Is Time Merely Constant Change?

[Doctordick]

Just what is or is not an illusion?

Mosassam, it seems to me that you have to think a little about what you have in mind when you say, "it is always NOW!" Are you trying to put forth the idea that nothing of the past exists? In other words, are you suggesting that your last birthday was an illusion? That no event you are aware of has any reality except the present? I think that is overlooking an important component of your experiences. What you think is going on "NOW" (even for every "NOW" in your past) is very strongly influenced on what you thought went on in the past before you experienced that "NOW"! As I said, the present can most easily be defined as a change in what you know. "NOW" is your awareness of change! Time is a concept which allows you to think of "what you know" as always changing; "t" being nothing but a parameter used to refer to a particular change of interest to you.

Thus the statement, "it is always NOW!" is essentially equivalent to saying, "what I know is always changing!" Read your comment with that substitution:

When I say "[what I know is always changing]", I'm not referring to myself. I am saying that [CHANGE] is an objective reality standing outside my own awareness. Unlike myself, [CHANGE] has always existed.

At this point it becomes obvious that you are making a presumption. All you can really say is that any concept of reality, if it is to allow for the fact that you are not all knowing, must accommodate itself to "change in knowledge" and thus must include a concept analogous to "time". You are presuming that "change" exists in the absence of understanding; that change "IS" a characteristic of reality. I would argue that the definition of reality is, "that which is without change": i.e., what we know of reality is what we call "the past"! It is our explanation of reality which changes, not reality.

Also, I'm not sure what you mean by awareness.

Well, I tell you what; you tell me what you mean by awareness and I will see if I can work with that.

I understand that you my think this is some kind of intellectual game, like ontology or epistemology, but I am really trying to stress that NOW, unlike Time, is an objective reality and one we all experience simultaneously.

No, I do not think this is some kind of intellectual game. I am a scientist, and, as such, was trained to be exact in my pronouncements. We cannot think about things rationally unless we are careful to consider the exact nature of our concepts. I would say we all experience what we call simultaneity (that we can relate changes in our knowledge to a parameterized table) but that "we all experience these changes simultaneously" is a direct contradiction to fact. That is the whole issue of relativity: events which are held to be simultaneous to one are not held to be simultaneous to others. Simultaneity is a very personal illusion necessary to any coherent explanation of reality; but cannot be defended as a "fact"!

This means Time is Not an Illusion. Its something that's been invented and utilized and has held up well over several millenia.

I wish you would clarify to me what you think "an illusion" is. In my head, an illusion, is any construct created by my mind which makes sense of my experiences. That this desk I am typing on is a solid object is an illusion; a very useful and simplifying illusion of reality but, none the less, an illusion. You imply that the fact that an illusion is useful or "holds up well over the years" implies it is no longer an illusion but "must be real". I would call that the fundamental axiom of any religion and, as such, is an attempt to change "science" into a religion.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Tournesol]

Hmmm, what exactly is meant with "natural concept" here?

-Anssi

It is what (I presume) man-made concrpts
are contrasted with. Of course, if they
are not contrasted with anything, talk about them is vacuous.

 

[Tournesol]

Y
Of course any astute person also readily recognizes that motion is just as much a man-made concept as time and as such these views should be equally valid, so I would like to be more careful in my assertion and just claim that it is merely useful for many purposes to assume that motion is more fundamental than time, and it is certainly useful to recognize that "time", as a backdrop for motion, is not necessarily of fundamental existence at all.

It is in fact more useful to assume time is fundamental. That is why
physics works that way.

 

[Tournesol]

Well done. By asking this question, you have gotten away from the annoyingly persistent fallacy of identity. The way we choose to understand the identity of things (i.e. when is it fair to say some thing changes to another thing), is completely up to some semantical criteria.

Some work a lot better than others.

 

[Tournesol]

I wish you would clarify to me what you think "an illusion" is. In my head, an illusion, is any construct created by my mind which makes sense of my experiences.

What do you call nonsensical constructs, like pink elephants, then?

 

[Tournesol]

This means Time is Not an Illusion. Its something that's been invented and utilized and has held up well over several millenia.

And before that, it didn't exist...?

 

[Doctordick]

Nonsensical constructs?

What do you call nonsensical constructs, like pink elephants, then?

I tend to consider them to be allusions (there is a subtle difference between allusions and illusions). Personally, I have never seen a "pink elephant". Now I have talked to drunks who claim to have seen such and they could either be pulling my leg or these are "constructs created by their mind which makes sense of their experiences". That makes them either allusions or illusions. What did they actually experience? Well, I'm not privy to their experiences; but according to them, they experienced seeing a pink elephant! If that is indeed the case it appears to be an explanation their mind created for them to explain their experiences!

Have fun -- Dic

 

[Tournesol]

I tend to consider them to be allusions (there is a subtle difference between allusions and illusions).

No, they are completely different.

# passing reference or indirect mention
wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn

# In rhetoric, an allusion is the implicit referencing of a related object or circumstance, which has occurred or existed in an external context. An allusion is understandable only to those with prior knowledge of the reference in question (as the writer assumes the reader has) Note: "allusion" should not be confused with an illusion.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allusion

# An implied or indirect reference in a literary text to another text.
usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/oal/gloss.htm

# A causal and brief reference to a famous historical or literary figure or event:
home.cfl.rr.com/eghsap/apterms.html

# in literature an indirect reference to some historical or cultural person, event, statement, or fact. For sociological or historical critics, allusions provide important clues to the contexts that provide a literary text added meaning and significance. Writers using allusions in a text assume that the reader will recognize the reference and in some fashion apply the extra-textual information in their interpretation of the text.
www2.cumberlandcollege.edu/acad/english/litcritweb/glossary.htm



[/QUOTE]
Personally, I have never seen a "pink elephant". Now I have talked to drunks who claim to have seen such and they could either be pulling my leg or these are "constructs created by their mind which makes sense of their experiences". That makes them either allusions or illusions. What did they actually experience? Well, I'm not privy to their experiences; but according to them, they experienced seeing a pink elephant! If that is indeed the case it appears to be an explanation their mind created for them to explain their experiences!
[/QUOTE]

Or not.

 

[AnssiH]

It is what (I presume) man-made concrpts
are contrasted with. Of course, if they
are not contrasted with anything, talk about them is vacuous.

They would be contrasted with noumenons. I.e. reality "as it really is". Of course you cannot think about or comprehend reality without resorting to some concepts/assumptions you've made all by yourself. Noumenon is the unknowable or unthinkable "real nature" of things.

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

It is in fact more useful to assume time is fundamental. That is why
physics works that way.

It makes the spacetime graphs simpler to understand and it usually makes easier to make practical predictions. Physics is different from ontology. We were talking about the latter.

-Anssi

 

[Tournesol]

They would be contrasted with noumenons. I.e. reality "as it really is".

They are not any kind of concept. The question is: what information
does "man made" convey?

 

[Tournesol]

It makes the spacetime graphs simpler to understand and it usually makes easier to make practical predictions. Physics is different from ontology. We were talking about the latter.

We don't have any access to ontology except models that work.

 

[nannoh]

I wish you would clarify to me what you think "an illusion" is. In my head, an illusion, is any construct created by my mind which makes sense of my experiences. That this desk I am typing on is a solid object is an illusion; a very useful and simplifying illusion of reality but, none the less, an illusion. You imply that the fact that an illusion is useful or "holds up well over the years" implies it is no longer an illusion but "must be real". I would call that the fundamental axiom of any religion and, as such, is an attempt to change "science" into a religion.

Have fun -- Dick

illusion |i?lo? zh ?n| noun a false idea or belief :a deceptive appearance or impression : the illusion of family togetherness | the tension between illusion and reality. • a thing that is or is likely to be wrongly perceived or interpreted by the senses : Zollner's illusion makes parallel lines seem to diverge by placing them on a zigzag-striped background.

The way you're using the word illusion would have all language categorized as illusion. When you hear the word tree, by your definition, it is an illusion of the biological event we call a tree. The word "tree" is actually an allusion to the biological event.

Without these allusions each item we wanted to communicate would have to be readily accessible to demonstrate our message. But, in the spirit of efficiency, humans have come up with language to describe events and concepts. Langauge is not an illusion. It is the mechanism of allusion. It is a common practice that has been in use for thousands of years. The concept of time and the term "time" are allusions to the experience of change.
Time is an allusion to change. It is an acknowledgment of change. It is our interpretation of events as measured against other events. We use the term "time" as a description of interacting mechanisms that we observe and use to delineate events in a sequence.

The real question is

Is reality an illusion or is illusion a reality?

because it can be argued that reality is an illusion and it can be argued that illusion is reality. Generally the argument is self-preserving while simultaneously being self-destructive.

 

[nannoh]

And before that, it didn't exist...?

Before that the word "time" didn't exist. The phenomenon of change, for all we know, did exist, even when we didn't. When we came along we attached the term "time" to change because we began to compare the different rates of change taking place in our environment and the comparison was dubbed "time".

 

[tehno]

"Tiii..ii..ime is on my side",sings Mick Jagger.
Accordingly,it's not just an illusion .

 

[Tournesol]

Before that the word "time" didn't exist. The phenomenon of change, for all we know, did exist, even when we didn't.

Why not same the phenomenon of time, as opposed to the
word, did exist?

When we came along we attached the term "time" to change because we began to compare the different rates of change taking place in our environment and the comparison was dubbed "time".

change makes no sense without time, irrespective of any speeds or rates.

 

[AnssiH]

They are not any kind of concept. The question is: what information
does "man made" convey?

That there are no such things as explicit truths, only beliefs. That there is no "true to reality" way to understand reality, only a number of equally valid ways to construct mental models that are good for predictions.

We don't have any access to ontology except models that work.

You seem to be throwing comments without knowing what was under discussion. "Model that works" doesn't answer ontology, which is about asking why is it that such and such model works. Model is not the reality; map is not the territory.

You implied before that it is more useful to think that time is more fundamental than motion, and I can only assume you say this because then you can suppose time is like a moving canvas on which there are events. So you mean you are a devoted dualist, or are you just blissfully unaware of the implications of your comment?

This thread is going round and round so I'll just refer to some old post where this was discussed in more detail already. Let's see...

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=127500&page=7

Start with post #99 and glance through some following posts between me and Paul and maybe Vanesch. You should be able to get up to speed in no time.

-Anssi

 

[nannoh]

Why not same the phenomenon of time, as opposed to the
word, did exist?



change makes no sense without time, irrespective of any speeds or rates.

Time is an abstraction of change, rate and speed. Its not an illusion. Its an invention.

Time is the abstraction of how we experience change.

Time is a method with which we measure rate and speed.

Time is a convenient and efficent invention like the cubit or inch or the photon, "graviton" or the electron.

Time is the reduction of processes down to an easily communicated and conveyed formula. It is part of our language that is practically universal to the human family. It is highly unlikely that there is another terestrial animal, besides humans, that have created an abstraction such as time.

 

[Tournesol]

That there are no such things as explicit truths, only beliefs. That there is no "true to reality" way to understand reality, only a number of equally valid ways to construct mental models that are good for predictions.

"Man made concept" does not contrast with anything else. But if all concepts are
man-made, you have no grounds for asserting that motion is primary. (not
even the grounds that physical models work that way).

You simply don't have valid argument to the effect that
all models are "equally valid" when they are no equally
simple or equally well-supported by the evidence. The playing-field
is no level.

You seem to be throwing comments without knowing what was under discussion. "Model that works" doesn't answer ontology, which is about asking why is it that such and such model works.

The straightforward answer is that it works because
it is like what it is representing. But you want to reject that.

Model is not the reality; map is not the territory.

That does not mean the territory is not like the map if it is a good map.

The Map/Territory distinction was introduced as part of Alfred Korzybski's general semantics. "Map" is taken in the broadest sense, descriptions scientific theories, mental representations, and, yes, even cartographical products are all maps.
The Map is certainly a distinct thing from the territory. But that does not mean it differs in its properties and structure differ from those of the territory. Two things can be distinct -- they can be two things -- without having different properties. from each other. (This has a lot to do with the nature of space). Every electron has the same properties as every other -- if the universe did not decompose into repeating units this way, it would be much harder to understand.

So the map does not necessarily have different properties to the territory. It may well have different properties. It is often stated that the way we see things has different properties to what is seen. But one has to be careful about such a claim. "The way things really are" is known only via another map, the scientific map. It is difficult to see anyone can claim to know that the map is necessarily different to the territory without claiming in the process to know the territory, which of course undermines the intended conclusion that the territory is unknowable.

Suppose the map does have different properties to the territory. Does that mean it is misrepresenting the territory? it depends on what the territory is like and what kind of representation we are interested in. (Remember, it is consistent to argue that the map might represent the territory, because the territory might be such-and-such. It is only inconsistent to argue that the map can never represent the territory because the territory is such-and-such).

If relations between properties are all that we are interested in, the properties themselves don't matter. For instance, a stone square can represent the shape of a wooden square perfectly well, because a shape is a structure, as a system of relations.

This gives us an answer to the question: what would the territory have to be like in order to be perfectly representable by the map.? It would have to be a system of pure structures, pattern all the way down.

You implied before that it is more useful to think that time is more fundamental than motion, and I can only assume you say this because then you can suppose time is like a moving canvas on which there are events.

I say this because that is the way physics models time, and physics
is useful. You speculations are completely wrong.

 

[Tournesol]

Time is an abstraction of change, rate and speed. Its not an illusion. Its an invention.

When was it invented?

 

[AnssiH]

"Man made concept" does not contrast with anything else. But if all concepts are
man-made, you have no grounds for asserting that motion is primary. (not
even the grounds that physical models work that way).

I cannot claim to know for sure that motion exists, but like I said, our subjective experience is in motion, and it surely is part of reality, so something in reality is static. Here some people go for a dualistic view; that our consciousness is in motion in spacetime, but of course not only is motion outside of spacetime is far from trivial to explain (unless you just arbitrarily claim it is metaphysical function of reality), it is also quite difficult to explain the details of any dualistic view in ways that correspond to all evidence.

So it seems more likely that the brain actually is what is doing the recognition processes and what have you, and that we experience a reality in motion because the physical processes of the brain really are in motion, and so is the reality around us, also made of the same physical "stuff" as our brain.

If you think it is more likely that brain is not in motion but rather we are an entity moving through spacetime, and somehow reading the state of the brain, care to elaborate how this could be possible and why we should expect it to be so?

You simply don't have valid argument to the effect that
all models are "equally valid" when they are no equally
simple or equally well-supported by the evidence. The playing-field
is no level.

I never said "all models are equally valid". I said there is "a number of equally valid models".

That is *some* number, with varying level of differences. They are all different views in our imagination, but yield identical observable phenomena.

The straightforward answer is that it works because
it is like what it is representing. But you want to reject that.

That does not mean the territory is not like the map if it is a good map.

Of course the map is like the territory! You obviously have not grasped what the map/territory relationship is about. The point is that we form an idea of things like electrons and how space and time exists and so on, and we do this because it can be used to predict the behaviour of some systems.

But after having done so we should not confuse the map with reality. The way we understand electrons is based on some stable behaviour that we observe, but we could have come to understand electrons very differently if we just chose to. You can imagine an electron as a little ball in what we call "space", or perhaps as a little hole in space, yielding the same properties. Our imagination does not consist of "things of reality" directly, but rather of our own ideas about reality, BASED on stable patterns or behaviour we observe.

Or let's take another exercise, regarding the nature of what we call "atoms". You might assert atoms are not just a case of having classified reality into stable patterns, of some which we call atoms. But rather that atoms really exist as atoms.

Where would you say we find the "real boundary" between an atom and the space that surrounds it? I.e. not a boundary that exists only because of some man-made definition of a specific way to define a boundary, but the real boundary that tells us the size of the "real" atom? (and what is the metaphysical meaning of "size")

So the map does not necessarily have different properties to the territory. It may well have different properties. It is often stated that the way we see things has different properties to what is seen. But one has to be careful about such a claim. "The way things really are" is known only via another map, the scientific map. It is difficult to see anyone can claim to know that the map is necessarily different to the territory without claiming in the process to know the territory, which of course undermines the intended conclusion that the territory is unknowable.

Suppose the map does have different properties to the territory. Does that mean it is misrepresenting the territory? it depends on what the territory is like and what kind of representation we are interested in. (Remember, it is consistent to argue that the map might represent the territory, because the territory might be such-and-such. It is only inconsistent to argue that the map can never represent the territory because the territory is such-and-such).

If relations between properties are all that we are interested in, the properties themselves don't matter. For instance, a stone square can represent the shape of a wooden square perfectly well, because a shape is a structure, as a system of relations.

What is being claimed is that map is not the territory. The map is made of properties, but the territory is not, for properties are things that exist once we classify the reality around us in such and such ways (as to define some properties).

Also, we can change the set of properties in the map into a different set and still keep the maps equivalent as far as any physical being is concerned.

This is not to say that map is totally different from territory; there is a correspondence, but the map does not reveal the ontology of reality. And once ontology is properly understood, it should be clear that it is unanswerable. What is important is to understand why this is so, and why models are not reality.

I say this because that is the way physics models time, and physics
is useful. You speculations are completely wrong.

Do you or do you not agree with the static spacetime interpretation of relativity? Or do you think time must be in motion for there to exist motion? Or what?

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

When was it invented?

Time is a semantical concept Tournesol. What we observe is motion. One might be thoughtless and claim that motion is impossible without time, but it is only impossible to consciously imagine motion without also imagining time. It doesn't mean time must exist in some metaphysical sense for there to exist motion.

Ask yourself, is time possible without motion? If nothing moved in reality, could it be said there is still such a thing as "time"?

Notice how we are throwing semantical concepts/definitions around, without getting into any real observable predictions? We cannot say motion must be more fundamental than time, but neither can we claim time, as we understand it, is of metaphysical existence. And even less we can claim that our idea of spacetime must be something that exist metaphysically.

-Anssi

 

[Tournesol]

I cannot claim to know for sure that motion exists, but like I said, our subjective experience is in motion,

It is changing. It is hard to say that it is going anywhere,.

and it surely is part of reality, so something in reality is static.

Static?

Here some people go for a dualistic view; that our consciousness is in motion in spacetime, but of course not only is motion outside of spacetime is far from trivial to explain (unless you just arbitrarily claim it is metaphysical function of reality), it is also quite difficult to explain the details of any dualistic view in ways that correspond to all evidence.

We can accept that change (or becoming, or, as you call, it motion)
is basic without adopting dualism.

So it seems more likely that the brain actually is what is doing the recognition processes and what have you, and that we experience a reality in motion because the physical processes of the brain really are in motion, and so is the reality around us, also made of the same physical "stuff" as our brain.

OK. But that is an escape-hatch from you claim that we cannot
tell what is really real. I don't have a problem with it,
but then I don't adopt your brand of map-territory anti-realism.

If you think it is more likely that brain is not in motion but rather we are an entity moving through spacetime, and somehow reading the state of the brain, care to elaborate how this could be possible and why we should expect it to be so?

I don't need to make either assumption to explain change.

That is *some* number, with varying level of differences. They are all different views in our imagination, but yield identical observable phenomena.

You have struggled to come up with examples of models
that are exactly equivalent.

Of course the map is like the territory! You obviously have not grasped what the map/territory relationship is about. The point is that we form an idea of things like electrons and how space and time exists and so on, and we do this because it can be used to predict the behaviour of some systems.

But after having done so we should not confuse the map with reality. The way we understand electrons is based on some stable behaviour that we observe, but we could have come to understand electrons very differently if we just chose to.

Not necessarily. You don't have an alternative theory with exactly
the same predictive power and simplicity.

You can imagine an electron as a little ball in what we call "space", or perhaps as a little hole in space, yielding the same properties.

That doesn't have much to do with the physics.

Our imagination does not consist of "things of reality" directly, but rather of our own ideas about reality, BASED on stable patterns or behaviour we observe.

The fact that they are our own ideas and not "direct" does not
make them inaccurate. (And of course "stable pattens" is
an ontology).

Or let's take another exercise, regarding the nature of what we call "atoms". You might assert atoms are not just a case of having classified reality into stable patterns, of some which we call atoms. But rather that atoms really exist as atoms.

Where would you say we find the "real boundary" between an atom and the space that surrounds it?

Orbitals are fairly well-defined. But that is not really the point.
If quantum fuzziness works as a predictive model, then I
will project that metaphysically.

I.e. not a boundary that exists only because of some man-made definition of a specific way to define a boundary, but the real boundary that tells us the size of the "real" atom? (and what is the metaphysical meaning of "size")

I don't need a "metaphysical meaning". This is all rather beside
the point. If a concept or model works, that is probably
how reality is. It doesn't matter if the concept is "man made"
(as opposed to what?)

What is being claimed is that map is not the territory. The map is made of properties, but the territory is not, for properties are things that exist once we classify the reality around us in such and such ways (as to define some properties).

We use the word "property" to indicate the real, metaphysical counterpart
of what appear on our maps as predicates.

Also, we can change the set of properties in the map into a different set and still keep the maps equivalent as far as any physical being is concerned.

So you say. You examples?

This is not to say that map is totally different from territory; there is a correspondence, but the map does not reveal the ontology of reality. And once ontology is properly understood, it should be clear that it is unanswerable.

You are not following your own rules. You started your reply
with an ontological claim.

Do you or do you not agree with the static spacetime interpretation of relativity? Or do you think time must be in motion for there to exist motion? Or what?

http://www.geocities.com/petedjones/tim_aspects.html#mctaggart

 

[Tournesol]

Time is a semantical concept Tournesol.

And motion isn't..?

What we observe is motion.

Even in our own subjective consciousness?

One might be thoughtless and claim that motion is impossible without time, but it is only impossible to consciously imagine motion without also imagining time. It doesn't mean time must exist in some metaphysical sense for there to exist motion.

If our logic is no guide to metaphysics, then we have
to give up on metaphysics entirely. Not that you have sworn off.

Ask yourself, is time possible without motion? If nothing moved in reality, could it be said there is still such a thing as "time"?

"It is only impossible to consciously imagine time without without also imagining time. It doesn't mean motion must exist in some metaphysical sense for there to exist time."

Notice how we are throwing semantical concepts/definitions around, without getting into any real observable predictions?

If some combinations of concepts is logically impossible
that is a reason for rejecting. We don't even need to get
onto observation.

We cannot say motion must be more fundamental than time, but neither can we claim time, as we understand it, is of metaphysical existence.

Yes we can. Providing we do not claim to be certain.

 

[AnssiH]

I cannot claim to know for sure that motion exists, but like I said, our subjective experience is in motion,

It is changing. It is hard to say that it is going anywhere,.

I'm not saying it is "going somewhere". "In motion", "changing", "dynamic", everyone understands these things slightly differently, we hardly need to argue about their meaning.

and it surely is part of reality, so something in reality is static.

Static?

Dynamic :)

We can accept that change (or becoming, or, as you call, it motion)
is basic without adopting dualism.

Yeah, and the question is then what is it that is undergoing a change. If we do not wish to follow the path of dualism, then it seems the sensible alternative is to say that all of reality is in motion (instead of just our "consciousness" as is the case in dualistic view)

This makes spacetime non-sensical concept as far as ontology goes, but it needs not change the suggested topology of spacetime (i.e. it doesn't have any observable effects, it is just an ontological view that makes more sense in the philosophy of the mind, but not necessarily in physics)

I went over this many times already in the previous posts.

OK. But that is an escape-hatch from you claim that we cannot
tell what is really real. I don't have a problem with it,
but then I don't adopt your brand of map-territory anti-realism.

When all is said and done, all our sense of reality is based on a set of assumptions. I cannot really claim our sense of reality is caused by the physical processes of the brain without first having made a large amount of assumptions so to build such and such worldview where it certainly makes sense to say that the brain "between my senses" is giving rise to my subjective experience.

In other words, I have to choose some path of ontology and try to follow it, to see if it leads anywhere. At this time I cannot explicitly deny dualism or idealism or solipsism, but I can say those views seem very arbitrary and very unlikely to me.

When I make assertions about motion or about my subjective experience being caused by such and such things, these are claims that make sense to me according to the knowledge that I hold at current time, even if these assertions are subject to change if I come across information that sparks a larger paradigm change in my worldview.

This is inherent to the way people understand reality or any system at all.

Map/territory relationship should not be confused with some kind of "anti-realism". It doesn't deny the existence of objective reality. It just notes that the intrinsic nature of reality is not found by classifying the stable behaviour around us into entities which have such and such properties. Just like a tornado is not a fundamental object and it doesn't have a metaphysical identity, any stable behaviour cannot be said to have a metaphysical identity outside of some specific semantical criteria to classifying them that way.

I.e. it is not to say that electrons are not there even when we think they are. It is to say that electrons are not metaphysically "objects with identity" just because we like to think of them that way.

I don't need to make either assumption to explain change.

Care to tell us what is your ontological view on this?

You have struggled to come up with examples of models
that are exactly equivalent.

If you think about the way you try to figure out how some system comes up with the behaviour you observe, it should be obvious we can understand the same thing in many different ways.

I think each QM interpretation and each interpretation of relativity is a valid example of this.

Also everything I said about the topology of spacetime should be valid here. Assertions about the nature of simultaneity are different but observationally equivalent models if they don't change the topology of spacetime.

Many physicisist and philosophers have also noted that the elementary particles of current models are things that are likely to only exist in the models, not necessarily in reality, although the behaviour we observe is real. If this doesn't seem to make sense;

http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy/message/9215

You can imagine an electron as a little ball in what we call "space", or perhaps as a little hole in space, yielding the same properties.

That doesn't have much to do with the physics.

It shouldn't have to do with physics in that physics should be holding a null interpretation of predictive math (in so far that it is possible for a human being), yet people in physics make ontological assertions about the nature of what we call electrons. This is what Thomas Kuhn, Martin Heidegger, Andrew Pickering and others are talking about.

The fact that they are our own ideas and not "direct" does not
make them inaccurate. (And of course "stable pattens" is
an ontology).

Of course it is. The only reason I like to say stable patterns is because it implies less about the nature of these patterns. I am not saying everything is "stable patterns". I am just saying we observe stable patterns.

Or let's take another exercise, regarding the nature of what we call "atoms". You might assert atoms are not just a case of having classified reality into stable patterns, of some which we call atoms. But rather that atoms really exist as atoms.

Where would you say we find the "real boundary" between an atom and the space that surrounds it?

Orbitals are fairly well-defined. But that is not really the point.
If quantum fuzziness works as a predictive model, then I
will project that metaphysically.

What do you mean by that?

Note that any boundary you draw, you draw it according to some criteria. How could we say there exists a boundary even without us choosing to draw the boundary in such and such way? Can you see how one could simply choose to say that there is no such thing as space, but there are only atoms in their extended sense, and that atom is the size of its whole "influence sphere" (whatever that is thought to mean)?

I don't need a "metaphysical meaning". This is all rather beside
the point. If a concept or model works, that is probably
how reality is. It doesn't matter if the concept is "man made"
(as opposed to what?)

Metaphysical nature is what map/territory relationship is about. The whole exercise is an attempt to point out *why* it is naive to assume reality probably is the way we imagine it.

A man made concept of the boundary of an atom would be, for example, the place where other atoms get deflected (where atoms collide with each others).

This is the distance at which the residual electromagnetism causes a repulsion. It is not a place where there is a wall of an atom, but rather where there is such and such information about the atom. There is information about the atom further away too, and we cannot say this is a metaphysical boundary, it is a man-made boundary.

All boundaries of an atom you can think of are like this. And furthermore, when I say "information about an atom", notice how that too is true only by accepting a certain way to identify an atom and information that is "about the atom". (There already was some discussion about identity of things)

http://www.geocities.com/petedjones/tim_aspects.html#mctaggart

Unfortunately the link doesn't work... ... but, Peter D Jones? Are you Peter, just using a different name? Haven't we been going through the same issues elsewhere?

Time is a semantical concept Tournesol.

And motion isn't..?

Haven't I already said;
Of course any astute person also readily recognizes that motion is just as much a man-made concept as time and as such these views should be equally valid, so I would like to be more careful in my assertion and just claim that it is merely useful for many purposes to assume that motion is more fundamental than time, and it is certainly useful to recognize that "time", as a backdrop for motion, is not necessarily of fundamental existence at all.

What we observe is motion.

Even in our own subjective consciousness?

I've said many times that motion can be understood in many different ways. The point is that you cannot say we observe time, rather we first observe motion and when we structure a more sophisticated worldview, we decide to use such concept as "time".

Quite obviously I cannot say what is the corresponding noumenon of what we call motion.

Notice how we are throwing semantical concepts/definitions around, without getting into any real observable predictions?

If some combinations of concepts is logically impossible
that is a reason for rejecting. We don't even need to get
onto observation.

Certainly. That is the only real way to reject some views. I believe panpsychism can be rejected on these grounds.

We cannot say motion must be more fundamental than time, but neither can we claim time, as we understand it, is of metaphysical existence.

Yes we can. Providing we do not claim to be certain.

Jeez... So we basically agree on this?

-Anssi

 

[Tournesol]

I'm not saying it is "going somewhere". "In motion", "changing", "dynamic", everyone understands these things slightly differently, we hardly need to argue about their meaning.

It is precisely because they are understood differently that we do need
to establish their meanings.

Yeah, and the question is then what is it that is undergoing a change. If we do not wish to follow the path of dualism, then it seems the sensible alternative is to say that all of reality is in motion (instead of just our "consciousness" as is the case in dualistic view)

Something like that.

http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/tim_aspects.html#mctaggart

This makes spacetime non-sensical concept as far as ontology

It conflicts with the "block universe" interpretation of relativity.

When all is said and done, all our sense of reality is based on a set of assumptions.

Since we reject assumptions that conflict with evidence. it is based
on evidence too.

I cannot really claim our sense of reality is caused by the physical processes of the brain without first having made a large amount of assumptions so to build such and such worldview where it certainly makes sense to say that the brain "between my senses" is giving rise to my subjective experience.

Yes. You have to start by taking a scientific picture
of the mid-world relationship realistically, in order
to come to your conclusions that nothing
should be taken realistically. Which is a contradiction.

In other words, I have to choose some path of ontology and try to follow it, to see if it leads anywhere. At this time I cannot explicitly deny dualism or idealism or solipsism, but I can say those views seem very arbitrary and very unlikely to me.

Yes. we can say what is probably true, in ontology.

When I make assertions about motion or about my subjective experience being caused by such and such things, these are claims that make sense to me according to the knowledge that I hold at current time, even if these assertions are subject to change if I come across information that sparks a larger paradigm change in my worldview.

That is how any scientifically informed person makes realistic
statements. But you want to reserve realism for
yourself, while telling others that they know nothing
of ontology...

Map/territory relationship should not be confused with some kind of "anti-realism". It doesn't deny the existence of objective reality. It just notes that the intrinsic nature of reality is not found by classifying the stable behaviour around us into entities which have such and such properties.

...like you do here. Arriving at a simple, predictive map is the
best guide we have to what reality really is. It isn't final
or perfect. But you allow yourslef wo work within its imperfections.

Just like a tornado is not a fundamental object and it doesn't have a metaphysical identity, any stable behaviour cannot be said to have a metaphysical identity outside of some specific semantical criteria to classifying them that way.

we can say that if a map works, it is telling us something about reality.

I.e. it is not to say that electrons are not there even when we think they are. It is to say that electrons are not metaphysically "objects with identity" just because we like to think of them that way.

If thinking about them that way works, that is a good
reason it suppose they are objects with identity.
That is your basis for taking realistically the things
you take realistically. It is only problem when other
people do it, apparently.

Care to tell us what is your ontological view on this?

http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/tim_aspects.html#mctaggart

If you think about the way you try to figure out how some system comes up with the behaviour you observe, it should be obvious we can understand the same thing in many different ways.

We have falsified many theories and are rarely faced with two equally
good theories we cannot decide between.

I think each QM interpretation and each interpretation of relativity is a valid example of this.

I think they are not.

Many physicisist and philosophers have also noted that the elementary particles of current models are things that are likely to only exist in the models, not necessarily in reality, although the behaviour we observe is real. If this doesn't seem to make sense;

http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy/message/9215

It shouldn't have to do with physics in that physics should be holding a null interpretation of predictive math

Absolutely not. The whole point of physics is to say what the
world is. Combining that with the valid points about what is and
isn't knowable, subtracting the various contradictions we arrive
at modest realism: we make statements about what the
real world is probably like.

Orbitals are fairly well-defined. But that is not really the point.
If quantum fuzziness works as a predictive model, then I
will project that metaphysically.

What do you mean by that?

I mean that having well-defined spatial boundaries is not the prerequisite for being metaphysically real.

Featuring in a predictive theory is the prerequisite for being metaphysically real.

Note that any boundary you draw, you draw it according to some criteria.

Some criteria work better than others. The playing field is not level.

How could we say there exists a boundary even without us choosing to draw the boundary in such and such way? Can you see how one could simply choose to say that there is no such thing as space, but there are only atoms in their extended sense, and that atom is the size of its whole "influence sphere" (whatever that is thought to mean)?

That theory would soon run into problems.

Metaphysical nature is what map/territory relationship is about. The whole exercise is an attempt to point out *why* it is naive to assume reality probably is the way we imagine it.

On the contrary, it is irrational to suppose that a theory
works for some reason other than modelling reality correctly.

A man made concept of the boundary of an atom would be, for example, the place where other atoms get deflected (where atoms collide with each others).

This is the distance at which the residual electromagnetism causes a repulsion. It is not a place where there is a wall of an atom, but rather where there is such and such information about the atom. There is information about the atom further away too, and we cannot say this is a metaphysical boundary, it is a man-made boundary.

All boundaries of an atom you can think of are like this. And furthermore, when I say "information about an atom", notice how that too is true only by accepting a certain way to identify an atom and information that is "about the atom". (There already was some discussion about identity of things)

Then we are finding out what realty is in terms of our
"man made" concepts. You are implying that we don't know anything unless
reality provides us with some kind of non-man-made concepts. That doesn't
follow.

Unfortunately the link doesn't work... ... but, Peter D Jones? Are you Peter, just using a different name? Haven't we been going through the same issues elsewhere?

yes and yes.

Haven't I already said;
Of course any astute person also readily recognizes that motion is just as much a man-made concept as time and as such these views should be equally valid, so I would like to be more careful in my assertion and just claim that it is merely useful for many purposes to assume that motion is more fundamental than time, and it is certainly useful to recognize that "time", as a backdrop for motion, is not necessarily of fundamental existence at all.

That should be reversed.

I've said many times that motion can be understood in many different ways. The point is that you cannot say we observe time, rather we first observe motion and when we structure a more sophisticated worldview, we decide to use such concept as "time".

"more sophisticated". You said it. The sophisticated analysis is better.

 

[nannoh]

When was it invented?

Time was invented when animals (assumedly anthropods) took note of change and applied to their activities in a predictive manner.

 

[Tournesol]

What happened before that?

 

[nannoh]

What happened before that?

There were no contrived interpretations of change that we know of. Change was simply another condition to be spontaneously dealt with by animals, plants and other organisms. Change was and is a condition that had to be adapted to the same as cold, heat, flood, hunger and so on. Conscious decisions to interpret change as "time" did not exist as far as we know. Not until there was a perceived requirement to predict.

 

[Tournesol]

change is the same thing being in different states at different times.

 

[AnssiH]

It is precisely because they are understood differently that we do need
to establish their meanings.

I guess what I actually meant with reality being in motion was described in the earlier posts which you haven't read, so just to re-cap, the point was to present a contrasted view from the idea that spacetime is static. In the static view all of past and all of future exists all the time, and we are simply "reading the spacetime from one location at a time".

In this view reality would be static and it does not explain in any sensical way why subjective experience is not static, other than suggesting that subjective experience is a case of some kind of metaphysical entity being in motion in spacetime. (Notice how the idea of "motion" is used in two different ways here, one is the motion of "consciousness", and other is how the consciousness is observing static things as if they are in motion)

I was pointing out that this is unnecessary assumption even if you assume that Relativity makes ALL the correct observable predictions. It's one type of mental model.

Something like that.

http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/tim_aspects.html#mctaggart

I think I need to read that page from the beginning to understand what that section is about.

But just to comment on few things at the beginning:
Time either exists or does not; if it exists it is either objective or subjective; if objective, it either involves flow or not.

The question is rather, is "time" a proper concept to understand the metaphysical nature of motion. I.e, is it fair to say that there needs to exist some sort of invisible entity called "time", before anything can move.
What do you think?

You argue against "there is only movement" with "how do you define movement without bringing time?" The point with arguing there is only movement is to remove "time" as a some kind of metaphysical entity or canvas from our conception of reality, on the basis that it is unnecessary component; motion can be metaphysical directly. It complicates matters to define speed of time and also the speed of motion on top of that.

Also, I think rather than saying time is either objective or subjective, we need to rather discuss by what degree the experience of time is subjective and by what degree we could expect it to be objective. For example, I think it is fair to say that the observed "rate of time" is not an objective property in any scheme (and when you think about this, you realize that even such a concept as "speed of time" is somewhat confused, and it is far simpler to say speed of motion)

There is a certain regularity to events e.g. if B1 is simultaneous with B2 and B2 is simultaneous with B3 then B1 is simultaneous with B3

Are you using the concept of simultaneity differently than it is used in relativity?

It conflicts with the "block universe" interpretation of relativity.

Of course it does, it is the alternative view.

Since we reject assumptions that conflict with evidence. it is based
on evidence too.

Yeah, of course, we observe things and make assumptions accordingly. What is notable is that the observation is never objectively made, since only way to interpret any sensory input is to do it according to the assumptions thus far made. This is true to any single experiment we can possibly conceive.

Yes. You have to start by taking a scientific picture
of the mid-world relationship realistically, in order
to come to your conclusions that nothing
should be taken realistically. Which is a contradiction.

To me it just means I cannot be sure of my views. Also there is a fair amount of unnecessary wordplay involved when I first say "I cannot be certain of anything", and someone says I'm contradicting myself since then I cannot be certain of being uncertain; perhaps I am certain after all. Just what I would expect to happen when our thoughts are are restricted to semantical concepts. Goes right besides the point.

But you want to reserve realism for
yourself, while telling others that they know nothing
of ontology...

I've said before that "realism" is always to a degree "naive realism", since each view of reality is a conception made of man-made concepts. I do not claim I know what reality is like. And understanding the concept of noumenons is knowledge of ontology, but it is also a realization that ontology is not answerable even in principle.

Map/territory relationship should not be confused with some kind of "anti-realism". It doesn't deny the existence of objective reality. It just notes that the intrinsic nature of reality is not found by classifying the stable behaviour around us into entities which have such and such properties.

...like you do here.

Where in that quote I claim to know what reality is like?

Arriving at a simple, predictive map is the
best guide we have to what reality really is.

Yeah, and it isn't an answer to ontology. No past model ever were, and no future model ever will be. They are models, they classify reality into some bits of identity with some properties, because this is useful for making predictions about the behaviour of reality. This way we know what is about to happen in reality before "reality itself" knows it, so to speak.

If thinking about them that way works, that is a good
reason it suppose they are objects with identity.
That is your basis for taking realistically the things
you take realistically. It is only problem when other
people do it, apparently.

I do think QM behaviour brings quite considerable weight to my argument about "non-objectivity of identity of things".

I think each QM interpretation and each interpretation of relativity is a valid example of this.

I think they are not.

Yeah I know, on the basis that you don't think the are equivalent... You do realize though that each and everyone has been built by a human brain, after observing the same observable behaviour?

Absolutely not. The whole point of physics is to say what the
world is.

You are completely wrong here. The whole point of physics is to come up with predictive models. It is philosophy when physicists give their interpretation as to why such and such math brings out the correct predictions, since they recognize we can make many conflicting assertions here without any observable effects. Most physicists know very well.

Combining that with the valid points about what is and
isn't knowable, subtracting the various contradictions we arrive
at modest realism: we make statements about what the
real world is probably like.

Perhaps the difference in our views is simply that I think it is more proper to say "we make statements about how to correctly predict reality". This does not entail knowing any single answer to any single ontological question. It just entails having made good assumptions about what things exist (with more or less stability) and how they behave.

Since Einstein showed mass is basically just energy, and since QM behaviour showed in more detail that little things are not very stable in their identity in space and time when they move from one place to another (whatever that means), it became less reasonable to assume reality is in ontological sense like the models with which we choose to understand the behaviour of so-called sub-atomic particles.

I mean that having well-defined spatial boundaries is not the prerequisite for being metaphysically real.

Yeah, exactly. There is objective reality, but to draw boundaries is something that we do, not something that nature does. That's what I'm saying.

I'm not saying it because of "QM fuzzyness", but because it is impossible to show that some boundary we draw is more than something we have drawn for convenience. Just like the boundaries between countries are not metaphysically real, the boundary between an atom and a space cannot be said to be more than a convention.

How could we say there exists a boundary even without us choosing to draw the boundary in such and such way? Can you see how one could simply choose to say that there is no such thing as space, but there are only atoms in their extended sense, and that atom is the size of its whole "influence sphere" (whatever that is thought to mean)?

That theory would soon run into problems.

Why would it run into problems? Because you are used to think in terms of space and matter duality? Why do you do that? No one has ever seen empty space. Space is filled with electromagnetic activity, which is what atoms are pretty much made of. There's no reason why you couldn't build a model where you use such terminology (and associated definitions) that there is nothing called "space". This could even be beneficial in that it removes some invalid assumptions about the "identity of location in space".

On the contrary, it is irrational to suppose that a theory
works for some reason other than modelling reality correctly.

No one is saying it isn't modeling reality correctly. You are missing the point. A weather simulation is modeling Earth's atmosphere correctly and thus it makes pretty accurate predictions. In principle we could build a weather simulation that works by moving everything according to QED. But the question is closer to something like, should it be assumed the particles move in many universes (like in MWI), or should their paths be calculated into static spacetime (transactional interpretation) or should the particles be modeled as something completely different, as if there is just a space with energy waves in interaction? Or something completely different?

Each of these would come up with the same predictions. Each of these feature ideas where things like particles and space and time are understood little bit differently, but the end result is exactly the behaviour as predicted by QED.

A man made concept of the boundary of an atom would be, for example, the place where other atoms get deflected (where atoms collide with each others).

This is the distance at which the residual electromagnetism causes a repulsion. It is not a place where there is a wall of an atom, but rather where there is such and such information about the atom. There is information about the atom further away too, and we cannot say this is a metaphysical boundary, it is a man-made boundary.

All boundaries of an atom you can think of are like this. And furthermore, when I say "information about an atom", notice how that too is true only by accepting a certain way to identify an atom and information that is "about the atom". (There already was some discussion about identity of things)
Then we are finding out what realty is in terms of our

"man made" concepts. You are implying that we don't know anything unless
reality provides us with some kind of non-man-made concepts. That doesn't
follow.

There is no such thing as non-man-made concept. There are concepts because they can be used to predict the behaviour of some system without knowing what really makes the system tick.

Also consider this question; What does an atom probably look like? Can you try and give an answer?

"more sophisticated". You said it. The sophisticated analysis is better.

More sophisticated is not the same as more fundamental. Physics simulations add more and more properties to things to calculate their behaviour more realistically (since they can't realistically go along modeling each sub-atomic particle), which can be said to be more sophistication, but it doesn't mean these properties really exist.

-Anssi

 

[nannoh]

change is the same thing being in different states at different times.

Change seems to me to be the condition of transition. There are different rates of change for different things. If everything was changing at the same rate then change would be imperceptible. It's only because we have references between contrasting rates of change that we are able to perceive change. So, without various and diverse rates of change as references, change is undetectable.

It's the nature of change that led humans to use contrasting rates of change to invent the measuring and comparitive system of time. We use the system of measuring change against more and less active changes (time) as one of our unique adaptations to the condition of change. It may be because we have more grey matter to work with that we arrived at this invention but, whales have larger brains than us however I don't know if they have invented a similar adaptation to change.

Time is an elaboration of the natural adaptive techniques that have evolved in the nervous systems of the organisms from which we have evolved. The sensory organs of all organisms use nature's diversity of conditions to judge how far to jump, how much to eat and when to hibernate among a many other survival activities.

But these adaptations and reactions to natural conditions are what we call "instinctive". They are not consciously measured responses to change or any other condition. Our adaptation to the conditions in nature, including change or "transition", is an intellectual one. We have measured the rate of the rotation of the Earth in relation to the relatively stable condition of the sun and used relationships like this to develop an abstraction of change known as "time". We use this abstraction to predict many things but ultimately to support our survival.

So time is not an illusion, by definition. It is an elaboration, an abstraction and invention that is used, like a tool, in our adaptation to the natural condition of change.

By definition illusion is this:

a misinterpreted perception that is caused by mistaking something present for something it is not. Illusions commonly occur with information that is seen or heard. For example, a common illusion is misinterpreting the noise made by wind for a voice. By contrast, a hallucination is a strong sensory perception that one has of an object or event while awake, when no such object or event exists.

www.dbs-stn.org/glossary2.asp[/URL]

 

[mosassam]

QUOTE FROM ANISSH
(Notice how the idea of "motion" is used in two different ways here, one is the motion of "consciousness", and other is how the consciousness is observing static things as if they are in motion)

There are various assumptions, models and interpretations involving sensorial data. What, in your view, is occurring when one 'observes' ones own consciousness?
The main point I'm making is, what happens when an observation is made that is not reliant on the 'dubiousness' of sensorial data?

 

[Tournesol]

The question is rather, is "time" a proper concept to understand the metaphysical nature of motion. I.e, is it fair to say that there needs to exist some sort of invisible entity called "time", before anything can move.
What do you think?

I think it does. Probably

You argue against "there is only movement" with "how do you define movement without bringing time?" The point with arguing there is only movement is to remove "time" as a some kind of metaphysical entity or canvas from our conception of reality, on the basis that it is unnecessary component; motion can be metaphysical directly.

How?

It complicates matters to define speed of time and also the speed of motion on top of that.

That is not what I am saying. I have been saying that the "speed" questions
are not very philosophically important.

Yeah, of course, we observe things and make assumptions accordingly. What is notable is that the observation is never objectively made, since only way to interpret any sensory input is to do it according to the assumptions thus far made.

Assumptions may be objective.

I've said before that "realism" is always to a degree "naive realism", since each view of reality is a conception made of man-made concepts.

That's not how Naive Realism is defined.

I do not claim I know what reality is like.

You claim to know what it is not, in various ways.

Where in that quote I claim to know what reality is like?

"It just notes that the intrinsic nature of reality is not found by classifying the stable behaviour around us into entities which have such and such properties".

why not? It might be right.

Arriving at a simple, predictive map is the
best guide we have to what reality really is

Yeah, and it isn't an answer to ontology.

Saying what reality really is, however tentatively,
is ontology.

No past model ever were, and no future model ever will be. They are models, they classify reality into some bits of identity with some properties, because this is useful for making predictions about the behaviour of reality. This way we know what is about to happen in reality before "reality itself" knows it, so to speak.

And why do these useful models work, if
they do not in some way resemble reality?

I do think QM behaviour brings quite considerable weight to my argument about "non-objectivity of identity of things".

It's non non-objective, it just works in a different
way to classical assumptions. You are much too
quick to say that things are not objective.

Yeah I know, on the basis that you don't think the are equivalent... You do realize though that each and every [interpretation of quantum physics] has been built by a human brain, after observing the same observable behaviour?

Not really. The statistical interpretation is ruled
out by single-particle experiments. Local HV theories
are rules out by the Aspect experiment.

And then there's all the intra-theoretic stuff that you always
ignore...

You are completely wrong here. The whole point of physics is to come up with predictive models.

Nope.

"Physics (from the Greek, φύσις (phúsis), "nature" and φυσικῆ (phusiké), "knowledge of nature") is the science concerned with the discovery and understanding of the fundamental laws which govern matter, energy, space, and time."

"The Road to Reality"(Book by R Penrose. Note: nto the road
to better predictions).

"the study of matter and energy"

"Discipline of Science dealing with the properties of matter and energy. Includes; acoustics, atomic physics, cryogenics, electromagnetism, elementary particle physics, fluid dynamics, geophysics, mathematical physics, mechanics, molecular physics, nuclear physics, optics, plasma physics, quantum physics, solid state physics, statistical mechanics, thermodynamics.".

Perhaps the difference in our views is simply that I think it is more proper to say "we make statements about how to correctly predict reality". This does not entail knowing any single answer to any single ontological question. It just entails having made good assumptions about what things exist (with more or less stability) and how they behave.

What things are and how they behave is ontology!

Since Einstein showed mass is basically just energy,

Don't you mean he showed that the mathematical formula e=mc^2
is a good predictor? Again, you can't stick to
your own anti-realism!

and since QM behaviour showed in more detail that little things are not very stable in their identity in space and time when they move from one place to another

Ditto.

(whatever that means), it became less reasonable to assume reality is in ontological sense like the models with which we choose to understand the behaviour of so-called sub-atomic particles.

People became anti-realist about some theories
because it allowed them to cling to dogmas
like determininism.

Yeah, exactly. There is objective reality, but to draw boundaries is something that we do, not something that nature does. That's what I'm saying.

How do you know that nature doesn't do it? Statements
about what the world isn't are still ontology!

I'm not saying it because of "QM fuzzyness", but because it is impossible to show that some boundary we draw is more than something we have drawn for convenience.

The fact that it works predictively, if it
does, is "something more".

Just like the boundaries between countries are not metaphysically real, the boundary between an atom and a space cannot be said to be more than a convention.

That's not remotely analogous. Hydrogen atoms are so small
that hey can pass through the molecular structure of rubber, If I redefeine
them as being 1cm across--they still pass through rubber.
My claims is therefore falsified.

That is completely different from re-drawing a national boundary.

Why would it run into problems?

It would make false predicitions as in the hydrogen atom example.

No one is saying it isn't modeling reality correctly. You are missing the point. A weather simulation is modeling Earth's atmosphere correctly and thus it makes pretty accurate predictions. In principle we could build a weather simulation that works by moving everything according to QED. But the question is closer to something like, should it be assumed the particles move in many universes (like in MWI), or should their paths be calculated into static spacetime (transactional interpretation) or should the particles be modeled as something completely different, as if there is just a space with energy waves in interaction? Or something completely different?

if we can settle on an outstandingly good theory we
are entitled to say reality is "like" that. The kind
of situation prevailing in QM with multiple interpretations is
fairly abnormal.

There is no such thing as non-man-made concept.

Then why harp on about man -made concepts?

There are concepts because they can be used to predict the behaviour of some system without knowing what really makes the system tick.

You mean "knowing for certain". Good predictive models
give FAPP knowledge.

Also consider this question; What does an atom probably look like? Can you try and give an answer?

Ontological questions don't have to be answered in naive "looks like"
terms.

More sophisticated is not the same as more fundamental.

Better theories are a better guide to what is fundamental.

Physics simulations add more and more properties to things to calculate their behaviour more realistically (since they can't realistically go along modeling each sub-atomic particle), which can be said to be more sophistication, but it doesn't mean these properties really exist.

if the theory works, that is a good reason to think they do.

 

[Doctordick]

As I read the contributions to this thread, I find things to be much the same as seen by Kant over two hundred years ago. Is there no progress in the field of philosophy?

Metaphysic, a completely isolated and speculative science of reason, which declines all teaching of experience, and rests on concepts only (not on their application to intuition, as mathematics), in which reason therefore is meant to be her own pupil, has hitherto not been so fortunate as to enter on the secure path of a science, although it is older than all other sciences, and would remain, even if all the rest were swallowed up in the abyss of an all-destroying barbarism. In metaphysic, reason, even if it tries only to understand a priori (as it pretends to do) those laws which are confirmed by the common experience, is constantly brought to a standstill, and we are obliged again and again to retrace our steps, because they do not lead us where we want to go; while as to unanimity among those who are engaged in the same work, there is so little of it in metaphysic, that it has rather become an arena, specially destined, it would seem, for those who wish to exercise themselves in mock fights, and where no combatant has, as yet, succeeded in gaining an inch of ground that he could call permanently his own. It cannot be denied, therefore, that the method of metaphysic has hitherto consisted in groping only, and, what is the worst, in groping among mere concepts.

Immanuel Kant,1787

Or perhaps you could give attention to another of his comments:

It is indeed a very common fate of human reason first of all to finish its speculative edifice as soon as possible, and then only inquire whether the foundations be sure.

Oh, how true; how true!

These comments are taken from his 1887 edition of his "Critique of Pure Reason" (from a translation done by F. Max Muller). In reading that document, I came to the conclusion that Kant was apparently trying to develop a rational mechanism to turn metaphysics into an exact science. From an “exact” analysis of current philosophic thought, I would judge that the final consequence of his effort was abject failure; however, I do not find his goal to be at all ridiculous. I think he just made some very poor assumptions.

The most serious error in his approach was that he missed the very essence of the problem. He begins by setting up two categories of knowledge; a-priori, being achieved without experience of any kind, and a-posteriori, which he terms “empirical” and arises from analysis of one’s experiences. His first mistake is to attribute a-priori knowledge to “intuition”. By making that identification, he clearly makes the assumption that intuition is not based on experience, a rather extreme assumption. I think he made that error because he needed a source for that a-priori knowledge and “intuition” was the only thing he could come up with.

Kant himself essentially points out the impossibility of a-priori knowledge in his section, “The General Problem of Pure Reason”.

Now the real problem of pure reason is contained in the question, How are synthetical judgments a-priori possible?

In the same section, he credits David Hume with the closest approach to the problem. But, according to Kant, David Hume held that a-priori knowledge was entirely impossible. This Kant apparently held to be a clearly illogical statement.

If he [Hume] had grasped our problem in all its universality, he would never have thought of an assertion which destroys all pure philosophy, because he would have perceived that, according to his argument, no pure mathematical science was possible either, on account of its certainly containing synthetical propositions a-priori; and from such an assertion his good sense would probably have saved him.

It seems to me that Kant shows a major deficit in his comprehension of mathematics. Mathematics is little more than a very carefully examined synthetical construct. It seems quite clear to me that any decent mathematician would accept any abstract structure shown to be totally internally self consistent to be a “mathematical” structure. The ontology of mathematics is as intuitively (i.e.,from experience) generated as is any other field. What makes it “pure” is the fact that it is without contradiction (at least as best as the mathematicians can manage to achieve). In no way can the existence of mathematics (and its presumed “purity” of essence) be held as evidence that a-priori knowledge exists.

I don’t know Hume’s position, but, if he did hold that a-priori knowledge was impossible, I would certainly agree with him and not Kant. All knowledge is based upon past experience in some way and whether that experience be personal experience of an individual or the experience provided to the entity via evolution is of no real consequence, it is still experience.

However, there is certainly a very great difference between deduced conclusions and induced conclusions. Philosophers make much of the fact that those deduced conclusions are based upon a-priori inductive foundations. It seems to me that the common philosophic separation of this issue is fairly clearly expressed through the division between ontology and epistemology, ontology commonly refers to the collection of things concepts or ideas held to be the foundation of a field (in philosophy that would be the fundamental question of what exists).

I should be clear to anyone that exactly what this ontology consists of is certainly beyond our knowing a-priori; it has to be learned subject. Prior to being learned or understood the correct ontology is no more than a collection of undefined “things”: concepts, objects, ideas…., whatever! The issue everyone seems to miss is the very fact that this “ontology” being referred to has to be regarded as a collection of undefined things.

That is, the definitions people put up for ontological elements are divined from arguments based on those ontological elements. These definitions are developed from functioning explanations as those explanations are refined. What needs to be understood here is that the definitions of those ontological elements can not be a-priori information: they themselves must be explained.

The problem most everyone seems to have with the issue of ontology is that they cannot comprehend not knowing what they have to work with[/color] and thus fail at the very first step. The issue being that the moment you put meaning to any ontological element, you are already outside the field of ontology and discussing epistemology: i.e., attaching meaning to an ontological element requires understanding the explanation of a definition and that is the essence of epistemology.

The very essence of metaphysics is understanding what can be said about ontology without defining that ontology. That is the very essence of my paper on explanation.

If anyone here can come up with a concept more basic than “an explanation” I would be quite interested in their arguments (I was very tempted to say “their explanation” but that sort of presumes they are wrong). Baring the existence of a more basic concept, it follows, as the night the day, that the absolute first effort of any objective scientific analysis must begin by examining exactly what it is that should be used to qualify something as “an explanation”. An effort apparently attempted by no one save myself. As you all well know, my opinions on that issue are expressed in the document http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm .

So long as you refuse to come to grips with that central problem, you will all be doomed to “exercise themselves in mock fights”.

Saying what reality really is, however tentatively,
is ontology. … What things are and how they behave is ontology!

So, are you interested in ontology? Or is it merely a preferred arena of mock logic? I am here for anyone who wishes to discuss metaphysics from the perspective of an exact science.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[mosassam]

The limit of Reason

[

I am here for anyone who wishes to discuss metaphysics from the perspective of an exact science.

Maybe it is possible to acquire knowledge without the process of Reason, although I'm not sure how this would be done. When discussing, interpreting, assuming, explaining or just plain guessing, we are inextricably tied to Reason. However, when simply observing, we are not. If we wish to extrapilate results from our observations or draw conclusions etc. we are once more at the behest of Reason. Any 'exact science' or 'metaphysics' is the prisoner of Reason. In my last post I asked, what is happening when we observe our own consciousness (which includes Reason)? I wanted to get away from the process of observing sensorial data as there is a necessary 'interpretation' required of such data. To observe or to be aware of something does not require Reason, anything that happens after this can be labelled Science.
What do the many theories and models that have sprung out of Quantum Mechanics have to say about observing ones own consciousness? Can any science or philosophy exist without Reason? If not, then the only thing they can ever say is that Reason is king, it is the ultimate, it is the conclusion.But is this really the case?

 

[Doctordick]

Maybe it is possible to acquire knowledge without the process of Reason, although I'm not sure how this would be done.

I am not talking about “acquiring knowledge”; I am speaking of a rational “scientific” way of examining one’s ontology so as to set up a mechanism for assuring a firm foundation prior to speculating as to the nature of that ontology (so as to fulfill Kant’s hopes).

When discussing, interpreting, assuming, explaining or just plain guessing, we are inextricably tied to Reason. However, when simply observing, we are not.

It isn’t the observation which concerns me; it’s the interpretation of those observations (the mechanism of representing the ontology behind those "observations").

If we wish to extrapolate results from our observations or draw conclusions etc. we are once more at the behest of Reason. Any 'exact science' or 'metaphysics' is the prisoner of Reason.

And so it should be if we wish to be objectively scientific about it.

In my last post I asked, what is happening when we observe our own consciousness (which includes Reason)?

The problem here is that you have already stepped out of ontology and into epistemology. You simply cannot even define what you mean by consciousness without asserting what Kant refers to as a "speculative edifice".

I wanted to get away from the process of observing sensorial data as there is a necessary 'interpretation' required of such data.

Indeed there is and that “interpretation’ is itself a “speculative edifice”. To ignore it, and proceed to an edifice more established by common speculation, is not a solution to the problem. The only solution is to develop a rational way of referring to a ontology which is all encompassing and thus requires no “speculative edifice”.

To observe or to be aware of something does not require Reason, anything that happens after this can be labeled Science.

I agree one hundred percent; but, your approach is essentially to ignore the issue of ontology as a science: i.e., you want to “finish your speculative edifice”. Why? Well, it’s quite clear to me that you have no idea as to how to handle the issue of ontology without a “speculative edifice” to work from. I am afraid that is putting the horse on the wrong side of the cart. Don’t feel bad; your attitude is quite the standard.

What do the many theories and models that have sprung out of Quantum Mechanics have to say about observing ones own consciousness? Can any science or philosophy exist without Reason? If not, then the only thing they can ever say is that Reason is king, it is the ultimate, it is the conclusion.But is this really the case?

Again, the whole subject of your comment is epistemology (having to do with setting up a rational “speculative edifice”) not ontology (what exists).

As I said, “the only solution is to develop a rational way of referring to a ontology which is all encompassing and thus requires no ‘speculative edifice’.”

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Rade]

...If anyone here can come up with a concept more basic than “an explanation” I would be quite interested in their arguments...

"existence" is more basic than explanation. Before one can explain first must be some set of things that exist that are open to the operation of explanation. An explanation is nothing more than a theory, and as a theory must be built from "facts", and explanation must be built from the set of things that exists. Existence is to explanation as fact is to theory. The fundamental axiom from which all philosophy develops is "existence exists" --read Ayn Rand. To exist is to be something, to have a nature, to have an identity. Existence = Identity, and both, as a superposition, are more basic that "an explanation". Now, here is how you falsify above. Form "an explanation" without using something that first exists (such as the letters on your keyboard)--as you say--have fun.

 

[nannoh]

Is the sun just an illusion? Is the rotation of the Earth just an illusion? Are stars just the illusion made by holes in black fabric? Are the hour glass, sand and gravity just an illusion? Is atomic decay just an illusion? These are the types of questions that I think would come with this thread.

 

[Doctordick]

"existence" is more basic than explanation.

Yes it is; however, that is the very issue of ontology. The problem is that epistemology is based on a presumed ontology and any discussion of ontological elements requires a “speculative edifice” and the moment you enter that realm, you are discussing epistemology, not ontology.

Before one can explain first must be some set of things that exist that are open to the operation of explanation.

Exactly; however, you are concerning yourself “what” those things are. Go back and read what I said.

Indeed there is and that “interpretation’ is itself a “speculative edifice”. To ignore it, and proceed to an edifice more established by common speculation, is not a solution to the problem. The only solution is to develop a rational way of referring to a ontology which is all encompassing and thus requires no “speculative edifice”.

An explanation is nothing more than a theory, and as a theory must be built from "facts", and explanation must be built from the set of things that exists.

You are spouting words without defining them. You want to define “an explanation” in terms of “a theory” (apparently presuming “a theory” is a more basic concept than “an explanation”). Then all you say about “a theory” is that it is built of facts (which you have not defined) and you give me no description of the procedure to be followed nor do you give even a hint as how I am to know when I have successfully built this ‘theory’. If I pile all these facts in a mound, do I have a theory? Put a little thought into your comments.

Existence is to explanation as fact is to theory. The fundamental axiom from which all philosophy develops is "existence exists" --read Ayn Rand.

Ontology is the study of “what exists”. Fundamentally existence is a quality given to something which assigns it to the field of ontology. To go beyond that statement (any attempt to define “existence”) is outside the field of ontology. The moment you begin such a process, you are creating a “speculative edifice”. What is quite evident is that you have no idea as to how to handle the issue of ontology without a “speculative edifice” to work from.

To quote Kant again: “In metaphysic, reason, even if it tries only to understand a priori (as it pretends to do) those laws which are confirmed by the common experience, is constantly brought to a standstill, and we are obliged again and again to retrace our steps, because they do not lead us where we want to go; while as to unanimity among those who are engaged in the same work, there is so little of it in metaphysic, that it has rather become an arena, specially destined, it would seem, for those who wish to exercise themselves in mock fights, and where no combatant has, as yet, succeeded in gaining an inch of ground that he could call permanently his own. It cannot be denied, therefore, that the method of metaphysic has hitherto consisted in groping only, and, what is the worst, in groping among mere concepts.”

To exist is to be something, to have a nature, to have an identity. Existence = Identity, and both, as a superposition, are more basic that "an explanation". Now, here is how you falsify above. Form "an explanation" without using something that first exists (such as the letters on your keyboard)--as you say--have fun.

What you fail to comprehend (because, to you, ontology is a collection of defined things: i.e., a speculative edifice) is that “concepts” are the defined working material of epistemology, not “existence” which is no more than a label certifying membership to your ontology. Existence itself, as you see it, is a speculative edifice.

Finally, I am not “explaining” anything! I claim that the primary element of any “speculative edifice” is “an explanation”. Any “speculative edifice” you may decide to build is worthless unless you can “explain” it and its elements (at least to yourself). It follows that the most basic concept of epistemology (and the one which bridges the gap between ontology and epistemology) is the concept of “an explanation”. Without such a concept, you sail without a rudder.

It is the primary issue to be confronted if we are to turn metaphysics into a science. However if you prefer to exercise yourself in mock fights and waste your time "groping among mere concepts", you can find more agreeable adversaries.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Paul Martin]

Interesting discussion. Where do each of you begin to disagree with the following?

1. Reality = existence. I.e. reality is what exists.

2. Ontology is the study of reality.

3. Explanation is basic for knowledge. I.e. one does not know if one can't explain, and if one can explain, then one knows whatever is explained.

4. Epistemology is the study of knowledge. I.e. Epistemology is, at base, the study of explanations.

5. Study requires a studier. I.e. a studier is one who studies.

6. Ontology requires a studier, since it is a study.

7. Without a studier there may be existence, but there can not be ontology.

8. Given a studier and an object of study, there still can be no study without some representation of the object of study. I.e. the studier must have some way of referring to the object(s) of study.

9. An explanation is an organized collection of these representations.

10. The organization of the representations in an explanation involves encoding the representations into symbols.

11. In the case of ontology, which is the study of what is real, the symbols used to encode the representations of the real objects of study, must, of necessity, also be real objects (because by definition, nothing else exists to serve as the symbols).

12. Even though the symbols are real and exist, they are not the objects of the study of ontology.

13. In the case of epistemology, which is the study of explanations, the symbols used must be at least of second order. I.e. the symbols must encode the representations of the objects of explanations, which explanations, in turn must involve symbols encoding representations of real existing objects.

14. In order to discuss either ontology or epistemology, as we are doing here, we must assume a studier.

15. If we make the common assumption that the studier is one or another of these live human bodies-with-brains, then we are making the further implicit assumption that such a thing exists.

16. This implies that live human bodies-with-brains really exist, which logically need not be the case.

17. We can avoid making that assumption by being careful in our language to refer to the studier only as 'one', as in "one may infer..." and also being careful not to assume any other characteristic, feature, or attribute of live human bodies-with-brains.

18. Putting it all together, one may study epistemology by considering the structure of possible explanations of representations of real objects, determining which if any of those structures are self-consistent, and finally exploring the logical implications of those consistent structures.

19. If one uses mathematical structures and language to encode (define) the representations and develop the representations, then the explanations will match reality to within mathematical isomorphism.

20. One may use any of several incompatible choices for the mathematical system to use in the study.

21. Among these incompatible choices are Euclidean vs. non-Euclidean geometry and discrete vs. continuous systems of numbers.

22. If one uses the continuous set of real numbers and Euclidean geometry, one may (IMHO) derive Dick's Theorem (much derided but scarcely studied) which generalizes the nature of consistent epistemology regardless of the underlying ontology.

23. The general nature of explanations (epistemology) is shown by Dick's Theorem to necessarily conform (by and large) to the known laws of Physics.

24. If one uses a discrete system of numbers instead of the continuous set, then it is my humble opinion that with work, the same (or equivalent) theorems of Mathematical Analysis, on which Dick bases his proof, can be proved, and thus I expect that Dick's Theorem will hold in certain discrete systems as well. I further suspect that better insights might be gained this way.

I'd be interested to know how far down my list each reader got before they began ROFLing.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Rade]

Originally Posted by Rade:
"existence" is more basic than explanation.

Originally Posted by Doctordick:
Yes it is

Thank you, see how quickly (within the first three words of an otherwise unnecessary post) you reach the truth that "existence" is priori to "explanation" without any speculation at all. What is "speculation"? -- it is a conclusion, opinion, or theory reached by conjecture, inconclusive evidence or supposition. But when you agreed with the axiom that "existence is more basic than explanation" you did not use conjecture, inconclusive evidence, nor supposition, you just exclaimed as a self evident axiom of logical thinking for all to read-- "Yes it is".

 

[Rade]

Interesting discussion. Where do each of you begin to disagree with the following?
1. Reality = existence. I.e. reality is what exists.

A few comments. First must be the statement:

1. Existence exists, first axiom.

then

2. You exist possessing consciousness, which is the faculty of perceiving that which exists, second axiom.

then

3. Reality is what exists as Identity as a metaphysical fact, third axiom.

I note that you derive the consciousness from your argument in #15, but I hold it to be an axiom, not derived.

 

[Paul Martin]

I note that you derive the consciousness from your argument in #15, but I hold it to be an axiom, not derived.

You didn't read what I wrote carefully enough. I didn't derive consciousness in #15. What I did was to point out the common assumption that the human body/brain is the conscious entity. I don't make that assumption. In #17 I propose avoiding that assumption by using the tag "one" to denote the conscious entity. This "one" can stand for whatever you think is conscious and has the ability to know and study, without affecting the conclusions we draw about what "one" can know about reality. My own personal belief, as you know, is that there is only one such "one", so the label is appropriate for me. But for the sake of investigating what "one" can know about reality, it doesn't matter.

2. You exist possessing consciousness, which is the faculty of perceiving that which exists

I think that assuming that "You", being the human body/brain, is an axiomatic given, is a HUGE "speculative edifice".

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Doctordick]

Thank you, see how quickly (within the first three words of an otherwise unnecessary post) you reach the truth that "existence" is priori to "explanation" without any speculation at all.

Unnecessary? You ought to go read it again; unless it is your sole interest to fight “mock battles groping among mere concepts” with no idea as to how to proceed. Have a ball! It may be more basic but it is, nonetheless, nothing but a mere label so long as you don’t indulge in construction of a “speculative edifice”.

And, Paul, I really miss your posts. I have begun to understand peoples inability to comprehend what I am talking about since reading Kant. Maybe we could reach an understanding if I made it clear that I am discussing ontology and not creating “speculative edifices”; something no one else (to my knowledge) has ever attempted. With regard to your post, I will give you my reaction.

Interesting discussion. Where do each of you begin to disagree with the following?

1. Reality = existence. I.e. reality is what exists.

One needs to avoid presenting arguments via relationships between words as those relationships are, in reality, “speculative edifices”. In other words, you are attempting to use the understanding of others (their comprehension of the meaning of those words) to convey the meanings you have in mind. In actual fact, the meanings you have in mind were arrived at via your lifetime of interaction with the ontology of your universe. Your representation of that ontology is a fundamental aspect of your world view: which is in fact, a “speculative edifice”. (I hate to keep using that expression but it is the only way of pointing out the massive volume of assumption behind your statements.

2. Ontology is the study of reality.

More words! Officially, ontology is a label for an explicit specification of a conceptualization. The term is borrowed from philosophy, where an Ontology is a systematic account of Existence. Let’s just back down a little (i.e., back down from “speculation”) and suggest that the “explicit specification” being referred to here IS exactly the speculation which carries one into epistemology. That is precisely the issue I want to avoid and the one you people want to discuss.

As I said in my post, the only way to turn metaphysics into a science is to not ignore the existence of ontological speculation but “to develop a rational way of referring to an ontology which is all encompassing and thus requires no “speculative edifice”.

3. Explanation is basic for knowledge. I.e. one does not know if one can't explain, and if one can explain, then one knows whatever is explained.

Yes, “explanation” is absolutely the first “speculative definition” which must be developed. Without such a concept, we are totally without a rudder (so to speak).

4. Epistemology is the study of knowledge. I.e. Epistemology is, at base, the study of explanations.

Yes, again I agree with you 100%. That is exactly why one cannot “explain” ontology. Ontology is, “what is”, and, as soon as you begin to “explain” what is (that is, explain what you believe “IS”) you are defending your personal “speculative edifice”. Essentially, you are not talking about “what is”, you are talking about “what you think is”.

5. Study requires a studier. I.e. a studier is one who studies.

Now here is where you and I part ways. We part, not because I disagree with you but rather because I am interested in a coherent representation of a general ontology (which, being entirely general, can serve as a valid foundation for “speculation”). To quote Kant, “in metaphysic, reason, even if it tries only to understand a priori (as it pretends to do) those laws which are confirmed by the common experience[/color], is constantly brought to a standstill, and we are obliged again and again to retrace our steps, because they do not lead us where we want to go”; this is exactly the log jam I wish to circumvent.

6. Ontology requires a studier, since it is a study.

My only complaint with this statement is that it is speculative: i.e., just because you cannot discover an alternate does not mean none exists.

7. Without a studier there may be existence, but there can not be ontology.

That need not be true. You are confusing “an ontology” with “a specific ontology”; which is an epistemological construct (an explanation of a specific ontology).

8. Given a studier and an object of study, there still can be no study without some representation of the object of study. I.e. the studier must have some way of referring to the object(s) of study.

I would have said the same thing; however, I would have said, construction of speculative edifices cannot take place without an ontology (i.e., if nothing exists).

9. An explanation is an organized collection of these representations.

With this I would strongly disagree. It is equivalent to saying that a pile of bricks is a building. You have omitted the central thread of an explanation. All brick piles are not necessarily buildings nor is a collection of specific ontological representations necessarily an explanation.

10. The organization of the representations in an explanation involves encoding the representations into symbols.

I would simply say representation itself requires symbolic definition of some kind. Symbolism is representation (essentially organization is superfluous to the issue). Please refer to something without using any symbolism at all.

11. In the case of ontology, which is the study of what is real, the symbols used to encode the representations of the real objects of study, must, of necessity, also be real objects (because by definition, nothing else exists to serve as the symbols).

Again, you are simply stating the conventional dogma: you cannot comprehend working with an undefined ontology.

As I said earlier, “the issue everyone seems to miss is the very fact that this “ontology” being referred to has to be regarded as a collection of undefined things”, otherwise we are off constructing “speculative edifices”. Per Kant, “it is indeed a very common fate of human reason first of all to finish its speculative edifice as soon as possible, and then only inquire whether the foundations be sure”. We need a way of dealing with a “general undefined ontology” as the “ontology” is the foundation of any sepeculation.

12. Even though the symbols are real and exist, they are not the objects of the study of ontology.

In the final analysis they are; however, as soon as you separate the question into symbols and non-symbols, you are working with a specific ontology (the basis of your speculative edifice construction) and have diverted into epistemology.

13. In the case of epistemology, which is the study of explanations, the symbols used must be at least of second order. I.e. the symbols must encode the representations of the objects of explanations, which explanations, in turn must involve symbols encoding representations of real existing objects.

Every speculative edifice is constructed from a specific ontology so as soon as you present an explanation of any kind you have lost the generality of the possible ontologies.

14. In order to discuss either ontology or epistemology, as we are doing here, we must assume a studier.

You are assuming that there exists no ontology which requires no “studier”. I would simply assert again that you are attempting to finish your speculative edifice as soon as possible, and then only inquire whether the foundations is sure. You have been continuously specifying specific ontological elements. That attack has been used for thousands of years and has never shown any sign of ultimate success. How about we try something else?

15. If we make the common assumption that the studier is one or another of these live human bodies-with-brains, then we are making the further implicit assumption that such a thing exists.

Yes; you are discussing the specific ontology required by your speculation.

16. This implies that live human bodies-with-brains really exist, which logically need not be the case.

Quite true; but, from my perspective, quite beside the point. About as informative as “existence exists”.

17. We can avoid making that assumption by being careful in our language to refer to the studier only as 'one', as in "one may infer..." and also being careful not to assume any other characteristic, feature, or attribute of live human bodies-with-brains.

Again I disagree; it is still a specific ontology, just one a little more vague than the other.

18. Putting it all together, one may study epistemology by considering the structure of possible explanations of representations of real objects, determining which if any of those structures are self-consistent, and finally exploring the logical implications of those consistent structures.

Yeah, but that’s what everyone does. To paraphrase Kant, they all racing about constructing “speculative edifices” with no thought to the foundations of those edifices (the self consistency of their ontology itself).

19. If one uses mathematical structures and language to encode (define) the representations and develop the representations, then the explanations will match reality to within mathematical isomorphism.

You seem to miss the point that, if mathematics is defined to be the study of self consistent systems (which I think is a good definition of mathematics) and your explanation is self consistent, then mathematics and valid explanations themselves are isomorphic entities and “reality” has nothing to do with the question. (You have utterly failed to even mention the central purpose of “an explanation”: to connect your experiences to your expectations).

20. One may use any of several incompatible choices for the mathematical system to use in the study.

It seems to me, here, that you are referring to specific mathematical structures, not to the field of mathematics. Incompatibility is a question of interpretation of the elements

21. Among these incompatible choices are Euclidean vs. non-Euclidean geometry and discrete vs. continuous systems of numbers.

Again, this “incompatibility is a question of interpretation: i.e., a continuous system certainly includes the discrete set and I would not refer to that as “incompatible”.

22. If one uses the continuous set of real numbers and Euclidean geometry, one may (IMHO) derive Dick's Theorem (much derided but scarcely studied) which generalizes the nature of consistent epistemology regardless of the underlying ontology.

If you go and look at it, you will discover that it makes no assertion as to the continuity of the ontological elements. In fact C (that portion of the ontology standing behind the epistemology) is specifically finite and thus can not be continuous.

23. The general nature of explanations (epistemology) is shown by Dick's Theorem to necessarily conform (by and large) to the known laws of Physics.

Now I would put that a little differently. That the known laws of Physics have to conform to my equation is a fact. If they don’t, they are wrong as what I have presented is a proof (yes Paul, I am going to accept your declaration). What is astonishing is the fact that I can find no solutions to my equation which are not known laws of physics. That is a much stronger statement as it says that those are the laws because it cannot be otherwise.

Thousands of years of experimentation has managed to eliminate no self consistent explanation. Explanations have been thrown out for one of two very simple reasons: either because they have been shown to be inconsistent or they have been shown to be inadequate representations of our expectations (actually I guess these can be seen as equivalent problems).

24. If one uses a discrete system of numbers instead of the continuous set, then it is my humble opinion that with work, the same (or equivalent) theorems of Mathematical Analysis, on which Dick bases his proof, can be proved, and thus I expect that Dick's Theorem will hold in certain discrete systems as well. I further suspect that better insights might be gained this way.

As I said, the ontology being explained is explicitly discrete. It is only our reference to what we know and/or references to what we expect which are allowed to be continuous. That is to say, I allow explanations which make assumptions as to continuity but I certainly do not make any assumption that continuity is a characteristic of reality (that would be the underlying ontology the explanation is based upon).

And finally, if you were to come up with an explanation of reality which was entirely discrete, I can explicitly show that your explanation can be interpreted as being one which requires continuity. That fact arises from the finite nature of our communications. That is to say, the simplest interpretation of your explanation would include assumptions of continuity. If you want to understand that, you would need to understand my definition of an explanation and the derived deductions in detail.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[mosassam]

As Dr.Dick and Paul oil each other up with word games I can't help feeling that they've fallen for the oldest one in the book. Logic can only be proved by logic and, as such, it should be viewed as some kind of assumption at best. You are both disciples of the ultimate dogma (and, DrDick, your arrogance certainly marks you as dogmatic) - that Reason is All.
An explanation is never the thing being explained and so, instead of your apalling attempts at describing reality, why don't you experience it instead and if you wish to communicate your experiences, don't write a formula, write a poem instead. Poetry has as much chance of becoming an exact science as metaphysics does.
A prisoner of dogma has ceased to grow, that which has ceased to grow is dead.
I am, therefore I exist. Is this logic?
Have fun, warm regards and remember - rubbing too vigorously can cause chaffing.

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi Dick,

1. Reality = existence. I.e. reality is what exists.

One needs to avoid presenting arguments via relationships between words as those relationships are, in reality, “speculative edifices”. In other words, you are attempting to use the understanding of others (their comprehension of the meaning of those words) to convey the meanings you have in mind. In actual fact, the meanings you have in mind were arrived at via your lifetime of interaction with the ontology of your universe. Your representation of that ontology is a fundamental aspect of your world view: which is in fact, a “speculative edifice”. (I hate to keep using that expression but it is the only way of pointing out the massive volume of assumption behind your statements.

With respect, Dick, in number 1. I am not "attempting to use the understanding of others (their comprehension of the meaning of those words) to convey the meanings [ I ] have in mind". Instead I am simply choosing a symbol to use for some unspecified subject of discussion. My first statement was not an argument for anything. It was simply a declaration that I intend to use the symbols 'reality' and 'existence' as synonyms.

The fact that I have accumulated a "speculative edifice" over my lifetime which happens to be my particular world-view doesn't make me any different than you or any other person. We all have done that. But I have tried to keep anything from that edifice from contaminating my list of statements. I would ask you to read what I wrote to see if I have dragged any of that edifice into my arguments. I don't think I have in number 1.

If choosing common words like 'reality' and 'existence' seems to imply that I am bringing along baggage from my worldview, then I will change and choose some sort of symbol, like 'A' to represent the unspecified subject of this discussion. Then my number 1. becomes A = A, which conveys exactly the same intent as my original. This, of course, is in the same spirit that, over the years, you also changed your language in your presentation from the old form of "Let reality = a set of numbers", to "1. A is a set. "What is to be explained."" Our starting points are the same.

2. Ontology is the study of reality.

More words!

Yes. Six words to be exact.

Officially, ontology is a label for an explicit specification of a conceptualization. The term is borrowed from philosophy, where an Ontology is a systematic account of Existence.

More words yet! Twenty seven words to be exact.

And, Paul, I really miss your posts.

Thank you, Dick. But I'll tell you what. I would be posting much less if I didn't use words. I am not enough of a mathematician to be able to write my posts entirely (or even partly) in mathematical language without using words, even though that might bring less "speculative edifice baggage" with it. But since using words is the normal form of this forum, I think I should be allowed to use them without being reproved and without negating any ideas I try to get across by using them.

Let’s just back down a little (i.e., back down from “speculation”)

With respect, Dick, I don't think my statement that "Ontology is the study of reality." is speculation. It is simply a definition. Now I admit that I used the term 'study' (along with 'is', 'the', and 'of') without defining it, but I hardly think that to have a reasonable discussion on this forum we need to define each and every word prior to using it. And my statement wasn't even as strong as a definition. It was simply a statement that I agree with the definition you gave for the term 'ontology' in your post #185

...ontology commonly refers to the collection of things concepts or ideas held to be the foundation of a field (in philosophy that would be the fundamental question of what exists).

I should be clear to anyone that exactly what this ontology consists of is certainly beyond our knowing a-priori; it has to be learned subject. Prior to being learned or understood the correct ontology is no more than a collection of undefined “things”: concepts, objects, ideas…., whatever! The issue everyone seems to miss is the very fact that this “ontology” being referred to has to be regarded as a collection of undefined things.

Here I think you might be making a category error, Dick (although the distinction you try to draw later between 'ontology' and 'a specific ontology' might be what I am talking about here). You seem to be conflating the subject of ontology with the subject matter of ontology. That would be equivalent to conflating 'biology' with 'life'. Biology is the subject; life is the subject matter. Similarly, according to common usage, ontology is the subject and existence is the subject matter.

But the distinction you are trying to make is valid, and, as you continually claim, is almost always overlooked or misunderstood. Let me try to clear it up and you tell me where I'm wrong.

Ontology, like biology, requires a studier and a subject matter at the outset. Then, with those two requirements met, the process of study may begin in which the studier studies the subject matter and produces explanations.

In the typical case of ontology, the studier is some human philosopher and the subject matter is that philosopher's mental concept of the notion of reality. As you and Kant have tried to point out, that philosopher's mental concept is a "speculative edifice" which provides an untrustworthy foundation for any explanation produced by that study.

In your atypical case, you (and any of us who have studied your work) are the studier and the subject matter is the unspecified set 'A'. The process you went through in logically studying the set 'A' culminated in your theorem (thank you for accepting my suggestion that it be seen as a theorem) which is a specific differential equation with some astonishing solutions.

Thus, your ontology, even though it involves an extremely mysterious studier (you), does not build its explanations on your world-view (which is every bit as much a "speculative edifice" as everyone else's). Furthermore, your ontology does not even build explanations, but instead demonstrates constraints which limit the possibilities for any and all self-consistent explanations of anything whatsoever. These constraints apply to all self-consistent explanations whether they be facts about sets of numbers or particular "speculative edifices" proposed by philosophers or others as explanations for the world.

I realize that it also applies to my own speculative world-view (much discussed here at PF) which posits the fundamental nature of consciousness. But I think that is positive. I think your theorem can show up any inconsistencies there may be in my edifice, and, if none shows up, the solutions to your differential equation might possibly suggest novel interpretations of the inferences. I just need some young, smart, energetic minds to explore those inferences.

5. Study requires a studier. I.e. a studier is one who studies.

Now here is where you and I part ways. We part, not because I disagree with you but rather because I am interested in a coherent representation of a general ontology (which, being entirely general, can serve as a valid foundation for “speculation”).

I think I now understand, and can possibly explain, why you have had such difficulty in communicating your work to anyone else.

Your ontology is more basic than anyone else's. Everyone else, including me, is interested in coming up with explanations for the world we find ourselves in. As you point out, we are each intimately familiar with "the world we find ourselves in" and this familiarity constitutes an untrustworthy "speculative edifice". You, on the other hand, are interested in discovering constraints that apply to everybody else's explanations. In other words, we are interested in discovering explanations for the world and you are interested in discovering what we might come up with.

So, yes, we part ways simply because of our different interests. But I think that we (the rest of us) can greatly benefit from your approach and results if we will only apply them to our own more down-to-earth efforts.

Good talking with you as always Dick,

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

As Dr.Dick and Paul oil each other up with word games I can't help feeling that they've fallen for the oldest one in the book. Logic can only be proved by logic and, as such, it should be viewed as some kind of assumption at best. You are both disciples of the ultimate dogma (and, DrDick, your arrogance certainly marks you as dogmatic) - that Reason is All.
An explanation is never the thing being explained and so, instead of your apalling attempts at describing reality, why don't you experience it instead and if you wish to communicate your experiences, don't write a formula, write a poem instead. Poetry has as much chance of becoming an exact science as metaphysics does.
A prisoner of dogma has ceased to grow, that which has ceased to grow is dead.
I am, therefore I exist. Is this logic?
Have fun, warm regards and remember - rubbing too vigorously can cause chaffing.

Thanks for the advice, mosassam; it is well taken. Since you don't know much about either of us, I can assure you that both Dick and I follow his persistent advice to "have fun". In my case, that is the reson my posts are so infrequent; I am usually heavily engaged in enjoying life in other ways than philosophizing here (which, incidentally, is also fun for me). In Dick's case, I am amazed that he has the time he does to post here since he is always having fun with his family, his world travel, and other engaging activities.

As for poetry, I am not as enamored with it as you seem to be. It seems evident to me that in spite of poetry being ubiquitous since Homer, it hasn't solved any of the great problems suffered by humanity. Mathematics, on the other hand, has led to the current understanding of the world, which in turn, has led more-or-less directly to many of the comforts (central heating, transportation, textiles, communication, entertainment, etc.) that we enjoy, as well as to the solution of many previously debilitating problems (starvation, disease, predation, etc.) and which we now take for granted. Poetry pales by comparison, IMHO. It's attempts at describing reality have been TRULY appalling.

We each have fun in our own preferred ways, so I would ask you to tolerate the fun Dick and I and others have here in "oiling each other up".

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Rade]

... Then my number 1.[edit addition:1. Reality = existence. I.e. reality is what exists] becomes A = A, which conveys exactly the same intent as my original...

The statement Reality (A) = Existence (B) is not A = A, it is A = B, correct ? So, let A = 1 + 1, let B = 3 - 1, then A = B. Reality and Existence are two separate concepts, just as (1 + 1) and (3 -1) are separate mathematical statements.
I am not sure how you thought you were starting with A = A (bty, A = A is known as the Law of Identity in terms of philosophic argument). Are you saying you start your argument list with the Law of Identity, and from that Law all else derives ?

 

[Paul Martin]

The statement Reality (A) = Existence (B) is not A = A, it is A = B, correct ?

It depends on what you mean by the equals sign.

So, let A = 1 + 1, let B = 3 - 1, then A = B.

Yes. And also A = A.

Reality and Existence are two separate concepts,

They may or may not be depending on the intent of the person using the terms. In my case I consider them to be two words denoting the same concept. That is what I intended to convey with my first statement.

just as (1 + 1) and (3 -1) are separate mathematical statements.

Not quite right. Neither of them is a mathematical statement. Each of them is a mathematical expression. The mathematical statement, (1 + 1) = (3 - 1) is an assertion that the two expressions are equal and in fact are the same number.

I am not sure how you thought you were starting with A = A

I hope I have adequately explained it above.

(bty, A = A is known as the Law of Identity in terms of philosophic argument). Are you saying you start your argument list with the Law of Identity,

No.

and from that Law all else derives ?

No.

Warm regards,

Paul