Is Time Merely Constant Change?

[Doctordick]

Just what is or is not an illusion?

Mosassam, it seems to me that you have to think a little about what you have in mind when you say, "it is always NOW!" Are you trying to put forth the idea that nothing of the past exists? In other words, are you suggesting that your last birthday was an illusion? That no event you are aware of has any reality except the present? I think that is overlooking an important component of your experiences. What you think is going on "NOW" (even for every "NOW" in your past) is very strongly influenced on what you thought went on in the past before you experienced that "NOW"! As I said, the present can most easily be defined as a change in what you know. "NOW" is your awareness of change! Time is a concept which allows you to think of "what you know" as always changing; "t" being nothing but a parameter used to refer to a particular change of interest to you.

Thus the statement, "it is always NOW!" is essentially equivalent to saying, "what I know is always changing!" Read your comment with that substitution:

When I say "[what I know is always changing]", I'm not referring to myself. I am saying that [CHANGE] is an objective reality standing outside my own awareness. Unlike myself, [CHANGE] has always existed.

At this point it becomes obvious that you are making a presumption. All you can really say is that any concept of reality, if it is to allow for the fact that you are not all knowing, must accommodate itself to "change in knowledge" and thus must include a concept analogous to "time". You are presuming that "change" exists in the absence of understanding; that change "IS" a characteristic of reality. I would argue that the definition of reality is, "that which is without change": i.e., what we know of reality is what we call "the past"! It is our explanation of reality which changes, not reality.

Also, I'm not sure what you mean by awareness.

Well, I tell you what; you tell me what you mean by awareness and I will see if I can work with that.

I understand that you my think this is some kind of intellectual game, like ontology or epistemology, but I am really trying to stress that NOW, unlike Time, is an objective reality and one we all experience simultaneously.

No, I do not think this is some kind of intellectual game. I am a scientist, and, as such, was trained to be exact in my pronouncements. We cannot think about things rationally unless we are careful to consider the exact nature of our concepts. I would say we all experience what we call simultaneity (that we can relate changes in our knowledge to a parameterized table) but that "we all experience these changes simultaneously" is a direct contradiction to fact. That is the whole issue of relativity: events which are held to be simultaneous to one are not held to be simultaneous to others. Simultaneity is a very personal illusion necessary to any coherent explanation of reality; but cannot be defended as a "fact"!

This means Time is Not an Illusion. Its something that's been invented and utilized and has held up well over several millenia.

I wish you would clarify to me what you think "an illusion" is. In my head, an illusion, is any construct created by my mind which makes sense of my experiences. That this desk I am typing on is a solid object is an illusion; a very useful and simplifying illusion of reality but, none the less, an illusion. You imply that the fact that an illusion is useful or "holds up well over the years" implies it is no longer an illusion but "must be real". I would call that the fundamental axiom of any religion and, as such, is an attempt to change "science" into a religion.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Tournesol]

Hmmm, what exactly is meant with "natural concept" here?

-Anssi

It is what (I presume) man-made concrpts
are contrasted with. Of course, if they
are not contrasted with anything, talk about them is vacuous.

 

[Tournesol]

Y
Of course any astute person also readily recognizes that motion is just as much a man-made concept as time and as such these views should be equally valid, so I would like to be more careful in my assertion and just claim that it is merely useful for many purposes to assume that motion is more fundamental than time, and it is certainly useful to recognize that "time", as a backdrop for motion, is not necessarily of fundamental existence at all.

It is in fact more useful to assume time is fundamental. That is why
physics works that way.

 

[Tournesol]

Well done. By asking this question, you have gotten away from the annoyingly persistent fallacy of identity. The way we choose to understand the identity of things (i.e. when is it fair to say some thing changes to another thing), is completely up to some semantical criteria.

Some work a lot better than others.

 

[Tournesol]

I wish you would clarify to me what you think "an illusion" is. In my head, an illusion, is any construct created by my mind which makes sense of my experiences.

What do you call nonsensical constructs, like pink elephants, then?

 

[Tournesol]

This means Time is Not an Illusion. Its something that's been invented and utilized and has held up well over several millenia.

And before that, it didn't exist...?

 

[Doctordick]

Nonsensical constructs?

What do you call nonsensical constructs, like pink elephants, then?

I tend to consider them to be allusions (there is a subtle difference between allusions and illusions). Personally, I have never seen a "pink elephant". Now I have talked to drunks who claim to have seen such and they could either be pulling my leg or these are "constructs created by their mind which makes sense of their experiences". That makes them either allusions or illusions. What did they actually experience? Well, I'm not privy to their experiences; but according to them, they experienced seeing a pink elephant! If that is indeed the case it appears to be an explanation their mind created for them to explain their experiences!

Have fun -- Dic

 

[Tournesol]

I tend to consider them to be allusions (there is a subtle difference between allusions and illusions).

No, they are completely different.

# passing reference or indirect mention
wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn

# In rhetoric, an allusion is the implicit referencing of a related object or circumstance, which has occurred or existed in an external context. An allusion is understandable only to those with prior knowledge of the reference in question (as the writer assumes the reader has) Note: "allusion" should not be confused with an illusion.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allusion

# An implied or indirect reference in a literary text to another text.
usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/oal/gloss.htm

# A causal and brief reference to a famous historical or literary figure or event:
home.cfl.rr.com/eghsap/apterms.html

# in literature an indirect reference to some historical or cultural person, event, statement, or fact. For sociological or historical critics, allusions provide important clues to the contexts that provide a literary text added meaning and significance. Writers using allusions in a text assume that the reader will recognize the reference and in some fashion apply the extra-textual information in their interpretation of the text.
www2.cumberlandcollege.edu/acad/english/litcritweb/glossary.htm



[/QUOTE]
Personally, I have never seen a "pink elephant". Now I have talked to drunks who claim to have seen such and they could either be pulling my leg or these are "constructs created by their mind which makes sense of their experiences". That makes them either allusions or illusions. What did they actually experience? Well, I'm not privy to their experiences; but according to them, they experienced seeing a pink elephant! If that is indeed the case it appears to be an explanation their mind created for them to explain their experiences!
[/QUOTE]

Or not.

 

[AnssiH]

It is what (I presume) man-made concrpts
are contrasted with. Of course, if they
are not contrasted with anything, talk about them is vacuous.

They would be contrasted with noumenons. I.e. reality "as it really is". Of course you cannot think about or comprehend reality without resorting to some concepts/assumptions you've made all by yourself. Noumenon is the unknowable or unthinkable "real nature" of things.

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

It is in fact more useful to assume time is fundamental. That is why
physics works that way.

It makes the spacetime graphs simpler to understand and it usually makes easier to make practical predictions. Physics is different from ontology. We were talking about the latter.

-Anssi

 

[Tournesol]

They would be contrasted with noumenons. I.e. reality "as it really is".

They are not any kind of concept. The question is: what information
does "man made" convey?

 

[Tournesol]

It makes the spacetime graphs simpler to understand and it usually makes easier to make practical predictions. Physics is different from ontology. We were talking about the latter.

We don't have any access to ontology except models that work.

 

[nannoh]

I wish you would clarify to me what you think "an illusion" is. In my head, an illusion, is any construct created by my mind which makes sense of my experiences. That this desk I am typing on is a solid object is an illusion; a very useful and simplifying illusion of reality but, none the less, an illusion. You imply that the fact that an illusion is useful or "holds up well over the years" implies it is no longer an illusion but "must be real". I would call that the fundamental axiom of any religion and, as such, is an attempt to change "science" into a religion.

Have fun -- Dick

illusion |i?lo? zh ?n| noun a false idea or belief :a deceptive appearance or impression : the illusion of family togetherness | the tension between illusion and reality. • a thing that is or is likely to be wrongly perceived or interpreted by the senses : Zollner's illusion makes parallel lines seem to diverge by placing them on a zigzag-striped background.

The way you're using the word illusion would have all language categorized as illusion. When you hear the word tree, by your definition, it is an illusion of the biological event we call a tree. The word "tree" is actually an allusion to the biological event.

Without these allusions each item we wanted to communicate would have to be readily accessible to demonstrate our message. But, in the spirit of efficiency, humans have come up with language to describe events and concepts. Langauge is not an illusion. It is the mechanism of allusion. It is a common practice that has been in use for thousands of years. The concept of time and the term "time" are allusions to the experience of change.
Time is an allusion to change. It is an acknowledgment of change. It is our interpretation of events as measured against other events. We use the term "time" as a description of interacting mechanisms that we observe and use to delineate events in a sequence.

The real question is

Is reality an illusion or is illusion a reality?

because it can be argued that reality is an illusion and it can be argued that illusion is reality. Generally the argument is self-preserving while simultaneously being self-destructive.

 

[nannoh]

And before that, it didn't exist...?

Before that the word "time" didn't exist. The phenomenon of change, for all we know, did exist, even when we didn't. When we came along we attached the term "time" to change because we began to compare the different rates of change taking place in our environment and the comparison was dubbed "time".

 

[tehno]

"Tiii..ii..ime is on my side",sings Mick Jagger.
Accordingly,it's not just an illusion .

 

[Tournesol]

Before that the word "time" didn't exist. The phenomenon of change, for all we know, did exist, even when we didn't.

Why not same the phenomenon of time, as opposed to the
word, did exist?

When we came along we attached the term "time" to change because we began to compare the different rates of change taking place in our environment and the comparison was dubbed "time".

change makes no sense without time, irrespective of any speeds or rates.

 

[AnssiH]

They are not any kind of concept. The question is: what information
does "man made" convey?

That there are no such things as explicit truths, only beliefs. That there is no "true to reality" way to understand reality, only a number of equally valid ways to construct mental models that are good for predictions.

We don't have any access to ontology except models that work.

You seem to be throwing comments without knowing what was under discussion. "Model that works" doesn't answer ontology, which is about asking why is it that such and such model works. Model is not the reality; map is not the territory.

You implied before that it is more useful to think that time is more fundamental than motion, and I can only assume you say this because then you can suppose time is like a moving canvas on which there are events. So you mean you are a devoted dualist, or are you just blissfully unaware of the implications of your comment?

This thread is going round and round so I'll just refer to some old post where this was discussed in more detail already. Let's see...

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=127500&page=7

Start with post #99 and glance through some following posts between me and Paul and maybe Vanesch. You should be able to get up to speed in no time.

-Anssi

 

[nannoh]

Why not same the phenomenon of time, as opposed to the
word, did exist?



change makes no sense without time, irrespective of any speeds or rates.

Time is an abstraction of change, rate and speed. Its not an illusion. Its an invention.

Time is the abstraction of how we experience change.

Time is a method with which we measure rate and speed.

Time is a convenient and efficent invention like the cubit or inch or the photon, "graviton" or the electron.

Time is the reduction of processes down to an easily communicated and conveyed formula. It is part of our language that is practically universal to the human family. It is highly unlikely that there is another terestrial animal, besides humans, that have created an abstraction such as time.

 

[Tournesol]

That there are no such things as explicit truths, only beliefs. That there is no "true to reality" way to understand reality, only a number of equally valid ways to construct mental models that are good for predictions.

"Man made concept" does not contrast with anything else. But if all concepts are
man-made, you have no grounds for asserting that motion is primary. (not
even the grounds that physical models work that way).

You simply don't have valid argument to the effect that
all models are "equally valid" when they are no equally
simple or equally well-supported by the evidence. The playing-field
is no level.

You seem to be throwing comments without knowing what was under discussion. "Model that works" doesn't answer ontology, which is about asking why is it that such and such model works.

The straightforward answer is that it works because
it is like what it is representing. But you want to reject that.

Model is not the reality; map is not the territory.

That does not mean the territory is not like the map if it is a good map.

The Map/Territory distinction was introduced as part of Alfred Korzybski's general semantics. "Map" is taken in the broadest sense, descriptions scientific theories, mental representations, and, yes, even cartographical products are all maps.
The Map is certainly a distinct thing from the territory. But that does not mean it differs in its properties and structure differ from those of the territory. Two things can be distinct -- they can be two things -- without having different properties. from each other. (This has a lot to do with the nature of space). Every electron has the same properties as every other -- if the universe did not decompose into repeating units this way, it would be much harder to understand.

So the map does not necessarily have different properties to the territory. It may well have different properties. It is often stated that the way we see things has different properties to what is seen. But one has to be careful about such a claim. "The way things really are" is known only via another map, the scientific map. It is difficult to see anyone can claim to know that the map is necessarily different to the territory without claiming in the process to know the territory, which of course undermines the intended conclusion that the territory is unknowable.

Suppose the map does have different properties to the territory. Does that mean it is misrepresenting the territory? it depends on what the territory is like and what kind of representation we are interested in. (Remember, it is consistent to argue that the map might represent the territory, because the territory might be such-and-such. It is only inconsistent to argue that the map can never represent the territory because the territory is such-and-such).

If relations between properties are all that we are interested in, the properties themselves don't matter. For instance, a stone square can represent the shape of a wooden square perfectly well, because a shape is a structure, as a system of relations.

This gives us an answer to the question: what would the territory have to be like in order to be perfectly representable by the map.? It would have to be a system of pure structures, pattern all the way down.

You implied before that it is more useful to think that time is more fundamental than motion, and I can only assume you say this because then you can suppose time is like a moving canvas on which there are events.

I say this because that is the way physics models time, and physics
is useful. You speculations are completely wrong.

 

[Tournesol]

Time is an abstraction of change, rate and speed. Its not an illusion. Its an invention.

When was it invented?

 

[AnssiH]

"Man made concept" does not contrast with anything else. But if all concepts are
man-made, you have no grounds for asserting that motion is primary. (not
even the grounds that physical models work that way).

I cannot claim to know for sure that motion exists, but like I said, our subjective experience is in motion, and it surely is part of reality, so something in reality is static. Here some people go for a dualistic view; that our consciousness is in motion in spacetime, but of course not only is motion outside of spacetime is far from trivial to explain (unless you just arbitrarily claim it is metaphysical function of reality), it is also quite difficult to explain the details of any dualistic view in ways that correspond to all evidence.

So it seems more likely that the brain actually is what is doing the recognition processes and what have you, and that we experience a reality in motion because the physical processes of the brain really are in motion, and so is the reality around us, also made of the same physical "stuff" as our brain.

If you think it is more likely that brain is not in motion but rather we are an entity moving through spacetime, and somehow reading the state of the brain, care to elaborate how this could be possible and why we should expect it to be so?

You simply don't have valid argument to the effect that
all models are "equally valid" when they are no equally
simple or equally well-supported by the evidence. The playing-field
is no level.

I never said "all models are equally valid". I said there is "a number of equally valid models".

That is *some* number, with varying level of differences. They are all different views in our imagination, but yield identical observable phenomena.

The straightforward answer is that it works because
it is like what it is representing. But you want to reject that.

That does not mean the territory is not like the map if it is a good map.

Of course the map is like the territory! You obviously have not grasped what the map/territory relationship is about. The point is that we form an idea of things like electrons and how space and time exists and so on, and we do this because it can be used to predict the behaviour of some systems.

But after having done so we should not confuse the map with reality. The way we understand electrons is based on some stable behaviour that we observe, but we could have come to understand electrons very differently if we just chose to. You can imagine an electron as a little ball in what we call "space", or perhaps as a little hole in space, yielding the same properties. Our imagination does not consist of "things of reality" directly, but rather of our own ideas about reality, BASED on stable patterns or behaviour we observe.

Or let's take another exercise, regarding the nature of what we call "atoms". You might assert atoms are not just a case of having classified reality into stable patterns, of some which we call atoms. But rather that atoms really exist as atoms.

Where would you say we find the "real boundary" between an atom and the space that surrounds it? I.e. not a boundary that exists only because of some man-made definition of a specific way to define a boundary, but the real boundary that tells us the size of the "real" atom? (and what is the metaphysical meaning of "size")

So the map does not necessarily have different properties to the territory. It may well have different properties. It is often stated that the way we see things has different properties to what is seen. But one has to be careful about such a claim. "The way things really are" is known only via another map, the scientific map. It is difficult to see anyone can claim to know that the map is necessarily different to the territory without claiming in the process to know the territory, which of course undermines the intended conclusion that the territory is unknowable.

Suppose the map does have different properties to the territory. Does that mean it is misrepresenting the territory? it depends on what the territory is like and what kind of representation we are interested in. (Remember, it is consistent to argue that the map might represent the territory, because the territory might be such-and-such. It is only inconsistent to argue that the map can never represent the territory because the territory is such-and-such).

If relations between properties are all that we are interested in, the properties themselves don't matter. For instance, a stone square can represent the shape of a wooden square perfectly well, because a shape is a structure, as a system of relations.

What is being claimed is that map is not the territory. The map is made of properties, but the territory is not, for properties are things that exist once we classify the reality around us in such and such ways (as to define some properties).

Also, we can change the set of properties in the map into a different set and still keep the maps equivalent as far as any physical being is concerned.

This is not to say that map is totally different from territory; there is a correspondence, but the map does not reveal the ontology of reality. And once ontology is properly understood, it should be clear that it is unanswerable. What is important is to understand why this is so, and why models are not reality.

I say this because that is the way physics models time, and physics
is useful. You speculations are completely wrong.

Do you or do you not agree with the static spacetime interpretation of relativity? Or do you think time must be in motion for there to exist motion? Or what?

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

When was it invented?

Time is a semantical concept Tournesol. What we observe is motion. One might be thoughtless and claim that motion is impossible without time, but it is only impossible to consciously imagine motion without also imagining time. It doesn't mean time must exist in some metaphysical sense for there to exist motion.

Ask yourself, is time possible without motion? If nothing moved in reality, could it be said there is still such a thing as "time"?

Notice how we are throwing semantical concepts/definitions around, without getting into any real observable predictions? We cannot say motion must be more fundamental than time, but neither can we claim time, as we understand it, is of metaphysical existence. And even less we can claim that our idea of spacetime must be something that exist metaphysically.

-Anssi

 

[Tournesol]

I cannot claim to know for sure that motion exists, but like I said, our subjective experience is in motion,

It is changing. It is hard to say that it is going anywhere,.

and it surely is part of reality, so something in reality is static.

Static?

Here some people go for a dualistic view; that our consciousness is in motion in spacetime, but of course not only is motion outside of spacetime is far from trivial to explain (unless you just arbitrarily claim it is metaphysical function of reality), it is also quite difficult to explain the details of any dualistic view in ways that correspond to all evidence.

We can accept that change (or becoming, or, as you call, it motion)
is basic without adopting dualism.

So it seems more likely that the brain actually is what is doing the recognition processes and what have you, and that we experience a reality in motion because the physical processes of the brain really are in motion, and so is the reality around us, also made of the same physical "stuff" as our brain.

OK. But that is an escape-hatch from you claim that we cannot
tell what is really real. I don't have a problem with it,
but then I don't adopt your brand of map-territory anti-realism.

If you think it is more likely that brain is not in motion but rather we are an entity moving through spacetime, and somehow reading the state of the brain, care to elaborate how this could be possible and why we should expect it to be so?

I don't need to make either assumption to explain change.

That is *some* number, with varying level of differences. They are all different views in our imagination, but yield identical observable phenomena.

You have struggled to come up with examples of models
that are exactly equivalent.

Of course the map is like the territory! You obviously have not grasped what the map/territory relationship is about. The point is that we form an idea of things like electrons and how space and time exists and so on, and we do this because it can be used to predict the behaviour of some systems.

But after having done so we should not confuse the map with reality. The way we understand electrons is based on some stable behaviour that we observe, but we could have come to understand electrons very differently if we just chose to.

Not necessarily. You don't have an alternative theory with exactly
the same predictive power and simplicity.

You can imagine an electron as a little ball in what we call "space", or perhaps as a little hole in space, yielding the same properties.

That doesn't have much to do with the physics.

Our imagination does not consist of "things of reality" directly, but rather of our own ideas about reality, BASED on stable patterns or behaviour we observe.

The fact that they are our own ideas and not "direct" does not
make them inaccurate. (And of course "stable pattens" is
an ontology).

Or let's take another exercise, regarding the nature of what we call "atoms". You might assert atoms are not just a case of having classified reality into stable patterns, of some which we call atoms. But rather that atoms really exist as atoms.

Where would you say we find the "real boundary" between an atom and the space that surrounds it?

Orbitals are fairly well-defined. But that is not really the point.
If quantum fuzziness works as a predictive model, then I
will project that metaphysically.

I.e. not a boundary that exists only because of some man-made definition of a specific way to define a boundary, but the real boundary that tells us the size of the "real" atom? (and what is the metaphysical meaning of "size")

I don't need a "metaphysical meaning". This is all rather beside
the point. If a concept or model works, that is probably
how reality is. It doesn't matter if the concept is "man made"
(as opposed to what?)

What is being claimed is that map is not the territory. The map is made of properties, but the territory is not, for properties are things that exist once we classify the reality around us in such and such ways (as to define some properties).

We use the word "property" to indicate the real, metaphysical counterpart
of what appear on our maps as predicates.

Also, we can change the set of properties in the map into a different set and still keep the maps equivalent as far as any physical being is concerned.

So you say. You examples?

This is not to say that map is totally different from territory; there is a correspondence, but the map does not reveal the ontology of reality. And once ontology is properly understood, it should be clear that it is unanswerable.

You are not following your own rules. You started your reply
with an ontological claim.

Do you or do you not agree with the static spacetime interpretation of relativity? Or do you think time must be in motion for there to exist motion? Or what?

http://www.geocities.com/petedjones/tim_aspects.html#mctaggart

 

[Tournesol]

Time is a semantical concept Tournesol.

And motion isn't..?

What we observe is motion.

Even in our own subjective consciousness?

One might be thoughtless and claim that motion is impossible without time, but it is only impossible to consciously imagine motion without also imagining time. It doesn't mean time must exist in some metaphysical sense for there to exist motion.

If our logic is no guide to metaphysics, then we have
to give up on metaphysics entirely. Not that you have sworn off.

Ask yourself, is time possible without motion? If nothing moved in reality, could it be said there is still such a thing as "time"?

"It is only impossible to consciously imagine time without without also imagining time. It doesn't mean motion must exist in some metaphysical sense for there to exist time."

Notice how we are throwing semantical concepts/definitions around, without getting into any real observable predictions?

If some combinations of concepts is logically impossible
that is a reason for rejecting. We don't even need to get
onto observation.

We cannot say motion must be more fundamental than time, but neither can we claim time, as we understand it, is of metaphysical existence.

Yes we can. Providing we do not claim to be certain.

 

[AnssiH]

I cannot claim to know for sure that motion exists, but like I said, our subjective experience is in motion,

It is changing. It is hard to say that it is going anywhere,.

I'm not saying it is "going somewhere". "In motion", "changing", "dynamic", everyone understands these things slightly differently, we hardly need to argue about their meaning.

and it surely is part of reality, so something in reality is static.

Static?

Dynamic :)

We can accept that change (or becoming, or, as you call, it motion)
is basic without adopting dualism.

Yeah, and the question is then what is it that is undergoing a change. If we do not wish to follow the path of dualism, then it seems the sensible alternative is to say that all of reality is in motion (instead of just our "consciousness" as is the case in dualistic view)

This makes spacetime non-sensical concept as far as ontology goes, but it needs not change the suggested topology of spacetime (i.e. it doesn't have any observable effects, it is just an ontological view that makes more sense in the philosophy of the mind, but not necessarily in physics)

I went over this many times already in the previous posts.

OK. But that is an escape-hatch from you claim that we cannot
tell what is really real. I don't have a problem with it,
but then I don't adopt your brand of map-territory anti-realism.

When all is said and done, all our sense of reality is based on a set of assumptions. I cannot really claim our sense of reality is caused by the physical processes of the brain without first having made a large amount of assumptions so to build such and such worldview where it certainly makes sense to say that the brain "between my senses" is giving rise to my subjective experience.

In other words, I have to choose some path of ontology and try to follow it, to see if it leads anywhere. At this time I cannot explicitly deny dualism or idealism or solipsism, but I can say those views seem very arbitrary and very unlikely to me.

When I make assertions about motion or about my subjective experience being caused by such and such things, these are claims that make sense to me according to the knowledge that I hold at current time, even if these assertions are subject to change if I come across information that sparks a larger paradigm change in my worldview.

This is inherent to the way people understand reality or any system at all.

Map/territory relationship should not be confused with some kind of "anti-realism". It doesn't deny the existence of objective reality. It just notes that the intrinsic nature of reality is not found by classifying the stable behaviour around us into entities which have such and such properties. Just like a tornado is not a fundamental object and it doesn't have a metaphysical identity, any stable behaviour cannot be said to have a metaphysical identity outside of some specific semantical criteria to classifying them that way.

I.e. it is not to say that electrons are not there even when we think they are. It is to say that electrons are not metaphysically "objects with identity" just because we like to think of them that way.

I don't need to make either assumption to explain change.

Care to tell us what is your ontological view on this?

You have struggled to come up with examples of models
that are exactly equivalent.

If you think about the way you try to figure out how some system comes up with the behaviour you observe, it should be obvious we can understand the same thing in many different ways.

I think each QM interpretation and each interpretation of relativity is a valid example of this.

Also everything I said about the topology of spacetime should be valid here. Assertions about the nature of simultaneity are different but observationally equivalent models if they don't change the topology of spacetime.

Many physicisist and philosophers have also noted that the elementary particles of current models are things that are likely to only exist in the models, not necessarily in reality, although the behaviour we observe is real. If this doesn't seem to make sense;

http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy/message/9215

You can imagine an electron as a little ball in what we call "space", or perhaps as a little hole in space, yielding the same properties.

That doesn't have much to do with the physics.

It shouldn't have to do with physics in that physics should be holding a null interpretation of predictive math (in so far that it is possible for a human being), yet people in physics make ontological assertions about the nature of what we call electrons. This is what Thomas Kuhn, Martin Heidegger, Andrew Pickering and others are talking about.

The fact that they are our own ideas and not "direct" does not
make them inaccurate. (And of course "stable pattens" is
an ontology).

Of course it is. The only reason I like to say stable patterns is because it implies less about the nature of these patterns. I am not saying everything is "stable patterns". I am just saying we observe stable patterns.

Or let's take another exercise, regarding the nature of what we call "atoms". You might assert atoms are not just a case of having classified reality into stable patterns, of some which we call atoms. But rather that atoms really exist as atoms.

Where would you say we find the "real boundary" between an atom and the space that surrounds it?

Orbitals are fairly well-defined. But that is not really the point.
If quantum fuzziness works as a predictive model, then I
will project that metaphysically.

What do you mean by that?

Note that any boundary you draw, you draw it according to some criteria. How could we say there exists a boundary even without us choosing to draw the boundary in such and such way? Can you see how one could simply choose to say that there is no such thing as space, but there are only atoms in their extended sense, and that atom is the size of its whole "influence sphere" (whatever that is thought to mean)?

I don't need a "metaphysical meaning". This is all rather beside
the point. If a concept or model works, that is probably
how reality is. It doesn't matter if the concept is "man made"
(as opposed to what?)

Metaphysical nature is what map/territory relationship is about. The whole exercise is an attempt to point out *why* it is naive to assume reality probably is the way we imagine it.

A man made concept of the boundary of an atom would be, for example, the place where other atoms get deflected (where atoms collide with each others).

This is the distance at which the residual electromagnetism causes a repulsion. It is not a place where there is a wall of an atom, but rather where there is such and such information about the atom. There is information about the atom further away too, and we cannot say this is a metaphysical boundary, it is a man-made boundary.

All boundaries of an atom you can think of are like this. And furthermore, when I say "information about an atom", notice how that too is true only by accepting a certain way to identify an atom and information that is "about the atom". (There already was some discussion about identity of things)

http://www.geocities.com/petedjones/tim_aspects.html#mctaggart

Unfortunately the link doesn't work... ... but, Peter D Jones? Are you Peter, just using a different name? Haven't we been going through the same issues elsewhere?

Time is a semantical concept Tournesol.

And motion isn't..?

Haven't I already said;
Of course any astute person also readily recognizes that motion is just as much a man-made concept as time and as such these views should be equally valid, so I would like to be more careful in my assertion and just claim that it is merely useful for many purposes to assume that motion is more fundamental than time, and it is certainly useful to recognize that "time", as a backdrop for motion, is not necessarily of fundamental existence at all.

What we observe is motion.

Even in our own subjective consciousness?

I've said many times that motion can be understood in many different ways. The point is that you cannot say we observe time, rather we first observe motion and when we structure a more sophisticated worldview, we decide to use such concept as "time".

Quite obviously I cannot say what is the corresponding noumenon of what we call motion.

Notice how we are throwing semantical concepts/definitions around, without getting into any real observable predictions?

If some combinations of concepts is logically impossible
that is a reason for rejecting. We don't even need to get
onto observation.

Certainly. That is the only real way to reject some views. I believe panpsychism can be rejected on these grounds.

We cannot say motion must be more fundamental than time, but neither can we claim time, as we understand it, is of metaphysical existence.

Yes we can. Providing we do not claim to be certain.

Jeez... So we basically agree on this?

-Anssi

 

[Tournesol]

I'm not saying it is "going somewhere". "In motion", "changing", "dynamic", everyone understands these things slightly differently, we hardly need to argue about their meaning.

It is precisely because they are understood differently that we do need
to establish their meanings.

Yeah, and the question is then what is it that is undergoing a change. If we do not wish to follow the path of dualism, then it seems the sensible alternative is to say that all of reality is in motion (instead of just our "consciousness" as is the case in dualistic view)

Something like that.

http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/tim_aspects.html#mctaggart

This makes spacetime non-sensical concept as far as ontology

It conflicts with the "block universe" interpretation of relativity.

When all is said and done, all our sense of reality is based on a set of assumptions.

Since we reject assumptions that conflict with evidence. it is based
on evidence too.

I cannot really claim our sense of reality is caused by the physical processes of the brain without first having made a large amount of assumptions so to build such and such worldview where it certainly makes sense to say that the brain "between my senses" is giving rise to my subjective experience.

Yes. You have to start by taking a scientific picture
of the mid-world relationship realistically, in order
to come to your conclusions that nothing
should be taken realistically. Which is a contradiction.

In other words, I have to choose some path of ontology and try to follow it, to see if it leads anywhere. At this time I cannot explicitly deny dualism or idealism or solipsism, but I can say those views seem very arbitrary and very unlikely to me.

Yes. we can say what is probably true, in ontology.

When I make assertions about motion or about my subjective experience being caused by such and such things, these are claims that make sense to me according to the knowledge that I hold at current time, even if these assertions are subject to change if I come across information that sparks a larger paradigm change in my worldview.

That is how any scientifically informed person makes realistic
statements. But you want to reserve realism for
yourself, while telling others that they know nothing
of ontology...

Map/territory relationship should not be confused with some kind of "anti-realism". It doesn't deny the existence of objective reality. It just notes that the intrinsic nature of reality is not found by classifying the stable behaviour around us into entities which have such and such properties.

...like you do here. Arriving at a simple, predictive map is the
best guide we have to what reality really is. It isn't final
or perfect. But you allow yourslef wo work within its imperfections.

Just like a tornado is not a fundamental object and it doesn't have a metaphysical identity, any stable behaviour cannot be said to have a metaphysical identity outside of some specific semantical criteria to classifying them that way.

we can say that if a map works, it is telling us something about reality.

I.e. it is not to say that electrons are not there even when we think they are. It is to say that electrons are not metaphysically "objects with identity" just because we like to think of them that way.

If thinking about them that way works, that is a good
reason it suppose they are objects with identity.
That is your basis for taking realistically the things
you take realistically. It is only problem when other
people do it, apparently.

Care to tell us what is your ontological view on this?

http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/tim_aspects.html#mctaggart

If you think about the way you try to figure out how some system comes up with the behaviour you observe, it should be obvious we can understand the same thing in many different ways.

We have falsified many theories and are rarely faced with two equally
good theories we cannot decide between.

I think each QM interpretation and each interpretation of relativity is a valid example of this.

I think they are not.

Many physicisist and philosophers have also noted that the elementary particles of current models are things that are likely to only exist in the models, not necessarily in reality, although the behaviour we observe is real. If this doesn't seem to make sense;

http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy/message/9215

It shouldn't have to do with physics in that physics should be holding a null interpretation of predictive math

Absolutely not. The whole point of physics is to say what the
world is. Combining that with the valid points about what is and
isn't knowable, subtracting the various contradictions we arrive
at modest realism: we make statements about what the
real world is probably like.

Orbitals are fairly well-defined. But that is not really the point.
If quantum fuzziness works as a predictive model, then I
will project that metaphysically.

What do you mean by that?

I mean that having well-defined spatial boundaries is not the prerequisite for being metaphysically real.

Featuring in a predictive theory is the prerequisite for being metaphysically real.

Note that any boundary you draw, you draw it according to some criteria.

Some criteria work better than others. The playing field is not level.

How could we say there exists a boundary even without us choosing to draw the boundary in such and such way? Can you see how one could simply choose to say that there is no such thing as space, but there are only atoms in their extended sense, and that atom is the size of its whole "influence sphere" (whatever that is thought to mean)?

That theory would soon run into problems.

Metaphysical nature is what map/territory relationship is about. The whole exercise is an attempt to point out *why* it is naive to assume reality probably is the way we imagine it.

On the contrary, it is irrational to suppose that a theory
works for some reason other than modelling reality correctly.

A man made concept of the boundary of an atom would be, for example, the place where other atoms get deflected (where atoms collide with each others).

This is the distance at which the residual electromagnetism causes a repulsion. It is not a place where there is a wall of an atom, but rather where there is such and such information about the atom. There is information about the atom further away too, and we cannot say this is a metaphysical boundary, it is a man-made boundary.

All boundaries of an atom you can think of are like this. And furthermore, when I say "information about an atom", notice how that too is true only by accepting a certain way to identify an atom and information that is "about the atom". (There already was some discussion about identity of things)

Then we are finding out what realty is in terms of our
"man made" concepts. You are implying that we don't know anything unless
reality provides us with some kind of non-man-made concepts. That doesn't
follow.

Unfortunately the link doesn't work... ... but, Peter D Jones? Are you Peter, just using a different name? Haven't we been going through the same issues elsewhere?

yes and yes.

Haven't I already said;
Of course any astute person also readily recognizes that motion is just as much a man-made concept as time and as such these views should be equally valid, so I would like to be more careful in my assertion and just claim that it is merely useful for many purposes to assume that motion is more fundamental than time, and it is certainly useful to recognize that "time", as a backdrop for motion, is not necessarily of fundamental existence at all.

That should be reversed.

I've said many times that motion can be understood in many different ways. The point is that you cannot say we observe time, rather we first observe motion and when we structure a more sophisticated worldview, we decide to use such concept as "time".

"more sophisticated". You said it. The sophisticated analysis is better.

 

[nannoh]

When was it invented?

Time was invented when animals (assumedly anthropods) took note of change and applied to their activities in a predictive manner.

 

[Tournesol]

What happened before that?

 

[nannoh]

What happened before that?

There were no contrived interpretations of change that we know of. Change was simply another condition to be spontaneously dealt with by animals, plants and other organisms. Change was and is a condition that had to be adapted to the same as cold, heat, flood, hunger and so on. Conscious decisions to interpret change as "time" did not exist as far as we know. Not until there was a perceived requirement to predict.

 

[Tournesol]

change is the same thing being in different states at different times.