Is Time Merely Constant Change?

[Doctordick]

I see. So this also means you recognize that we cannot comprehend the functions (derive any predictions) of any system without classifying it into a set of components that we assume to exhibit such and such behavior under such and such conditions?

No, saying that any ontology qualifies as a set merely give us a vocabulary to use in discussing ontology without defining it. What one can and can not comprehend has nothing to do with the issue. What one can and can not comprehend is a epistemological issue.

Yeah, although then the case would be that the best we can do is to have a reference to a valid ontology (instead of actually having the valid ontology itself).

You are explicitly trying to define what qualifies as an ontology and that is the exact issue to be avoided as any such move is essentially a presumption which removes possibilities and we don't want to make presumptions.

Now here's the beef. I cannot actually "handle" any system without classifying it into such a set, and this is why it seems to me that everything is made of some sort of fundamental set (of elements).

I don't know what you mean by "such a set". Under normal circumstances, the modifier "such a" is a implicit reference to some constraining rule: i.e., used when one is trying to define some presumed qualifications. You are apparently having difficulty comprehending an undefined set.

... but I also question the ontological validity of defining reality into any sort of "set".

Then would you please explain to me what constraint exists in the concept of a set which makes an assumption as to "what sort" of thing the set is?

It is entirely possible that we can define a set of elements that produces 100% success rate for our predictions, but we still could not know whether our particular method of classification is true to reality in any ontological sense.

Again, you are off in the field of epistemology; the issue under discussion here was supposed to be ontology. (Is time an illusion is an ontological question based upon the common speculative edifice referred to as one's world view.)

... questions like, where does the boundary between atom and space lie (and subsequently what do we mean by space and why should we expect it to be a valid concept at all, etc...)

Once again, you want to take some speculative edifice (an epistemology dealing with atoms and space) and then talk about the ontological concepts behind it. As Kant said:

It is indeed a very common fate of human reason first of all to finish its speculative edifice as soon as possible, and then only inquire whether the foundations be sure.

This is exactly the issue which is to be avoided. Let us first inquire into the issue of a "valid ontology"; when we understand what we are dealing with (this undefined valid ontology), then we can make rational inquires as to how the problem (creating rational explanations) can be solved. Before that, everything is little more than a stab in the dark.

Keep in mind that to classify reality into a set is to assume metaphysical identity onto some stable patterns.

I am referring to reality (or the "valid" ontology conceived to be reality) as a set and that reference makes no assumptions about reality at all. And pray, what do you mean by "some stable patterns"? That concept involves the concept of "time" and makes the presumption that "time" is an aspect of your "valid ontology". You are already off in a speculative edifice and outside the area of examining a valid ontology.

We often do this while knowing it is physically unjustified (according to our best physical models). Like when we assume identity onto a shadow (we think it is the same shadow over some space and time region, while knowing this is not "really" so; we just see it so semantically). I.e. I am noting that it could be wrong to assume metaphysical identity to ANYTHING (temporal nor spatial, and this includes the identity we tend to assume to "space" and "time" also)

You seem to have an overwhelming urge to see the question of ontology in terms of the speculative edifice the ontology supposedly supports. I need you to see the "valid ontology" as an undefined[/color] thing (that is why I want to use the term "set").

This is what I meant when I claimed we are not playing 21 questions with the nature but all by ourselves, and this is why I've been claiming ontology is unanswerable; because the very method with which we comprehend reality is not a method for answer it.

What you are saying is very simple: ontological analysis is not to be done by epistemological methods. That is perfectly clear. That is why I am trying to show you an alternate method. But in order to show you the method, I need an abstract way of referring to that "undefined valid ontology".

So, is this something you have already considered and come to conclude that we can still say valid ontology certainly is some kind of a set?

I am not saying anything about what a "valid ontology" is; I am merely saying that referring to it as a set makes no constraints whatsoever as to what it is and yields a vocabulary which can be mapped into any vocabulary which might be required to discuss that "valid ontology". That should be clear to you as "any vocabulary" may be considered a set[/color] of representations of concepts.

A "self-supporting structure" is what is commonly called "a tautology"; all it need be is totally internally consistent (explicit truth has nothing to do with the definition). It is entirely possible that such a structure may be either "based on some explicit truth" or it could be "without any explicit truth". Go read about Solipsism; it is well accepted that one cannot prove that Solipsism is false, but neither can one prove Solipsism is truth. You are apparently making the assumption that all "self-supporting structures" are without a grain of explicit truth; that is an assumption that Solipsism is truth.

If I understand your assertion about "set" correctly, it seems to me that you are presupposing in true ontology there are "things" (with real metaphysical identity)

That is the standard interpretation of the question implied by the definition of ontology: i.e., "what exists". And I brought up the Null set as an explicit possibility (nothing with real metaphysical identity) in order to assure you that I wished to make no assumptions. Again, you are making the argument for the possibility of Solipsism but as I said, that need not be the case (and is a rather extreme one at that). Solipsism is an epistemological argument and says nothing about "a valid ontology". All I am saying is that "a valid ontology" might lie behind our "world view" and, if that is true, what kind of consequences should one expect (before we chase off after some speculative edifice). What can we say about "sure foundations" before we create a speculative edifice? I know your answer is "nothing"; however, I don't think you have thought the problem out.

My central purpose here is to make no assumptions -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

Just replying in a hurry, hoping I'll still be somewhat clear :)

No, saying that any ontology qualifies as a set merely give us a vocabulary to use in discussing ontology without defining it. What one can and can not comprehend has nothing to do with the issue. What one can and can not comprehend is a epistemological issue.

Well it's certainly true that I am diving headlong into epistemology with that assertion, just that it appears unavoidable to me. But I promised I'd keep the door open to other possibilities than my current view, so let me accept your first assertion. Perhaps your further steps will tell me better what you mean by an undefined set exactly.

I don't know what you mean by "such a set". Under normal circumstances, the modifier "such a" is a implicit reference to some constraining rule: i.e., used when one is trying to define some presumed qualifications. You are apparently having difficulty comprehending an undefined set.

"Such a set" referred to any kind of set. Understanding something as a set is something we need to do in order to be able to discuss it (like you said) and also in order to understand it in our own mind. It seems like this is already more than an ontology, even when we don't define what the set might be. But perhaps you are right and I just don't understand what you mean by an undefined set.

Then would you please explain to me what constraint exists in the concept of a set which makes an assumption as to "what sort" of thing the set is?

That there is something (even just a single thing) with ontological/metaphysical identity even when there is no semantical mind defining it that way.

I see you clarified that by "null set" you meant it'd be fair to call it a set even when it doesn't refer to anything atl all (not even to a single thing). I am little bit confused about how the first assertion has got any meaning to it anymore (i.e. why make the assertion), but perhaps I'll understand it later.

I am referring to reality (or the "valid" ontology conceived to be reality) as a set and that reference makes no assumptions about reality at all. And pray, what do you mean by "some stable patterns"? That concept involves the concept of "time" and makes the presumption that "time" is an aspect of your "valid ontology". You are already off in a speculative edifice and outside the area of examining a valid ontology.

This is exactly the problem I am talking about. I am calling things "patterns" knowing perfectly well that this is too a semantical concept and involves an assumption about identity of many things. We need to talk about semantical entities in order to discuss or understand anything at all. That, I reckon, is always invalid ontology. Yet it's all we can do :(

What you are saying is very simple: ontological analysis is not to be done by epistemological methods. That is perfectly clear. That is why I am trying to show you an alternate method. But in order to show you the method, I need an abstract way of referring to that "undefined valid ontology".

I keep failing to see how it's possible to think about anything at all without epistemological methods, but let's just advance to next step, maybe that'll clear things up.

That is the standard interpretation of the question implied by the definition of ontology: i.e., "what exists". And I brought up the Null set as an explicit possibility (nothing with real metaphysical identity) in order to assure you that I wished to make no assumptions. Again, you are making the argument for the possibility of Solipsism but as I said, that need not be the case (and is a rather extreme one at that).

Yeah ok, the null set.

btw, I'm not referring to solipsism at all with my assertions (although it seems my assertions are often understood that way).

I am assuming there is a reality out there without my subjective experience, but that my subjective experience is caused by the brain classifying reality into semantical things and comprehending it as an artificial model or an artifical expression of the real reality. As a crude analogy I referred to the way some being could understand only numbers, and the same way we understand only semantical/"sensible things", while reality is hardly made of semantical components.

So what I'm saying is that perhaps *any* "perspective" we choose to view some system from, is just an approximated model of the reality of that system.

In fact another topic just went straight into the same area of "limits of comprehension", and I presented my views from slightly different angle, perhaps it explains you better how I am actually presenting fairly standard materialistic view;

(Don't worry, I know the text is full of wild hypotheses... Again, just to be able to discuss anything at all, I must make assertions knowing perfectly well that they are completely undefendable)
http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy/message/10393

But regardless of our particular views, let's get to the next step in your assertions about ontology?

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Hi AnssiH, I hope that nothing I say upsets you. I appreciate your responses immensely; you are quite clear and quite thoughtful, the only problem here is that what I am saying is quite far from the common approach and few people can even begin to comprehend what I am doing.

Well it's certainly true that I am diving headlong into epistemology with that assertion, just that it appears unavoidable to me.

It appears unavoidable to everyone; that is why no one ever attempts to avoid it.

Understanding something as a set is something we need to do in order to be able to discuss it (like you said) and also in order to understand it in our own mind. It seems like this is already more than an ontology, even when we don't define what the set might be.

What I believe you are doing is confusing the ontology of logic (something we need to communicate) with the subject of ontology itself. That is to say,

The ontology of mathematics is as intuitively (i.e.,from experience) generated as is any other field. What makes it “pure” is the fact that it is without contradiction (at least as best as the mathematicians can manage to achieve).

the speculative edifice constructed upon that limited and concise ontology provides us with the only dependable means of communication (dependable meaning we can be fairly confident that we both understand the relationships being expressed in a mathematical expression). Of course, there is a very serious disadvantage of using an exact language and that is the fact that only a small range of relationships can be expressed. Now that is a real problem; however, the value of clarity certainly supersedes that limitation.

I would like to point out that the "speculative edifices" associated with mathematics and logic are what one might call abstract constructs having utterly nothing to do with reality. Their value resides entirely in the issue of self consistency. Self consistency is a quality one desires in any explanation as it is the only guarantee that answers will not be a function of the particular path taken through analysis of a problem. Consistency is a quality required of an acceptable explanation. That is why mathematics and logic play such a big roll in the exact sciences.

The problem we are trying to deal with here is the fact that we must do our best to avoid the presumption that the "valid ontology" we wish to talk about is defined as that is the very source of Kant's complaint. That constraint does not disallow speculative edifices such as language or the ontological elements used to establish language, it merely makes it imperative that we be very careful in expressing the relationships connected to this "valid ontology" under examination. A point Rade cannot seem to comprehend.

It is indeed a very common fate of human reason first of all to finish its speculative edifice as soon as possible, and then only inquire whether the foundations be sure.

We owe it to ourselves not to confuse the two issues.

That there is something (even just a single thing) with ontological/metaphysical identity even when there is no semantical mind defining it that way.

And it is exactly that set of "things" which is to be the subject of this discussion. The problem is that we need a method of referring to that set without defining it. This is why I refer to it as a set and give no further constraint.

I see you clarified that by "null set" you meant it'd be fair to call it a set even when it doesn't refer to anything at all (not even to a single thing). I am little bit confused about how the first assertion has got any meaning to it anymore (i.e. why make the assertion), but perhaps I'll understand it later.

It is possible that you missed the essence of the assertion (probably because you found little meaning in it). The assertion is simply that I can refer to reality (another name for this "valid ontology") as a set and nothing else is to be inferred.

We need to talk about semantical entities in order to discuss or understand anything at all. That, I reckon, is always invalid ontology. Yet it's all we can do :(

The only problem with that particular assertion I have is that "semantical entities" already requires presumption of an ontology. I think that you understand that in some subtle way, but I don't think you have entirely faced the problem.

I am assuming there is a reality out there without my subjective experience, ...

That reality is exactly what I am referring to as my "valid ontology" and your "subjective experience" is the intuitive speculative edifice you have constructed to explain that ontology. In the absence of a speculative edifice, that ontology is absolutely "undefined".

I keep failing to see how it's possible to think about anything at all without epistemological methods, but let's just advance to next step, maybe that'll clear things up.

Perhaps it will.

I read your reference to see what you had in mind and have only one comment to make:

So I am assuming conscious thoughts are caused by certain arrangement of physical stuff, and that for this reason I can never REALLY know how.

You may not know "how" but you could understand the limits rationally imposed upon your metal model by the simple issue of internal consistency. They are far more specific than imagined by most everyone.

But regardless of our particular views, let's get to the next step in your assertions about ontology?

I have already made all the assertions about that "valid ontology" which I had to make.

I am saying three very simple things: first, any ontology can be referred to as a set; second, an acceptable epistemology must be based on reality in some way and third, there are truths (valid ontological elements) of which we are ignorant.

The next step is to understand the problem of "explaining" that ontology in the absence of definition. In order to simplify the examination of the problem, I will first examine a somewhat simpler problem. But before I go into that problem, let me first point a very usefull abstract "tool".

There are some simple logical conclusions which may be deduced from those three assertions above. The first one is that any mental model (any solution to the problem of explaining that valid ontology) can not depend upon those "valid ontological elements" of which we are ignorant. Since a correct solution to the problem must include any collection of "valid ontological elements", the correct solution must include the existence of "valid ontological elements" of which we are ignorant. This means that the set of possible rational mental models must be a collection; each of which depends upon the particular subset of those "valid ontological elements" which underly the model. I will propose a method of handling this fundamental problem. Note that this proposition is not an assertion, it is no more than a mechanical method of handling this quite subtle circumstance. What one might call a "mental tool".

For the sake of analysis, I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" underlying any specific solution, "the past"[/color]. Likewise, I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" omitted from that specific solution, "the future"[/color]. I give these sets these names because I happen to know what the logical consequences will be (it should be clear to everyone that such a categorization will allow the correct solution to accommodate differences in the collection of "valid ontological elements" underlying a specific solution). Clearly the next significant definition is the difference between a given collection of "valid ontological elements" and a second collection of "valid ontological elements". I will call this set (the difference set) "the present"[/color].

Since "the present" consists of the difference between two specific collections of "valid ontological elements", "the past" (any collection of "valid ontological elements") can always be seen as a collection of "presents". I always thought it funny that, although the concept "gift" was not intended there, the idea that the past was a collection of presents (seen as gifts) seemed quite an appropriate relationship . But that's getting into other issues .

I will let the presentation pause this point because I think I need to know your reaction so that I can be sure the step is clearly understood before I go on. What you should begin to comprehend here is that what I am defining is tool of analysis which is valid even if reality (that valid ontology we are trying to think about) does not include the concept "time". It is no more than a mechanism designed to handle ignorance of the valid ontology. I might comment that this is, in fact, the answer to the issue questioned by this thread, "Is time just an illusion?": that is, there is utterly no need for time to be a valid ontological element (which, in a way, makes time little more than a valuable illusion); but proof of that fact will require some further work.

Think about it -- Dick

 

[baywax]

Is time just an illusion?

Three words answer the five word question.

Yes and no.

 

[Rade]

...My central purpose here is to make no assumptions -- Dick

The statement:

[My central purpose is to make no assumptions]​

Sure does sound like an "assumption" to me, sounds like a claim you are taking for granted as being a fact, (not to mention your "three simple things"--all assumptions you wish us to take for granted as facts). So I claim you have failed your central purpose if this is how you "start" your "undefined ontology"--eg., your argument starts with "an assumption" of "three simple things".

 

[sd01g]

Is time just an illusion?

Three words answer the five word question.

Yes and no.

I would agree with the 'no' part. Time is something that we experience. Things move and thus change. Each individual is constantly moving and changing in many different ways, including the cellular and molecular. There are multiple meanings of the word illusion but none of them apply to time.

 

[Rade]

...For the sake of analysis, I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" underlying any specific solution, "the past"[/color]. Likewise, I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" omitted from that specific solution, "the future"[/color]. I give these sets these names because I happen to know what the logical consequences will be (it should be clear to everyone that such a categorization will allow the correct solution to accommodate differences in the collection of "valid ontological elements" underlying a specific solution). Clearly the next significant definition is the difference between a given collection of "valid ontological elements" and a second collection of "valid ontological elements". I will call this set (the difference set) "the present"[/color]. Since "the present" consists of the difference between two specific collections of "valid ontological elements", "the past" (any collection of "valid ontological elements") can always be seen as a collection of "presents"...Think about it -- Dick

OK, you have me thinking.

So, let this set [A,B,C] be the set of valid ontological elements that underlay the specific solution [&], therefore the set [A,B,C] is called "the past".

then,

let [1,2,3] be the set of valid ontological elements that are omitted from [&], therefore the set [1,2,3] is called "the future"

thus,

the total of all possible valid ontological elements as relates to [&] is the set
[A,B,C,1,2,3]

now, you state,

...the difference between a given collection of "valid ontological elements" and a second collection of "valid ontological elements". I will call this set (the difference set) "the present"[/color].

clearly from above, the set [A,B,C,1,2,3] is a given collection of valid ontological elements.

now, let us find a second such collection, as the set [X,Y,C,7,8,9].

next you claim, that the difference between [A,B,C,1,2,3] and [X,Y,C,7,8,9]
is called "the present", and we see that while they are mostly different, they are not completely different, since they share the element [C], thus the set for "the present" is [A,B,X,Y,1,2,3,7,8,9].

Now, you claim that "the past", which is the set [A,B,C], ...can always be seen as a collection of "presents"...

But, clearly this is a false claim, because nowhere in the present set of [A,B,X,Y,1,2,3,7,8,9] do we find the past set [A,B,C], let alone "always".

Your model is thus falsified.

But I'm sure you will correct the error(s) of my thinking

 

[baywax]

I would agree with the 'no' part. Time is something that we experience. Things move and thus change. Each individual is constantly moving and changing in many different ways, including the cellular and molecular. There are multiple meanings of the word illusion but none of them apply to time.

There is the illusion that "time has slowed down" "time flies"
These phrases illustrate the illusions we have created out of the simple measurement system of time.

There are many illusions we have built around the measuring system of time. Another one is where we have arbitrarily decided that
"time is up" or "there's no time".

An illusion can be defined as a representation of an object or idea that is not the actual object or idea.

Time is a conceptual representation of change and motion.

An "inch" or a "foot" or a "meter" are specific to conceptual models that are not based on anything in nature other than our own conceptual way of partitioning the universe.

Measuring systems don't seem like an illusion to us because they are our tools we use to organize our environment and our experience of it.

The system only applies to humans and their way of thinking. To all other species, the measurment of change and motion and the measurement of distance and volume are all illusionary and have no relation to the actual universe. They are simply conceptual representations of reality.

 

[AnssiH]

Hi AnssiH, I hope that nothing I say upsets you.

It doesn't. But it may take me a while to reply sometimes, because there are days when I don't feel like thinking too hard :)

The problem we are trying to deal with here is the fact that we must do our best to avoid the presumption that the "valid ontology" we wish to talk about is defined as that is the very source of Kant's complaint. That constraint does not disallow speculative edifices such as language or the ontological elements used to establish language, it merely makes it imperative that we be very careful in expressing the relationships connected to this "valid ontology" under examination. A point Rade cannot seem to comprehend.

Well I'm very much struggling too.

The only problem with that particular assertion I have is that "semantical entities" already requires presumption of an ontology. I think that you understand that in some subtle way, but I don't think you have entirely faced the problem.

I'm painfully, painfully aware of the problem every day. :P (Except those days when I don't feel like thinking too hard :)

The next step is to understand the problem of "explaining" that ontology in the absence of definition. In order to simplify the examination of the problem, I will first examine a somewhat simpler problem. But before I go into that problem, let me first point a very usefull abstract "tool".

There are some simple logical conclusions which may be deduced from those three assertions above. The first one is that any mental model (any solution to the problem of explaining that valid ontology) can not depend upon those "valid ontological elements" of which we are ignorant. Since a correct solution to the problem must include any collection of "valid ontological elements", the correct solution must include the existence of "valid ontological elements" of which we are ignorant. This means that the set of possible rational mental models must be a collection; each of which depends upon the particular subset of those "valid ontological elements" which underly the model. I will propose a method of handling this fundamental problem.

Let me make sure I'm reading you right.

In other words are you saying that, when we try to understand a physical system, it is a case of building a mental model out of "assumed ontological elements" (concepts).

And that we are capable of building a number of rational (self-coherent) models because there are elements that are unknown to us. I.e. if these unknown elements were known, they would constrain our worldview into the "correct ontological view" (so to speak). But since they aren't known, the other elements are to an extent unconstrained too (which is why they are called assumed ontological elements), which is to say we can build many different models?

For the sake of analysis, I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" underlying any specific solution, "the past"[/color]. Likewise, I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" omitted from that specific solution, "the future"[/color]. I give these sets these names because I happen to know what the logical consequences will be (it should be clear to everyone that such a categorization will allow the correct solution to accommodate differences in the collection of "valid ontological elements" underlying a specific solution). Clearly the next significant definition is the difference between a given collection of "valid ontological elements" and a second collection of "valid ontological elements". I will call this set (the difference set) "the present"[/color].

I will let the presentation pause this point because I think I need to know your reaction so that I can be sure the step is clearly understood before I go on.

Well I'm starting to get lost more and more. You seem to be drawing a relationship to a subjective experience of time (or motion).

"I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" underlying any specific solution, "the past"[/color]."

a "specific solution" is here the same as "a particular mental model"?

"Likewise, I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" omitted from that specific solution, "the future"[/color]."

...and the "valid ontological elements omitted from that specific solution" are referring to elements that would yield a different mental model? Something that a person has not yet formed, but might in the future?

Like I said, I'm very much struggling to interpret you properly.

-Anssi

 

[mosassam]

Clearly the next significant definition is the difference between a given collection of "valid ontological elements" and a second collection of "valid ontological elements". I will call this set (the difference set) "the present"[/color].

Do both collections of "valid ontological elements" refer to the same specific solution (as for the 'past' and 'future')? If so, why is the second collection required? If not, what is the connection between them?

 

[Doctordick]

I am only answering Rade because I wish to make sure others aren't sucked into his obvious misdirection of attention.

Sure does sound like an "assumption" to me, sounds like a claim you are taking for granted as being a fact, (not to mention your "three simple things"--all assumptions you wish us to take for granted as facts).

They do not qualify as "assumptions" as none of them contain any information at all; they merely lay down the issues germane to the problem facing us.

Ontology can be referred to as a set as anything can be "referred to" as a set. As I explained to AnssiH, even nothing can be referred to as a set, namely the "Null" set. This step does nothing except pull in the vocabulary associated with the mathematical concept of sets.

The second, "an acceptable epistemology must be based on reality in some way", merely asserts my (and I hope any other rational person's) lack of interest in arguments based on invalid ontological concepts. Since the "valid ontology" I am talking about has not been defined, no ontological concept has been eliminated and nothing at all need be "taken for granted as facts".

And, finally, "there are truths (valid ontological elements) of which we are ignorant", corresponds very closely to the statement "all I know for sure is that I know nothing for sure". I would say that any violation of that statement would constitute an assumption but either that is over Mr. Rade's head or his intention is to purposely misinterpret things in order to create a mock battle. I don't believe he is stupid so I attribute his acts to the second purpose.

His second post is about as well thought out as his the one above. He first sets a possible set to be considered as an example:

So, let this set [A,B,C] be the set of valid ontological elements that underlay the specific solution [&], therefore the set [A,B,C] is called "the past".

I doubt any entity faced with a valid ontology (a past) consisting of but three elements would concern itself with the issue of epistemology at all; however, there are those who argue for solipsism as a rational basis for our experiences. Since solipsism is clearly based on the null set (no valid ontological elements at all), we could call Rade's example "semi-solipsism". If that were the case, then it could certainly be argued that the specific solution [&] could be essentially identical to the common world view held by Humanity (one could no more prove that wrong than one could prove solipsism is wrong). If such a view could be obtained from nothing, might it also not be obtained from three valid elements?

In that case, let us look at an entity whose past might consist of but three valid ontological elements [A,B,C]. Presuming [&] is our common world view, those three elements might well consist of A as an egg, B as a sperm and C as fertilization. So Rade's example could be thought of as "the past" as seen by a fertilized egg (the valid information upon which that egg would base [&]). So let's go on.

let [1,2,3] be the set of valid ontological elements that are omitted from [&], therefore the set [1,2,3] is called "the future"

The entire "valid ontology" underlying reality consists of but six elements? Well now, that certainly deserves the title "semi-solipsism" and, just as an aside, how does he happen to know that? I suppose Rade must be presuming he is God and is actually aware of the entire "valid ontology" underlying reality; in that case it would seem reasonable that one of those six elements is Rade himself (the all knowing God) and the rest of [&] whatever epistemological solution for reality that might be, is based mostly on self generated illusion. (Maybe some of you can see why I don't hold out a lot of interest in "solipsism".) But, let us go on anyway.

Certainly, in his example, "the total of all possible valid ontological elements as relates to [&] is the set [A,B,C,1,2,3]"; but then he says:

... let us find a second such collection, as the set [X,Y,C,7,8,9].

Where in the world is he going to find that set? He has already specified that "all of reality" (the valid ontological elements known plus the valid ontological elements not known being the total collection of valid ontological elements) consists of nothing but [A,B,C,1,2,3]. Certainly [X,Y,C,7,8,9] is either not a collection of valid elements or he has merely given different names to the elements of the valid ontology under discussion.

Now, you claim that "the past", which is the set [A,B,C], ...can always be seen as a collection of "presents"...

Yes, I certainly did and, in Mr. Rade's example (since the future is known), the entire set of possible "pasts", "future" and "presents" can be explicitly listed. (Note that any member of this collection could be considered to be a possible "past", "future" or present; which role it plays is a function of [&] your epistemological explanation.)

The entire collection of possibilities consist of the following:
No elements -- [NULL],
One element -- [A], , [C], [1], [2], [3],
Two elements -- [A,B], [A,C], [A,1], [A,2], [A,3], [B,C], [B,1], [B,2]. [B,3], [C,1], [C,2], [C,3], [1,2], [1,3], [2,3],
Three elements -- [A,B,C], [A,B,1], [A,B,2], [A,B,3], [A,C,1], [A,C,2], [A,C,3], [A,1,2], [A,1,3], [A,2,3], [B,1,2], [B,1,3], [B,2,3], [C,1,2], [C,1,3], [C,2,3], [1,2,3],
Four elements -- [A,B,C,1], [A,B,C,2], [A,B,C,3], [A,B,1,2], [A,B,1,3], [A,B,2,3], [A,C,1,2], [A,C,1,3], [A,C,2,3], [B,C,1,2], [B,C,1,3], [B,C,2,3], [A,1,2,3], [B,1,2,3], [B,1,2,3], [C, 1,2,3]
Five elements – [A,B,C,1,2], [A,B,C,1,3], [A,B,C,2,3], [A,B,1,2,3], [A,C,1,2,3], [B,C,1,2,3]
Six elements – [A,B,C,1,2,3]

That collection can be seen as the entire collection of possibilities for a possible past given Rade's proposed six element valid ontology. Given anyone of those pasts, the future is represented by a specific member of the collection (the member which completes the set [A,B,C,1,2,3]). The present is defined to be the difference between two possible pasts. Now, if your explanation of reality ([&], your epistemological construct) is going to allow knowledge of reality to vanish (i.e., to proceed from a past which contains an element of that valid ontology to one which lacks that particular element, which one could call a "reality of forgetfulness") then the present could consist of any selection from the above collection (you could move from one past to another without constraint). I guess one could call that "time travel".

However, our explanations of reality (our epistemological constructs) generally do not allow for valid knowledge of the past to vanish as including such a concept kind of defeats the usefulness of the explanation. Thus it is that our explanations of reality usually allow only addition of valid ontological elements not subtraction. That constraint (and please note that the constraint is a self imposed constraint on the acceptability of an explanation and not a constraint on reality) forces one to consider only a limited set of ordered "presents" and any specific "past" can be seen as a collection of presents occurring in some specific sequence.

But I'm sure you will correct the error(s) of my thinking

Actually, I don't think that is possible; I make these comments for others who you might confuse. To paraphrase another, "when people are confronted with new information, their most probable reaction will be to deny that information as to do otherwise requires them to review their beliefs".

... may take me a while to reply sometimes, because there are days when I don't feel like thinking too hard :)

To paraphrase Kant, I think you are trying very hard to construct some speculative edifice (which makes what I am saying make sense in your world view) without first building a foundation. At this point, I am saying some very simple things and I suspect that you can't comprehend anything of value arising from such simple ideas. As a consequence, you are trying to conceive of implications which will make these foundations profound. The foundations I am laying are not profound at all; they are no more than rather obvious conditions on the problem we want to solve. Conditions people never consider seriously because they see nothing of value coming from them; they thus regard a close examination of such things as a total waste of time. I think you are being drawn by these same forces.

To restate the issues succinctly, we are trying to build a solid foundation upon which we can construct solid and dependable speculative edifices. That foundation is called a "valid ontology" (reality). Of interest is exactly what conclusions can be drawn from a valid ontology (reality) given that the ontology is both unknown and undefined (remember, it is our speculative edifices which presume definitions for these ontological elements). Confusing? Perhaps, but it is really no more than a clear statement of the problem facing any entity trying to understanding reality.

In other words are you saying that, when we try to understand a physical system, it is a case of building a mental model out of "assumed ontological elements" (concepts).

When we try to understand anything[/color], it is a case of conceiving of a world view built out of "assumed ontological elements"[/color] (i.e., ideas which are presumed true). The reason I restated your comment is that the issue is much more general than implied by the content of your statement as written.

And that we are capable of building a number of rational (self-coherent) models because there are elements that are unknown to us. I.e. if these unknown elements were known, they would constrain our worldview into the "correct ontological view" (so to speak). But since they aren't known, the other elements are to an extent unconstrained too (which is why they are called assumed ontological elements), which is to say we can build many different models?

That would be a very accurate assessment of the situation.

Well I'm starting to get lost more and more. You seem to be drawing a relationship to a subjective experience of time (or motion).

Again, I think you are trying very hard to construct some speculative edifice which makes what I am saying make sense in your world view. There is a very strong compulsion amongst human thinkers to construct speculative edifices in order to define a specific ontology. I think they want that so that they can use their intuition to provide them with solutions. (Another issue I tried to communicate a long time ago; and failed.) I am hoping that my response to Rade's confused presentation will make this issue a little clearer.

... and the "valid ontological elements omitted from that specific solution" are referring to elements that would yield a different mental model? Something that a person has not yet formed, but might in the future?

Maybe, maybe not! The issue here is that the future, in my definition, constitutes aspects of reality (valid ontological elements) of which he is ignorant. I am only saying one thing: being ignorant of them, he cannot build a speculative edifice based upon them. But that does not mean that his speculative edifice is "incorrect" (i.e., contains a demonstrable flaw). It could be that he just happened to make a good guess: i.e., his speculative edifice just might be built on a foundation containing a valid ontological element which were not represented in his past. What is important here, and I will get to it in detail later, is that it is impossible to differentiate between valid and invalid ontological elements so long as no flaw can be found in the speculative edifice. You should understand that, if it were possible to determine the difference, one could prove solipsism invalid. But this is an issue down the line from where we are now and I wouldn't worry about it if I were you. Just take my statements at face value; I will get to the issue after I solve the simple problem I will present when I am pretty sure you understand what I have said to date.

Like I said, I'm very much struggling to interpret you properly.

Again, I think you are trying to find the consequences of what I have said. All I want is for you to accept the steps themselves; I will show you the consequences as I build upon them.

Do both collections of "valid ontological elements" refer to the same specific solution (as for the 'past' and 'future')? If so, why is the second collection required? If not, what is the connection between them?

I think you are viewing ontology as something defined by the "solution" (some speculative edifice) and not as an issue unto itself. The "valid ontological elements" do not refer to anything; they are what really exists and provide the foundation for any possible specific solution. To repeat myself, I have defined reality to be a valid ontology (the entirety of what exists is the entirety of what exists). I have simply divided that valid ontological set into two parts which I have decided to call "the past" and "the future". The future is defined to be the portion of that valid ontology of which we are ignorant. That's the whole of it and there is no more.

looking to hear from you -- Dick

 

[sd01g]

There is the illusion that "time has slowed down" "time flies"
These phrases illustrate the illusions we have created out of the simple measurement system of time.

There are many illusions we have built around the measuring system of time. Another one is where we have arbitrarily decided that
"time is up" or "there's no time".

An illusion can be defined as a representation of an object or idea that is not the actual object or idea.

Time is a conceptual representation of change and motion.

An "inch" or a "foot" or a "meter" are specific to conceptual models that are not based on anything in nature other than our own conceptual way of partitioning the universe.

Measuring systems don't seem like an illusion to us because they are our tools we use to organize our environment and our experience of it.

The system only applies to humans and their way of thinking. To all other species, the measurment of change and motion and the measurement of distance and volume are all illusionary and have no relation to the actual universe. They are simply conceptual representations of reality.

I agree that we experience time at different rates according to our conscious state. In deep sleep, time seems to stop. Depending on our brain chemistry balance and synaptic activity, we experience time at different rates-sometimes fast, sometimes slow, sometimes stopped.

To describe the experience of time at different rates as an 'illusion', instead of trying to understand brain activity, is not accurate or enlightening.

 

[baywax]

To describe the experience of time at different rates as an 'illusion', instead of trying to understand brain activity, is not accurate or enlightening.

I can agree that studying brain activity as one of the sources of illusion makes sense.

Trying to find a congruent experience and understanding of time that is shared in more than one set of brain activities would be like trying to find a common pattern of CO2 activity in two separate glasses of pop. The commonalities would be restricted to how "the bubbles go up and down and burst on occasion".

 

[I_AM]

I can no longer see time. All I recognize is the morphing and changing of energies/masses/matters. This concept of time we have is slowly deteriorating from my mind. There is no time, all things are just constantly changing? Nothing ever really leaves us... and nothing is ever really born new in terms of energy. So all that we have is all that we have and it never goes anywhere except for changing into differenent physical, dimensional, and material states? So everything is not really passing... only changing. Time will never leave us, we must learn to leave time.

you summed it up well as time = change or the marking of, nothing more :)

"All I recognize is the morphing and changing of energies/masses/matters."

" Nothing ever really leaves us... and nothing is ever really born new in terms of energy. So all that we have is all that we have and it never goes anywhere except for changing into differenent physical, dimensional, and material states? So everything is not really passing... only changing."

 

[Rade]

.. The "valid ontological elements" do not refer to anything; they are what really exists and provide the foundation for any possible specific solution...

Here then, with this statement, we see how the philosophy being presented by Docterdick is based on contradiction. How ? In a previous post where he discussed my example of a past set with valid ontological elements [A,B,C], Doctordick made this claim:

In that case, let us look at an entity whose past might consist of but three valid ontological elements [A,B,C]. Presuming [&] is our common world view, those three elements might well consist of A as an egg, B as a sperm and C as fertilization. So Rade's example could be thought of as "the past" as seen by a fertilized egg (the valid information upon which that egg would base [&])...

But now, in discussion with AnssiH, we have Doctordick saying that "valid ontological elements do not refer to anything" . But how can this be , since in the exact same post he informs that the "valid ontological element" A refers to an egg, B refers to a sperm--thus A & B refer to THINGS ! (ps, he does state that C refers to a "process", what he calls fertilization, thus C is not referring to any "thing", nor is C a "thing that really exists").

...I have defined reality to be a valid ontology...

OK, now we are getting somewhere--"reality" is defined by Doctordick as a valid "study of being" (= ontology--note the "ology" in the word = "study of"). So, the philosophy of Doctordick is that, priori to the existence of an entity that could carry out the operation of "ology", there was (by his definition) no reality, which is nothing more than the position of logical positivism.

...(the entirety of what exists is the entirety of what exists)...

Bravo. Finally it is "explained" that the "Philosophy of Doctordick" derives from one of the fundamental axioms of logic--the Law of Identity-- A = A; let A = "the entirety of what exists". So, here I agree with Doctordick, any "valid philosophy" must have the Law of Identity as a fundamental assumption--what is called an axoim. But, note that before Doctordick can say [A] = [A], FIRST MUST BE [A] AS EXISTENCE ITSELF, thus, the fundamental axiom of ALL VALID ONTOLOGY is the axoim "Existence Exists" -- this is what is "undefined", the axiom [existence exists] is undefined, not the "ontology" or "study of" [the entirety of what exists]. And here we have one of many reasons why I do not agree with this approach to the development of a philosophy based on the axiom of "undefined ontology", it is "existence" itself that must be "undefined", not the "study of existence", where "being = existence".

...I have simply divided that valid ontological set into two parts which I have decided to call "the past" and "the future". The future is defined to be the portion of that valid ontology of which we are ignorant. That's the whole of it and there is no more...

Here we read yet another contradiction in the philosophy being presented, for he has made it clear in previous posts that this is not "the whole of it"--for the "whole of time" must not only include the past and future, but also the "present". Now, let me make a prediction, I predict Doctordick will contradict himself in any attempt to respond to this comment, and he will attempt to claim that within his "valid ontological set" are not only two parts (past and future), but will build yet another layer of contradiction to add "the present" as a "mathematical operation" to his "valid ontological set", even after we are informed that past and future is "the whole of it". I claim that the discourse of Doctordick on the past, future, and present elements of time is a long drawn out argument based on one contradiction after another after another, etc., derived from the false axiom of the "undefined ontology".

 

[AnssiH]

I doubt any entity faced with a valid ontology (a past) consisting of but three elements would concern itself with the issue of epistemology at all; however, there are those who argue for solipsism as a rational basis for our experiences. Since solipsism is clearly based on the null set (no valid ontological elements at all), we could call Rade's example "semi-solipsism".

Just a side-note, wouldn't we say that solipsism is based on one thing, the self?

To paraphrase Kant, I think you are trying very hard to construct some speculative edifice (which makes what I am saying make sense in your world view) without first building a foundation. At this point, I am saying some very simple things and I suspect that you can't comprehend anything of value arising from such simple ideas. As a consequence, you are trying to conceive of implications which will make these foundations profound. The foundations I am laying are not profound at all; they are no more than rather obvious conditions on the problem we want to solve. Conditions people never consider seriously because they see nothing of value coming from them; they thus regard a close examination of such things as a total waste of time. I think you are being drawn by these same forces.

That is probably true.

In other words are you saying that, when we try to understand a physical system, it is a case of building a mental model out of "assumed ontological elements" (concepts).

When we try to understand anything, it is a case of conceiving of a world view built out of "assumed ontological elements" (i.e., ideas which are presumed true). The reason I restated your comment is that the issue is much more general than implied by the content of your statement as written.

Yes of course. I've been known to reduce everything into a "physical system" in my (materialistic) semantical mind ;) I know what you are saying though.

Again, I think you are trying very hard to construct some speculative edifice which makes what I am saying make sense in your world view.

Well yes, I'm trying my hardest to figure out why you call them "past" and "future". Maybe it'll get clearer soon.

Just take my statements at face value; I will get to the issue after I solve the simple problem I will present when I am pretty sure you understand what I have said to date.

Ok, let's hear how this continues.

 

[AnssiH]

But now, in discussion with AnssiH, we have Doctordick saying that "valid ontological elements do not refer to anything" . But how can this be , since in the exact same post he informs that the "valid ontological element" A refers to an egg, B refers to a sperm--thus A & B refer to THINGS !

He said he isn't referring to any specific ontological elements when he talks about a set. He is only referring to a framework that could refer to specific element(s) (just that we don't know what those elements are... ...or if there even are things that can be referred to, which is my main confusion right now)

And then he talked about your example separately, as in "what if the set were referring to a specific set of egg, fertilization, etc..."

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Just a side-note, wouldn't we say that solipsism is based on one thing, the self?

Why not presume that too could be an illusion: i.e., prove you exist! Seriously, I spend little time worrying about solipsism no matter how it is defined as I find the entire concept to be problematical (it provides little if any guidance on what to expect; that is to say, it explains nothing).

Well yes, I'm trying my hardest to figure out why you call them "past" and "future". Maybe it'll get clearer soon.

The most serious reason I define past and future that way is that the definition makes it quite clear that the "future" is a totally open subject. That is to say, anything you manage to explain resides in the past. That you can make any predictions about the future at all is a presumption and the one thing I want to avoid is making any presumptions (presumptions might preclude discovering the correct solution).

Speaking of "explaining things", you might try a quick read of "Commonalities of intelligence in the cosmos". On page 2, post number 23, I define exactly what I mean by "an explanation".

I define "An explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from given known information.

If you are confused by that definition, note the following: "given known information" can be absolutely anything you wish it to be (whatever it is you are explaining); your "expectations" consist of what you expect (as guided and defined by that explanation).

I have laid out the situation as follows:

I am saying three very simple things: first, any ontology can be referred to as a set; second, an acceptable epistemology must be based on reality in some way (i.e., it is reasonable to presume there are aspects of that valid ontology in our beliefs) and third, there are truths (valid ontological elements) of which we are ignorant.

For the sake of analysis, I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" underlying any specific solution, "the past"[/color]. Likewise, I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" omitted from that specific solution, "the future"[/color].

Any specific "past" can be seen as a collection of presents occurring in some specific sequence. Thus it is that "time", in this presentation, is nothing more than a list of the "presents" going to make up the totality of the past upon which your explanation is based. That makes "time" a very personal thing having everything to do with your personal experiences and absolutely nothing to do with that "valid ontology" (which constitutes my definition of reality). As I said, time, as thus defined, is a tool which is valuable for analysis when the valid ontological elements of which we are ignorant are not fixed (one could say: when one overtly recognizes the existence of any possible future).

When we try to understand anything, it is a case of conceiving of a world view built out of "assumed ontological elements" (i.e., ideas which are presumed true). For the sake of argument and explanation of my attack, I will first consider a much simplified problem. Let us examine the mechanical problem of obtaining specific expectations from given known information when that known information (that past) consists of nothing except valid ontological elements. That is to say, there are no illusions and the valid ontological elements in each and every "present" going to make up the past upon which our solution is built are known.

When I say those valid ontological elements are known, I am of course presuming an epistemological solution (some speculative edifice built upon those ontological elements) which, if known, would include definition of those elements. In order to actually solve the problem, I would have to know that epistemological solution; however, I am not interested in solving the problem, I am interested in the procedure necessary to solve the problem, another matter entirely.

The first step in solving such a problem would be to lay the problem out in detail. In order to accomplish such a feat, one would need a label for each and every valid ontological element going to make up every "present" in that personal list of "presents" which make up the "past" on which the given epistemological solution was based. What needs to be reccognized here is that the problem does not actually require knowing the definitions of the labels; all that is actually required is that the labeling itself can be performed.

Consider that statement of the "simplified problem", and let me know if you find any part of it unclear.

Looking forward to hearing from you again -- Dick

 

[mosassam]

Still having problems with the "present". I can see that;
Anything known = the past
Anything unknown = the future
But when you say:

Any specific "past" can be seen as a collection of presents occurring in some specific sequence

.

Does this mean that "Any specific "past" can be seen as a collection of 'specific elements of the known' occurring in some specific sequence"?
In other words, the "present" = a specific element of the "past".
I am aware that your emphasis lies with the procedure "to obtain expectations" and not with any specific solution.
Previously you have stated:
"Clearly the next significant definition is the difference between a given collection of "valid ontological elements" and a second collection of "valid ontological elements". I will call this set (the difference set) 'the present'."
I am still a bit baffled about the arrival of the second collection.

 

[Doctordick]

In other words, the "present" = a specific element of the "past".

You sort of have the emphasis on the wrong issue. I am saying that the past of interest can be seen as built from a collection of "presents" (changes in the past which have been accumulated).

I introduced a concept (which I choose to call "time", because of where it leads me; which you will have to wait to see) which allows me to include the fact that, whatever it is that an explanation explains, explanations are based on less than full knowledge of the entire "valid ontological set". Not only that, but different explanations are often based on different knowledge. Any logical analysis of the problem of setting up "speculative edifices" based on different collections of knowledge must include a mechanism for handling such changes. I am simply defining any change in the valid ontology underlying the analyzers "speculative edifices" to be the present.

Surely you see the obvious connection to your personal world view: the past is continually changing as you proceed into the future (information which was once part of your unknown future becomes part of your past), that change is what you have chosen to call the present (to quote someone on this thread, "everything happens in the present"). The only difference between your perspective and the one that I am defining is that your's makes an assumption of a unique and continuous process. I do not make that assumption; under my definition, your awareness proceeds from one given past to another without constraint beyond the presumption that your knowledge of reality (that valid ontology) increases only. Actually, I'll get back to that issue later, when I will point out some of the consequences of relaxing that constraint.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Rade]

... That you can make any predictions about the future at all is a presumption and the one thing I want to avoid is making any presumptions (presumptions might preclude discovering the correct solution).

No, when one claims to make a scientific "prediction" one says nothing more or less that their exists a constraint. So, if as you claim a prediction is a presumption, and "all you want to avoid is making any presumption", then what you claim to do is not science.

...Any specific "past" can be seen as a collection of presents occurring in some specific sequence...

. Yes, and it is the "specific sequence" of these events that is a form of constraint and thus what allows for "prediction".

...Thus it is that "time", in this presentation, is nothing more than a list of the "presents" going to make up the totality of the past upon which your explanation is based.

I think "time" would find it strange indeed that it must wait for you (or any human) to put together a list before it could exist.

That makes "time" a very personal thing having everything to do with your personal experiences and absolutely nothing to do with that "valid ontology"...

Well, here we have it in a nutshell, a rehash of worn out logical positivism--as if there was no "time" in the universe before the personal experience of Doctordick.

...As I said, time, as thus defined, is a tool which is valuable for analysis when the valid ontological elements of which we are ignorant are not fixed...

Yes, exactly--exactly why what you present has no value at all, for the simple reason that "valid ontological elements" (REALITY) is fixed.

 

[Rade]

He said he isn't referring to any specific ontological elements when he talks about a set. He is only referring to a framework that could refer to specific element(s) (just that we don't know what those elements are... ...or if there even are things that can be referred to, which is my main confusion right now)...

Thank you for your reply. As I see it, not only do we have your "main confusion", (eg, can Doctordick begin with an "undefined philosophy" from a framework without "things"), but also this confusion of mine--is not the concept of a "framework" itself an "ontological element" of a more general concept known as "mathematics" ? Just two of many confused notions being put forward by Doctordick as the axioms of a new philosophy.

 

[Rade]

...The only difference between your perspective and the one that I am defining is that your's makes an assumption of a unique and continuous process. I do not make that assumption; under my definition, your awareness proceeds from one given past to another without constraint beyond the presumption that your knowledge of reality (that valid ontology) increases only...

OK, so here we have the fundamental "assumption" of the philosophy being presented by Doctordick--it is the "assumption" of a "non-unique and dis-continuous process". Which is fine with me, as long as it is clear to all that then the philosophy being presented by Doctordick DOES begin with "an assumption"--which is the negation of what has been claimed in previous posts, and the reason I have stated all along that this philosophy derives from a logical contradiction--it claims no use of "assumption" when in fact one clearly exists.

 

[mosassam]

Dear Doctordick, is the life you share with your wife/lover/children/relatives/friends etc. an assumption?

 

[Rade]

... I am saying that the past of interest can be seen as built from a collection of "presents" (changes in the past which have been accumulated)...

But this is just plain false. Consider the TV remote control I now hold. The functionality of its program guide can be viewed as being a valid ontological metaphor of the concept "time", a type of "tinder-box". And what a capital tinder-box it is, for when I strike it once in the negative direction (the past) out comes the TV show about the dog that sat upon the chest of copper money, and when I strike it a second time in the positive direction (the present) out comes the TV show about the dog who had the chest of silver, and when I strike it a third time in the positive direction (the future) then appears the TV show of the dog who had the chest of gold. Your philosophy of the past of interest (say my interest in TV shows) being "built from a collection of presents" is thus falsified.

 

[AnssiH]

Why not presume that too could be an illusion: i.e., prove you exist! Seriously, I spend little time worrying about solipsism no matter how it is defined as I find the entire concept to be problematical (it provides little if any guidance on what to expect; that is to say, it explains nothing).

It just struck me a bit odd when you said solipsism is a case of "nothing existing" since the subjective experience exists. Call it an illusion or add any other kind of spin on it whatsoever, but at least one thing always exists in it, which is the experience (or whatever causing the experience) the person is having.

Perhaps it's a bit irrelevant to this discussion, but I wonder if you agree that in your framework too we would say that at least one ontological element exists in solipsistic view. Because if you don't agree, then perhaps I have understood something wrong about your philosophy.

The most serious reason I define past and future that way is that the definition makes it quite clear that the "future" is a totally open subject. That is to say, anything you manage to explain resides in the past. That you can make any predictions about the future at all is a presumption and the one thing I want to avoid is making any presumptions (presumptions might preclude discovering the correct solution).

Ok yeah. I guess you don't assume this view is the ontologically correct view of "time/motion" though? I.e. that the ontological nature of time is still somewhat shrouded behind some elements we are ignorant of.

Speaking of "explaining things", you might try a quick read of "Commonalities of intelligence in the cosmos". On page 2, post number 23, I define exactly what I mean by "an explanation".

Yeah that's a reasonable/useful definition.

That makes "time" a very personal thing having everything to do with your personal experiences and absolutely nothing to do with that "valid ontology" (which constitutes my definition of reality). As I said, time, as thus defined, is a tool which is valuable for analysis when the valid ontological elements of which we are ignorant are not fixed (one could say: when one overtly recognizes the existence of any possible future).

Yeah so it's not an attempt to pin down the ontological nature of time? This seems to be one source of confusion, it is easy to take your description as an assertion about the true nature of time... (reading the other posts, looks like many people already did...)

When we try to understand anything, it is a case of conceiving of a world view built out of "assumed ontological elements" (i.e., ideas which are presumed true). For the sake of argument and explanation of my attack, I will first consider a much simplified problem. Let us examine the mechanical problem of obtaining specific expectations from given known information when that known information (that past) consists of nothing except valid ontological elements. That is to say, there are no illusions and the valid ontological elements in each and every "present" going to make up the past upon which our solution is built are known.

When I say those valid ontological elements are known, I am of course presuming an epistemological solution (some speculative edifice built upon those ontological elements) which, if known, would include definition of those elements. In order to actually solve the problem, I would have to know that epistemological solution; however, I am not interested in solving the problem, I am interested in the procedure necessary to solve the problem, another matter entirely.

The first step in solving such a problem would be to lay the problem out in detail. In order to accomplish such a feat, one would need a label for each and every valid ontological element going to make up every "present" in that personal list of "presents" which make up the "past" on which the given epistemological solution was based. What needs to be reccognized here is that the problem does not actually require knowing the definitions of the labels; all that is actually required is that the labeling itself can be performed.

Consider that statement of the "simplified problem", and let me know if you find any part of it unclear.

Well it seems pretty clear but I have a feeling I could be interpreting some things little bit wrong. I'm trying not to jump ahead and start guessing how do you label ontological elements without defining anything. Let's see it.

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

No, when one claims to make a scientific "prediction" one says nothing more or less that their exists a constraint. So, if as you claim a prediction is a presumption, and "all you want to avoid is making any presumption", then what you claim to do is not science.

Well if I'm allowed to butt in a bit, and I cannot stress this enough; ontology is different matter than science. They are related to a great extent, but it is absolutely imperative to understand clearly where they part. That is to say, scientific models are not reality itself, they are models. Anyone abiding to scientific philosophy needs to understand this. Far better than it is generally understood.

I'll let Thomas Kuhn explain it more:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Kuhn
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Structure_of_Scientific_Revolutions

There are more recent authors reminding us of the same distinction. Like, say, Andrew Pickering. ("Constructing Quarks: A Sociological History of Particle Physics")

Thank you for your reply. As I see it, not only do we have your "main confusion", (eg, can Doctordick begin with an "undefined philosophy" from a framework without "things"), but also this confusion of mine--is not the concept of a "framework" itself an "ontological element" of a more general concept known as "mathematics" ?

Well I think our confusions are basically the same. I.e. I am wondering if even the minimal framework - which exist because without it there could be no discussion/thoughts about ontology at all - is already such that it precludes correct ontology. (Although of course we need to understand "valid" as different than "correct"... this is in fact the same difference as there exists between ontology and scientific models; model can be valid but not true. It's a muddy field we are walking on :)

I was explaining this concern in post #269 in more detail.

But then let's see how far we can get with this minimal framework, you know...

-Anssi

 

[Paul Martin]

I am not interested in solving the problem, I am interested in the procedure necessary to solve the problem, another matter entirely.

I think this needs to be emphasized because I think it is a common stumbling block for people trying to understand Dick's work. Maybe a simple analogy will help.

Suppose one were interested in solving a particular problem whose solution is a solution to a quadratic equation. To solve that particular problem, one would have to know the coefficients of the particular equation. It would also be helpful to know the quadratic formula.

But if, on the other hand, one were not interested at all in solving any particular quadratic equation, but instead were interested in deriving the quadratic formula, then knowing any particular coefficients would be irrelevant and completely useless. The quadratic formula can be derived without such knowledge. And, armed with the quadratic formula, one can solve many quadratic equations if only the specific coefficients are known.

Similarly, Dick has developed a general method of solving the problem of producing expectations from any set of information, without any need to be specific about, or to know, any of that information.

For the sake of argument and explanation of my attack, I will first consider a much simplified problem. Let us examine the mechanical problem of obtaining specific expectations from given known information when that known information (that past) consists of nothing except valid ontological elements.

So the problem Dick is attacking is the problem of producing some "mechanical" process, like that of plugging coefficients into the quadratic formula and calculating the solutions, which will produce expectations from known information.

Now, here's a question for you, Dick. What exactly constitutes "known information"? Known by whom? Shannon has given us a definition for 'information' which is essentially an ordered set of bits which presumably represents something. As I see it, the representation part of it must be defined prior to the gathering and ordering of the bits. Of course, the "representation" may not be strictly necessary for the existence of information. For example, physical entities beyond the ken of any intelligent being are considered to carry information in physical theory as far as I know. The instruments on the Voyager spacecraft might very well have captured some information and stored it in ordered bit patterns on board after the radio lost its ability to transmit that information back to Earth. I would think those stored bit patterns would still be considered "information". The bit patterns were arranged according to a pre-planned representation scheme even though they have not been known by any intelligence to date.

But you specifically referred to "known information". So it seems that you require a "knower" and a process or state of "knowing". That requirement seems to be an assumption in your work that you overlook. It seems that we must assume some kind of "knower" in order to have "known information". No?

The first step in solving such a problem would be to lay the problem out in detail. In order to accomplish such a feat, one would need a label for each and every valid ontological element going to make up every "present" in that personal list of "presents" which make up the "past" on which the given epistemological solution was based.

Let's take that a little slower. Let's examine just exactly what is required for that first step.

You say, "In order to accomplish such a feat, one would need ..." One? Who is this One? It seems to me that a requirement that you overlook is some intelligent or conscious agent (One) who is, or will be, instrumental in going about solving the problem, not to mention being interested in the problem in the first place.

From what you have said before, I think you would say that you, or I, or some reader of your work, is the "one" who is the agent that will "operate" the mechanism your work spells out. This seems to me to be a huge complex assumption, that is if you consider you, or me, or others to be these complex material bodies-with-brains existing in some kind of physical world "out there".

I agree that if you posit such a "One", then your development is without error -- at least any error that I could detect. But I think you should acknowledge that such a "One", who is in a position to "know" information, is a necessary assumption behind your work. No?

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[raolduke]

Its to bad time is money, because we are all going god-damned broke.

 

[Rade]

Well if I'm allowed to butt in a bit, and I cannot stress this enough; ontology is different matter than science. They are related to a great extent, but it is absolutely imperative to understand clearly where they part. That is to say, scientific models are not reality itself, they are models. Anyone abiding to scientific philosophy needs to understand this. Far better than it is generally understood...

But when someone (as did Doctordick) claims...that you can make any predictions about the future at all is a presumption...taken at face value I find this to be a false statement, since the process of Science is all about making predictions, it is the essence of the "hypothesis"--where one makes an educated prediction (in the present) of the future based on "uncertain knowledge" of the past. Now, the prediction (the hypothesis) may in fact be that "no prediction of the future can be made"--but, you see, this is not the same as saying "no prediction (eg, hypothesis) can be made"--which I take to be the false statement of Doctordick.

Now, it seems to me that there are only two types of "knowledge" (1) certain knowledge, and (2) uncertain knowledge. I hold that Science = process of gaining uncertain future knowledge of the metaphysical. Thus as you say, Science is "not reality itself", Science is the process of gaining uncertain knowledge of the metaphysical given (= reality). If one wishes to gain certain knowledge of the metaphysical it is not by Science that such knowledge will be obtained. Clearly the process of ontology (= study of existence) differs from the process of science (= gaining uncertain knowledge of existence).