality is not actually made of semantical structures, but the subjective experience cannot be about reality "the way it exists". There are many reasons why I have chosen to see it this way, and it doesn't seem to me to be too hard to figure out. Yet too many people cling onto empirical evidence as a proof that our models - the way we think about systems or reality - is really the way reality exists. It seems absolutely crazy to me to assume it to be so once you look at how we know anything at all.

-Anssi
 
  • #340
AnssiH said:
Well yeah. I mean, it was your statement,
Touche. How careless of me. (Years ago Dr. Dick told me I needed to be more careful when I talk to smart people. He was right; and you are among the smartest people I have ever talked to. Sorry.)
AnssiH said:
but I know what you mean of course, and actually the way I usually see and word it is that it is the subjective experience that exists by the virtue of some "system" making semantic models of reality. I.e. that reality is not actually made of semantical structures, but the subjective experience cannot be about reality "the way it exists".
I agree. I like the way you expressed it.
AnssiH said:
There are many reasons why I have chosen to see it this way, and it doesn't seem to me to be too hard to figure out.
I also have a few reasons for choosing to see it this way. I am curious about how much overlap there is between your reasons and mine.
AnssiH said:
Yet too many people cling onto empirical evidence as a proof that our models - the way we think about systems or reality - is really the way reality exists. It seems absolutely crazy to me to assume it to be so once you look at how we know anything at all.
I agree.
AnssiH quoting Paul Martin said:
But we can still talk about it and try to make sense of our guesses.
When I think about the ultimate origin of reality, here's what makes sense to me. I'll parse your statement: "it is the subjective experience that exists by the virtue of some "system" making semantic models of reality."

First, I assume that "it is the subjective experience that exists" at the outset. I.e., the subjective experience is ontologically fundamental. It seems reasonable to suppose that that subjective experience has the ability to know. That is, it doesn't make much sense to talk about experience if the experience isn't, or can't be, known.

At the very beginning, nothing would be known because there was nothing to know. But, there really would be something to know, viz. the fact that nothing was known. If, somehow, this fact did indeed become known, i.e. the subjective experience experienced, or realized, that fact, then that event, or process of changing state from "not knowing" to "knowing" would constitute what we could call a "system".

The change of state I mentioned would provide a new experience for the subjective experience which would increase the set of facts, or "things" available to the subjective experience.

So, at this stage, it seems that there would be a chicken-egg relationship between the subjective experience and the set of facts, or information that have been (were, are) experienced. They would grow together. And, this would obviously introduce change and time into reality.

At some point, it seems reasonable that the subjective experience would experience something akin to pattern recognition, particularly in some repetitive part of the "system". And the experience of any pattern, would be a different "kind" of experience from that of mere information. The relationship between a pattern and the underlying information could be seen as a semantical relationship. That is, the identification of a pattern could be seen as a symbol standing for the experience of the pattern in the underlying information.

So, by this point, reality would consist of "the subjective experience that exists by the virtue of some "system" making semantic models".

Now, the models are modeling some subset of the information that has been (is, was) experienced by the subjective experience, so, to make a slight modification to your statement, I would say that "it is the subjective experience that exists by the virtue of some "system" making semantic models of some subset of reality."
AnssiH said:
I.e. that reality is not actually made of semantical structures,
...because reality includes more than semantical structures; it also includes the primordial subjective experience.
AnssiH said:
but the subjective experience cannot be about reality "the way it exists".
...because the subjective experience cannot experience itself.

What do you think?

Warm regards,

Paul
 
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  • #341
Paul Martin said:
First, I assume that "it is the subjective experience that exists" at the outset. I.e., the subjective experience is ontologically fundamental. It seems reasonable to suppose that that subjective experience has the ability to know. That is, it doesn't make much sense to talk about experience if the experience isn't, or can't be, known.
I would disagree with this point. The subjective experience does not know anything. Knowing requires a knower, which must be the "I" of subjective experience. Can one have an experience in which the "I" ceases to be? I know from personal experience the answer to be Yes! My favourite part of being a musician is jamming, which involves getting together with other people and making music up from scratch. Instantaneous creativity. During a successful jam the "I" has disappeared, the only reason I know this is because I am well aware of the "I" returning to say "This is great" or some such thing, which kills the moment. I don't have any memory of any jam I've ever done while it was happening because, I suppose, there was no "I" present to remember it. However, when listening back to a recording I am often amazed by my own heightened technical ability and the patterns or lines I've chosen to play which otherwise would never have occurred to me.The same thing happens when contemplating something of immense beauty, having a Eureka moment, and so on.
Two important points I would like to make:
1) The experience cannot be considered an experience until it has ended. Whilst happening it can be described as a state of being. Once over, the "I" comes rushing into claim it. The "I" smashes what has happened into thousands of pieces it can then analyse. The smashing up creates information. The "I" really doesn't like being left out of things, after all, Death can be seen as an "I"less state of being.
2) The state of being cannot be communicated. This can only happen once the "I" has smashed it up and, obviously, this is not the same thing.
If the rational mind can be said to be a crystallisation of the "I", and Science a crystallisation of the rational mind, I think we can see the limitation that science will always have in describing reality - namely, that it is a description.
I would venture reality as a state of being, open to all humans but one that cannot be communicated.
I am not sure, when you talk about subjective experience, whether it incorporates this "I"less state of being or whether you are beginning with the "I". If the latter, I'm not sure how subjective experience can then be considered 'fundamental'.
At the moment I am intrigued by Dr.D's notion of things "emerging from the undefined" as "I" must be considered an assumption.
 
  • #342
Doctordick said:
...With regard to the limitations which should be imposed on the problem of understanding "foundations", my position is quite simple. If one looks at the fundamental issue of "foundations", foundations are what the arguments are based upon. If those arguments are based on anything at all, the arguments themselves are not foundations (the foundations are what they are based upon). This is the very source of "infinite regress". As infinite means that (no matter what you have done) you are not finished, "infinite regress" is clearly not a solution. The only rational answer to the question is that philosophical foundations must be based on nothing! Now most people immediately jump to the conclusion that such a position is equivalent to solipsism and presume the only possible result is either infinite regress or solipsism, neither of which is really acceptable. What they miss is that there is another possibility: foundations might exist but they can not be known: i.e., they can not be defined and must be handled as "unknowns", a mathematical concept. Philosophers seem to have a very difficult time understanding the concept of working with unknowns.
Let me try to understand. First I sort the key points.

1. foundations are what the arguments are based upon. [this informs us we assume that foundations exist]
2. foundations must be based on nothing [yes, this is why they are called foundations--another term used is axiom--the axiom is based on nothing--it is from which all arguments are based upon]
therefore:
3. foundations might exist but they can not be known

But clearly we then have these additional logical possibilities to add to the argument:

4. foundations might exist but they can be known to be based on nothing [in which case the above argument is falsified]
5. foundations might exist but they can not be known directly only indirectly [in which case the above argument is clarified]
 
  • #343
I've been too busy these past days to even read the posts on this thread properly. Hopefully I'll be little bit faster in the future... but then what's the hurry, the world is not going anywhere (I assume :)

Paul Martin said:
The starting point for existence has to be definable, i.e. in the situation (universe, world) in which we find ourselves we must assign tags to things we think exist simply in order to talk about them.

Or to even think about reality.

Little bit later in the same post you said something that struck me as a bit odd:

Are they physical things? Well, that is debatable. You could say that the letters are made of ink molecules arranged in a specific pattern on paper. That would make them physical. Similarly, an uttered phoneme, called 'A', would be made of a pattern of vibrating air molecules which is also physical.

Perhaps it struck me as odd just because I'm interpreting you wrong, but I thought I'd comment just in case.

What do we mean when we say something (like an ink molecule) is "physical"? I thought in your philosophy too, ink molecules and all the smaller particles, including the so-called "fundamental particles" posited by any physical model, are still those "semantical things" that we have classified reality into. I.e. while there is reality behind them, it is an extra assumption to say they are "fundamental", i.e. possesses an identity to themselves.

To say they do have metaphysical identity to themselves is to confuse a physical model with ontology.. It shouldn't be too controversial in this day and age to say something like this, since there exists many alternative (and at this time valid) models where the fundamentals of the Standard Model are thought to be the "side effects" of some different fundamentals. In my opinion the large number of alternative models (that may or may not merge together) is accentuating beautifully this method of "understanding through semantical classification" that we are doing.

So, something being a "physical object" doesn't make it "more real" than any other semantical object, like a rainbow or any other interference pattern, or something like a pattern we have classified as letter "T". This is NOT to be confused with idealism. It is an epistemological assertion made from a completely materialistic framework.

Doctordick said:
Originally Posted by AnssiH
What do you mean with "set of references" (of specific ontological elements)? I.e what does it mean to "refer to a specific element", is it not the same as "defining an ontological element"?

No it isn't. Consider the issue of defining a specific concept. One can cast that problem as an issue between two people (one who knows what he means and the other for whom the concept is still undefined) but you should be aware that even when you are trying to define something to yourself you are very much in the same boat. The process usually starts with a description of what is meant and, when further discussion reveals misunderstanding (or inconsistent conclusions), further communication us used to clarify things. During this period, one can not consider the second party as understanding the definition so, to him (or her), the concept is still undefined though they may very well have agreed upon a reference tag for what they are discussing (I won't comment on the whether the first party really understands their own definition or not; that is a subtle issue). But what you must remember, if you are going to be open minded and objective, is that, even after you have reach what seems to be a consensus, the possibility exists that there is still a misunderstanding there which just hasn't yet become an issue. You must always hold the idea (that you understand something) to be an assumption.

Yeah I very much agree with the above (I'm sure we have all experienced that first hand many times on forums like these :)

And what you describe is exactly the case right now... After reading the above, I *think* in your conception "referring to an ontological element" is the same as "referring to an concept of an ontological element" (like referring to a concept of "photons")?

Before I was thinking that referring to an ontological element was done BY defining an entity that corresponds to certain phenomena (i.e. the entity that is thought to be responsible for certain phenomena, like thinking of "photon" or "mind" as a reference to some real phenomena that is nevertheless not really an "object with identity")

I hope you can pickup what I'm trying to say. It's reeeaallly seriously hard to try and communicate this unambiguously, exactly because of the problem you describe...

Rade said:
[This derives from facts of research on knowledge that it is possible for any single human to know more than one specific present at exactly the same time--from research the limit for most humans is ~ 7, that is, you can know at any time (t0) as many as 7 different "sets of VOEs"

What? :rolleyes:

Paul Martin said:
Touche. How careless of me. (Years ago Dr. Dick told me I needed to be more careful when I talk to smart people. He was right; and you are among the smartest people I have ever talked to. Sorry.)

Wow, thanks. You're not too shabby yourself.

When I think about the ultimate origin of reality, here's what makes sense to me. I'll parse your statement: "it is the subjective experience that exists by the virtue of some "system" making semantic models of reality."

First, I assume that "it is the subjective experience that exists" at the outset. I.e., the subjective experience is ontologically fundamental.

That's not what I was saying. I just refer to "subjective experience" instead of "mind" because the former implies less about the nature of our existence. "Thought happens", but we don't know how, and we don't know what "thoughts" are fundamentally. To assume that subjective experience is ontologically fundamental phenomenon seems to be very shaky assumption; not something I feel like building on (but that's just me :)

The latter part of the sentence should be revealing; "...exist by the virtue of some "system" making semantic models of reality". That is, subjective experience is a phenomenon that exist WHEN some "system" (system is also a semantical concept) models its environment by building semantical models of it. I.e. Subjective experience is NOT ontologicall fundamental (even if it is the starting point of our ontological considerations).

This is just one of the most succint ways to put it and it leaves out some very important requirements, one being what mosassam is describing in post #341. That is, that the system is modeling reality in such a sense that there exists a self. This "self" is a semantical concept that the system makes ABOUT REALITY and can express a situation in form of "self is perceiving" or "self is choosing" or "self is running" by its logical configuration. I.e. we could say it is only an assumption that there exists a "self" with identity (something that persists over time instead of that there only exists memories about a past of semantical "self"), and this assumption appears to be wrong in many ways.

(To continue on what Mosassam is talking about, many athletes have reported that after a peak performance they don't have any recollection of the performance itself... ...this is to be expected since if you have familiarized yourself with a certain pattern well enough, during the performance semantical ideas of "self" would only complicate the situation. You cannot think about the motions associated with playing a guitar too consciously or you will only mess things up. And when there doesn't exists semantics about "self performing" something, there can be no recollection or subjective experience of this at all... Same thing with infant amnesia where no semantical concept of "self" has been formed yet)

Likewise, when I say "reality is not actually made of semantical structures", I mean reality is not actually made of "fundamental entities with identity". That is to say, what we call a photon, is a phenomenon of some sort in reality, but when we are thinking about a system where there exists photons, we are thinking of "things with identity", while in reality no such identity can be claimed. Photon turns out to be just a handy way to model the situation.

It is still merely an assumption that subjective experience springs from some "system" performing such and such semantical classification of reality, and I certainly cannot explain WHY it would be so. But when you think about something like, how electrochemical patterns flow around in the brain, you are still only conscious of that semantical MODEL of reality where there exists such things as "electrochemical patterns" (or "electrons" and "chemicals" that you tack with identity) and consequently you could not hope for understanding properly the relationship between the models of reality that you hold, and the true reality of your "mind" (in so far that we can refer to it as a "mind")

At first this can seem little bit odd, not least because we certainly feel like we have identity to ourselves. But then it is not really possible to pin down what constitutes the identity of self, other than defining ourselves in some semantical form, like "our memories define ourselves". But it is possible to see ourself as a case of certain memories being expressed in a stable manner by certain configuration of reality.

In the end, any words I might use to describe this situation is a case of referring to semantical elements. It is not possible to have thoughts about systems without assuming identity of some sort, and for this reason it seems to us like there must exist some fundamentals with identity (something "to start with").

But if "identity" indeed is completely artificial (semantical) concept that bears NO MEANING TO REALITY WHATSOEVER, then all our thoughts about reality are always to some extent confused from the actual ontological nature of reality. This is pretty serious limitation to our thoughts :) (But not to our predictive capabilities, which is where all the advances in science exist)

-Anssi
 
  • #344
Who really knows?

I think on a much larger scale than our own existence we can treat ourselves as one single atom.We say things change but never came to the fact that things can repeat as well.Could this mean that when my life ends it will repeat in a shadow form with no difference.If someone says there was no start or no end,this means we are stuck in a continues repeat.In othere words I am here and have always been here,I also will be here.I am talking about what we see as present.We are our own universe, we were never put here, that would need a start.Energy has no start nor stop.All there is is an instant.I think awareness slows down time to us.Who really knows?
 
  • #345
AnssiH said:
This "self" is a semantical concept that the system makes ABOUT REALITY
Once again, your clarity shines through. The Self is not 'central', it is just another 'semantical concept ABOUT reality'. OOOOUUUUCH! But what observes this state of affairs. Thought? Simple awareness? (When I use the word 'observe' I literally mean it. Some things are reasoned constructs and some things can be just "seen". A problem I'm having with Dr.D's stuff is that I'm having to build an understanding using reason, I've not yet had the insight that allows me to "see" what he is driving at)
The System (you mention) that makes the semantical concept of the Self needs some clarification (I certainly don't want to be getting into some meta-self. Or do I?).
Thought seems to be the greatest obstacle in experiencing reality but when used correctly can provide the flash of insight that can almost allow one to glimpse the "fabric of reality" (perhaps). Physical reality is, to a certain extent, created by Thought. What is the nature of reality without Thought? Quantum Theory seems very close to reaching this point, but there doesn't seem to be a way it can 'cross the line'. (Warning - oversimplification:) an electron has properties "only when we're looking" (ie: only when thought is used). What is happening when we're not looking because I'm betting THAT is reality :bugeye:
In a previous post I'm sure you said you were dubious about consciousness having an effect at a quantum level (ie: effecting certain experiments). From the little I understand, I still have the lingering feeling it does, somehow. If you can, please clarify.
 
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  • #346
AnssiH said:
...But if "identity" indeed is completely artificial (semantical) concept that bears NO MEANING TO REALITY WHATSOEVER, then all our thoughts about reality are always to some extent confused from the actual ontological nature of reality...
But, your but conclusion is not necessarily a truth statement, for to say that a metaphysical entity has "identity" can be nothing more than saying that "identity" evolves from dialectic union of axioms of "existence" and "consciousness". To put it simply (as put by Ayn Rand):
Existence is Identity
Consciousness is Identification​
To hold that "identity as a concept bears no meaning to reality", is to say you hold that a metaphysical entity can exist apart from its characteristics, which is a completely artificial (semantical) concept because it leads to a contradictory conclusion that a metaphysical entity is a non-existent, which is a logical impossibility. I find that you attempt to force the concept of "identity" into a false dichotomy--to force it into either the camp of existence OR consciousness when it is nothing of the sort--it is a concept formed from the dialectic union of the two.
 
  • #347
Rade said:
To hold that "identity as a concept bears no meaning to reality"

The statement you are analysing is an If/Then statement. You have presented it as if some law is being laid down, which obviously it isn't.
My interpretation of what Anssi is saying is that thought fragments reality into different categories, classifications - identities. We divide reality into a list of contents which we label. This way we can communicate with each other. More importantly, it seems that thought must fragment reality so that it can think about reality (which, I believe, demonstrates the fundamental nature of thought - if it did not divide, thought would not exist).
However, IF this dividing process (allotting identities) has nothing to do with what reality actually is, THEN thought (the source and product of the dividing process) will never be able to grasp the true nature of reality.
If this is a correct interpretation I would say this - the reality I have just been referring to I have previously labelled the unified whole and have been viewing this as the "true" underlying reality that thought has separated us from. However, the "true" underlying reality may be the Yin/Yang interplay of thought (the particle) and unified whole (the wave). The balance of these complementary 'forces' (the wavicle?? (D'oh!:bugeye: )) may be fundamental reality.
(IJMTU)
PS: Any chance of getting back to Dr.D's stuff)
 
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  • #348
mosassam said:
.. the "true" underlying reality may be the Yin/Yang interplay of thought (the particle) and unified whole (the wave). The balance of these complementary 'forces' (the wavicle?? (D'oh!:bugeye: )) may be fundamental reality...
Yes, I agree with this logic that there is a dialectic (Yin/Yang) interplay that form a balance (or synthesis) to explan what you call the "underlying reality", that is, the ONLY reality that any human can "explain"--it is what I was trying to explain to Dr.D. with no success when I presented this modification to his first equation concerning the "present" in a previous post:
Let a set of "known" VOEs in present be: Bt1 = <(a1A1),(a2A2),(a3A3)...anAn>​
So given that VOEs are "valid ontological elements" in the present, the "true underlying reality of the specific present for you at a specific space and time" (Bt1) is the interplay of "thought" about three specific VOEs, what I symbolize as (a1,a2,a3) and the three specific undefined axiomatic VOEs (A1,A2,A3), and so, what you refer to as being the "balance" (or synthesis) is the right side of the equation for a "specific present"--it is for me the equation of your "wavicle":
<(a1A1),(a2A2),(a3A3)...anAn>​
Thus for me the balance of the Yin/Yang derives from the dialectic of onotology (the study of what exists as VOEs--the A1,A2,A3) and epistemology (the study of the "thought" of what exists as VOEs--the a1,a2,a3). The underlying reality is a quantum superposition based on use of mathematics to first differentiate "perception" of VOEs and then to integrate via thought to "concept" of VOEs. Perhaps we can say that the:
"explanation of underlying reality" = process of the calculus​
Let me know where this does not make sense.
 
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  • #349
Rade said:
to explan what you call the "underlying reality", that is, the ONLY reality that any human can "explain"
This doesn't tally with what I was saying. Before explaining why, I must confess that my last post (like so many of mine) can be viewed as bulls#*t, because they are my groping attempts to get to a 'model' of reality that feels right to me, one that makes maximum sense (to me) logically but also intuitively. (hardly scientific)
In the post I refer to three elements -
1) Thought (the Many, Divider, the Particle)
2) Unified Whole (the One, Unifier, the Wave)
3) and the balance of these two complementary "forces", Fundamental Reality
The only thing that can be explained of these three is Thought, and that hasn't even been accomplished with much success at the moment. The Unified Whole may be detectable but it cannot be communicated, and thus cannot be explained. As for Fundamental Reality, that fact of the matter is I've got a cheek even mentioning it, but for me there is a deep beauty to this simple explanation of affairs and that's all its got going for it.
As for the rest of your post - I'm using every ounce of brain power I have trying to get a handle on what Dr.D is going on about but (I think) you seem to have misunderstood what present actually means which, I believe, is - a change in knowledge. Once this change has occurred, the knowledge becomes 'known' and, thus, becomes the past. So, when you write
"...given that VOE's are "valid ontological elements" in the present...", you seems to be using present in a different way than Dr.D is.
PS: I would like to retract the word "wavicle" as it seems so bloody stupid!
 
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  • #350
I'll be speaking entirely through my particular worldview (acknowledge these are just my beliefs, although I haven't laid them on too shaky grounds I can assure you)

mosassam said:
Once again, your clarity shines through. The Self is not 'central', it is just another 'semantical concept ABOUT reality'. OOOOUUUUCH! But what observes this state of affairs. Thought? Simple awareness?

This is exactly where we should divorce from the intuitive idea where some thing must be "observing this state of affairs" (or we quickly end up to dualism and/or homunculus argument and/or naive realism). This is intuitive idea precisely because the brain builds a worldview by classifying it into "things"; one of these things is "self". By inventing such an object as "self", the "rational" interpretation of the sensory data turns into a form of "self is perceiving". In a purely materialistic stance, this must be enough for a subjective experience to occur, i.e. we assume that reality is such a place where this kind of process causes subjective experience (albeit our understanding of that very process is quite shaky since it is based on us classifying that process into "sensible things", while reality is not quite like that -> our own ontological nature is still shrouded from our thoughts)

Let me offer you some material for wrestling that idea of "being no one" properly into your system. Consider a thought experiment where you undergo an adult mitosis. That is, every cell in your body is copied and you split into two; both into the exact same physical state. Which one is the one where the "old you" will go? (Whose "point of view" your current self will assume?) To up the ante, ask yourself if you would agree to undergo an adult mitosis, and have another one of the copies killed, and have the other given a million dollars.

If you find yourself baffled by this thought experiment, it can only be because you have traces of "non-physical self" ideas left in your thinking. In a materialistic stance, the contents of your subjective experience are caused by certain configuration of the brain. With two configurations in the exact same state, there will be two subjective experiences both having the same memories, and both being convinced they are the same self that existed before the split. From this you can derive how there is no metaphysical identity to yourself from one moment to the next either.

For further clarity, let's view this matter from the point of view of natural evolution.

Dawkins describes nicely in "The Selfish Gene" how intelligence as a survival method came to be. Rather than reacting to the changes in the environment merely by the natural selection of the genes, the animal branch of the survival machines begun reacting to their environment by learning meaningful reactions to certain stimulus. That is, mobile organisms became able to react to dangers immediately; this obviously improves their changes in the gene pool. In other words, first iterations of simple sensory systems & nervous systems turned up into the scene. These are basically relatively simple systems, with simple reactions to certain stimulus; hardly a case of something having a subjective experience.

We can see that it would be extremely beneficial for an organism to be able to predict events in its environment rather than to just react in a straightforward manner to certain stimulus. I.e. to be able to recognize a rock that is rolling towards it, and to be able to predict it is going to get hit unless it does something.

After many iterations, the nervous systems become able to do just that; to predict reality. For some system to predict some scene, it must model it, by classifying it into "sensible components" to which it assumes certain behaviour, and consequently it can "simulate" how those components behave together (Much like we perform weather simulations by modeling the weather system). In a sense, this is what the brain is; a machine that runs a simulation of reality, so to be able to make rational predictions.

The point to stress here is precisely that idea about the brain classifying reality into sensible components. I suspect this sounds very familiar to you, but it has to be understood precisely. When you are looking at a ball that flies through your field of view, the brain is basically receiving bunch of spatial/temporal patterns flowing into different parts of the cortex as the ball moves in your view. For the system to be able to interpret this avalanche of patterns as a "single ball in motion", quite a few things have to happen. At a sufficiently high abstraction level we can say simply refer to this processas a case of spatial/temporal patterns being interpreted against a worldview. It is that worldview which contains the information about what sorts of "things" exist and how they behave.

Note that at all times, this whole recognition process is done for predictive purposes. If the brain recognizes that avalance of patterns as a case of a ball in flight, and it has assumed certain behaviour to balls, it can immediately draw a meaningful prediction about where that ball is going to land. Basically any activity you do can be seen as a case of prediction through semantical model of reality.

Now, as the nervous systems kept improving and became capable of forming more and more sophisticated worldviews, the resulting behaviour of the organisms became "more intelligent". I.e. they could figure things out with greater accuracy, and use more complex reasoning and form more and more abstract concepts to their advantage. At some point when such a system becomes capable enough, and it forms concepts like "existence" and "reality", it cannot help but draw such an assumption about its sensory data, that it exists itself! This is basically a case of "self" becoming a semantical concept of that worldview (It requires quite a few assumptions about reality before assumptions about self come to exist). And this is basically how we all become aware of ourselves during the first years of our lives. Helen Keller has said that the first time she realized there is a reality out there, was the first time she also realized "she existed", and she says "that was the first time consciousness existed in me" (or something akin to that).

And like you noted, we regularly lose subjective experience for moments, when the brain just doesn't happen to interpret the situation in the form of "self experiencing" (or "self-reflection" might exist in very weak sense)

I suspect if you now take a look at the book description and the first pages of:
https://www.amazon.com/dp/0262633086/?tag=pfamazon01-20
it will make a lot of sense to you.

(When I use the word 'observe' I literally mean it. Some things are reasoned constructs and some things can be just "seen".

You have gotten over naive realism though? There must exist an interpretation of the sensory data (that avalance of patterns) before it turns into a subjective experience. That interpretation is done against a worldview that is a semantical construction, in that it is built out of certain assumptions about reality.

The System (you mention) that makes the semantical concept of the Self needs some clarification (I certainly don't want to be getting into some meta-self. Or do I?).

Not really. The explanation can be as mundane as to just look at the physical functions of the brain and understanding them in an appropriate logical level. The reason I say "a system" rather than "a brain" is that the former implies less about the nature of ourselves. The brain is what we understand through our worldview. It is completely circular reasoning to say what I'm saying, since I am basing my arguments on the worldview whose existence I am trying to describe. Little bit tricky state of affairs :)

Thought seems to be the greatest obstacle in experiencing reality but when used correctly can provide the flash of insight that can almost allow one to glimpse the "fabric of reality" (perhaps).

Yeah. In that we can tell how some of our tacit ideas may be dead wrong.

Physical reality is, to a certain extent, created by Thought. What is the nature of reality without Thought? Quantum Theory seems very close to reaching this point, but there doesn't seem to be a way it can 'cross the line'. (Warning - oversimplification:) an electron has properties "only when we're looking" (ie: only when thought is used). What is happening when we're not looking because I'm betting THAT is reality :bugeye:
In a previous post I'm sure you said you were dubious about consciousness having an effect at a quantum level (ie: effecting certain experiments). From the little I understand, I still have the lingering feeling it does, somehow. If you can, please clarify.

This idea about subjective experience "collapsing" reality places some very specific constraints on the nature of that subjective experience (and reality). What I'm describing above for example, is directly contradicting such idealistic ideas.

A coherent idealistic worldview can be built, but the findings of quantum mechanics don't point at that direction very strongly, although these kinds of ideas are often spread to the general public (Probably because we are naturally drawn to mysteries). Copenhagen interpretation did not directly try to suggest that consciousness collapses wave function, but some people interpreted Copenhagen that way. This is because Copenhagen remained completely vague about what it means to observe something (so it is easy to interpret the idea as if only subjective experience is considered observation).

Anyway, in reality we don't have any observations that suggest that strongly towards idealistic schemes. There are mysterious observations, but it is by far more likely that they are mysterious because our model of reality is not the way reality really is; that some particularly sticky assumptions about reality are in fact dead wrong.

Which ones, who knows? Dr Dick is proposing a method for structuring our attempts.

Apologies for length

-Anssi
 
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  • #351
Rade said:
But, your but conclusion is not necessarily a truth statement, for to say that a metaphysical entity has "identity" can be nothing more than saying that "identity" evolves from dialectic union of axioms of "existence" and "consciousness". To put it simply (as put by Ayn Rand):
Existence is Identity
Consciousness is Identification​
To hold that "identity as a concept bears no meaning to reality", is to say you hold that a metaphysical entity can exist apart from its characteristics,

No, I'm rather saying that a "metaphysical entity" is a concept that exists due to the way the brain is structuring reality (by recognizing characteristics). There is no reason to assume metaphysical identity to the brain to say this, but there is a reason to assume the existence of reality in some stable manner. Just that the idea of identity to anything at all can still be just a method for prediction. In a sense, the real nature of reality becomes inherently unintelligible, while reality does exist.

Can we say that existence is identity; subjective experience certainly exists, but to what extent it has got identity? We have our memories certainly, but consider the adult mitosis thought experiment in the previous post.

This is very difficult subject to communicate though, I can't be sure about anyones opinion even when they try to communicate it to me... :( (Wonder what Ayn Rand means specifically...)

-Anssi
 
  • #352
AnssiH said:
This is exactly where we should divorce from the intuitive idea where some thing must be "observing this state of affairs" (or we quickly end up to dualism and/or homunculus argument and/or naive realism).
This, for me, is the point of interest. Let's forget dualism or the 'little man inside', that's just Thought trying to have its way. Genuine creativity occurs in the absence of "the observer" (be it baking, athletics, maths, music, etc.), but what is creating? (this is actually a stupid question but I don't know another way to phrase what I'm trying to say)

This is intuitive idea precisely because the brain builds a worldview by classifying it into "things"; one of these things is "self". By inventing such an object as "self", the "rational" interpretation of the sensory data turns into a form of "self is perceiving". In a purely materialistic stance, this must be enough for a subjective experience to occur, i.e. we assume that reality is such a place where this kind of process causes subjective experience (albeit our understanding of that very process is quite shaky since it is based on us classifying that process into "sensible things", while reality is not quite like that -> our own ontological nature is still shrouded from our thoughts)
I can see how "self" is unlike other 'things' in that it is a conduit through which everything else passes (for me), but the 'thing' that "sees" this must be another aspect of "self", so I don't know where that leaves me.

Let me offer you some material for wrestling that idea of "being no one" properly into your system. Consider a thought experiment where you undergo an adult mitosis. That is, every cell in your body is copied and you split into two; both into the exact same physical state. Which one is the one where the "old you" will go? (Whose "point of view" your current self will assume?) To up the ante, ask yourself if you would agree to undergo an adult mitosis, and have another one of the copies killed, and have the other given a million dollars.
The only thing I can glean from this thought experiment is that Thought is not mine. Thought is like an 'unseen river' that both me and my copy dip our heads in, believing that we have our "own" thoughts because we are physically separated, whereas we actually 'share' Thought, only circumstances, and our physical nature, give the 'illusion' of separate thoughts.
If you find yourself baffled by this thought experiment, it can only be because you have traces of "non-physical self" ideas left in your thinking. In a materialistic stance, the contents of your subjective experience are caused by certain configuration of the brain. With two configurations in the exact same state, there will be two subjective experiences both having the same memories, and both being convinced they are the same self that existed before the split. From this you can derive how there is no metaphysical identity to yourself from one moment to the next either.
They are both the "same self that existed before the split", but to each other they are strangers, due to the physical nature of the separating process of thought.

After many iterations, the nervous systems become able to do just that; to predict reality. For some system to predict some scene, it must model it, by classifying it into "sensible components" to which it assumes certain behaviour, and consequently it can "simulate" how those components behave together (Much like we perform weather simulations by modeling the weather system). In a sense, this is what the brain is; a machine that runs a simulation of reality, so to be able to make rational predictions.

I disagree with this situation completely. I view the nervous system as an interface between the 'internal' and 'external' "realities". Changes in the environment trigger physical changes the neural structure of the nervous system, leading to changes (or affirmations) of mind patterns. Conversely, changes in mind patterns trigger changes in the neural structure of the nervous system, leading to changes (or not) of the environment. I certainly don't view the brain as some isolated entity running programs. (check out Mantura/Verala - (Wiki) Autopoiesis)

Anssi - I have to bail out right now but I will return :bugeye:
 
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  • #353
mosassam said:
I can see how "self" is unlike other 'things' in that it is a conduit through which everything else passes (for me), but the 'thing' that "sees" this must be another aspect of "self", so I don't know where that leaves me.

Well, think about all those rational reasons that lead you to believe that "the thing that sees is another aspect of self" (like an entity on its own, right?). I.e. think about what other beliefs this belief is based on. To what extent can you trust all the assumptions that must have been made about reality before you can even begin to believe there is some kind of a metaphysical observer somehow connected to the brain?

And to open another line of thought, think about all the functions that this "observer" would have to be capable of metaphysically (without any internal mechanism) Like object recognition (observation is object recognition). If you imagine it does have some internal mechanism to perform this function, well then it's not a metaphysical entity anymore but a system, and it also happens to be just the kind of system that the brain appears to be. An unobservable brain inside the observable brain. Little bit tricky idea.

-Anssi
 
  • #354
I spoke earlier of presenting an unrealistic example for the purpose of illustrating some of the important aspects of treating the ontology as an unknown. The following is the presentation of that "unrealistic" example I had in mind.

I have defined "reality" to be the valid ontology underlying any explanation of the universe. What is very clear is that we have no way of knowing which part of those ontologies which underly our epistemological solutions are valid and which are merely mental constructs required by those solutions themselves. For this reason, I will first consider the quite unrealistic hypothetical problem where the known past (what is to be explained) consists only of valid ontological elements. What these ontological elements actually are is undefined so all we have to work with are references to those elements. In this picture, the "past", that which is to be explained, consists of a finite collection of valid ontological elements. As I commented earlier, that "past" can be seen as a sequence of changes (I defined "changes" in what is known as "presents") which are themselves part of what is to be explained. To put it simply, what is to be explained is a specific sequence of collections of ontological elements which are known only by specific references to those elements (any definitions are embedded in that structure of those references themselves and, if the specific epistemological construct which explains that sequence is understood, the definitions will be presumed to be understood).

Reality itself is the complete set of valid ontological elements (I will call this the set A). Clearly, the set A must be regarded as infinite as, no matter how many elements are contained in the "past" which is to be explained, we must include the possibility that there exists a valid element of which we are ignorant (i.e., that a future exists). This is the very definition of the concept "infinite". On the other hand, "the past" which is to be explained must be finite as, if it were infinite, we could not have knowledge of it (we couldn't finish "knowing the information"). Thus it is that the past can be seen as a finite sequence of presents, each of which consist of a finite collection of valid ontological elements. The past, the set C, consists of an ordered collection of sets Bt<a1,a2, ... , an>. The terms "aj" are simply references to those individual ontological elements which go to make up this "past" which is to be explained.

In most logical examples, those references mentioned above would be given via English words or phrases; however, this is certainly not a necessary requirement. We can, in fact, use numerical labels to play this role. The great advantage of using numerical labels is the simple fact that there exist an infinite number available to be used as specific labels. The other advantage is that "numerical labels" contain no information in and of themselves: i.e., it is easy to comprehend that the meanings are not carried in the symbols themselves, something very difficult to comprehend when the labels are given in a specified language. People find it very difficult to comprehend the possibility of error in their understanding of English labels.

Under this perspective, what is to be explained is a finite sequence of finite collections of numbers (our references to the known past). Since no flaw free explanation can be expected to explain anything beyond that "known collection", the only expectations which that explanation can be presumed to provide consists of the validity of any specific "present": i.e., the validity of the set of numbers Bt where "t" is an index on that sequence.

Since the number of collections is finite and the number of reference labels in any collection is also finite, the explanation can be put in the form of a table (in some ways analogous to a truth table common to any logical analysis). As I defined "an explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from "known information", this table fulfills the definition of an explanation. Given any set of numbers, all one need do is look at the table. If the set is in the table, it is a valid set; if not, it isn't a valid set. What you must consider when you think about that issue is the fact that, though what might be considered an explanation under common concepts may be quite different from that table (the method might very well be some logical procedure), the procedure must yield exactly the same result as examining the table just defined. And second, that logical procedure, no matter what it may be, can be seen as manipulation of those numerical labels.

What is important about that last point is that, the explanation (the tabular solution), as given has no capability of yielding expectations outside the actual given past; however, it can be seen as a mathematical table of expectations for specific known "presents" which could be created by some logical manipulation of those numerical labels. That logical manipulation of numerical labels has the capability of yielding expectations outside the known information. So what we are talking about here are methods of interpolation which agree perfectly with the known information.

I'll see if anyone can get their head around that before I go any farther. I am sure your reactions are going to be far from what I expect and am quite curious as to how you will interpret what I have just said.

Have fun -- Dick
 
  • #355
AnssiH said:
...subjective experience certainly exists, but to what extent has it got identity?...
Before I can respond I need to understand what you mean by "subjective"--do you mean a mental thought that is unrelated to facts of reality and assigned arbitrary groupings (say into sets of VOEs).

Consider two options:
Option A. subjective experience derives from subjective mind (Kant)

Option B. subjective experience derives from objective reality (Rand)

Which Option is it for you, A, B, or neither ?
 
  • #356
Doctordick said:
...I have defined "reality" to be the valid ontology underlying any explanation of the universe...
:confused: I thought your philosophy was the one derived from "UNDEFINED ONTOLOGY"--now here you go starting a very long thread with "A DEFINITION" of ontology itself:cry: Or, are you now saying, since you want to begin your argument with a "definition of reality", that you no longer hold a philosophy of "undefined ontology" ? Am I the only one having a problem with this ?
 
  • #357
Doctordick said:
...What is very clear is that we have no way of knowing which part of those ontologies which underly our epistemological solutions are valid and which are merely mental constructs required by those solutions themselves. For this reason, ...
NO, this is NOT VERY CLEAR--NOTHING IS CLEAR ABOUT HOW HUMANS "KNOW" ANY"THING". So, let us start with discussion of these options and then all agree that #1 (the one used by Dr.D. to derive his philosophy) is the only one that is "very clear" to all.

1. Humans have "no way of knowing which part...are valid...are mental constructs" [Dr.D. option]
2. Humans have "only one way of knowing which part...are valid..."
3. Humans have "more than one way of knowing which part...are valid..."

Note added in edit: Dr. D., a question for you. Why do you distinguish between parts of ontology that (1) are "valid" vs those that are (2) "mental constructs" ? I see no good reason why ...parts of ontology cannot be both "valid" AND "mental constructs" as a dialectic union...
 
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  • #358
Doctordick said:
I spoke earlier of presenting an unrealistic example for the purpose of illustrating some of the important aspects of treating the ontology as an unknown. The following is the presentation of that "unrealistic" example I had in mind.

I have defined "reality" to be the valid ontology underlying any explanation of the universe. What is very clear is that we have no way of knowing which part of those ontologies which underly our epistemological solutions are valid and which are merely mental constructs required by those solutions themselves. For this reason, I will first consider the quite unrealistic hypothetical problem where the known past (what is to be explained) consists only of valid ontological elements. What these ontological elements actually are is undefined so all we have to work with are references to those elements. In this picture, the "past", that which is to be explained, consists of a finite collection of valid ontological elements. As I commented earlier, that "past" can be seen as a sequence of changes (I defined "changes" in what is known as "presents") which are themselves part of what is to be explained. To put it simply, what is to be explained is a specific sequence of collections of ontological elements which are known only by specific references to those elements (any definitions are embedded in that structure of those references themselves and, if the specific epistemological construct which explains that sequence is understood, the definitions will be presumed to be understood).

Reality itself is the complete set of valid ontological elements (I will call this the set A). Clearly, the set A must be regarded as infinite as, no matter how many elements are contained in the "past" which is to be explained, we must include the possibility that there exists a valid element of which we are ignorant (i.e., that a future exists). This is the very definition of the concept "infinite". On the other hand, "the past" which is to be explained must be finite as, if it were infinite, we could not have knowledge of it (we couldn't finish "knowing the information"). Thus it is that the past can be seen as a finite sequence of presents, each of which consist of a finite collection of valid ontological elements. The past, the set C, consists of an ordered collection of sets Bt<a1,a2, ... , an>. The terms "aj" are simply references to those individual ontological elements which go to make up this "past" which is to be explained.

In most logical examples, those references mentioned above would be given via English words or phrases; however, this is certainly not a necessary requirement. We can, in fact, use numerical labels to play this role. The great advantage of using numerical labels is the simple fact that there exist an infinite number available to be used as specific labels. The other advantage is that "numerical labels" contain no information in and of themselves: i.e., it is easy to comprehend that the meanings are not carried in the symbols themselves, something very difficult to comprehend when the labels are given in a specified language. People find it very difficult to comprehend the possibility of error in their understanding of English labels.

Under this perspective, what is to be explained is a finite sequence of finite collections of numbers (our references to the known past). Since no flaw free explanation can be expected to explain anything beyond that "known collection", the only expectations which that explanation can be presumed to provide consists of the validity of any specific "present": i.e., the validity of the set of numbers Bt where "t" is an index on that sequence.

Since the number of collections is finite and the number of reference labels in any collection is also finite, the explanation can be put in the form of a table (in some ways analogous to a truth table common to any logical analysis). As I defined "an explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from "known information", this table fulfills the definition of an explanation. Given any set of numbers, all one need do is look at the table. If the set is in the table, it is a valid set; if not, it isn't a valid set. What you must consider when you think about that issue is the fact that, though what might be considered an explanation under common concepts may be quite different from that table (the method might very well be some logical procedure), the procedure must yield exactly the same result as examining the table just defined. And second, that logical procedure, no matter what it may be, can be seen as manipulation of those numerical labels.

What is important about that last point is that, the explanation (the tabular solution), as given has no capability of yielding expectations outside the actual given past; however, it can be seen as a mathematical table of expectations for specific known "presents" which could be created by some logical manipulation of those numerical labels. That logical manipulation of numerical labels has the capability of yielding expectations outside the known information. So what we are talking about here are methods of interpolation which agree perfectly with the known information.

I'll see if anyone can get their head around that before I go any farther. I am sure your reactions are going to be far from what I expect and am quite curious as to how you will interpret what I have just said.

Well, it certainly is little bit tricky to interpret unambiguously.

I picked up that you presented a hypothetical example where you don't yet tackle the complications that arise due to the fact that we don't know which elements of an ontology are "valid" and which are mental constructs?

Then you propose marking down all the elements (which are all valid in this example) onto a table, but how that is useful I didn't yet get...

Hmm, also, perhaps you can clarify another thing which I've wondered before. You have chosen to handle ontology as a set of "presents" (set of moments?), this I reckon is like defining "what exists at each moment"? This is one of the most difficult things to remember when reading your text, since we are (or at least I am) so used to handle ontological elements as a set of "stable functions", i.e. instead of defining everything that ever existed in each moment, I would rather attempt to define how reality behaves.

Would this approach be incompatible to what you are presenting (I'm not quite sure where you presentation is heading), and/or do you feel it would be presupposing too much to think it's valid to define ontology as a set of stable functions(behaviours)?

I hope you can understand what I'm asking because it is pretty hard to even think of meaningful questions... :I

-Anssi
 
  • #359
Rade said:
Before I can respond I need to understand what you mean by "subjective"--do you mean a mental thought that is unrelated to facts of reality and assigned arbitrary groupings (say into sets of VOEs).

When I said "subjective experience certainly exists", I was referring to that all-familiar experience that we are having. That which consists of all sorts of "things" that we recognize around us, whatever their underlying nature (causes) might be.

But it is not a naive realistic experience; the aspects it consists of don't exist in reality the way we experience them, but according to our best physical models the particular subjective experience is caused by a specific way our brain/sensory systems recognizes wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation (colour) or air pressure fluctuations => differences in air molecule density (sound) etc... I.e. the subjective experience is not "like" objective reality exists, but it is rather just a particular way to "handle" that reality.

Consider two options:
Option A. subjective experience derives from subjective mind (Kant)

Option B. subjective experience derives from objective reality (Rand)

Which Option is it for you, A, B, or neither ?

I could agree with both, depending on how you mean them. I would say that which could be called "objectve reality" exists, and by "subjective mind" I would refer to the specific high-level process (portion of that reality) that is causing the subjective experience.

Even reading the wikipedia page about Rand and her view she calls Objectivism, I could still agree with both depending on how I should interpret these views.

I am not proposing that reality does not exist, but I am proposing that when we point our finger at some particular stable pattern of it and call it by name, it doesn't mean an entity like that actually exists in ontological sense (that reality is made of such entities).

You could choose to understand the word "identity" as just a reference to certain stable property or characteristic of something, and in that sense point your finger at a wave on a pond and say it has got identity, while also those water molecules that are just going up and down are also having an identity of their own.

With a different definition to "identity" you could say that wave does not have identity but the molecules do, or at least the elementary particles that the molecules are composed of have got identity to themselves (i.e. if the water molecules were swapping those elemantary particles with each others all the time, they would not have a persisting identity).

This is probably the most common definition people assume to "identity", and in this view you would not say that the hole of a doughnut has got identity to itself (while it stably exists), but the doughnut itself does (since its made of elementary particles that are usually thought to possesses identity).

Note that with this definition already, when joined with materialism, the identity of "self" disappears. You are a learning machine and your knowledge and memories (and consequently the way you react to stimulus) exists only in the specific configuration of neurons that keeps changing all the time. You think there is a self with identity, but that is only because your experience and your memories persist, and it would persist even if all the material particles of your brain were switched to different particles; as long as that specific configuration remained that holds/is your memories.

But let's push it little bit further still. Why suppose those elementary particles have got identity to themselves; perhaps they are just a specific configuration of energy in constant flux (after all, matter can be turned into energy and vice versa). Checking out Milo Wolff's model where everything is made of spherical standing waves of space is a good excercise here, regardless of what you might think of the validity of that model.

Next we need to also question the identity of "energy". And we run into trouble, much like we ran into trouble with the identity of space when Newtonian relativity was introduced (there was no longer reason to assume space has got metaphysical "locations" (rest frame) in it, and yet objects are moving "through it". Instead space should be seen either as a relativistic spacetime construction, or as something that matter gives rise to... our conception of "space" turn out to be rather full of questions)

So we can see that it is an extra assumption to assume identity to any elementary particles that exist in any model, be it photons, electrons or quarks. While all these things "exist" in the same sense that that hole in the doughnut exists.

Let me still tell you that it can be quite illuminating to look at the quantum mechanics while keeping in mind that these little particles that move in such an odd manner, probably do not have an identity to themselves. It doesn't resolve the mystery, but it certainly seems to be few steps forward as long as you remember all the measuring devices are similarly "stable things without identity", and that we indeed do tend to find the particles from locations that would hold a highest "energy density" at any given moment. (The timewise evolution of quantum systems is seriously shrouded in mystery still, but then, time is also a semantical concept we hold in our minds... :I)

Oh, and some people at this point cannot find much sense to the idea that nothing would have an identity... ...this would be the case already due to the way our brain appears to be modeling a reality (building a worldview). To model something, you have got to describe it in terms of certain objects and their associated behaviour, regardless of how it really exists. To think of reality, we absolutely must classify it into "sensible objects".

I am not sure if Rand or Kant would disagree, and if so, at which points.

-Anssi
 
  • #360
AnssiH said:
When I said "subjective experience certainly exists", I was referring to that all-familiar experience that we are having. That which consists of all sorts of "things" that we recognize around us, whatever their underlying nature (causes) might be.
Thank you for the clarity of your response.

Following this quote from your post:
"I am not proposing that reality does not exist"--that is, you propose that reality does exist, therefore as a Premise #1 let us agree:
Reality Exists​
[Note: here you will find agreement with Rand, although she states it as]:
"Existence Exists"​
And then your quote:
"To think of reality, we absolutely must classify it into "sensible objects"."

Now, suppose a "sensible object" {X} that is real before you and you point your finger at it. Would you then agree that ?:
your experience of {X}= dialectic union of your subjective mind + objective reality of {X}​

If so, can we not conclude that the terms "subjective experience" and "objective experience" of {X} are of no value, but offer a false dichotomy--that is, when we refer to the term "experience of {X}" we mean a dialectic union of the subjective (the classifier = you) + objective (that which is classified = {X}) ?

Next your comments about "identity"...

AnssiH said:
This is probably the most common definition people assume to "identity", and in this view you would not say that the hole of a doughnut has got identity to itself (while it stably exists), but the doughnut itself does (since its made of elementary particles that are usually thought to possesses identity).
Here I would say the the hole of a doughnut is an attribute of the doughnut and as such the hole as attribute has identity (that is, the hole is what the hole is), however, the hole as existent does not have "identity", for while it is possible to have a doughnut without a hole, it is not possible in this example to have a hole without a doughnut.

Anssih said:
So we can see that it is an extra assumption to assume identity to any elementary particles that exist in any model, be it photons, electrons or quarks. While all these things "exist" in the same sense that that hole in the doughnut exists.
Here I would not agree--to attach same level of existence to "hole of doughnut" as to "photons, electrons, quarks" is a form of concept stealing, what has been called a Reification of the Zero. Physicists can cause photons to hit other photons, or electrons, or quarks and observe cause-effect events. But it is nonsense to even consider that we remove hole from donut and use it (the hole) to cause an effect on some other thing with identity. Now, concerning energy--it comes in many different forms so I see no good reason why different forms of potential energy and kinetic energy cannot have their specific identity(see http://www.need.org/needpdf/FormsofEnergy.pdf)--not sure I am grasping your concern about energy having identity ? Finally, I find no problem with quantum mechanics and identity--so, it goes for me... existence exists and what exists must exist as some metaphysical entity with identity and the nature (dynamics) of that identity is explained by quantum mechanics. I do not know if Rand would agree or not with this (I think she would), but Kant most surely would not.
 
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