Is Time Merely Constant Change?

[Rade]

...Since "what one thinks one knows" is undefined we can represent each element with a number...

Well no, Dr.D. just defined it, that is, "what one thinks one knows" is defined by Dr.D. as being "undefined". Thus, it not possible for Dr.D. to represent each element with only a single number (1,2,3,...n), he must represent each element to show the dialectic union of the "undefined" ontological essence of the element (let me call it the set O1, O2, O3, ...On) with some token representation for epistemic uncertain knowledge of each element (let us use the 1,2,3...n of Dr.D.). Thus, each element must be represented by the dialectic set (O1-1, O2-2, O3-3...On-n)--and now Dr.D. can continue with his equation once so modified. If someone other than Dr.D. finds error in my argument, please explain.

 

[Doctordick]

Actually, I have been following this thread since the beginning and have read most of your posts on this forum.

I presume you mean the "Philosophy" forum and not the "Physics Forums" per say. I would be totally astonished if you had read a significant number of those 600 posts I have managed to stick out there.

I've hesitated to comment to this because, well, you were a little mean to people in the beginning (and used waaay too many emoticons )

I'm not a "mean" person; all I was doing is trying to get a rise out of the readers. And I only use a lot of "emoticons" when I feel I am getting no feedback. What I am trying to say is actually quite simple but I don't seem to be able to reach very many people. My real problem is that I have no idea as to what part of what I am saying is not being understood, but I am learning.

Anyway, I'm here just trying to learn something, so please proceed.

Now see, you haven't given me any indication of what you do or do not understand of my presentation. You could understand every point or you could be missing the whole issue, like Rade. Now you see I have nothing against Rade; it's just that he doesn't seem to comprehend any of what I am talking about. If you think his posts are relevant, I would say you are not following my thoughts. If you do have some understanding of what I have said, maybe you could explain it to Rade in a way he could understand. It would help me a lot to know where others are going astray of what I am saying. I am beginning to comprehend that they are missing the very essence of my thoughts.

Since "what one thinks one knows" is undefined we can represent each element with a number.

Only Anssi seems to understand that these numbers are no more than labels for those undefined ontological elements in exactly the same sense that words are nothing more than labels for whatever we think the words mean. When we understand (have decided we know what we are talking about), then and only then can we replace the numbers with defined words.

The interesting issue at that point is that, replacing those numbers with words is no more than relabeling; the only thing which is really important is the correlation evident in multiple appearances of the same collections of words (or letters or even hieroglyphics of any kind). Those various correlations are exactly what we mean by definition. A dictionary is no more than a supposedly complete collection of the most important such correlations in a given specific language. What collection of symbols is used for labels is of utterly no significance. In fact, it can be a hindrance as people tend to believe they understand the language they learned before they learned to think.

A long time ago, I asked the question, "How do you tell the difference between an electron and a Volkswagen?" Take a look at that and tell me what you think. You will find my answer a few posts down from there.

The example is clearly silly but what it points out is that the identification of an event is a constraint on acceptable surrounding events. When we define an event to be an electron (or a Volkswagen) we are actually using the tag to constrain surrounding events to a known collection of expectations of already defined events. In fact, it is usually a very vast collection and generally impossible to delineate by any mechanism other than by presuming the listener is familiar with the general nature of the associated events indicated by the very act of naming the event of interest.

i.e., if you don't know the difference between an electron and a Volkswagen, you just don't know what they are, the're different things!

Glad you are having fun -- Dick

 

[nabuco]

I'm not a "mean" person; all I was doing is trying to get a rise out of the readers.

For someone making the arguments you are making, that sentence is very strange. "What you really are" is as unknowable as "what the universe really is", even to yourself. You cannot know what you really are, you can only have a model of yourself based on your self-perception. As to everyone else reading this forum, all they have are your words, and when you tell them "who you really are", all you are doing is give them more words.

I believe the hypothesis that you are mean is consistent with everything else you wrote so far, since calling people idiots is part of what defines a person as being mean.

But I'm probably just another idiot :)

 

[AnssiH]

Hey, sorry it has taken a while for me to reply. I've read this post a few times, trying to digest it, and I can kind of sort of get what you are getting at, but it's a bit tricky to grasp. But first the rats :)

The blue comment is mine. As I told my wife, that sort of means rats are pretty smart. I guess we should be thankful their life span is short and they haven't come up with language yet or they would take the world over!

But really, I think the difference might very well be that the rats are hard wired for specific types of memories and don't waste any time trying to think of alternate explanations whereas the essence of human success is that they spend a lot of time (as a species, not as individuals) considering alternate possibilities before new information is correlated into preexisting knowledge. Of course I could be wrong.

Well, yeah, seems to me that the more sophisticated (large & complex) a worldview is, the more work it is to incorporate new information into it in a coherent manner. I.e. anything we see needs to make sense with everything we know, and when it doesn't, a small worldview is "refined" faster into a new coherent whole than a large one (since this refinement would require you to redefine many things in that worldview, until it is internally coherent again)

Also there is another factor that is probably contributing to this, which is that animals seem to have more hardwired functions in their brain whereas our brain seems to have more freedom in the ways to interpret information, and this freedom entails longer learning periods, especially right after birth. And that would explain why it takes so long for a human infant to start functioning in the world in any reasonable manner at all...

The useful end is the organization of your thoughts and that organization yields results almost beyond belief. That is exactly where I want to lead you.
If any explanation turns out to be counter to my past (i.e., inconsistent with what I know to have happened beyond doubt) I certainly wouldn't accept it as valid. Would you?

No I wouldn't, that's when we are forced to try and refine that worldview.

Okay, onto the topic;

As far as "a useful end" is concerned, we need an exact definition of "an explanation" (otherwise, we don't know how to go about explaining things). That is why I defined an explanation to be a method of obtaining one's expectations from known information.

Under that definition, the structure of the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation is quite simple in that it is no more than a table of "undefined ontological elements" going to make up every discrete present going to make up that "past" which constitutes "what one thinks one knows". Since "what one thinks one knows" is undefined we can represent each element with a number.

Here I need some clarification... When we lay down these numbers onto the "x, tau, t" -table, that is an attempt at a specific solution, right? I.e. we have made some definitions to be able to do that at all?

Whether this is correct or not, I think it would be helpful if we could actually try and describe some simple system in this manner?

One's expectation are no more than a "true/false" decision on any given present. In the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation, the method is no more than "look in the table". If a particular list is in the table the answer to your expectations is, "true". If it is not there, the answer is false.

This I don't quite get either. I have some expectation (for the future?), and I make a list (of ontological elements?)... Is this like a description of a specific state (a specific present)? Probably not because then I don't know how I would find it from the table, or what it being "true" (being found) would entail...

If we could really contain, in our minds, a complete collection of all "presents" going to make up our past, then that might be a useful view but that feat is somewhat beyond our mental capabilities. What we would really like is a procedure (think of it as a fundamental rule) which would accomplish that result for a any single ontological element.

I.e. which would tell us if some specific single ontological element is "valid"? Or if it exists in reality as has been defined? No?

I hope you can clarify these issues to me before I reply to the rest of the post. Of which I'm sure I'll have more questions :)

What I am trying to say is actually quite simple but I don't seem to be able to reach very many people. My real problem is that I have no idea as to what part of what I am saying is not being understood, but I am learning.

This reminds me, one thing that I find particularly useful when I'm trying to grasp some new model or a concept, is that I look at the history of that model; how the idea was developed one step at a time. Usually when you find a new outlook at something that causes you to look at everything from a different angle than most others, in the end you are so deep in your own paradigm that it is going to be very hard to communicate even the simplest of things to anyone else (since they understand too many concepts differently).

But people get the new concepts (and new ways to understand old concepts) better if you can explain what lead you to that idea step by step, i.e. what is the problem you were trying to solve that lead you to the first tiny step, and how things followed from there.

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

Well yes, because I realize that it is impossible for any human to "know" what happened in the past "beyond doubt". By definition, science (= search for knowledge) always provides uncertain (= with doubt) knowledge.

But you would not consider a worldview (or a physical model) to be valid if it fails to explain your past, would you?

edit example: Let A = the birth doctor explanation for an event [E] that occurred to you when you were born (say 30 seconds after birth from womb). Let B = your explanation of "what you know to have happened" at that exact past time. Now, which explanation is "valid", A or B ? The criterion of being "counter to my past" is of no value in this example to understanding why any explanation of past events is valid for the simple reason that "your past" provides uncertain knowledge of the present.

Of course part of the explanation is your idea about how your memories exist etc, and likewise part of the explanation is about why your memories would be uncertain. Even then each aspect of your worldview is something that has been extracted from your experiences; that is all you have to work with.

Here we get to that unfortunate complication that is under discussion. Perhaps a good way to express it is that there is no way to "interpret our experiences" correctly* until we have built a worldview, and we have no way to build a worldview until we can interpret our experiences correctly.

(*That's a bit misleading because there is no such thing as an experience without interpretation; it turns out it is the result of interpretation that is the experience itself)

This is analogous to the problem of understanding language. You cannot explain what words mean to someone who doesn't know any words. Yet we all learn the language around us.

So that's the problem, and the solutions to the both problems are also similar; we make certain assumptions about meanings of things (~patterns), and we arrive at a coherent set of definitions. Be that defined words, or defined things. (We are not intelligent because we understand language. Instead, we understand language because we are intelligent)

After some learning (few years of "pasts") our worldview is an internally coherent association network (some things and properties and other such concepts defined by other things and vice versa) that can explain our past, at least in so far that we consider any parts of it to be valid.

Scientific models are likewise internally coherent explanations for the phenomena around us, and likewise they are a set of things defined by other things. For instance, to be able to define a "photon", i.e. to explain what a photon is, you need to refer to great many other things, that you must also defined properly. Imagine trying to explain what a photon is and how it behaves to someone who doesn't know what does matter and space mean, or what is energy, frequency, motion, time, or any other concept that we use to understand everyday situations.

So the only reason we can talk about photons with each others is that we can refer to such concepts as "space" and "motion" and "time", and be fairly certain that the other person understands them in a similar manner as we do.

You can see the "internal coherence" at work when you look at just about any case of us having made scientific advances, as we have defined something very differently from before, and that has affected many other things in our worldview, so to keep it internally coherent. For instance, after defining simultaneity as relative to so-called "inertial frame" (a very carefully defined concept in itself), we were led to quite a few additional changes in our models/worldviews.

And now, for instance, if you look at quantum behaviour, we have many ways to explain it, just by defining some things differently. Each different QM interpretation is a case of having chosen to define different "ontological elements" differently (and having transformed the rest of the worldview accordingly).

Wouldn't it be nice to have a method for structuring these sorts of attempts?

-Anssi

 

[Rade]

But you would not consider a worldview (or a physical model) to be valid if it fails to explain your past, would you?

Yes I would. Many physical models "fail" to "completely" explain past events. I assume you know about the various models on the structure of the atomic nucleus--thus you will know that the Schrödinger wave-equation is the essence of the independent-particle model--it provides the unique quanta state of each nucleon plus the spins of all known isotopes--very impressive indeed. However, this model is of no help to explain nuclear density, binding energies, radii--we need the liquid-drop model for this "explanation" of reality of atomic nucleus. So you see, yes, I do consider both wave-equation model and liquid-drop model to be "valid" (in a narrow sense) yet they do not "explain past events" completely.

Also, from reading your post to Dr.D. I see that you agree with him that it is possible to attain scientific knowledge without doubt--well, all I can say is I do not agree with either of you--convince me with logical argument how this is possible--to have scientific knowledge without doubt.

Here we get to that unfortunate complication that is under discussion. Perhaps a good way to express it is that there is no way to "interpret our experiences" correctly* until we have built a worldview, and we have no way to build a worldview until we can interpret our experiences correctly. (*That's a bit misleading because there is no such thing as an experience without interpretation; it turns out it is the result of interpretation that is the experience itself)

Well, I do not agree here. Many people "build a worldview" without correct interpretation of experiences. Did not President Bush build in his mind a worldview on Irag without correct interpretation of his experiences ? Also, it is not true that "there is no such thing as experience without interpretation"--it is called "perception", yet even before "sensation"--both are types of "experience" that humans have without "interpretation".

Wouldn't it be nice to have a method for structuring these sorts of attempts?-Anssih

Yes, but do we not already have a method for structuring the various interpretations of QM--is it not called the Scientific Method ? Are any interpretations of QM held to be valid that have been falsified by experimentation via the Scientific Method ?

Sorry for the interruption between you and Dr.D.--I am learning from the exchange--but be sure he answers all your questions about logical premises, for a deductive argument such as being presented based on false premise is no argument at all--on this I think we all agree.

 

[AnssiH]

Yes I would. Many physical models "fail" to "completely" explain past events. I assume you know about the various models on the structure of the atomic nucleus--thus you will know that the Schrödinger wave-equation is the essence of the independent-particle model--it provides the unique quanta state of each nucleon plus the spins of all known isotopes--very impressive indeed. However, this model is of no help to explain nuclear density, binding energies, radii--we need the liquid-drop model for this "explanation" of reality of atomic nucleus. So you see, yes, I do consider both wave-equation model and liquid-drop model to be "valid" (in a narrow sense) yet they do not "explain past events" completely.

Oh that is what you meant. I see what the misconception was. A model can certainly be (and usually is) considered "valid" prediction-wise even if it doesn't cover everything.

What Dr Dick was referring to as a "failure to explain your past" was if a model produces expectations that turn out to be false. That is not different from saying that if a physical model makes predictions that turn out to be false, it is not considered valid.

Also, from reading your post to Dr.D. I see that you agree with him that it is possible to attain scientific knowledge without doubt--well, all I can say is I do not agree with either of you--convince me with logical argument how this is possible--to have scientific knowledge without doubt.

I don't think it is possible either, and I am not sure if Dr.D is saying that, and even if he is, I am certainly interested to figure out how he is manipulating ontological elements, because it seems to be something that should be useful for a number of things.

there is no way to "interpret our experiences" correctly* until we have built a worldview, and we have no way to build a worldview until we can interpret our experiences correctly.

Well, I do not agree here. Many people "build a worldview" without correct interpretation of experiences.

Yeah I worder that very badly. Amazingly badly! :)
I shouldn't use the word "correct" when I'm just trying to say, "until you can interpret your experiences at all". Interpretation of any sort entails you know the meaning of some pattern, and that entails you have built a worldview, and that entails you have information about reality, and that entails you have interpreted some patterns... That is probably better way to put the problem.

Anyway, important aspect of this problem is that...

Also, it is not true that "there is no such thing as experience without interpretation"--it is called "perception", yet even before "sensation"--both are types of "experience" that humans have without "interpretation".

...the view you paint in the above quote about "pure perception" above seems to be false, unless we abide to naive realistic view (i.e. reality is as we perceive it).

Perhaps the misconception here is that I use the word "interpretation" which people usually take as something we'd do consciously. But what I am referring to is that the cortex takes in spatial/temporal patterns, and infers meaning from it (recognizes things), and what is being recognized is what the subjective experience is.

That is what I meant with "there is no such thing as an experience without interpretation; it turns out it is the result of interpretation that is the experience itself". So instead of saying "we interpret our experiences" a more proper way to put it would be brain interprets sensory data, and the result of that is what we call our "experience"

But of course, before the brain can recognize any single thing at all, it must have built a worldview where definitions for these "things" exist (so any sort of interpretation on the data can be performed at all). So you see how this is kind of an egg-chicken problem in a sense.

What I describe is a "specific epistemological solution" though (something that most materialists should agree on), and what is important from ontological perspective is simply that we cannot consider our conscious perception to be objective information, since the real nature of that perception is unkown (unless you assume a specific epistemological solution called idealism)

Yes, but do we not already have a method for structuring the various interpretations of QM--is it not called the Scientific Method ? Are any interpretations of QM held to be valid that have been falsified by experimentation via the Scientific Method ?

Of course not. But then falsification is little bit tricky at this time since each interpretation is a model that has been built to explain the exactly same observations. As long as any given interpretation is "valid" (it can explain the said observation in a coherent manner), it cannot be falsified by anything we have observed so far. Yet we can be pretty sure not all of the can be ontologically valid (and almost as sure that none is completely true)

I see scientific method as an attempt to produce valid models in that they produce valid predictions, but not something that directly produces ontological answers. When it's used correctly, it produces important constraints that any valid "ontological explanation" must meet. The reason why I see them as pure models is exactly that they are a set of things we have defined, and nothing says nature is built the way we end up defining it.

-Anssi

 

[Rade]

Thank you AnssiH, I have a comment about this comment you make:

...But of course, before the brain can recognize any single thing at all, it must have built a worldview where definitions for these "things" exist (so any sort of interpretation on the data can be performed at all). So you see how this is kind of an egg-chicken problem in a sense...

Here I would argue you put "definition" (the label) of a thing priori to "perception" (the existence) of a thing. Let me explain my thoughts. As I see it, when a human first encounters some new "thing" that exists (some valid ontological element) they do not have some file folder in the mind where exists a priori definition (label) of this new thing. In my view, before we define (label) we form a "concept" of the thing perceived (that is, we form the file folder of the valid ontological element)--and that the process of forming a concept (of making the folder) is prior to the process of forming a definition (of putting a label on the folder). So I cannot agree that we have in mind a priori labels (definitions) of things never before perceived. First comes perception (which I take to be an automatic process--not conscious), then we form the concept of what is perceived (we make a mental file folder via consciousness), then we define (we put a label on the folder in order to communicate with both self and other).

 

[AnssiH]

Thank you AnssiH, I have a comment about this comment you make:

Here I would argue you put "definition" (the label) of a thing priori to "perception" (the existence) of a thing.

I didn't suggest that. On the contrary. I said it is an egg-chicken problem. You cannot have an experience of perceiving something without having defined something (having some conception of reality). But you cannot have any definitions unless you have perceived something. But it is possible to form an internally coherent worldview that yields useful perceptions. Just like it is possible to assume meanings on words that yield useful interpretation of what someone is saying.

Let me explain my thoughts. As I see it, when a human first encounters some new "thing" that exists (some valid ontological element) they do not have some file folder in the mind where exists a priori definition (label) of this new thing. In my view, before we define (label) we form a "concept" of the thing perceived (that is, we form the file folder of the valid ontological element)--and that the process of forming a concept (of making the folder) is prior to the process of forming a definition (of putting a label on the folder).

That is pretty much what I said, except I don't know how you differentiate between "forming concepts" and "forming definitions"; to me this is essentially the same thing.

EDIT: Let me reiterate little bit, since there seems to be fair amount of confusion from us using some words differently. The actual difference in our views is here:

First comes perception (which I take to be an automatic process--not conscious), then we form the concept of what is perceived (we make a mental file folder via consciousness), then we define (we put a label on the folder in order to communicate with both self and other).

It is kind of intuitive (and common) to assume perception comes first, and that it is then used to make sense of the world. But it is very difficult (probably impossible) to avoid homunculus ideas or some type of naive realism when you assume this. Whether one considers homunculus ideas to be problematic or not depends on quite a few things, but let it be said that I definitely do consider them to be extremely problematic.

Instead everything falls in place when you see any conscious perception as a case of something having been defined (conceptualized) & recognized. This requires the brain to build some sort of conception (a model) of reality, and everything that exists in that model (anything that you can recognize, be it a specific shape or a colour or anything at all), are things that allow for a useful interpretation of the spatial/temporal patterns coming in from different sensory systems. I.e. conscious experience as a result of sensory data intepretation.

-Anssi

 

[Rade]

Thank you Anssih...it seems we will have to disagree on the essence of "perception"--you view it as a process that includes "definition" (as interaction with some"thing" pre defined), I view it as a process priori to "definition" (but perhaps here I still do not grasp what you are saying). Whatever, let us have Dr.D. continue with his explanation of "explanation".

 

[Doctordick]

Hey, sorry it has taken a while for me to reply.

You are forgiven. I also have been slow to answer. Life has been quite busy lately and I have had little free time to "surf".

And that would explain why it takes so long for a human infant to start functioning in the world in any reasonable manner at all...

Yeah, I tend to agree with that.

No I wouldn't, that's when we are forced to try and refine that worldview.

Most people are not "forced to try and refine their world-view. There is another option: you can deny the new information. Sometimes that is easier than trying to incorporate it into one's world view. Denial tends to lead to what I call compartmentalization: some people, even respected exact scientists, can hold two conflicting theories as both being correct by simply never bringing the conflict to mind. But that's not what I am interested in. It seems to me that any rational person, when confronted with such a circumstance, would indeed "try and refine that world-view".

The problem is that success is quite difficult and, if we are to survive, we have to compartmentalize, most people just don't admit it. I began to consciously compartmentalize before I started grade school. When I was about four, my father told me that "anyone who believes more than ten percent of what he hears, or fifty percent of what he reads, or ninety percent of what he sees with his own eyes is gullible!" and I certainly didn't want to be "gullible". I had a very difficult time trying to figure out what I was supposed to believe and I soon developed a very major compartmentalized view: "what I thought I knew" (what I used to decide my actions; which I later began to refer to as "intuition") and "what I believed" (a category which did nothing but shrink as I got older). That's how I got into math and physics: they were the only subjects where I could figure out what I was supposed to believe (computer studies didn't exist then or I would probably have gone that way). I still hold "pure logic" (the fundamentals of mathematics) as a believable area but graduate school moved a lot of physics out of that realm (luckily I had already learned some important mathematics quite relevant to that physics).

As an aside, when it comes to "everyday life", I leave it all to "intuition" and make no attempt to make sense of it at all, it isn't worth the effort. If the decision is important, your gut is a more dependable asset than your logic (logic won't work because too many variables are generally omitted). My favorite comment is, "god save me from the guy who thinks he knows what ought to be done"; he is the most dangerous man in the universe. (I am not trying to convince you of anything; I am just trying to clarify to you how I think.)

But, as you said, "Okay, onto the topic;"

Here I need some clarification... When we lay down these numbers onto the "x, tau, t" -table, that is an attempt at a specific solution, right? I.e. we have made some definitions to be able to do that at all?

Absolutely correct; the moment you actually assign a label, any label at all, you have defined what you are referring to. My point is very simple, "you can do that" and, without doing such a thing (assigning a label to something) you cannot fabricate a epistemological construct of any kind.

Whether this is correct or not, I think it would be helpful if we could actually try and describe some simple system in this manner?

The mistake you are making is that you are trying to understand what I am saying on an intuitive level. You are trying to comprehend how this is going to help you understand the universe you find yourself in; it won't, not in any way at all. What it will do is provide a simple structure which has no component too complex to analyze completely. What that structure can represent (or display) is so complex that real analysis of such a structure is beyond our mental capabilities. But it does yield some awfully interesting constraints.

What I am saying is that keeping the kind of example you want, both simple and not completely meaningless, is probably the most difficult issue you could bring up (see my earlier comments on Rade's "three element" universe). What you need to keep in mind is the fact that I am setting up an abstract scenario, what logically could be done (if you had all the time and notational resources to logically examine all the information available to you; essentially equivalent to a infinitely fast mind). The process, as I define it, probably cannot be done in a linear manner (as is common logic). In any decent problem, the amount of data to be correlated is probably many many terabytes of information. The issue is, how would you attack the problem if you had sufficient time or could think fast enough. The first thing is to have a clear idea of where you want to go (ergo, my definition of "an explanation") and second, how can you analytically lay out the information such that no possibility has been eliminated by the structure of that representation itself. But, there are a few examples which can be (and are) directly examinable and perhaps it is worth while to look at one.

The best example I can think of would be an attempt to decipher messages from an alien civilization on another star system: i.e., our only contact is via some messaging system. Let us say this message system delivers messages in the form of, of apparently meaningless, glyphs displayed on a video screen (idea taken from the movie "Contact").

Just for the fun of it, to open your mind a little, these glyphs represent smells which the aliens use to communicate. Our inability to differentiate these smells, if we could produce them electronically, completely bars direct communication as does their complete indifference to sounds. It is only their use of EM waves which allows communication at all.

For the sake of argument, the time it takes to send and/or receive messages is insignificant (after all, we can use all the time we get between messages to analyzing and develop new hypotheses as to what they mean). What I am looking at is representing the general problem which faces us, not actual solution of the problem (I will leave that to others).

From the perspective of the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation, we can list the glyphs as we receive them (i.e., attach a numerical label to each one we get). The order with which we get examples of these glyphs may or may not be significant to our eventual understanding, but our understanding will probably change as new epistemological solutions are proposed and some of those theories may include "order" information which might or might not be important (our expectations could be a function of what glyph makes up the previous "present" in our analysis). Particularly in view of the fact that "our understanding" is supported by our expectations being consistent with the messages already received, it behooves us to have a method of keeping track of order itself. So we attach another label to indicate the "order" parameter (which I call "time").

As an aside, elements within the glyphs will probably be the basic things on our list (both with regard to identification and order". Certainly you could use bit mapped pictures of the glyphs on your computer (which can very definitely be seen as a list of pixels, "color numbers" and "order" number). What I am saying is that these (x, t) coordinates in my abstract picture can handle absolutely any communicable information.

Now, within that abstract structure (we actually have nothing to work with but "arbitrary numbers" on a two dimensional "space": identity and time), we might have identical glyphs received at the same time and we need a way of indicating that fact. That is the sole purpose of the additional tau space: a further attachment of a label indicating that these are different glyphs even though they have exactly the same (x,t) labels.

You should note that this additional label only becomes necessary when you begin to fabricate a solution: when you say, "ah, these are the same glyph". So long as you deal entirely with entirely undefined ontology (in which case it is impossible to specify that two glyphs are the same), the tau dimension will not required in the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation. The problem with the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation is that it isn't very useful; the only prediction it makes is, "if you go and look at what we know, this is what you will find". This is what everyone has to work with in their attempts to find an explanation of those glyphs. And that is all I am talking about.

I suspect that it is the overwhelming simplicity of the problem I want to discuss which drives people to bring in all that extraneous stuff. They simply cannot comprehend looking at things from this perspective having any value at all; I must have something else in mind and they are trying to figure out what that could possibly be. Their problem is the very fact that there IS nothing else for them to consider; absolutely anything else constitutes an epistemological problem.

What I am saying is that absolutely 'any explanation' of those glyphs would have to be consistent with the information contained in the three dimensional table of labels (x, tau, t) which has been described above (using any specific of labels consistent with that explanation). The labels for the glyphs are what your explanation chooses to use and are free to be whatever you wish them to be (as are the "order" labels). It may be that your explanation may give no credence at all to that order of receipt (give the same "t" label to all glyphs) or you might want to give meaning to some aspect of order and not to others. The point being here that we are merely allowing an aspect other than "identity" to have impact on the meaning our understanding is going to presume.

The issue of the tau dimension is that I want to be able to represent all possible epistemological solutions (all possible explanations) with that same "what is", is "what is"[/color] structure and that requires a way of expressing multiple occurrences of identical ontological elements at the same (x,t) coordinate of my representation. I am merely constructing a method of laying out these abstract numerical labels such that no information is lost in the representation of what might be known. That is, every possible explanation can be seen as a specifically labeled "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation. What you must comprehend is that your understanding of that explanation is based on making sense of a communicable representation of that explanation which, prior to your understanding the communication, is itself a specific collection elements, we have labeled for our convenience (that is what language is all about).

This I don't quite get either. I have some expectation (for the future?), and I make a list (of ontological elements?)... Is this like a description of a specific state (a specific present)? Probably not because then I don't know how I would find it from the table, or what it being "true" (being found) would entail...

In order to understand this, you have to understand the fundamental nature of the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation. The "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation has utterly nothing to say about the future. But it does describe the past! Since it does have a temporal element (the "t" index I introduced) it can be examined as a collection of "presents". It follows that any "valid" explanation of that information must yield expectations consistent with that structure: i.e., what actually happened at "t".

That would be the collection of ontological labels called B(t) (specifically labeled consistently with that explanation: i.e., identical elements have the same label). The fundamental question then becomes, if the only information available to you were to consist of the "pasts" for the "t" index less than some given "t", would that explanation yield expectations consistent with what actually happened. If the answer is "false" you would certainly reject the explanation. What a lot of people do is to presume "yields you expectations" means "give you the specific answer". Such a presumption is a logical error.

The "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation is quite unique because it yields expectations consistent with whatever happens: i.e., it only tells you what the past was and says nothing about the future. It follows that under the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation, any B(t) satisfies the expectation for that given "t". You should be able to comprehend that, "this explanation does not yield a specific result for that observation", is a specific description of your expectations: i.e., your expectations are your expectations, what ever they happen to be, and are not necessarily a specific B. However, they can always be expressed in terms of a specific B: i.e., if I ask you about a specific B, your explanation, no matter what that explanation might be, will yield the probability you attribute to the expectation that that B is the correct answer. That is what explanations are all about: they yield some structure to your logical expectations.

If we could really contain, in our minds, a complete collection of all "presents" going to make up our past, then that might be a useful view but that feat is somewhat beyond our mental capabilities. What we would really like is a procedure (think of it as a fundamental rule) which would accomplish that result for a any single ontological element.

I.e. which would tell us if some specific single ontological element is "valid"? Or if it exists in reality as has been defined? No?

In a word, NO! If we had the mental capability to hold, in our conscious mind, a complete collection of all the "presents" going to make up our personal pasts, then, we could think about "what we think we know" logically; however, that feat is well beyond our capabilities: i.e., we can't even comprehend "what we think we know"! Somehow, our brains (you understand that, in referring to "our brains", I am speaking to you in intuitive terms: i.e., the common world view we use in everyday communications) manage to deal with an extremely large component of "what we think we know" (yielding answers in terms of intuitive gut instinct). But we certainly can not, logically, proceed on the presumption that our intuition is correct; that is almost the definition of idiocy.

Idiocy is a word, by the way, which comes down to us from the same source as idiom which means "in a particular style": i.e., originally an idiot was someone who didn't think about things but rather went with the style of the times. I have noticed that the common vernacular meaning of that word has shifted quite a bit since I was young. Actually, the history of words is a hilarious story if you ever get into it. For example, if you go back to the source meanings, "A buxom wench with a thick French accent!" could be, a good child who genetically inherited an indistinct Frankish finger (what ever that might be).

I hope you can clarify these issues to me before I reply to the rest of the post. Of which I'm sure I'll have more questions :)

I hope I have made myself a little clearer.

Usually when you find a new outlook at something that causes you to look at everything from a different angle than most others, in the end you are so deep in your own paradigm that it is going to be very hard to communicate even the simplest of things to anyone else (since they understand too many concepts differently).

Yeah, I know. But, I think the real problem here is that people bring too much to the table and they can't see what I am saying for all the junk in the way.

... i.e. what is the problem you were trying to solve that lead you to the first tiny step, and how things followed from there.

When I was four years old, I began to seriously worry about how to avoid being gullible: i.e., how to determine what I should and should not believe. The real problem is that no one else even thinks about such a problem; they never even consider it and can't seem to comprehend the worth of thinking about it. You are very definately an exception; you seem to at least have some grasp of the fact that there is a problem here.

Looking forward to your next post -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

Down to the "nub"!

Anssi, I have been thinking this afternoon and perhaps I can make my position a little clearer. The issue is the chicken and egg nature of ontology and epistemology. Each and every epistemology (without exception) requires an ontology. There is but one path out of the dilemma and it lies with the definition of "an explanation". If one defines "an explanation" to be "a method of obtaining one's expectations from the known information", there exists but one explanation which requires no epistemological structure: that is the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation. Thus, if one can come up with a notation capable of expressing the ontology behind the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation, one has created a representation of the ontology behind any explanation.

The issue behind the above statement is the fact that any epistemology needs to be understood and, in order to understand that epistemology, one must be able to first deduce the implied ontology. Before it is understood, any explanation is a "what is", is "what is"[/color] structure, the only issue being that the underlying ontology is defined by the implied structure of the ontology. From the perspective of the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation, that means that the ontological elements are actually labeled. The important fact is that exactly what symbols are used to perform that labeling is unimportant.

The nub of the observation is that the structure of the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation is the only structure which provides a basis for thinking about ontology in the absence of an epistemology. If we are interested in an exact scientific examination of the field of ontology, the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation is the only explanation of use to us. Anytime any element of that ontology is actually labeled, you are discussing epistemology, not ontology. It follows that, though one is free to discuss the problems which arise when one goes to actually label those ontological element, one can not actually label them without exiting the field of ontology.

This is the mistake made by everyone: they exit the field at the first opportunity.

Does that make any sense to you?

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Rade]

Let " what is" = A, then the claim {"what is" is "what is"} is in notation form A = A.

Now, the A = A explanation is called the Law of Identity. So, what Dr.D. is saying is that the Law of Identity (A = A) "requires no epistemolgical structure", (that is, that Identity itself is axiomatic--prior to explanation).

Therefore, the notation (A = A) is the representation of the ontology behind any explanation that Dr. D. looks for. That is, we take it that A = "what is" is a metaphysical given and that Existence (the sum of all "what is" elements) itself IS Identity.

 

[Doctordick]

So, what Dr.D. is saying is that the Law of Identity (A = A) "requires no epistemological structure", (that is, that Identity itself is axiomatic--prior to explanation).

No, you have it exactly backwards! I am pointing out that every epistemological structure requires the Law of Identity. The moment you attach "identity" you are already discussing epistemological structures: i.e., you are no longer studying the subject of ontological constraints, you are already in the process of establishing a specific ontology. The law of identity (A=A) only exists if you can actually produce a label for whatever it is you are talking about. Identity itself is the opening axiom to any epistemological structure.

The nub of the observation is that the structure of the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation is the only structure which provides a basis for thinking about ontology in the absence of an epistemology.

The critical issue in that statement is, "thinking about"[/color]. The point being that, the moment you open any epistemological structure, you have labeled your ontology and that set of labels constitute exactly, the ONLY[/color] requirement of the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation.

This means that the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation underlies every conceivable epistemological solution and it behooves us to conceive of a representation of these labels which is applicable to any "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation and which makes utterly no constraints on the labeling (as it is the epistemological constructs which constrain that labeling to specific labels: i.e., they require those labels be defined).

Essentially you miss the entire point of my presentation.

This is the mistake made by everyone: they exit the field at the first opportunity.

It is quite evident that your only interest has always been in exiting the field of ontological analysis as quickly as possible so you can get over to epistemological analysis which you clearly find much more comfortable.

I have no interest in discussing any epistemology. I leave that to the scientists. My interest is understanding the boundaries on ontology itself. The common belief is that there are none and this turns out to be wrong.

 

[AnssiH]

Most people are not "forced to try and refine their world-view. There is another option: you can deny the new information. Sometimes that is easier than trying to incorporate it into one's world view. Denial tends to lead to what I call compartmentalization: some people, even respected exact scientists, can hold two conflicting theories as both being correct by simply never bringing the conflict to mind.

Yeah that's true, I guess we all do that to an extent. I know I do. But then I think there is kind of a rationale behind such behaviour too. We find ourselves thinking "there must be a perfectly good explanation to that new information if I just spent the time to really check it out, and my time is better spent elsewhere".

That is what we do because we hear so much silly stuff all the time. Say, when you hear that someone saw a ghost or whatever. That same thought kept many scientists on denial when they heard it doesn't look like planets go around the Earth after all etc...

The problem is that success is quite difficult and, if we are to survive, we have to compartmentalize, most people just don't admit it. I began to consciously compartmentalize before I started grade school. When I was about four, my father told me that "anyone who believes more than ten percent of what he hears, or fifty percent of what he reads, or ninety percent of what he sees with his own eyes is gullible!"

Heh, when I was a kid, my father said something to the effect of "the more people there are believing something, the more likely it is they are believing a lie". I realized that people's values and beliefs are strongly a cultural thing, and so I disregarded "everyone thinks so" as a criteria for figuring out what to believe. I kind of started seeing dumb behaviour all around me. I guess it went on from there.

Anyway, onto the topic again.

In order to understand this, you have to understand the fundamental nature of the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation. The "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation has utterly nothing to say about the future. But it does describe the past! Since it does have a temporal element (the "t" index I introduced) it can be examined as a collection of "presents". It follows that any "valid" explanation of that information must yield expectations consistent with that structure: i.e., what actually happened at "t".

So when you say "expectations" here, it always means expectations about something in the past? Hmmm, this was confusing because I hadn't figured out you were talking about a method of handling this sort of information without actually having to mark down every single element in every single "present" (and if we could mark everythign down, indeed we wouldn't need any fancy functions, since we could just look at a specific t)

Okay, if this is correct, I think I can go back to that earlier post (tomorrow, it's late :)

Anssi, I have been thinking this afternoon and perhaps I can make my position a little clearer. The issue is the chicken and egg nature of ontology and epistemology. Each and every epistemology (without exception) requires an ontology. There is but one path out of the dilemma and it lies with the definition of "an explanation". If one defines "an explanation" to be "a method of obtaining one's expectations from the known information", there exists but one explanation which requires no epistemological structure: that is the "what is", is "what is" explanation. Thus, if one can come up with a notation capable of expressing the ontology behind the "what is", is "what is" explanation, one has created a representation of the ontology behind any explanation.

The issue behind the above statement is the fact that any epistemology needs to be understood and, in order to understand that epistemology, one must be able to first deduce the implied ontology. Before it is understood, any explanation is a "what is", is "what is" structure, the only issue being that the underlying ontology is defined by the implied structure of the ontology. From the perspective of the "what is", is "what is" explanation, that means that the ontological elements are actually labeled. The important fact is that exactly what symbols are used to perform that labeling is unimportant.

The nub of the observation is that the structure of the "what is", is "what is" explanation is the only structure which provides a basis for thinking about ontology in the absence of an epistemology. If we are interested in an exact scientific examination of the field of ontology, the "what is", is "what is" explanation is the only explanation of use to us. Anytime any element of that ontology is actually labeled, you are discussing epistemology, not ontology. It follows that, though one is free to discuss the problems which arise when one goes to actually label those ontological element, one can not actually label them without exiting the field of ontology.

This is the mistake made by everyone: they exit the field at the first opportunity.

Does that make any sense to you?

Well yeah, I think I know what you are saying. Us "exiting the field" is the same moment as when we think we now understand reality. For a child that idea is quite natural; we all thought we knew what reality was like (and it was exactly "like" how we perceived it) before we had recognized any serious problems in our worldview. Of course when you start realizing there are problems, there's still long way to go before you can appreciate how deep those problems really are...

And then you are faced with the problem that is; to discuss or to think about those problems you need to be thinking in terms of some "defined things" even when you understand these things are so merely because you have defined them so. (e.g. I am talking about the problem in terms of the cortex and other familiar naturalistic concepts)

And even when this is understood, whenever you are trying to figure out what someone else is trying to say, and especially when they are proposing a new paradigm, you are trying to figure out how to understand the concepts they are using. Since trying to understand someone is a case of trying to define (or refine) an epistemological solution, it is kind of the same as "trying to exit the field of ontology". Since this is naturally what we do all the time, I guess it's to be expected it is an issue when trying to explain a method for keeping one foot "in the field" of ontology.

-Anssi

 

[Rade]

Clearly above you say:

...there exists but one explanation which requires no epistemological structure: that is the "what is", is "what is" [A=A, Law of Identity] explanation...

Then you say:

...I am pointing out that every epistemological structure requires the Law of Identity [A=A] explanation...

So, you claim that while the [A=A, aka your "what is" is "what is"] explanation requires no epistemological structure (in fact, it is the only such explanation), all other possible explanations do have epistemological structure that require the [A=A] explanation...correct ?

You also say this:

Identity itself is the opening axiom to any epistemological structure.

I do not agree. EXISTENCE ITSELF is the opening axiom to any epistemological structure. Identity comes latter in the presentation. A non-existent cannot have Identity.

 

[Doctordick]

EXISTENCE ITSELF is the opening axiom to any epistemological structure. Identity comes latter in the presentation. A non-existent cannot have Identity.

Ah then, you must hold that Super Man exists! I will never comprehend you; you seem to have this compulsion to post before you think. How can you possibly discuss the existence of something which you can't identify? I am personally aware of a great many "epistemological structures" which do not require existence; what do you think the plot of a SF film is?

 

[AnssiH]

Okay, back to that earlier post.

So first of all I understood we have established that "x, tau, t"-structure so to be able to represent reality. And had we made an attempt to define ontological elements, we could lay down some "presents" on that table accordingly.

One's expectation are no more than a "true/false" decision on any given present. In the "what is", is "what is" explanation, the method is no more than "look in the table". If a particular list is in the table the answer to your expectations is, "true". If it is not there, the answer is false.

If we could really contain, in our minds, a complete collection of all "presents" going to make up our past, then that might be a useful view but that feat is somewhat beyond our mental capabilities. What we would really like is a procedure (think of it as a fundamental rule) which would accomplish that result for a any single ontological element.

And here we are looking at a method of "seeing what existed in the past" without having all the information about each and every moment we ever experienced? The "result" is simply, whether or not a single ontological element existed in a particular t?

The first "invalid ontological elements" I would like to add, is a very simple set. As defined, all real presents consist of specific changes in my knowledge of valid ontological elements.

I have to proceed very carefully here so I can be sure I get the right idea.

"All real presents consists of specific changes in my knowledge of valid ontological elements", what does this mean? I thought we represented presents in terms of "what exists in each present", as oppose to what has changed (since previous present?). Or are you just saying that because we can see what has changed between presents if we have information about what existed at each moment?

I have already eluded to the fact that I am using numerical labels because I can then talk about that "method of obtaining one's expectations" as a mathematical function. The "true/false" can be seen as a "one/zero" dichotomy and I am using numerical labels for that "known knowledge" (those specific "valid ontological elements" which constitute the "reality" of any given "present") so the method is a mathematical function: i.e., it transforms one set of numbers into a second set (you give me a set of numbers which could possibly be a real "present" and that "mathematical function" returns either a one or a zero (depending upon whether or not that collection of numbers is in that table of my "what is", is "what is" explanation.

"It transforms one set of numbers into a second set of numbers"; what does this second set represent? Or do you refer to that "1" or "0" (true or false) as the "second set"?
And so does this function return "1" if the specific set is found in any "present" in the past?

I'm getting really confused when reading the rest of the post... I'm trying to proceed through your post without understanding the reason for almost any manipulation of those ontological elements, hoping things would clear up, but my head is filled with questions. What I'm wondering now is; if we first have some kind of partially filled "x, tau, t"-table, how could it contain knowledge about the un-filled parts? I must be too far off the mark again to be able to make any sense out of this...

I figured you said there exists a function that would yield the complete table, if we just give it... what? Partial table?

-Anssi

 

[Rade]

Ah then, you must hold that Super Man exists! ...I am personally aware of a great many "epistemological structures" which do not require existence; what do you think the plot of a SF film is?

Well, let's see, the "plot" of a SF film is a thing that exists.
And Super Man is of course nothing more than the imagination of the human mind forming union of two concepts "man", (the reality that humans do exist) and "super" (implied as supernatural which may exist somewhere but by definition is outside science). It seems clear Dr.D., when you claim ... Ah then, you must hold that Super Man exists !...that you do not agree with logical conclusion that man's imagination is nothing more than the ability to rearrange the things (your valid ontological elements) he has observed in reality. If this claim is false, then provide examples of things you imagine that are not a rearrangement of some aspect of reality. There are no epistemological structures that do not require first some existence that you wish to acquire knowledge of--to claim as you do is the same as saying you have the ability to acquire knowledge of no"thing". When your imagine Super Man, you "know" he does not exist, imagination is a sense of the "what if ?"--speculation, not a road to knowledge.

 

[nabuco]

Well, let's see, the "plot" of a SF film is a thing that exists.

I think Doctordick was saying that even things that do not exist can have explanations, therefore not every "epistemological structure" must necessarily refer to some ontology.

There are no epistemological structures that do not require first some existence that you wish to acquire knowledge of--to claim as you do is the same as saying you have the ability to acquire knowledge of no"thing"

This is obviously wrong, but it might be difficult for me to explain why. Self-consistent logical structures do not need to refer to any"thing" but themselves. For instance:

a = b
b = c
c = d

That is an epistemological structure, on which we can even do "science" to discover that a = d.

 

[Doctordick]

Anssi, it is certainly possible that you understand what I have presented but I get the strong feeling that your understanding is just a little askew; just enough to lead to bothersome complications. I think one of the problems here is that your expectations are more complex than what I am presenting: i.e., you reading things in there which are not there. This leads to subtle misinterpretations of what I say which may tend to lead you astray. Perhaps a quick and dirty presentation of the central issues would be helpful.

As I said above, the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation is the only explanation which does not require an epistemological construct. When I defined an explanation as a method of generating your expectations, I had in mind the concept of yielding the probability which would describe your expectations that a particular state was to be expected. Of course, the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation yields only zero for any state not actually in the basis of that explanation (i.e., what is known or thought to be known). Thus it is that "the method" is, "look at the table of 'what is' which you have to work with. (Again, I am working in the abstract so that the great extent of that table is not an issue.)

I think you understand that the symbols used to refer to the ontological elements of the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation are immaterial so that I can use numerical reference labels. Since the explanation yields a number (the probability of a specific state) and the specific state is described by a set of numbers, it follows that, from this perspective, any explanation is fundamentally a mathematical function. The "what is", is "what is"[/color] table is a representation of that function for those specific instances which are known. Any flaw-free explanation must also yield exactly those points (they represent the information the explanation is to explain).

Thus it is that the only difference between the desired explanation and the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation is that the desired explanation yields expectations for states not in the known set (i.e., it is capable of making predictions for the future). Thus it is that any explanation constitutes a mathematical function which fits the points established by the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation and, in addition, yields values for points not in that set. What all scientists are looking for, are the simplest relationships which fulfill that requirement.

This is a point fitting problem: i.e., one is looking for a mathematical function which fits the entire collection of points displayed in that table. As anyone who has studied mathematics understands, there exist an infinite number of algorithms which will fit any finite set of numbers. That is why the issue of "simplest" arises. Now one man's "simple" is often another's "complex" so we should leave the issue open and consider only the consequences of fundamental constraints on the possibilities.

So first of all I understood we have established that "x, tau, t"-structure so to be able to represent reality.

Slightly askew of what I was describing; what this structure is to represent is "what we think we know". Reality has been defined to be "a valid ontology". What we know of reality is only a part of that "valid ontology" (there may exist ontological elements of which we are unaware and they are not in our "data base") and, in addition, you must keep in mind that there exists absolutely no way of determining whether or not a particular ontological element we think we know is valid or not. Thus it is that I find the phrase "to represent reality" to be somewhat misleading. This can easily lead to sloppy thinking and is best avoided.

There is also a second issue which must be kept in mind: the (x, tau, t) representation is being designed to represent the "valid ontological elements" we know and, as such, the difference between valid and invalid elements must be kept in mind during the analysis of that design. Note that I earlier commented that we can ignore the existence of invalid elements within the actual data being represented as any acceptable explanation must explain all the data which certainly must include the valid components (we are, after all, looking for a mathematical function which fits "all" the known points).

And had we made an attempt to define ontological elements, we could lay down some "presents" on that table accordingly.

Making an attempt to define ontological elements has almost nothing to do with what is being represented here (i.e., with the logic of the representation itself) as defining the ontological elements is essentially no more than setting down a specific set of (x, tau, t) labels for each element. The representation is a set of points in an (x, tau, t) Euclidean space. By my definition of the t index, the collection of points (which I have chosen to represent as B) with identical "t" indices are representations of a specific present. It follows that the representation itself has time (as I have defined it) embedded in the representation. Time is nothing more or less than the t axis.

One's expectation with regard to "known information" are no more than a "true/false" decision on any given present. In the "what is", is "what is" explanation, the method is no more than "look in the table". If a particular B(t) is in the table the answer to your expectations is, "true". If it is not there, the answer is false.

Here I am speaking of the representation itself as an abstract structure; the table (which represents the "what is", is "what is"[/color] would, by definition, include all of the information known to us (our entire personal past so to speak). But represented in a totally abstract form.

And here we are looking at a method of "seeing what existed in the past" without having all the information about each and every moment we ever experienced? The "result" is simply, whether or not a single ontological element existed in a particular t?

No, the structure is designed to represent "each and every moment we ever experienced". My next comment was to point out that, if we did indeed have the mental capability to actually construct and record that table (as an information base we could consciously consult) the idea of using such a thing might be useful. Don't take that comment as anything more than a mere comment on the circumstance. As I said, that feat is clearly beyond our mental capabilities and it would be much more useful to have some sort of rule which would tell you if a particular B(t) existed in the table. I am doing no more than pointing in a direction which would yield what I would think of as "a useful explanation"; useful in the sense that we would prefer a rule which would not exceed our mental capabilities.

What we would really like is a procedure (think of it as a fundamental rule) which would accomplish that result for a any single ontological element.

I tried to prepare you for this perspective when I commented on that post where I had asked the question, "How do you tell the difference between an electron and a Volkswagen?". As I said then, you will find my answer a few posts down from there. The correct answer is the labels, "Volkswagen" and "electron", presume a great quantity of information about the rest of the universe is either understood or unimportant. Identification is itself a statement of what will be taken as valid associated acceptable criteria. In other words, we are talking about a single ontological element (or an object, which I earlier defined to be a collection of ontological elements) of the set B(t) where the rest of the elements of B(t) are either unimportant or known.

I might comment that, as the future is fundamentally unknown, "the rest of the elements are known" is the assumption that they either won't be different or the difference is predicted. Another way to see this is to realize that the behavior of the significant element is based on the presumption that the behavior of the associated criteria is correctly understood. All this is just buried in assumptions too voluminous to even discuss. If we are going to be "exact" we need to avoid all these assumptions.

And here we are looking at a method of "seeing what existed in the past" without having all the information about each and every moment we ever experienced? The "result" is simply, whether or not a single ontological element existed in a particular t?

In a sense yes; but certainly not clear the way you put it. What I am describing is a rule which would yield the existence of a single specific ontological element in that incomprehensible table. First, remember that we are talking about what we would like "a useful explanation" to provide which means we are talking about a useful epistemological construct (i.e., a specific set of labels have been introduced in that "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation). That means that we would like to have a rule which would yield the (x, tau) indices in our (x, tau, t) representation (those different ontological elements in that representation) which are going to be regarded as the same ontological element in that epistemological construct.

Or, to put it a little simpler, we would like a rule which would give us the appropriate (x, tau) indices as a function of time given that all the other points in that B(t) are known (or unimportant, which is really the same thing). This is essentially what any rule discovered by science tells us about the behavior of things. It is presumed that the rest of the universe is either unimportant or has its impact embedded in the rule: the rules of science talk about the behavior of objects (how specific identified entities behave).

I have to proceed very carefully here so I can be sure I get the right idea.

The proposed representation of the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation is essentially identical to the common Newtonian representation of reality (i.e., a space "x" coordinate and a time "t" coordinate) except that it is neither three dimensional or continuous (Newtonian "time lines" constitute a presumption that these points are the same entity) and no "measure" of any kind has been introduced (neither in the space or time axes). Sort of, "the actual facts we have to explain" are being represented as collections of known points in a (x, tau, t) space.

Or are you just saying that because we can see what has changed between presents if we have information about what existed at each moment?

If there has been no change, how do you know the "t" index of the referenced ontological element should be different? How do you know you are talking about a different "time"?

And so does this function return "1" if the specific set is found in any "present" in the past?

In this case, your use of the word "any" worries me. The "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation has been laid out as a table of indices B(t) which describes that set of points in the (x, tau, space) which represents ontologically recognizable cases of what you think you know (the basis of your future epistemological solution). The table provides you with the set of answers to the question, does the specific set of points, B(t) exist in that table? B(t) can be seen as a set of numbers and the answer can be seen as either a one or a zero representing "yes" and "no". Thus, your expectations concerning "what you think you know" can be seen as a mathematical function: i.e., the function yields the probability that a specific "present" (annotated as B(t) ) is a valid entry in that "what is", is "what is"[/color] table of what you know.

Now, an acceptable scientifically usable explanation has to go a bit further. If it makes no predictions, it is a pretty worthless explanation. What that is essentially saying is that the scientifically usable explanation must yield the probability that a specific "present" ;not in that "what is", is "what is"[/color] table of what you think you know; will turn up as an acceptable entry via a change in your past (what you know or what you think you know): i.e., the future.

Fundamentally, this is a point fitting problem and it is well known that there are an infinite number of functions which will fit a finite number of points. Which function you choose to "believe" valid (your epistemological theory) must satisfy two very important constraints: first, it must agree with your knowledge of the past and second, it needs to be simple enough to mentally comprehend. Those two constraints are the cause of the underlying need for compartmentalization. Since this presentation is an abstract analysis of ontological constraints and not concerned with the complexity of epistemological solutions, compartmentalization is not a pertinent factor.

What I'm wondering now is; if we first have some kind of partially filled "x, tau, t"-table, how could it contain knowledge about the un-filled parts?

It can't! But you must see that any table (the actual set of ontological events our epistemological solution must explain) is essentially incomplete: i.e., we are not all knowing and the future will bring forth entries for that table which we don't currently have. What we would like to have is a rule which would tell us what those entries should be. Now that "rule" might be wrong but there is one thing we know for sure, any valid rule must yield the entries for the table which we already have: i.e., if our expectations for entries not in the table are to be given by some function, that function must first yield, exactly, the entries representing what we know (or think we know). If it doesn't then it is either the wrong "function" or something we thought we knew was wrong: i.e., the "theoretical epistemological solution represented by that ontology together with that "function" is wrong. The fundamental issue here is normally referred to as "induction" and there is no logical defense of induction other than, "it's something I understand and, gee it seems to work"

I figured you said there exists a function that would yield the complete table, if we just give it... what? Partial table?

Not the complete table, but rather, our "expectations" for the entries to the table; a subtly different statement. The idea that "there exists a function" which would, forever, yield the complete table, is equivalent to saying that the complete universe is a knowable thing. That there exists a function which yields a complete table (for the known past) at this moment, is a fact; there are, in fact, an infinite number of functions which satisfy that requirement. The problem is that most all of them are far to complex to even consider as usable representations of reality. But that is not my concern as I have no interest in developing an epistemological solution; what I am concerned about are the constraints on the fundamental behavior of ontological elements in any epistemological solution, a very different issue.

I think Doctordick was saying that even things that do not exist can have explanations, therefore not every "epistemological structure" must necessarily refer to some ontology.

I would have said, "some valid[/color] ontology". Otherwise, I think your comment is accurate. Perhaps you can talk a little sense into Rade. My major complaint is that standard languages are chock full of vague definitions and these lead to misunderstandings. I am afraid Rade's central purpose is to accent these misunderstandings and that serves no purpose except confusion.

I hope I have not confused any of you further -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

Anssi, it is certainly possible that you understand what I have presented but I get the strong feeling that your understanding is just a little askew

Me too! :) I basically know what this is about, but I am struggling with some important details regarding how you handle the tables to a useful end.

As I said above, the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation is the only explanation which does not require an epistemological construct. When I defined an explanation as a method of generating your expectations, I had in mind the concept of yielding the probability which would describe your expectations that a particular state was to be expected.

i.e. that a particular state that occurred in some moment in the past was to be expected according to other "presents" around it?

The "explanation" can be seen as a mathematical function that could be used to transform one x,tau-present to another present?

I think you understand that the symbols used to refer to the ontological elements of the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation are immaterial so that I can use numerical reference labels. Since the explanation yields a number (the probability of a specific state) and the specific state is described by a set of numbers, it follows that, from this perspective, any explanation is fundamentally a mathematical function. The "what is", is "what is"[/color] table is a representation of that function for those specific instances which are known. Any flaw-free explanation must also yield exactly those points (they represent the information the explanation is to explain).

i.e. we are looking for a function that would produce the changes in our known past? An infinite amount of such functions exists, but most are terribly complex, and that is why we are looking for a simplest such function? So it is not that different from traditional theoretical physics, except we are trying to keep the elements of reality undefined? Even then, we need to try and define some things before we can build any sort of x, tau, t-table? Is this correct?

Thus it is that the only difference between the desired explanation and the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation is that the desired explanation yields expectations for states not in the known set (i.e., it is capable of making predictions for the future). Thus it is that any explanation constitutes a mathematical function which fits the points established by the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation and, in addition, yields values for points not in that set. What all scientists are looking for, are the simplest relationships which fulfill that requirement.

Yeah ok, this sounds like it perhaps answers what I just asked... I think :)

This is a point fitting problem: i.e., one is looking for a mathematical function which fits the entire collection of points displayed in that table. As anyone who has studied mathematics understands, there exist an infinite number of algorithms which will fit any finite set of numbers. That is why the issue of "simplest" arises. Now one man's "simple" is often another's "complex" so we should leave the issue open and consider only the consequences of fundamental constraints on the possibilities.

Yup.

I've also been wondering how should one express something like, say, a definition for "space" in the "x, tau, t"-table? Is it about identifying space in different manners? Hmmm...

So first of all I understood we have established that "x, tau, t"-structure so to be able to represent reality.

Slightly askew of what I was describing; what this structure is to represent is "what we think we know". Reality has been defined to be "a valid ontology". What we know of reality is only a part of that "valid ontology" (there may exist ontological elements of which we are unaware and they are not in our "data base") and, in addition, you must keep in mind that there exists absolutely no way of determining whether or not a particular ontological element we think we know is valid or not. Thus it is that I find the phrase "to represent reality" to be somewhat misleading. This can easily lead to sloppy thinking and is best avoided.

True.

There is also a second issue which must be kept in mind: the (x, tau, t) representation is being designed to represent the "valid ontological elements" we know and, as such, the difference between valid and invalid elements must be kept in mind during the analysis of that design. Note that I earlier commented that we can ignore the existence of invalid elements within the actual data being represented as any acceptable explanation must explain all the data which certainly must include the valid components (we are, after all, looking for a mathematical function which fits "all" the known points).

Hmmm... here "invalid elements" refers to elements we think exists but are merely artificial parts in our worldview? As oppose to the elements you added arbitrarily to the "x, tau, t"-tables in post #398?

And had we made an attempt to define ontological elements, we could lay down some "presents" on that table accordingly.

Making an attempt to define ontological elements has almost nothing to do with what is being represented here (i.e., with the logic of the representation itself) as defining the ontological elements is essentially no more than setting down a specific set of (x, tau, t) labels for each element.

Yup, in other words, we have to have attempted to make some definitions before we can have any filled "x, tau, t"-table in our hands, right? That's what I think I said; as soon as we have made an attempt to define ontological elements, we can lay down some "presents" on the table according to our definitions, but not before? Even if these labels are taken as abstract references to "possible ontological elements", we can't label anything until we have assumed it is a "thing"?

I'm being pressed for time, so I'll continue from here soon...

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

And here we are looking at a method of "seeing what existed in the past" without having all the information about each and every moment we ever experienced?

No, the structure is designed to represent "each and every moment we ever experienced". My next comment was to point out that, if we did indeed have the mental capability to actually construct and record that table (as an information base we could consciously consult) the idea of using such a thing might be useful. Don't take that comment as anything more than a mere comment on the circumstance. As I said, that feat is clearly beyond our mental capabilities and it would be much more useful to have some sort of rule which would tell you if a particular B(t) existed in the table. I am doing no more than pointing in a direction which would yield what I would think of as "a useful explanation"; useful in the sense that we would prefer a rule which would not exceed our mental capabilities.
I tried to prepare you for this perspective when I commented on that post where I had asked the question, "How do you tell the difference between an electron and a Volkswagen?". As I said then, you will find my answer a few posts down from there. The correct answer is the labels, "Volkswagen" and "electron", presume a great quantity of information about the rest of the universe is either understood or unimportant.

Yup... So this is essentially the same as saying, we define objects by observing properties (functions/behaviour)? The difference between an electron and a volkswagen, as they exist in our worldview, is how we have defined them; how they relate to other things in our worldview, or how they behave. When we observe something (an electron or a volkswagen), it is their their behaviour that we observe and recognize them as such (walks like a duck...).

Identification is itself a statement of what will be taken as valid associated acceptable criteria. In other words, we are talking about a single ontological element (or an object, which I earlier defined to be a collection of ontological elements) of the set B(t) where the rest of the elements of B(t) are either unimportant or known.

So, when you say "What we would really like is a procedure (think of it as a fundamental rule) which would accomplish that result for a any single ontological element.", is this about finding a mathematical function that would explain the "journey" (the behaviour) of a single ontological element through a series of t's? (I feel my assumptions are shaky... :)

Or, to put it a little simpler, we would like a rule which would give us the appropriate (x, tau) indices as a function of time given that all the other points in that B(t) are known (or unimportant, which is really the same thing). This is essentially what any rule discovered by science tells us about the behavior of things. It is presumed that the rest of the universe is either unimportant or has its impact embedded in the rule: the rules of science talk about the behavior of objects (how specific identified entities behave).
The proposed representation of the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation is essentially identical to the common Newtonian representation of reality (i.e., a space "x" coordinate and a time "t" coordinate) except that it is neither three dimensional or continuous (Newtonian "time lines" constitute a presumption that these points are the same entity) and no "measure" of any kind has been introduced (neither in the space or time axes).

Yeah okay, this is starting to sound clearer and clearer. As we are laying down "pasts" in the manner you are proposing, we can start forming mathematical functions that explain the changes between presents. And a function that explains all our past in this manner, can be considered valid.

With a small extra assumption one can assume it also predicts the future, much like Newtonian mechanics can be used to make predictions?

And so does this function return "1" if the specific set is found in any "present" in the past?

In this case, your use of the word "any" worries me.

Yup, I clearly had picked it up wrong.

Fundamentally, this is a point fitting problem and it is well known that there are an infinite number of functions which will fit a finite number of points. Which function you choose to "believe" valid (your epistemological theory) must satisfy two very important constraints: first, it must agree with your knowledge of the past and second, it needs to be simple enough to mentally comprehend.

Yup! I think I now have a better idea about what you are saying, and I can again return to that old post... Next time!

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Anssi,

I don't know that it is beneficial to try to understand my previous posts as they are cast in what I thought you knew at the time. Since this could be in error, trying to understand those posts could be counter productive. Perhaps you should first read the following carefully.

I am beginning to suspect that your major problem is that you are trying to figure out how this attack is going to help you construct valid epistemological solutions to understanding the universe. It isn't (or at least is not designed to do such a thing); as I have tried to make clear, any useful solution is "is just buried in assumptions too voluminous to even discuss". The issue is, "If we are going to be "exact" we need to avoid all these assumptions". On the other hand, if we avoid these assumptions, the correct solution is going to be so out of reach as it is guaranteed unachievable (beyond our ability to comprehend).

That is why I keep harping on the issue of not trying to find a valid epistemological solution: it is fundamentally an unachievable goal. What I am trying to do is to present to you an abstract "exact" representation of the problem; which is an achievable goal (i.e., the representation is achievable, not the solution). I have laid out the representation as a "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation because that structure is easily understood (as a representation, not as a real usable entity).

All I am doing is representing "what we know" (or think we know) as points in a (x, tau, t) space. A table of those points is capable of representing any knowledge of any kind. That is all there is to it! In doing so I defined two very important indices: "x" and "t". The index "x" is there to express "difference" (different "x" means "different ontological element") and the index "t" is there to express "difference in what we know" (different "t" means "a change in our knowledge"). The index "tau" is only there because representation as points in an index space is incapable of specifying multiple occurrences of the same ontological element (an essential part of any "usable"[/color] explanation).

Yup... So this is essentially the same as saying, we define objects by observing properties (functions/behaviour)?

No, not exactly. We define objects by the circumstance within which we find them. If the surrounding circumstance is not the certifying circumstance for that object, then we are looking at something else. The fundamental issue is that B(t) for all the other significant entities is "known". There is a subtlety here which is very important and much neglected. When we discover some familiar behavior outside the certifying circumstance, we call it a metaphor. The issue here is possibly not as important to understanding my perspective as I think but it seems to me that it is very important to recognize that, whenever we speak of something specific, we are actually presuming the surrounding circumstance is clearly understood.

So, when you say "What we would really like is a procedure (think of it as a fundamental rule) which would accomplish that result for a any single ontological element.", is this about finding a mathematical function that would explain the "journey" (the behavior) of a single ontological element through a series of t's? (I feel my assumptions are shaky... :)

Yes; that is what I am saying ordinary useful explanations accomplish (with regard to either "single ontological elements" or collections of such elements where internal behavior of the collection can be neglected: i.e., objects as I have defined them).

Yeah okay, this is starting to sound clearer and clearer. As we are laying down "pasts" in the manner you are proposing, we can start forming mathematical functions that explain the changes between presents. And a function that explains all our past in this manner, can be considered valid.

Again, I think your understanding is a little askew of what I am saying. All I am saying is that "your expectations" (since they can be seen as a number associated with each specific B(t) which itself is expressed as a set of numbers) can be seen as a mathematical function. Since any flaw free explanation can be expressed as a specific "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation (i.e., little more than a specific set of labels), all explanations can be seen as mathematical functions which must yield those true/false results for that table which represents what "we think we know" (since we are free to symbolize the elements any way we choose). It would be more appropriate to say that any function which does not yield all of our past must be considered "invalid" (i.e., it is most definitely flawed).

You must be careful to understand that the function is to produce "your expectations" and, "your expectations" are not necessarily what actually happened. For example, the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation yields the expectation for a specific B(t) (given that all B(t) for lesser values of t are known) is simply, "any B is equally possible" (and the probably of "one of any" is zero since the number of possibilities for "any" is infinite). So, the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation yields exactly the correct answer for the past (it is flaw free) but fails as a "useful" explanation as it tells you utterly nothing about the future (or, for that matter, any B(t) not in the table of what you know).

With a small extra assumption one can assume it also predicts the future, much like Newtonian mechanics can be used to make predictions?

One can make no such assumption! The future is totally undefined and no prediction can be logically defended. On the other hand, our expectations are another matter. This is where induction plays a roll. It is also why I brought up that "Volkswagen" vs "electron" issue. If some part of the future is known then expectations for associated events can be predicted (by comparison with statistics of the past). When it is the future, portions of it may be known by elimination: i.e., if the surrounding circumstance is not the certifying circumstance for the event of interest, the event of interest didn't occur and no expectations exist. On the other hand, if the surrounding circumstances are the certifying circumstance, your expectations will be that the event of interest will occur. This is the very issue of induction and you need to understand the implications (maybe not now, but later anyway).

For the moment, I think your real difficulty is that you are trying to read more into what I have said than I have said.

Looking to hear from you -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

Anssi,

I don't know that it is beneficial to try to understand my previous posts as they are cast in what I thought you knew at the time. Since this could be in error, trying to understand those posts could be counter productive. Perhaps you should first read the following carefully.

I am beginning to suspect that your major problem is that you are trying to figure out how this attack is going to help you construct valid epistemological solutions to understanding the universe. It isn't (or at least is not designed to do such a thing); as I have tried to make clear, any useful solution is "is just buried in assumptions too voluminous to even discuss". The issue is, "If we are going to be "exact" we need to avoid all these assumptions". On the other hand, if we avoid these assumptions, the correct solution is going to be so out of reach as it is guaranteed unachievable (beyond our ability to comprehend).

Well, what I've gathered before this presentation is that a large number of valid epistemological solutions are bound to exists; ones that express different ontological elements but are merely semantically different, and produce essentially the same predictions for reality (only the predictions too are expressed in those different ontological elements)

What you are saying above, I reckon, is the same thing. Any valid solution hinges on a some set of undefendable assumptions, and staying on the objective ground is achieved only by not doing those assumptions, and to achieve this you are expressing this "x, tau, t"-table.

And I've gathered that any specific (filled) "x, tau, t"-table is a epistemological solution (valid or invalid), since some assumptions have been made so to be able to fill it.

I didn't assume - while writing the previous post - that this sort of framework is meant to be something that could tell us what ontological elements really exist (since I find the whole question meaningless and confused one), but I did assume it is good for finding internally coherent solutions (keeping in mind each is only a solution, not the solution). Are these false assumptions?

That is why I keep harping on the issue of not trying to find a valid epistemological solution: it is fundamentally an unachievable goal.

Yeah, that's what I would hope people would understand, apparently there are many ways to arrive to this conclusion.

What I am trying to do is to present to you an abstract "exact" representation of the problem; which is an achievable goal (i.e., the representation is achievable, not the solution). I have laid out the representation as a "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation because that structure is easily understood (as a representation, not as a real usable entity).

Yup, I think I understand this, but then I may have made some wrong assumptions that nevertheless yield sensical interpretation of what you are saying ;)

One thing I've been wondering though, perhaps you can try and explain the role of symmetry again. Was the point of that simply that it is "differences" that give us any ground for our attempts to classify ontological elements?

No, not exactly. We define objects by the circumstance within which we find them. If the surrounding circumstance is not the certifying circumstance for that object, then we are looking at something else. The fundamental issue is that B(t) for all the other significant entities is "known". There is a subtlety here which is very important and much neglected. When we discover some familiar behavior outside the certifying circumstance, we call it a metaphor. The issue here is possibly not as important to understanding my perspective as I think but it seems to me that it is very important to recognize that, whenever we speak of something specific, we are actually presuming the surrounding circumstance is clearly understood.

I'm wondering if there are some important details in this description that I am missing. It sounds to me like a semantically different way of saying that we define(classify) objects by observing behaviour, or patterns, or however I would wish to express the situation, that would nevertheless be just a (necessarily) vague picture painted with semantical concepts (pattern, behaviour, etc...)

Basically it seems to make sense to me. As long as we cannot say in any objective sense there exists some thing X, we are merely conceptualizing reality into some set of components, and what allows us to do that, can be in my opinion expressed equally well as "surrounding circumstances", or "stable patterns", as long as one understands the necessary weaknesses of these descriptions... (surrounding circumistances of "what"? or "stable in what sense?")

Damn it's tricky to use natural language to discuss these issues :)

Again, I think your understanding is a little askew of what I am saying. All I am saying is that "your expectations" (since they can be seen as a number associated with each specific B(t) which itself is expressed as a set of numbers) can be seen as a mathematical function. Since any flaw free explanation can be expressed as a specific "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation (i.e., little more than a specific set of labels), all explanations can be seen as mathematical functions which must yield those true/false results for that table which represents what "we think we know" (since we are free to symbolize the elements any way we choose). It would be more appropriate to say that any function which does not yield all of our past must be considered "invalid" (i.e., it is most definitely flawed).

Yeah I agree. Natural language just keeps tricking me :)

You must be careful to understand that the function is to produce "your expectations" and, "your expectations" are not necessarily what actually happened. For example, the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation yields the expectation for a specific B(t) (given that all B(t) for lesser values of t are known) is simply, "any B is equally possible" (and the probably of "one of any" is zero since the number of possibilities for "any" is infinite). So, the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation yields exactly the correct answer for the past (it is flaw free) but fails as a "useful" explanation as it tells you utterly nothing about the future (or, for that matter, any B(t) not in the table of what you know).

So whenever you are referring to the "what is, is what is" explanation, you are just referring to the table of known past, but not any of the assumptions that one has made about the behaviour of the elements marked down in that table?

But in order to fill any table, you must have made some assumptions regarding the identity of those elements, right? (Even though you have made these assumptions knowing well that they are undefendable) Hmmm, or is it possible to mark down mere differences? Hmmmm

With a small extra assumption one can assume it also predicts the future, much like Newtonian mechanics can be used to make predictions?

One can make no such assumption! The future is totally undefined and no prediction can be logically defended. On the other hand, our expectations are another matter. This is where induction plays a roll.

Yeah. Is my assertion valid if I reiterate that by "prediction" I don't mean explicitly knowing the future, but merely having some anticipation for it... I tend to use this terminology because of the meaning "prediction" has in the context of an intelligent organism trying to make useful predictions about the future (useful for survival). That is, our predictions fail all the time, and they are always based on undefendable set of assumptions. Yes?

It is also why I brought up that "Volkswagen" vs "electron" issue. If some part of the future is known then expectations for associated events can be predicted (by comparison with statistics of the past).

I'm not sure what you are referring to when you say "...part of the future is known..."? If we have "certain expectations" for some part of future (by having made some set of "undefendable assumptions")

When it is the future, portions of it may be known by elimination: i.e., if the surrounding circumstance is not the certifying circumstance for the event of interest, the event of interest didn't occur and no expectations exist. On the other hand, if the surrounding circumstances are the certifying circumstance, your expectations will be that the event of interest will occur. This is the very issue of induction and you need to understand the implications (maybe not now, but later anyway).

For the moment, I think your real difficulty is that you are trying to read more into what I have said than I have said.

Yeah, probably... And the complications introduced by natural language :)

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Hi again Anssi,

I have been trying to sculpt with "Poser" and, so far, not being very successful; but I am learning things. I was surprised to find your post so soon when I looked this evening. And I agree with you whole heartedly; it is quite easy to become confounded by the complications introduced by natural language. That is exactly why I continue to insist that you make no attempts to find epistemological solutions consistent with my representation. What I am saying is that my representation is universal in that absolutely any explanation can be cast in exactly the form of that "what is", is "what is"[/color] table.

Essentially, if there exists a workable explanation of anything, any attempt to understand that explanation amounts to exactly the same problem as understanding anything else: i.e., all of the knowledge required to understand that explanation can be expressed in exactly the same model (as points in a (x, tau, t) space).

Well, what I've gathered before this presentation is that a large number of valid epistemological solutions are bound to exists

Again, there is no reason to make that assumption; it is entirely possible that only one exists. The real issue here is that we do not have the power to settle that question and even consideration of it is counter productive as it distracts us from the serious problem of maintaining objectivity. And don't be upset by that comment as I am as guilty of being drawn into unproductive side issues as is anyone here.

What you are saying above, I reckon, is the same thing. Any valid solution hinges on a some set of undefendable assumptions, and staying on the objective ground is achieved only by not doing those assumptions, and to achieve this you are expressing this "x, tau, t"-table.

Essentially, yes!

And I've gathered that any specific (filled) "x, tau, t"-table is a epistemological solution (valid or invalid), since some assumptions have been made so to be able to fill it.

The actual answer to this question is, "maybe, maybe not". You sort of have the horse on the wrong side of the cart. The real issue is that the table cannot represent a flaw free epistemological solution without being specifically filled out as, if the table does not exist, the explanation cannot be checked against it. These issues once again get hairy because real epistemological solutions (theories) make both assumptions about what exists and assumptions about things which exist not being important. The only important fact here is the fact that an epistemological argument itself consists of a set of symbols which can be expressed in exactly the same table we are discussing. The subtlety of this can get profound and we really ought not to be drawn off into that discussion. Please, let us put it off until I have presented my full model.

There are essentially three things I want to do with that "what is", is "what is"[/color] table before I get into the issue of symmetry. All three of these steps involve adding "invalid ontological elements". I claim this as a reasonable thing to do because all epistemological solutions do this kind of thing: i.e., they invent reasons for things to be the way they are and, if that invention allows them to explain things and, all results are consistent with the existence of those invented things, then there exists no reason to deny that invention. In particular, we have the fact that there exists no way to tell the difference between an invented ontological element and a valid ontological element. This is a freedom available in ontological constructs not available in epistemological constructs and I will eventually show you that it is exactly this freedom which allows one create a solution to the problem. But that will come later; for the moment, all I want is for you to allow these three steps and understand exactly what the three steps provide.

The first step involves the issue of "expectations" being a mathematical function of "what we think is known": i.e., P(B(t)), the probability of having the set B(t), is a function of that B(t) where B is a set of number pairs (x and tau indices). At the moment, this is a very strange mathematical function as the number of arguments changes with the index "t". I am afraid I have never heard of such a function from the mathematical community. However, in this case, the problem is easily eliminated; all one need do is propose a collection of "invalid ontological elements" to fill in the gap. So our "what is", is "what is"[/color] table now has the same number of entries for every "t" (we just don't know what they are).

You must understand that their existence is now a presumed fact and that our past includes not knowing exactly what references should be attached to them (other than the fact that they are seen occasionally at other times: i.e., they are members of some supposedly known B(t). If you happened to know a flaw free epistemological solution, you would know which occurrences went with that solution. But, as far as we are concerned, they are still undefined as we have no epistemological solutions; but at least the mathematical function which yields our expectations has the same number of arguments in every case.

The second set I wish to add has to do with the "t" index. If time is to be a communicable element of an epistemological solution then the value of that index must be deducible from the "what is", is "what is"[/color] table. That means that, given a particular set of (x, tau) indices supposedly defining a particular B in the table, it must be possible to deduce the appropriate index "t" to be attached to that set. Again, this is easily solved by adding "invalid ontological elements" (i.e., fictitious entries in the table which will establish every entry B as different from every other such entry). If you need a procedure for developing these entries, I will give you a specific procedure; however, there are clearly a number of different procedures which will accomplish this goal. The end product is a table where, given a specific B (a specific collection of (x, tau) indices) one can examine the table and, by elimination, discover what the t index had to be.

Analysis of this second set leads to the development of the third set. If I can make the index "t" recoverable from the "what is", is "what is"[/color] table then it is clear that the same procedure can make other indices recoverable. In particular, I am interested in recovering a specific "x" index, given that all the other indices defining a particular B(t) are known. Once again, it is easily shown that addition of fictitious entries in that table can make every B(t) different even if any specific "x" index is missing. This means that, given (n-1) of the n indices (remember, our first step was to make the number of indices in every B the same: i.e., after that is accomplished, n has a specific value and the second step merely increments that value whatever that value happens to be. But the net result is that, given those (n-1) indices, we can consult our table and immediately declare what the missing index had to be.

This means that the missing index can be seen as is a function of the other indices. Again, we may not know what that function is but we do know that the function must agree with our table. What this says is that there exists a mathematical function which will yield

(x,\tau)_n(t) = f((x,\tau)_1, (x,\tau)_2, \cdots, (x.\tau)_{n-1},t)
​

It follows that the function F defined by

F((x,\tau)_1,(x,\tau)_2, \cdots, (x,\tau)_n) = (x(t),\tau(t))_n - f((x,\tau)_1, (x,\tau)_2, \cdots, (x.\tau)_{n-1},t) = 0
​

is a statement of the general constraint which guarantees that the entries conform to the given table. That is to say, this procedure yields a result which guarantees that there exists a mathematical function, the roots of which are exactly the entries to our "what is", is "what is"[/color] table. Clearly, it would be nice to know the structure of that function. If you understand what I have just written (which is somewhat of a restatement of an earlier post) then, I will proceed to the issue of symmetry and how that concept further constrains the nature of the function which is to yield the probability of our expectations.

... (since I find the whole question meaningless and confused one), but I did assume it is good for finding internally coherent solutions (keeping in mind each is only a solution, not the solution). Are these false assumptions?

Finding solutions is not the critical issue here; finding constraints on solutions is another matter and one which we are going to solve: i.e., rules of thumb which will clearly delineate a flawed solutions.

One thing I've been wondering though, perhaps you can try and explain the role of symmetry again. Was the point of that simply that it is "differences" that give us any ground for our attempts to classify ontological elements?

I will attack that issue as soon as you make it clear that you understand the reasons and the rationality of including the "invalid ontological elements" I have described above.

I'm wondering if there are some important details in this description that I am missing. It sounds to me like a semantically different way of saying that we define(classify) objects by observing behaviour, or patterns, or however I would wish to express the situation, that would nevertheless be just a (necessarily) vague picture painted with semantical concepts (pattern, behaviour, etc...)

The issue is that there are two important patterns here; first, the behavior of the "defined entity" and, second, the surrounding events which define that "defined entity". What a lot of people miss is the fact that surrounding events are a critical issue in identifying "defined entities". I really don't think you have a serious problem here as you have demonstrated a very analytical approach to your perspective. For the moment, I think these issues can be laid aside.

So whenever you are referring to the "what is, is what is" explanation, you are just referring to the table of known past, but not any of the assumptions that one has made about the behavior of the elements marked down in that table?

Exactly right. It is my overt intention to make no steps which place a constraint of any kind on the behavior of these elements.

But in order to fill any table, you must have made some assumptions regarding the identity of those elements, right? (Even though you have made these assumptions knowing well that they are undefendable) Hmmm, or is it possible to mark down mere differences? Hmmmm

Again, the answer is, "yes and no". Again, you are getting the horse behind the wagon (so to speak). I can certainly fill in the table (if I am careful) in a way which does not yield any direct epistemological solution but I certainly cannot have a solution in mind and fill out that table in a manner defending that solution which does not include some assumptions (and some "invalid ontological elements").

That is, our predictions fail all the time, and they are always based on undefendable set of assumptions. Yes?

Again, you are getting into subtle issues and I can show you that our predictions need not fail all the time; however, success is very closely related to magic: i.e., misdirection of attention.

I'm not sure what you are referring to when you say "...part of the future is known..."? If we have "certain expectations" for some part of future (by having made some set of "undefendable assumptions")

No, by defining the circumstance in such a way that success is guaranteed. As I said, it's magic and you have to understand the nature of magic. But please, don't worry about this for the time being. We can get back to it after you understand what I am talking about.

As you have said, "Damn it's tricky to use natural language to discuss these issues :) ." Let us go on; things will become clearer later.

Thanks for your attention -- Dick

 

[Rade]

Dr.D.--a question. When you made this statement above

...you must keep in mind that there exists absolutely no way of determining whether or not a particular ontological element we think we know is valid or not...

are you saying that there is absolutely no way for "you" to determine whether or not "you" (e.g., Dr.D. as an ontological element) are "valid" or not ? Thanks for clarification.

 

[AnssiH]

I have been trying to sculpt with "Poser" and, so far, not being very successful; but I am learning things.

For serious sculpting, you definitely want to check out ZBrush;
http://www.pixologic.com/home.php

Thank you for restating the issues regarding the useful mathematical functions for "x,tau,t"-table. Now I don't have to keep jumping back to that old post that much :)

The first step involves the issue of "expectations" being a mathematical function of "what we think is known": i.e., P(B(t)), the probability of having the set B(t), is a function of that B(t) where B is a set of number pairs (x and tau indices).

Hmmm... That way you put that; "the probability of having the set B(t) is a function of that B(t)" was so odd that I first suspected a typo... But reading back to the older posts and scratching my head a bit, perhaps you are saying essentially that it is possible to build a function which yields the probability that a given "present" (or portion of?) exists somewhere in an "incomplete past" which we are representing as an x,tau,t-table?

It is possible I am getting something topsy turvy, but it is very difficult to think of meaningful questions since my idea about this is still rather shaky... Perhaps partially because I am not sure where this is heading. You said earlier this is somewhat similar to Newtonian mechanics, so I must assume that once we have built an "x,tay,t"-table, we have not only assumed what ontological elements existed at given moments, but also how they behave?

At the moment, this is a very strange mathematical function as the number of arguments changes with the index "t". I am afraid I have never heard of such a function from the mathematical community. However, in this case, the problem is easily eliminated; all one need do is propose a collection of "invalid ontological elements" to fill in the gap. So our "what is", is "what is"[/color] table now has the same number of entries for every "t" (we just don't know what they are).

You must understand that their existence is now a presumed fact and that our past includes not knowing exactly what references should be attached to them (other than the fact that they are seen occasionally at other times:

The text I emphasized in italics is clearly and important bit since you specifically said I must understand it... ...which is unfortunate because I don't :)
I understand you end up adding invalid (arbitrary?) elements on purpose so to make the mathematical functions easier to handle, but I don't understand why their existence is a presumed fact after you have specifically said they are invalid elements? Since this is so blatantly odd, I don't think you have made an error, but I must be getting some idea rather topsy turvy... :I

i.e., they are members of some supposedly known B(t). If you happened to know a flaw free epistemological solution, you would know which occurrences went with that solution. But, as far as we are concerned, they are still undefined as we have no epistemological solutions; but at least the mathematical function which yields our expectations has the same number of arguments in every case.

The second set I wish to add has to do with the "t" index. If time is to be a communicable element of an epistemological solution then the value of that index must be deducible from the "what is", is "what is"[/color] table. That means that, given a particular set of (x, tau) indices supposedly defining a particular B in the table, it must be possible to deduce the appropriate index "t" to be attached to that set. Again, this is easily solved by adding "invalid ontological elements" (i.e., fictitious entries in the table which will establish every entry B as different from every other such entry). If you need a procedure for developing these entries, I will give you a specific procedure; however, there are clearly a number of different procedures which will accomplish this goal. The end product is a table where, given a specific B (a specific collection of (x, tau) indices) one can examine the table and, by elimination, discover what the t index had to be.

This stuff about obtaining the t-index was something I was confused about earlier too, but thought it would get clarified further down the road.

I'm wondering what does it mean that there is an "appropriate index t" to be attached to some set. The t is just an arbitrary number isn't, it, since t was introduced just to be able to express a set of presents.

I do understand the need to add invalid elements so to make sure no two presents are identical, I just don't get what relevance the "t" value is going to have...

Analysis of this second set leads to the development of the third set. If I can make the index "t" recoverable from the "what is", is "what is"[/color] table then it is clear that the same procedure can make other indices recoverable. In particular, I am interested in recovering a specific "x" index, given that all the other indices defining a particular B(t) are known. Once again, it is easily shown that addition of fictitious entries in that table can make every B(t) different even if any specific "x" index is missing. This means that, given (n-1) of the n indices (remember, our first step was to make the number of indices in every B the same: i.e., after that is accomplished, n has a specific value and the second step merely increments that value whatever that value happens to be. But the net result is that, given those (n-1) indices, we can consult our table and immediately declare what the missing index had to be.

This means that the missing index can be seen as is a function of the other indices.

Hmm, does this have to do with the "surrounding circumstances" that you were talking about before? I'm wondering how the information about one missing index can be embedded to the other indices of that present... Especially when some of those elements are invalid elements we added on purpose (and thus arbitrary?)

This seemed to make more sense to me in the earlier post where you explained that there's a way to first find if a present (minus 1 element) exists on the "augmented table #2", and if it does, check what the missing element was from table #1 (just check the same t).

Again, we may not know what that function is but we do know that the function must agree with our table. What this says is that there exists a mathematical function which will yield

(x,\tau)_n(t) = f((x,\tau)_1, (x,\tau)_2, \cdots, (x.\tau)_{n-1},t)
​

It follows that the function F defined by

F((x,\tau)_1,(x,\tau)_2, \cdots, (x,\tau)_n) = (x(t),\tau(t))_n - f((x,\tau)_1, (x,\tau)_2, \cdots, (x.\tau)_{n-1},t) = 0
​

is a statement of the general constraint which guarantees that the entries conform to the given table. That is to say, this procedure yields a result which guarantees that there exists a mathematical function, the roots of which are exactly the entries to our "what is", is "what is"[/color] table. Clearly, it would be nice to know the structure of that function. If you understand what I have just written (which is somewhat of a restatement of an earlier post) then, I will proceed to the issue of symmetry and how that concept further constrains the nature of the function which is to yield the probability of our expectations.

Clearly I don't... Hopefully you can figure out what I'm getting wrong ,and additionally, if you think it might be helpful in clarifying these issues too, please proceed to the next step also.

Thanks for your attention -- Dick

Thank you for your patience :)

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

Dr.D.--a question. When you made this statement above

are you saying that there is absolutely no way for "you" to determine whether or not "you" (e.g., Dr.D. as an ontological element) are "valid" or not ? Thanks for clarification.

This is a discussion about ontology, so certainly the answer is that there is no way to tell if our "self" is an ontological element. Is there a dualistic "mind"-object, or is subejctive experience a phenomenon caused by the interaction of other elements that do not have by themselves a "mind".

So even when we say "I exist" or "this apple exists", it isn't meant to be an assertion about the ontological nature of those things. How they exist ontologically is a question about "what am I made of" (with obvious complications) or "what is the apple made of" (which is essentially what physics is attempting to answer... by defining ontological elements and their behaviour in such a sense that they explain the existence of that apple as we have observed it)

I hope this clarifies the issue. The wikipedia page about "ontology" seems like an okay overview as well.

-Anssi

 

[Rade]

...So even when we say "I exist" or "this apple exists", it isn't meant to be an assertion about the ontological nature of those things. I hope this clarifies the issue...
-Anssi

Thank you, Anssi. As I see it, it is the function of "ontology" (the study of being qua being ) to establish that there are metaphysical entities (such as Anssi) that have natures and interact with other entities,--it is the function of "science" to establish the specific nature of those entities and the laws of those interactions. So, if this is what you mean when you say "I exist" to yourself, then we are seeing eye to eye, if not, then I am sorry but I have no idea what you are saying about "ontology". Cordially, Rade.

 

[D_Arsonval]

Wholly smokes!

Lots of replies, answers, theories, thoughts on this one!
“Is Time Just an Illusion?”

Is enduring something within you, an illusion?
Have you spent any time in pain, emotional or likewise?

I realize words like “Real”, and “Illusion” can be used to fit our
own purpose.

Just surfing the educated crowd here…
toying with the idea of where all the 21st Century Philosophers
are hanging out. (I'm sure they're here somewhere.)

John

 

[AnssiH]

Rade, I think I understand what you are trying to say, but it appears to me that the way you have defined "ontology" to yourself could little bit non-standard (and kind of meaningless too). This could be a source of great confusion. Let's see if I can give you a meaningful reply...

Thank you, Anssi. As I see it, it is the function of "ontology" (the study of being qua being ) to establish that there are metaphysical entities (such as Anssi) that have natures and interact with other entities,--

Since you gave "Anssi" as an example of a "metaphysical entity", I believe you are still referring to the fact that our "subjective experience exists".

That my subjective experience exists doesn't lead me to believe that I am a metaphysical entity. That would be so only in dualism and in idealism. In materialism the subjective experience is thought to be caused by the interaction of smaller entities that are thought to be "metaphysical" or "ontological" elements. -> It is not given that "Anssi" is a valid ontological element.

If on the other hand you regard any thing we have defined, as something that exists ontologically, this kind of defeats the purpose of the concept "ontology", because the whole reason why there is such a field as ontology is to ask what are things that exist even when we are not there to define them as such.

We need to make a distinction between something that exists in an everyday sense, and something that exists ontologically. When I say that a star constellation is not an ontological element, I am not suggesting I am a brain in a vat and the star constellation is only in my mind. I am suggesting it is completely arbitrary accident that we have given names to some groups of stars and call them constellations; that we define them as constellations does not change the nature of reality.

Fairly obvious when I am talking about constellations, but now you have to extrapolate that idea to other things we have names for. Apple, sand, your ankle, electrons. This is ontology. "Whatever you say a thing is, it isn't" = our words may represent reality, but they are not the reality itself, they are only referring to whatever entities we have classified reality into (and how we happen to understand those entities).

In the words of Alan Watts; "What we call things, facts, or events are after all no more than convenient units of perception, recognisable pegs for names, selected from the infinite multitude of lines and surfaces, colours and textures, spaces and densities which surround us. There is no more a fixed and final way of dividing these variations into things than of grouping the stars in constellations" ---Note though that the brain does not do its model of reality based on "lines, surfaces, colours, textures, spaces and densities", but these in themselves are "concepts" that have been formed as part of that mental model of reality; they are not ontological elements either.

That inlcudes what we call our "self"! The ontological question about the existence of "self" is IMO best understood when you turn the question into one about identity. What is your identity? In a materialistic sense, while you say you exist, the whole content of your experience is still just a certain physical state of the brain, and the state you were in yesterday is not with you anymore. There is no metaphysical identity to yourself that persists, and that poses no problems to the existence of subjective experience.

it is the function of "science" to establish the specific nature of those entities and the laws of those interactions.

Well it's a two-way street between philosophy and science. In a pure objective form, the philosophy of science should be that it seeks to build valid models (prediction-wise) about reality, but it doesn't necessarily tell you if electrons really are metaphysical entities, or just some sort of persistent patterns (~portion of reality) we happen to call "electrons". I.e. we should regard scientific models as models. Perhaps easier example is that, even though certain models explain gravity as something caused by particles called "gravitons", it doesn't mean observing gravity proves gravitons exists.

Perhaps using E-prime would help here. It's english but all references to "being" removed -> instead of saying "electron is a particle and a wave", we'd say "Electrons behave partially like a wave and partially like a particle". (And when you explain what are "waves" and "particles" in E-prime, you see you can again only refer they are "like" some conception that you hope other people understand like you do)

This stuff gets really hairy when you get deeper into it, mainly because classifying reality (or any system) into things remains to be your only way to comprehend anything at all. That's the way we work.

Hmmm, looks I write too much :P Well hopefully it was helpful.

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

For serious sculpting, you definitely want to check out ZBrush;
http://www.pixologic.com/home.php

The results look good but I haven't the time to look into it now; I am trying to get a handle on Maya which cost me a pretty penny to set up. At the moment I am pretty convinced Poser is a rotten program but Maya seems to be quite powerful. Wish me luck.

I suspect your biggest problem is that you are over complicating what I am saying. I know you don't see it that way but I think that is because of the natural tendency to try and comprehend what I am saying in terms of your world view which is a major mistake (it fundamentally presumes that world view is valid, an issue which cannot be defended at this moment).

Hmmm... That way you put that; "the probability of having the set B(t) is a function of that B(t)" was so odd that I first suspected a typo... But reading back to the older posts and scratching my head a bit, perhaps you are saying essentially that it is possible to build a function which yields the probability that a given "present" (or portion of?) exists somewhere in an "incomplete past" which we are representing as an x,tau,t-table?

This is an excellent example of over complicating things. The set, "B(t)", is absolutely nothing more than the set of indices (numbers: the numeric labels given to the ontological elements acquired at the "present" referred to as "t"). B(t) is a representation of a specific present in that "what is", is "what is"[/color] table. These are "numbers". That table is an exact representation of a "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation and it "IS"[/color] the representation of a mathematical function which yields exactly your expectations under the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation.

That is to say, for any possible collections of indices (i.e., any conceivable specific present; absolutely any B(t) you can come up with) the probability of that particular set of indices is a function of what those indices are! It is a simple tabular function: i.e., you want to know the probability a a specific set of indices, you merely look at the table. If that set of indices is in the table, the probability is one; if that set is not there, the probability is zero.

As I have said several times, the problem with the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation is it yields utterly no hypotheses on either the future or on any possibilities (unknown to you) lying between the indices which represent what you know (or think you know). All it yields is "what you think you know". As an aside, the answer, "it could be anything", immediately yields a probability of zero for any specific set of indices. That should be clear to you; but I will explain it anyway. Since the number of possibilities in, "it could be anything" is infinite and one (the number of specific sets being asked about) divided by infinity (the number of possibilities) is zero, the probability of that specific set is zero.

...that it is possible to build a function...

No! That the function exists and that the function (which needs be nothing more than a procedure for finding the result) is is in fact exactly that "what is", is "what is"[/color] table: all you have to do is look it up! It is what is called a "tabular function" being defined by a table. My sole purpose was to get you to see "explanations" as "functions" which yield your "expectations".

It is possible I am getting something topsy turvy, but it is very difficult to think of meaningful questions since my idea about this is still rather shaky... Perhaps partially because I am not sure where this is heading.

Please don't worry about "where this is heading"; you will know exactly where this is heading the moment we get there and not before because you have never been there before. And believe me, it's not complex at all; it is in fact quite simple. The real problem is that no one ever looks.

You said earlier this is somewhat similar to Newtonian mechanics, so I must assume that once we have built an "x,tay,t"-table, we have not only assumed what ontological elements existed at given moments, but also how they behave?

At this point, you are getting way out ahead of the issues at hand. I didn't say "this is somewhat similar to Newtonian mechanics". What I tried to say was that the (x, tau, t) table was very similar to representations of dynamic phenomena used in Newtonian mechanics. B(t) (that set of indices representing a specific set of ontological elements) can be seen as a set of points in a two dimensional plane at a fixed t (where t is an axis orthogonal to that plane). Think of it as a snapshot of a two dimensional universe you are aware of at time t.

What I am trying to present to you is a representation of the problem[/color] you are trying to solve. A representation capable of representing the information upon which any solution to that problem must be based (how to make a general representation of "what you think you know" without defining "what you think you know"). And all I get from you is an overwhelming urge to define "what you think you know". Forget about it! It is only by maintaining that lack of definition that we can maintain an objective representation of the problem confronting us.

Your solution to any problem must be based on what you think you know: i.e., on "what is" as you see it. That means that, in order to examine the ontology behind that explanation, we need to have a method of representing the information: we need a way of representing "what you think you know" without making any presumptions about what that is. Every explanation of anything must begin from a "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation. That is why I start from that point; so I can define exactly how I am going to handle that information – not so I can define the information.

The text I emphasized in italics is clearly and important bit since you specifically said I must understand it... ...which is unfortunate because I don't :)

All I am saying is that, since the "what is", is "what is"[/color] table constitutes "what you think you know" (i.e., the exact data which any flaw free explanation must explain), these invalid elements added to the table become ontological elements presumed to exist: i.e., their existence thereafter is a presumed fact. (To my analysis, it amounts to no more than an intellectual convenience, but to subsequent explanations based upon that "what is", is "what is"[/color] table, it is presumed fact.)

The central issue here is that, if an explanation is perfectly consistent with what you think you know and the explanation is based upon some invalid ontological elements (in among those critical "valid ontological elements"; which I have defined to be "reality") then the explanation still explains all those "valid ontological elements" as, by definition, it explains everything you think you know: i.e., the "what is", is "what is"[/color] table. If you think there exist any explanations of reality which contain no such invalid ontological concepts, you are, without a doubt, dealing in thoughtless gullibility.

In a way, this may be the critical factor which drives everyone to distraction. They don't seem to be able to comprehend the idea that all explanations need to include mental fabrications.

What is, in my opinion, quite obvious here (and I cannot comprehend how the idea can be consistently overlooked by supposedly intelligent people) is that what people think reality is, is a mix of truly objective aspects and total mental fabrications[/color]. What they seem to miss is the fact that all epistemological constructs are based on the presumption of some ontology; in particular, on the presumption that the ontology is known. It is a fact that, given a flaw free explanation, there exists no way of defending the validity of any ontological element underlying that explanation. It is the opinion of the scientific community that only failure of the explanation itself bears on the question. It is the common (and overtly gullible) assumption that a "flaw free explanation" is a logical guarantee of the validity of the ontology. I am afraid that, that is a logically undefendable assertion.

The only handle we have on the problem is that there exists a very simple logical difference between "valid ontological elements" and "fabricated ontological elements". That difference consists of the fact that absolutely every flaw free epistemological construct must explain those "valid ontological elements" while the "fabricated ontological elements are free to be anything that epistemological construct needs them to be. That is to say, the fabricated ontological elements are part and parcel of the epistemological construct and are free variables unconstrained[/color] by "reality". It is exactly the freedom to create these invalid ontological elements which makes it possible to explain things, The idea that a successful theory constitutes a defense of the reality of those ontological elements it is the single most overt flaw in the modern scientific paradigm.

In addition to that, there is another belief held as inviolate by every scientist or philosopher I have ever spoken to (a belief which totally blocks their minds from even considering what I have discovered): "since we cannot tell the difference between these two components (valid ontological elements and mentally fabricated ontological elements) we cannot handle them as different". All I can say about that assertion is that it is an opinion. Yes, it is an opinion based on thousands of years of experience with the defense of epistemological constructs but it has no bearing at all on the defense of ontological validity. This is a fundamentally flawed perspective when it comes to analyzing ontological issues.

Every scientist blocks his mind to the idea that he is creating "fabricated ontological elements" anytime he says "suppose ...".

I understand you end up adding invalid (arbitrary?) elements on purpose so to make the mathematical functions easier to handle, but I don't understand why their existence is a presumed fact after you have specifically said they are invalid elements? Since this is so blatantly odd, I don't think you have made an error, but I must be getting some idea rather topsy turvy... :I

They are a presumed fact in that every flaw free explanation must explain them. What is blatantly odd is the fact that I present them as "invalid ontological elements" and not as "suppose these elements are valid...". That is an honest objective paradigm and does not make any assumption of truth: i.e., these invalid elements will be handled in a manner logically different from "valid ontological elements".

This stuff about obtaining the t-index was something I was confused about earlier too, but thought it would get clarified further down the road.

If you cannot obtain the t index from the data available to you, t cannot be a parameter of your explanation. The issue is that simple!

I'm wondering what does it mean that there is an "appropriate index t" to be attached to some set. The t is just an arbitrary number isn't, it, since t was introduced just to be able to express a set of presents.

Absolutely, "t", the number placed upon a specific present, has no basis in reality. But the "t" associated with an explanation has to be appropriate to that explanation: i.e., the specific value of that t (or, to be exact, an interpretation of the time being referenced) must be recoverable from the data which constitutes the explanation. Essentially it has to be an implicit parameter of the explanation or the explanation cannot have it as a parameter.

Hmm, does this have to do with the "surrounding circumstances" that you were talking about before? I'm wondering how the information about one missing index can be embedded to the other indices of that present... Especially when some of those elements are invalid elements we added on purpose (and thus arbitrary?)

You need to take this one step at a time. Let us first try to understand how adding invalid elements to the "what is", is "what is"][/color] table can allow a look up to determine the correct associated "t" index. All you need to do is assure that no two presents, B(t), are identical (which can be accomplished by adding indices to B such that any two which were identical before you added these indices are no longer identical. Then, a simple look up tells you either that the probability of the element is zero (it never happened) or what the t index was when it did happen.

One thing you might find enlightening is the fact that the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation has a very interesting property, quite obvious from the perspective I am presenting but not obvious at all from common perspectives on explanation. Notice that in the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation, where the table is known up to some specific index t, the probability for every B contemplated for the next index, say t' is zero (the same for every one of the entire infinite set); however, "a moment later", when the B(t') becomes a member of the "known information", the probability for the correct answer becomes one while all the other possibilities remain zero. Modern science has only recently (from a historical perspective) become aware of this phenomena. It is exactly the phenomena they are referring to with the phrase, "collapse of the wave function". Think about that for a little while.

I think that, if you relax and stop worrying about where I am going and the consequences, you will find the logic quite easy to follow. Sorry if I get abrupt but I have had almost fifty years to think about this and I see lots of things that seem utterly obvious to me. I am very sorry that I have difficulty comprehending the problems everyone else has with my thoughts.

Again, I am looking forward to your response -- Dick
PS:

This stuff gets really hairy when you get deeper into it, mainly because classifying reality (or any system) into things remains to be your only way to comprehend anything at all. That's the way we work.

Classifying reality is essentially identifying patterns in the "what is", is "what is"[/color] table which can be seen as "the same thing", using whatever data transformation which makes that result reasonable and/or acceptable.

 

[AnssiH]

The results look good but I haven't the time to look into it now; I am trying to get a handle on Maya which cost me a pretty penny to set up. At the moment I am pretty convinced Poser is a rotten program but Maya seems to be quite powerful. Wish me luck.

Heh, yeah, Maya is alright. All these programs have their own little quirks. And actually ZBrush may have little bit steep learning curve for fun and play. There's this other capable sculpting software called "Mudbox", but I don't think it's available for Mac yet.

I suspect your biggest problem is that you are over complicating what I am saying. I know you don't see it that way but I think that is because of the natural tendency to try and comprehend what I am saying in terms of your world view which is a major mistake (it fundamentally presumes that world view is valid, an issue which cannot be defended at this moment).

Could be that too, but I feel bigger obstacle is that it's hard for me to remember everything about your terminology (which has been quite familiar to you for some decades :), and so interpreting some sentences in any meaningful way becomes very difficult :P (i.e. I find my self going back to old posts a lot :) But it seems that with every new post couple of things that were full of questions before, become clearer.

This confusion about the "probability of B(t)" is a good example. I was just thinking if I have a set of numbers "X", how is "probability of X a function of that same X" :D You know, cause I had already forgotten what was meant with probability etc...

Given your latest response, this seems rather clear now. If I make up a set of numbers and want to find out if a particular "present" (1) is that set of numbers, then quite simply I can look at the table and find out; in the hypothetical fully filled table, the probability of finding that set of numbers from a present "1", is a function of the present "1" that has actually been laid down on the table.

In other words we could say; "the probability of having a presumed set X at particlar B(t) is a function of that B(t)" (Which is in my opinion a clearer way to say this simple fact; IF I now interpreted you correctly.

No! That the function exists and that the function (which needs be nothing more than a procedure for finding the result) is is in fact exactly that "what is", is "what is" table: all you have to do is look it up! It is what is called a "tabular function" being defined by a table. My sole purpose was to get you to see "explanations" as "functions" which yield your "expectations".

Okay. Should I study what are "tabular functions" (is it important here?)

And should I not pay attention to the complications that arise due to the fact that we don't have a "filled table" (that we are not all-knowing about our past, like you put it)? I mean that seemed to me to be what you were referring to when you said this is essentially a "point fitting problem", and that we are "looking for a mathematical function which fits the entire collection of points displayed in that table". That seemed to be a referring to the fact that the table is never fully filled.

In a way, this may be the critical factor which drives everyone to distraction. They don't seem to be able to comprehend the idea that all explanations need to include mental fabrications.

What is, in my opinion, quite obvious here (and I cannot comprehend how the idea can be consistently overlooked by supposedly intelligent people) is that what people think reality is, is a mix of truly objective aspects and total mental fabrications[/color]. What they seem to miss is the fact that all epistemological constructs are based on the presumption of some ontology; in particular, on the presumption that the ontology is known.

Well it's true that most people don't really grasp that because they never think about it (seems like it doesn't much interest them... and of course in daily life it just makes one's head hurt :), but then there are few philosophers who have expressed this issue in different ways. (For instance, I am a big fan of the concept of noumenons)

Also, I would go so far as to express it as, what we think reality is, is not just a mix of objective aspects and mental fabrications, but rather all mental fabrications whose correlation with objective reality is unknown... but that's just semantics! :D (And up to what is meant with "objective")

In addition to that, there is another belief held as inviolate by every scientist or philosopher I have ever spoken to (a belief which totally blocks their minds from even considering what I have discovered): "since we cannot tell the difference between these two components (valid ontological elements and mentally fabricated ontological elements) we cannot handle them as different". All I can say about that assertion is that it is an opinion.

Yeah, and I think few philosophers and philosophically aligned physicists have expressed a more objective opinion saying "physical models are models dammit!" :) It is surprising to me how hard it is for some people to accept this. (One more time I hear someone using "Occam's razor" to argue about ontology...)

If you cannot obtain the t index from the data available to you, t cannot be a parameter of your explanation. The issue is that simple!

Ahha, of course! (Why didn't you say so )

You need to take this one step at a time. Let us first try to understand how adding invalid elements to the "what is", is "what is"][/color] table can allow a look up to determine the correct associated "t" index. All you need to do is assure that no two presents, B(t), are identical (which can be accomplished by adding indices to B such that any two which were identical before you added these indices are no longer identical.

And if I remember correctly, it was the only reason why they could be identical is that we added those invalid ontological elements to make each present have the same amount of elements? (Since had we not done it, we could not have two consequent "presents" that are identical; since by definition they would be marked as a single "present", right?)

Then, a simple look up tells you either that the probability of the element is zero (it never happened) or what the t index was when it did happen.

One thing you might find enlightening is the fact that the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation has a very interesting property, quite obvious from the perspective I am presenting but not obvious at all from common perspectives on explanation. Notice that in the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation, where the table is known up to some specific index t, the probability for every B contemplated for the next index, say t' is zero (the same for every one of the entire infinite set); however, "a moment later", when the B(t') becomes a member of the "known information", the probability for the correct answer becomes one while all the other possibilities remain zero. Modern science has only recently (from a historical perspective) become aware of this phenomena. It is exactly the phenomena they are referring to with the phrase, "collapse of the wave function". Think about that for a little while.

Hmmm, I can't pick up any meaning from this... (Hell, maybe that's just what you wanted to hear :)

I mean, with just the "what is, is what is" table, which does not provide any expectations about the future, this to me is similar to NOT having made any assumptions about how anything in reality exists or behaves (and as such one could not make any assumptions about how things unfold in the future either). I can't think of any meaningful association to quantum phenomena... What do you have in mind?

I think that, if you relax and stop worrying about where I am going and the consequences, you will find the logic quite easy to follow. Sorry if I get abrupt but I have had almost fifty years to think about this and I see lots of things that seem utterly obvious to me. I am very sorry that I have difficulty comprehending the problems everyone else has with my thoughts.

Well, I'm just trying to express how I understand what you are saying, with the hopes that you can figure out what I'm getting wrong. I hope it makes your task easier. Don't worry about the long parts I've snipped; it's usually simply because I agree what you are explaining.

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

But it seems that with every new post couple of things that were full of questions before, become clearer.

That is very nice to know; at least it means we are getting somewhere.

Okay. Should I study what are "tabular functions" (is it important here?

Study “tabular functions”? I think not. All I mean by a “tabular function” is a function where the result is obtained from a table. Back when I was young (that’s prior to computers and “slide rules” were usually only good to three digits) we quite often used things like log tables, trigonometric tables, etc. Prior to Newton, gunners used “range tables” to fire their guns. These “range tables” were constructed through experiment. Now days, gunnery is all done on computers (thanks to Newton for the most part). As a matter of fact, computers were originally invented to create gunnery tables in WWII from mathematical relations since the mathematicians often made errors. Any table of information can be seen as a “tabular function”. When one says something is a function of something else, all it means is that, if you are given the second item (that something else) and you know the “functional relationship” you also know what the answer is: “the function”.

For example, what one looks like is a pretty strong function of how old they are. Just because mathematicians have done a lot with the idea don’t think they have a patent on the concept.

And should I not pay attention to the complications that arise due to the fact that we don't have a "filled table" (that we are not all-knowing about our past, like you put it)?

That isn’t an important issue at all since your solution to the epistemological problem cannot depend upon facts you have forgotten. The solution is based on what you think you know. Now that may be a very large table, but it is not infinite nor is it all incompassing.

I mean that seemed to me to be what you were referring to when you said this is essentially a "point fitting problem", and that we are "looking for a mathematical function which fits the entire collection of points displayed in that table". That seemed to be a referring to the fact that the table is never fully filled.

That is correct, every moment of your life is another B(t) to be added to your personal table. What we want to do is look at that information objectively! Ah, yes, you asked about the definition of objectivity. What you think you know IS[/color] an objective perspective; at least you think it is. My only concern is that I can represent that perspective, no matter what it is: i.e., that it can be represented as a table of ontological elements you think are valid. The important issue here is that the symbols you use to represent those entries is a free parameter; a parameter, the meaning of which I have to deduce from the table you present to me.

(For instance, I am a big fan of the concept of noumenons)

I am ignorant of the “concept of noumenons”! I have never heard the term before.

(One more time I hear someone using "Occam's razor" to argue about ontology...)

I am of the opinion that the issue of “ontology” has never been examined “scientifically”; the scientist simply have never conceived of a way of handling it. And they never will so long as they hold the necessity of definition as primary.

Aha, of course! (Why didn't you say so )

I thought I had!

And if I remember correctly, it was the only reason why they could be identical is that we added those invalid ontological elements to make each present have the same amount of elements? (Since had we not done it, we could not have two consequent "presents" that are identical; since by definition they would be marked as a single "present", right?)

I get the impression here that you are mixing two very different issues. What I am looking for is a way of representing any possible ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table. My concern is that the fundamental representation be capable of representing each and every possible explanation. When the issue comes to “valid ontological elements”, the representation must represent these as different elements in spite of the fact that any specific explanation might (erroneously by the way) consider them to be the same element. This is a subtle issue which logically must exist in any analysis of supposed “facts”. The “tau” index was introduced to solve this basic problem. My complaint with your response is that you are worrying about the issue of their really being the same. If the “valid table” has them as the same, then they must be the same. What I don’t want to do is specify that the table, as given, is valid.

Hmmm, I can't pick up any meaning from this... (Hell, maybe that's just what you wanted to hear :)

No, I never want to hear comments that imply that you didn’t understand what I said. I just thought you would appreciate that fact. But I will try to explain it a little fuller. Quantum Mechanics has (in the current interpretation) the concept of “wave function collapse”. Since the wave function is what yields the probability that a specific result will occur, measurement is taken as having an effect on the wave function (actually it is the result of considering the “wave function” to be an ontologically real thing). When a measurement is accomplished (i.e., the actual value of the relevant measurement is known), the value of the measurement is now known whereas, prior to the measurement, it was something dependent upon that “wave function”. This, supposedly real event, is commonly referred to as “collapse of the wave function”. One of the philosophical problems with the “collapse of the wave function” is that it occurs everywhere at the same time: i.e., the simultaneity of this event is a direct violation of relativity. Go read some articles on the consequences of “entanglement”. This is a direct consequence of trying to hold “wave functions” and “physical existence of entities” as both being valid ontological concepts simultaneously.

I mean, with just the "what is, is what is" table, which does not provide any expectations about the future, this to me is similar to NOT having made any assumptions about how anything in reality exists or behaves (and as such one could not make any assumptions about how things unfold in the future either). I can't think of any meaningful association to quantum phenomena... What do you have in mind?

The meaningful association with quantum mechanics is the “uncertainty of the outcome”.

Don't worry about the long parts I've snipped; it's usually simply because I agree what you are explaining.

That’s nice to know! At least someone out there thinks some of what I say makes sense.

Have fun Anssi -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

That is very nice to know; at least it means we are getting somewhere.
Study “tabular functions”? I think not. All I mean by a “tabular function” is a function where the result is obtained from a table.

Heh, I googled "tabular function" and got results that looked pretty complicated :) Anyway, I see what you meant.

That is correct, every moment of your life is another B(t) to be added to your personal table. What we want to do is look at that information objectively! Ah, yes, you asked about the definition of objectivity. What you think you know IS[/color] an objective perspective; at least you think it is.

...or at least most people think it is. This way of defining "objective" is a difficult thing for me to remember since it's been my philosophy for so long that any phenomena or thing we can think of is a case of have made a purely subjective categorizing or classification (So I need to do it in order to "think", so to speak, but I cannot claim to "know" the reality of what I'm thinking of).

I think I know how you mean that though, since you defined "intuition" little bit differently than I did, and sure enough, we must work with "what we think we know" when we investigate the world, so I think I can accept this definition too.

I am ignorant of the “concept of noumenons”! I have never heard the term before.

The way I see it, a "noumenon" is referring to the reality behind a "phenomenon" we are subjectively aware of (I.e. it is contrasted by "phenomenon"). The reason Kant was using that concept was to refer to the idea that being subjectively aware of some phenomenon is a case of having mentally categorized reality, and the actual ontological reality behind that mental idea is not captured by that categorizing (which results into what we call "phenomena" and "things" so to speak")

Noumenon is closely related to "thing in itself" (which is equally tricky concept since we arrive at such a thing as "a thing" only by having categorized relality!)

In my opinion that concept has been misunderstood many times. Sometimes it seems people take it as an assertion towards some sort of idealism (big surprise, right?).

But if I cut and paste the text from wikipedia entry, I think I can arrive at what I think Kant meant to say (or should have said... keeping in mind this is very old stuff and we have much more information about reality to work with now)

1. Human understanding is structured by categories that the mind creates in order to make sense of raw unstructured experience

2. Humans can make sense of reality in these various ways (categorizing, classification), but can never directly know the noumena, the "things-in-themselves," the actual (ontological) dynamics of the natural world.

'These unknown somethings are "noumena"—although we can never know how or why as our perceptions of these unknown somethings are bound by the limitations of the categories of the understanding and we are therefore never able to fully know the "thing-in-itself".'

Note here that Kant may have been thinking there are "innate categories of understanding" to the mind. I.e. something similar to platonism. I beg to differ at this point. But it doesn't make the concept of noumenons invalid. The way I view it is that it is required for us to break reality into "sensible parts" so to understand it (i.e. it is "innate" to the brain to attempt to build a predictive model of reality this way), but any time you break reality into ANY sensible parts, you are talking about your "mental fabrications" about reality around you, and reality is not actually made of "parts" no matter how much we need to see things that way. (Incidentally, a different isolated culture would probably describe physical things with very different sorts of components than we do)

Couple more things that Kant said, that seem to be close to your philosophy (except for how you see "intuition")

About "things-in-themselves"
"...though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears."
(Could it be tabular representation of "what we think we know"??)

About "Noumena"
"But in that case a noumenon is not for our understanding a special [kind of] object, namely, an intelligible object; the [sort of] understanding to which it might belong is itself a problem. For we cannot in the least represent to ourselves the possibility of an understanding which should know its object, not discursively through categories, but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition".

i.e. we cannot say we understand noumena since it is by definition the non-classified reality; it is non-sensible since it is the reality without it having been "defined" into anything. (Once again perhaps he thought there are "platonistic innate categories" to mind, but we need not think of something that naive to arrive at the same conclusion)

I get the impression here that you are mixing two very different issues. What I am looking for is a way of representing any possible ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table. My concern is that the fundamental representation be capable of representing each and every possible explanation. When the issue comes to “valid ontological elements”, the representation must represent these as different elements in spite of the fact that any specific explanation might (erroneously by the way) consider them to be the same element. This is a subtle issue which logically must exist in any analysis of supposed “facts”. The “tau” index was introduced to solve this basic problem. My complaint with your response is that you are worrying about the issue of their really being the same. If the “valid table” has them as the same, then they must be the same. What I don’t want to do is specify that the table, as given, is valid.

Right.

No, I never want to hear comments that imply that you didn’t understand what I said. I just thought you would appreciate that fact. But I will try to explain it a little fuller. Quantum Mechanics has (in the current interpretation) the concept of “wave function collapse”. Since the wave function is what yields the probability that a specific result will occur, measurement is taken as having an effect on the wave function (actually it is the result of considering the “wave function” to be an ontologically real thing). When a measurement is accomplished (i.e., the actual value of the relevant measurement is known), the value of the measurement is now known whereas, prior to the measurement, it was something dependent upon that “wave function”. This, supposedly real event, is commonly referred to as “collapse of the wave function”. One of the philosophical problems with the “collapse of the wave function” is that it occurs everywhere at the same time: i.e., the simultaneity of this event is a direct violation of relativity. Go read some articles on the consequences of “entanglement”.

Yeah I know what is meant with "wave function", and it always amazes me when someone considers it to be a real thing, although these days as there are so many ways to understand QM, it seems more and more people actually think for themselves and realize wave function is just a concept that is useful in thinking about quantum systems.

Incidentally, I was commenting on this apparent violation between wave functions and spacetime here:
https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=130623

Even though I don't think of much about the "reality of spacetime" either (as I'm sure you have noticed :), I thought it was relevant to comment that Bell experiments are explainable with the idea of spacetime as well (and as long as you are talking about photons, quite trivially so). Well, that shouldn't be surprising since it is essentially similar to "transactional interpretation". Perhaps you can appreciate that sort of joggling with "ontological elements" (keep in mind I am NOT making assertions about how reality IS... ...but only about how things can be explained to ourselves)

This is a direct consequence of trying to hold “wave functions” and “physical existence of entities” as both being valid ontological concepts simultaneously.

Heh, so I guess that is a sentence that would fit right into that post about spacetime interpretation. But then there must be more invalid things in our ideas about reality, since we need to find an explanation for the correlation in bell experiments. The route I think could be more fruitful than "static spacetime" is perhaps ditching relative simultaneity as an ontological concept, and then take a good hard look at "non-locality"... maybe.

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Hi again, I finally got my “Fedora 6” running decently on my PC . But for some strange reason, I can't access my e-mail (maybe the server is down) so I went to physicsforums to see if I could see that and noticed your post which is quite informative. You have given me another word to express my thoughts.

The way I see it, a "noumenon" is referring to the reality behind a "phenomenon" we are subjectively aware of (I.e. it is contrasted by "phenomenon").

That is to say, it is a valid ontological element of reality by definition.

... i.e. we cannot say we understand noumena since it is by definition the non-classified reality; it is non-sensible since it is the reality without it having been "defined" into anything.

That is to say, it is a mere entry in my ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table. And you should understand why I insist on leaving the “valid ontological elements” totally undefined: they are there as a basis which the explanation (your world view) was invented to explain.

The way I see it, a "noumenon" is referring to the reality behind a "phenomenon" we are subjectively aware of (I.e. it is contrasted by "phenomenon").

And the “phenomenon” we are subjectively aware of are built from those mentally fabricated ontological elements we have invented to allow us to think about the problem of explaining “reality”. The “phenomenon” are categorizations of “what we think we know”. A fabrication; but a fabrication which serves a purpose; the real purpose of that fabrication is to allow our severely limited minds generate expectations consistent with reality. (As I have said before, it's a data compression problem.) As long as that “explanation” explains the past (what we think we know: that ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table) then we think of it as a valid “explanation of reality” (after all, we have utterly no evidence to support the idea that it is wrong as long as it explains everything we think we know). As many philosophers have said, there is no logical defense for the presumption it will be valid tomorrow.

What I think a lot of people fail to recognize is that I do not concern myself at all with the problem of flawed theories (ones which fail to completely explain the past: “what we think we know”). I concern myself only with absolutely flawless epistemological constructs. I want to know exactly what kind of constraints such a thing must obey. The only absolutely flaw free explanation of what you think you know is that ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] explanation (all it does is yield “what you think you know”). As I have commented several times, it is nonetheless, a pretty worthless explanation (other than the fact that it will still be valid tomorrow in that it will simply have some more entries). But it certainly can't be used in reality as the volume of information required simply exceeds our ability to consider. (We are confronted with a data compression problem!)

The issue here is, what kinds of “fabricated ontological elements” can I invent which will simplify the problem (the problem of “explaining reality”) without eliminating any possibilities; while, at the same time, maintaining the flaw free nature of the explanation itself: i.e., continuing to yield exactly the entries in that ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table (including the fabricated ontological elements).

Sorry I get carried away. Meanwhile, back to your post.

The reason Kant was using that concept was to refer to the idea that being subjectively aware of some phenomenon is a case of having mentally categorized reality, and the actual ontological reality behind that mental idea is not captured by that categorizing (which results into what we call "phenomena" and "things" so to speak")

I agree with you one hundred percent.

Noumenon is closely related to "thing in itself" (which is equally tricky concept since we arrive at such a thing as "a thing" only by having categorized reality!)

That is why I insist on working directly with the concept of referencing these things via the ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table: we totally avoid the issue of comprehending any concepts as all I am doing is examining the problem itself.

1. Human understanding is structured by categories that the mind creates in order to make sense of raw unstructured experience.

... in order to make sense of that raw unstructured ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table.

2. Humans can make sense of reality in these various ways (categorizing, classification), but can never directly know the noumena, the "things-in-themselves," the actual (ontological) dynamics of the natural world.

They can never prove their expectations are correct; all they can really say is, “what they expect”.

'These unknown somethings are "noumena"—although we can never know how or why as our perceptions of these unknown somethings are bound by the limitations of the categories of the understanding and we are therefore never able to fully know the "thing-in-itself".'

All we can really know is that ”they are”, what “they are”[/color] strange how we come back to that same kind of expression isn't it!

Couple more things that Kant said, that seem to be close to your philosophy (except for how you see "intuition")

Now why do people complain about the way I see “intuition”? All I say is that there are things I do, say, feel and think I understand, where I can not explain the mechanism by which this ability is achieved. So I call the mechanism “intuition” and simply regard it as “unexplained” except that I am pretty sure it comes from experience (it certainly improves with practice).

About "things-in-themselves"
“...though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think [of] them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears."[/I]
(Could it be tabular representation of "what we think we know"??)

Well, as far as I am concerned, I can conceive of no other way of referring to them which does not require defining them.

Even though I don't think of much about the "reality of space time" either (as I'm sure you have noticed :)

I read your post on the “Quantum Physics” forum and had to laugh. You brought up almost exactly the same issues I used to bring up with the professors when I was in graduate school. I think we do think a lot alike.

The route I think could be more fruitful than "static space time" is perhaps ditching relative simultaneity as an ontological concept, and then take a good hard look at "non-locality"... maybe.

The only problem with this comment is that the concern is with solving the problem of explaining reality. This is an issue I have no interest in attacking; I will simply leave it to the scientists. A correct solution is much like hitting a thirty foot jump shot; you need a lot of practice to develop the intuition required to correlate all the significant issues. My point being that none of these solutions are arrived at by logic; they are only defeated by logic.

These forums are full of people who believe that great solutions come about by accident and that they might be the ones to discover something significant. As I have said several times, the attitude is that, if they stir the pot of what is known enough, maybe something of value will float to the top; it's what I call the “guess and by golly approach”. Let me point out that if the purpose of science is to discover new valuable ways of explaining reality, most all scientists can count themselves as failures. There is no organization to the search at all.

My attack is very simple. I am trying to see what a flaw free solution might look like if we had one. Since I don't have one, other than that ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table, that has to be the only representation I can examine. As I said above, the question is, what “invalid ontological elements” can I invent which will simplify the problem. I have already pointed out a number of such things. I invented the t index (what I have called “time”) to allow changes in “what we think we know”; I invented the x index to allow representation of “difference” (notice that the concept of measure is notably absent: “space time” is certainly not being introduced); I invented the tau index to allow a flaw free explanation to possesses entities (ontological elements) which are not different without presuming no real difference; I invented the idea of representing “all flaw free explanations” as mathematical functions which yield true or false results embedded in that ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table. And finally (where we are at the moment) I invented the idea of inserting additional “invalid ontological elements” in order to simplify that mathematical function. The purpose of the first set was to make the number of arguments in the function the same. The purpose of the second set was to make the t index a recoverable entity from the table. And finally, I showed that by adding such “invalid ontological elements” it was possible to define a function which would yield the ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table as simple roots (places where that function evaluates to zero) of that function.

You should find this last step as interesting because, if you can actually find an “analytical” mathematical function which does indeed populate that ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table correctly, that analytical function also has the property of yielding values for all possibilities: i.e., it provides a mechanism for predicting the future. The problem is that what we are really talking about here is a “point fitting” problem and, as any mathematician knows, there are always an infinite number of analytical functions which will fit a finite number of points; nevertheless, you should see this as a simplifying move. We are now looking for an analytical function which yields an exact fit to that ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table. That function, should we find one sufficiently simple to be used[/color], would essentially be a usable explanation of reality: i.e., its roots would essentially yield expectations identical to what we think we know.

Do you understand my interest in examining such a function?

Are we having fun -- Dick

P.S. My wife and I were in Helsinki in September of 2002 (I think, though I could have the date wrong). We were in Scandinavia because of the 300th anniversary of the creation of St. Petersburg, Russia; we had expected somewhat of a celebration but it didn't happen. We enjoyed Scandinavia a lot more than we enjoyed Russia. I just felt sorry for most of the Russians. And, yes, I knew Linus Torvalds was from Helsinki U.

 

[Rade]

... [1]In materialism the subjective experience is thought to be caused by the interaction of smaller entities that are thought to be "metaphysical" or "ontological" elements. -> It is not given that "Anssi" is a valid ontological element...[2]Since you gave "Anssi" as an example of a "metaphysical entity", I believe you are still referring to the fact that our "subjective experience exists"...[3]If on the other hand you regard any thing we have defined, as something that exists ontologically, this kind of defeats the purpose of the concept "ontology", because the whole reason why there is such a field as ontology is to ask what are things that exist even when we are not there to define them as such...

Well, no, you are not understanding what I say. [1]I hold that "Anssi" is a valid ontological element since I reject materialism as a false dichotomy to idealism. I hold that "Anssi" is much more than the sum of some smaller ontological entities-- that "Anssi" is a metaphysical given and not a figment of his own imagination. [2]As to your comment about "subjective experience exists"--well, no, this is not what I say. I say that "existence exists" is the first axiom of philosophy and that your "subjective experience" forms dialectic union with that which exists--that you cannot "know" what exists as it exists itself but only as it exists as a dialectic union of the object with the subject. [3]No, I do not hold that what exists ontologically is what we define--what exists ontologically is a "primary fact of reality that cannot be analyzed, requires no proof or explanation--but is on what all proofs and explanations rest". What exists ontologically is NOT SUBJECT TO THE PROCESS OF DEFINITION.

 

[AnssiH]

Hi again, I finally got my “Fedora 6” running decently on my PC . But for some strange reason, I can't access my e-mail (maybe the server is down) so I went to physicsforums to see if I could see that and noticed your post which is quite informative. You have given me another word to express my thoughts.

Cool :) I thought noumenon would be a concept you'd very much appreciate.

What I think a lot of people fail to recognize is that I do not concern myself at all with the problem of flawed theories (ones which fail to completely explain the past: “what we think we know”). I concern myself only with absolutely flawless epistemological constructs. I want to know exactly what kind of constraints such a thing must obey.

Yeah, let me tell you it can be very difficult to figure out how you mean that exactly (has been for me too). Not surprising I guess, since we all naturally think of things by trying to define/conceptualize/classify them into comprehensible chunks. So this includes the case of trying to understand what you are saying.

Perhaps it would be helpful to really stress the fact that this is not so much an attempt to find what ontological elements exist, but an exercise at finding some constraints for our explanations.

Now why do people complain about the way I see “intuition”? All I say is that there are things I do, say, feel and think I understand, where I can not explain the mechanism by which this ability is achieved. So I call the mechanism “intuition” and simply regard it as “unexplained” except that I am pretty sure it comes from experience (it certainly improves with practice).

Yeah :) I have no problems with however one defines intuition (and I personally try to keep it away from equation, as it appears to be a mere side-effect of us not being conscious of what is occurring at the low levels of the cortical hierarchy), but I was just warning you that Kant seems to use "intuition" as caused by those "innate categories".

I read your post on the “Quantum Physics” forum and had to laugh. You brought up almost exactly the same issues I used to bring up with the professors when I was in graduate school.

Did they have anything relevant to say about those issues? No?

My attack is very simple. I am trying to see what a flaw free solution might look like if we had one. Since I don't have one, other than that ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table, that has to be the only representation I can examine. As I said above, the question is, what “invalid ontological elements” can I invent which will simplify the problem. I have already pointed out a number of such things. I invented the t index (what I have called “time”) to allow changes in “what we think we know”; I invented the x index to allow representation of “difference” (notice that the concept of measure is notably absent: “space time” is certainly not being introduced); I invented the tau index to allow a flaw free explanation to possesses entities (ontological elements) which are not different without presuming no real difference; I invented the idea of representing “all flaw free explanations” as mathematical functions which yield true or false results embedded in that ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table. And finally (where we are at the moment) I invented the idea of inserting additional “invalid ontological elements” in order to simplify that mathematical function. The purpose of the first set was to make the number of arguments in the function the same. The purpose of the second set was to make the t index a recoverable entity from the table. And finally, I showed that by adding such “invalid ontological elements” it was possible to define a function which would yield the ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table as simple roots (places where that function evaluates to zero) of that function.

You should find this last step as interesting because, if you can actually find an “analytical” mathematical function which does indeed populate that ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table correctly, that analytical function also has the property of yielding values for all possibilities: i.e., it provides a mechanism for predicting the future. The problem is that what we are really talking about here is a “point fitting” problem and, as any mathematician knows, there are always an infinite number of analytical functions which will fit a finite number of points; nevertheless, you should see this as a simplifying move. We are now looking for an analytical function which yields an exact fit to that ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table. That function, should we find one sufficiently simple to be used[/color], would essentially be a usable explanation of reality: i.e., its roots would essentially yield expectations identical to what we think we know.

Do you understand my interest in examining such a function?

Certainly. Although I understand the associated math very superficially (I mean I understand the idea of finding a function that is doing the "point-fitting")

Are we having fun

Busy fun :) I think we can probably proceed to the next issue? (regarding symmetry?)

P.S. My wife and I were in Helsinki in September of 2002 (I think, though I could have the date wrong). We were in Scandinavia because of the 300th anniversary of the creation of St. Petersburg, Russia; we had expected somewhat of a celebration but it didn't happen. We enjoyed Scandinavia a lot more than we enjoyed Russia. I just felt sorry for most of the Russians. And, yes, I knew Linus Torvalds was from Helsinki U.

Heh, cool :) Yeah, Russia and Finland are still two very different worlds certainly.

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

Well, no, you are not understanding what I say. [1]I hold that "Anssi" is a valid ontological element since I reject materialism as a false dichotomy to idealism. I hold that "Anssi" is much more than the sum of some smaller ontological entities--

You are referring to "strong emergence"? (Instead of normal everyday emergence; some function as a result of natural interaction between some components)

that "Anssi" is a metaphysical given and not a figment of his own imagination. [2]As to your comment about "subjective experience exists"--well, no, this is not what I say. I say that "existence exists" is the first axiom of philosophy and that your "subjective experience" forms dialectic union with that which exists--that you cannot "know" what exists as it exists itself but only as it exists as a dialectic union of the object with the subject. [3]No, I do not hold that what exists ontologically is what we define--what exists ontologically is a "primary fact of reality that cannot be analyzed, requires no proof or explanation--but is on what all proofs and explanations rest". What exists ontologically is NOT SUBJECT TO THE PROCESS OF DEFINITION.

I would agree with the 3rd point you are making, but I am unable to figure out why do you imply it is given that "self" is a valid ontological element. Isn't it relevant to ask what is the ontology behind our "thoughts" (i.e. what causes conscious experience)? Unless if by "ontological element" you don't mean to refer to fundamental (or "undivisible") elements at all?

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

The deduction of quantum mechanics.

Perhaps it would be helpful to really stress the fact that this is not so much an attempt to find what ontological elements exist, but an exercise at finding some constraints for our explanations.

I think you are right here. Though I have come to the conclusion that very few if any people with really good backgrounds in mathematical physics actually read any of these forums, posting here has nonetheless been very educational for me. I see what I have discovered from quite a different perspective (more of a philosophical perspective) than I did five years ago. I first got on the web at the suggestion of my son-in-law after a conversation we had back in 2002 (he was a national consultant on web page design at the time). While cleaning the attic, I had accidentally run across a copy of something I had tried to publish twenty years before (it had been rejected by several journals as not being physics). My son-in-law suggested the web as a method of reaching people. As I said, it's been a learning experience for me.

Did they have anything relevant to say about those issues? No?

You know they didn't. One of them actually once responded with, “only geniuses worry about things like that and, believe me, you're no genius, worry about learning physics!” It started me wondering what a “genius” was. I am sure you have heard the line, “there is a thin line between genius and madness”. I have since decided that the word “genius” was invented by learned people as an excuse for not having figured those things out for themselves: in fact, I suspect the only advantage so called “geniuses” have over ordinary scholars is that they do ask such questions.

Certainly. Although I understand the associated math very superficially (I mean I understand the idea of finding a function that is doing the "point-fitting")

What math you need to know I think I can explain; if I have a clear idea as to what you don't understand that is.

I think we can probably proceed to the next issue? (regarding symmetry?)

Yes, I think we can; however, I would like to put that off to the next post as there is one other thing I would like to introduce you to. You might google “quantum mechanics and square root”. Many physics advancements have occurred in conjunction with the introduction of new mathematics and many physicists try to relate new mathematical systems to their problems in the hope that the new relationships will prove useful. Take a look at “The Square Root of Not”. I have noticed quite a lot of interest related to that particular mathematical “phenomena” lately. I was aware of exactly the same issue back when I was a graduate student; but from quite a different perspective. Before we go into the issue of symmetry, I would first like to show you the reason for the fundamental significance of square roots (or rather, the importance of squaring) to our problem. It is a well known fact that these operations yield results very important to quantum mechanical relationships but the real issue here is, how can we justify such a representation as more than just a mindless stab in the dark.

As I am sure you have picked up, I am concerned with the issue that absolutely “any explanation”[/color] can be seen as a mathematical function which yields the probability of a certain set of numbers being an entry in that ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table. It is fundamental that the output of that function is a probability. Now probabilities are defined to be represented by positive numbers bounded by zero and one (zero meaning it can't happen and one meaning it absolutely does happen). This fact is a major constraint on the set of functions which are capable of representing “an explanation” under the perspective we have taken here.

The problem with any constraint of any kind is that simply finding the constraint is not sufficient; we must also come up with a way of representing that constraint in a way which can be logically implemented in our representation. After all, one could say simply say, “the explanation must make sense” but how in the world would one represent such a constraint? This probability constraint is actually quite simple to implement. The implementation uses the fact that the square of a number is positive definite (squaring will guarantee that the output will be bounded by zero and positive infinity). All that is left then is to develop a mechanism which will reduce the upper bound from infinity to “one”. That is a simple scaling operation and is the fundamental issue behind the quantum mechanical notion of “normalization” (it is essentially one of the “Postulates of Quantum Mechanics”). If you look at the bottom of that page you will see the comment, “The central equation of quantum mechanics must be accepted as a postulate”: i.e., it is to be seen as a successful “mindless stab in the dark” (from the physicist's point of view, it is defended by induction, not deduction). This is the exact issue I have discovered to be faulty, it turns out that its validity is absolutely unavoidable and may be directly deduced. What is really interesting is that, when that deduction is performed, relativity (both special and general) become exactly defined also.

Here, I will approach the issue of normalization from an only slightly different perspective. Absolutely any mathematical function can be seen as a set of instructions for transforming one set of numbers into a second set of numbers. You and I have already discussed the issue that a set of numbers can represent anything so the concept A is a function of B[/color] can represent any functional relationship including semantic relationships in philosophy. It follows that, in our perspective, “a function” generates a set of numbers. These numbers can be seen as defining a point in an abstract space with dimensionality equal to the number of numbers in the output of that function. Those numbers can be seen as representing the components of a vector in that space which points to that point; the function which yields these multiple outputs is often referred to as a “vector function” for the rather obvious reason that its output can be seen as a vector.

There is a concept in Euclidean geometry called a “scalar product” which is a defined product of two vectors yielding a scalar product (often referred to as a “dot” product because of the standard way of representing it). We can use this idea to represent a simple method of obtaining a positive definite number from absolutely any conceivable mathematical function. Suppose we are given some arbitrary function \vec{\phi}(B(t)), then \vec{\phi}\cdot \vec{\phi} is a positive definite number.

Scaling it so that the maximum cannot exceed one is, for the most part quite simple. All we need do is find the absolute maximum which can exist (given that function) and divide phi by the positive square root of that number. Understanding what is meant by probability, you should comprehend that the sum of the probabilities for each and every possibility needs to be one. Since the only reason this explanation (this function) was introduced was to provide probabilities for B(t) in the future, (essentially for points outside our ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table) we must essentially sum over all the possibilities. Since the the possibilities will range over all possible values for those arguments we are talking about the generalization of a sum commonly referred to as an integral. The value of that number is given by

A = \int_{x_1=-\infty}^{x_1=+\infty}\int_{x_2=-\infty}^{x_2=+\infty}\cdots\int_{x_n=-\infty}^{x_n=+\infty}<br /> \vec{\phi}\cdot \vec{\phi}dx_1dx_2 \cdots dx_n
​

It may be a bear to do, but it is at least mathematically defined if phi is known. The definition has however introduced some minor problems. In order to obtain the proper probability we need to divide the scaler product by A. It should be clear to you that the actual value of A above is a function of the exact definition of phi. The integral over phi might very well yield a usable value for A; however, it is also possible that the integral will yield unusable results (that would be zero or infinity) as phi is a representation of “any” possible function. We all know that division by zero is undefined so a result of zero would be unacceptable; however, let's look at what the result zero means in our representation. A result of zero means that the sum of all possibilities is zero. That means absolutely nothing can happen. This result can be seen as a strong indicator that the explanation (that function being represented by phi) is the wrong explanation. That sort of gets us out of that dilemma: i.e., it certainly can't occur with a flaw free explanation.

The problem with infinity is a bit more subtle. Division by infinity is no mathematical difficulty but it is a bothersome result anyway as it generates a probability function \vec{\phi}(B(t))\cdot\phi}(B(t))/A which is identically zero which means the probability of any individual B(t) is exactly zero. Not exactly the result we were looking for though it is indeed a very rational expectation. When we open up the possibilities to an infinite number of cases, we should expect the probability of a specific one to go to zero.

Actually, the solution to this difficulty is quite straight forward. If the number of possibilities is infinite, we cannot concern ourselves with a specific result. We must instead resort to comparing collections of possibilities (which essentially amounts to comparing two integrals over different ranges). In essence, that means that it is the ratio of one probability to another which interests us where both probabilities are taken over limited sets of possibilities. Here we can take advantage of a very simple observation: the factor A was introduced solely to assure that the probability was not greater than one. When we are dealing with ratios of probabilities, this constraint is simply not necessary. That is essentially the issue behind the common concept of “normalization” in quantum mechanics. It is the form of the function itself and how it changes with circumstances which is significant.

So to review what I have just done, I have introduced a mechanism for guaranteeing that the constraints embodied in the concept of probability are no longer an extraneous constraint. Since any explanation can be seen as a function yielding the probability for a specific B(t), it follows that the solution to the epistemological problem (finding an explanation) amounts to picking a phi which is consistent with the actual points in our ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table. Since phi is unconstrained in any way, a flaw free explanation of the known past certainly exists (it is after all a finite point fitting problem) and all of the possibilities are included in the set of functions being considered (which is explicitly, all of them).

Hopefully I have not confused you. If I have, I will do my best to straighten things out.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Langbein]

Why is it likely to believe that time is something else than time ?

As time can be described, why is likely to believe that time has only one explanation ?

If time should happen to be time and not something else, couldn't it be thinkable or possible that the explanation of time, that wold not be the time itself, but an explanation of time, rather would be a set of time explanations ?

Could it be some different kinds of "time".

 

[Doctordick]

Why is it likely to believe that time is something else than time ?

As time can be described, why is likely to believe that time has only one explanation ?

If time should happen to be time and not something else, couldn't it be thinkable or possible that the explanation of time, that wold not be the time itself, but an explanation of time, rather would be a set of time explanations ?

Could it be some different kinds of "time".

I agree with you one hundred percent. This is exactly why I defined what I meant by time as I did. I am in the process of showing what can be deduced from my definition of time. What you mean by the term may be entirely different but, unless you can demonstrate some important usefulness of your perspective, I think mine is superior. Now that is just an opinion you understand; I make no claim that a better explanation of the issue does not exist, I just haven't heard one myself.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Langbein]

This is exactly why I defined what I meant by time as I did.

But if time is defined to be something else than it usualy is wouldn't the answer to the original question be like this:

Question: Is time "just" an illusion ?

Answer: If "time" is defined to be something else than the ordinary and common meaning of the term "time", then it will be an illusion, if the new definition defines it to be an illusion.

If the nature of "time" can be described as a sum of different properties that has some complementary relationships to each other, would it then be wise to remove some of those "complementary properties" ?

If the magnetic component by definition is left out of the term "electro magnetic vaves" will it then have a meaning to ask question about the nature of electro magnetic vaves ?

Is it thinkable that the nature of time might have such compementary properties ?

 

[AnssiH]

Sorry for late response. I had to find time to read this post properly (had to do some googling while reading it :)

You know they didn't. One of them actually once responded with, “only geniuses worry about things like that and, believe me, you're no genius, worry about learning physics!” It started me wondering what a “genius” was. I am sure you have heard the line, “there is a thin line between genius and madness”. I have since decided that the word “genius” was invented by learned people as an excuse for not having figured those things out for themselves: in fact, I suspect the only advantage so called “geniuses” have over ordinary scholars is that they do ask such questions.

Heh, that's probably true :)

What math you need to know I think I can explain; if I have a clear idea as to what you don't understand that is.

I'll try to ask the meaningful questions. Although often I can find the answers by some googling. (I messed around with vectors and dot products and what not about a year ago and had already forgotten everything :)

You might google “quantum mechanics and square root”. Many physics advancements have occurred in conjunction with the introduction of new mathematics and many physicists try to relate new mathematical systems to their problems in the hope that the new relationships will prove useful. Take a look at “The Square Root of Not”. I have noticed quite a lot of interest related to that particular mathematical “phenomena” lately. I was aware of exactly the same issue back when I was a graduate student; but from quite a different perspective. Before we go into the issue of symmetry, I would first like to show you the reason for the fundamental significance of square roots (or rather, the importance of squaring) to our problem. It is a well known fact that these operations yield results very important to quantum mechanical relationships but the real issue here is, how can we justify such a representation as more than just a mindless stab in the dark.

As I am sure you have picked up, I am concerned with the issue that absolutely “any explanation”[/color] can be seen as a mathematical function which yields the probability of a certain set of numbers being an entry in that ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table. It is fundamental that the output of that function is a probability. Now probabilities are defined to be represented by positive numbers bounded by zero and one (zero meaning it can't happen and one meaning it absolutely does happen). This fact is a major constraint on the set of functions which are capable of representing “an explanation” under the perspective we have taken here.

The problem with any constraint of any kind is that simply finding the constraint is not sufficient; we must also come up with a way of representing that constraint in a way which can be logically implemented in our representation. After all, one could say simply say, “the explanation must make sense” but how in the world would one represent such a constraint? This probability constraint is actually quite simple to implement. The implementation uses the fact that the square of a number is positive definite (squaring will guarantee that the output will be bounded by zero and positive infinity). All that is left then is to develop a mechanism which will reduce the upper bound from infinity to “one”. That is a simple scaling operation and is the fundamental issue behind the quantum mechanical notion of “normalization” (it is essentially one of the “Postulates of Quantum Mechanics”). If you look at the bottom of that page you will see the comment, “The central equation of quantum mechanics must be accepted as a postulate”: i.e., it is to be seen as a successful “mindless stab in the dark” (from the physicist's point of view, it is defended by induction, not deduction). This is the exact issue I have discovered to be faulty, it turns out that its validity is absolutely unavoidable and may be directly deduced. What is really interesting is that, when that deduction is performed, relativity (both special and general) become exactly defined also.

Here, I will approach the issue of normalization from an only slightly different perspective. Absolutely any mathematical function can be seen as a set of instructions for transforming one set of numbers into a second set of numbers. You and I have already discussed the issue that a set of numbers can represent anything so the concept A is a function of B[/color] can represent any functional relationship including semantic relationships in philosophy. It follows that, in our perspective, “a function” generates a set of numbers. These numbers can be seen as defining a point in an abstract space with dimensionality equal to the number of numbers in the output of that function. Those numbers can be seen as representing the components of a vector in that space which points to that point; the function which yields these multiple outputs is often referred to as a “vector function” for the rather obvious reason that its output can be seen as a vector.

There is a concept in Euclidean geometry called a “scalar product” which is a defined product of two vectors yielding a scalar product (often referred to as a “dot” product because of the standard way of representing it). We can use this idea to represent a simple method of obtaining a positive definite number from absolutely any conceivable mathematical function.

Most of the above seems pretty clear, but here I get a bit lost. A function can yield a vector, but to get a scalar product we need two vectors. Can we get a positive definite number from a single mathematical function?

Another thing I didn't get from the post was whether there is a specific meaning to a scalar product, or could we use any method of "obtaining positive definite number from any mathematical function"?

Suppose we are given some arbitrary function \vec{\phi}(B(t)), then \vec{\phi}\cdot \vec{\phi} is a positive definite number.

Scaling it so that the maximum cannot exceed one is, for the most part quite simple. All we need do is find the absolute maximum which can exist (given that function) and divide phi by the positive square root of that number.

After some googling, I assume "phi" it just represents any mathematical function. But I must be getting something wrong because if we have a function which gives the maximum of, say, 100, then dividing some result from between 0 and 100 by 10, will not necessarily give us a result less than 1... What am I reading wrong?

At any rate, obviously I understand it is possible to scale results so they come bounded by 0 and 1. I guess that was the important bit.

Understanding what is meant by probability, you should comprehend that the sum of the probabilities for each and every possibility needs to be one. Since the only reason this explanation (this function) was introduced was to provide probabilities for B(t) in the future, (essentially for points outside our ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table) we must essentially sum over all the possibilities. Since the the possibilities will range over all possible values for those arguments we are talking about the generalization of a sum commonly referred to as an integral. The value of that number is given by

A = \int_{x_1=-\infty}^{x_1=+\infty}\int_{x_2=-\infty}^{x_2=+\infty}\cdots\int_{x_n=-\infty}^{x_n=+\infty}<br /> \vec{\phi}\cdot \vec{\phi}dx_1dx_2 \cdots dx_n
​

I can't really understand mathematical expressions too well (especially since I can hardly see them as the symbols generated by LaTeX are so incredibly small :( )
Anyway, I can understand what you are saying above the LaTeX.

It may be a bear to do, but it is at least mathematically defined if phi is known. The definition has however introduced some minor problems. In order to obtain the proper probability we need to divide the scaler product by A. It should be clear to you that the actual value of A above is a function of the exact definition of phi. The integral over phi might very well yield a usable value for A; however, it is also possible that the integral will yield unusable results (that would be zero or infinity) as phi is a representation of “any” possible function. We all know that division by zero is undefined so a result of zero would be unacceptable; however, let's look at what the result zero means in our representation. A result of zero means that the sum of all possibilities is zero. That means absolutely nothing can happen. This result can be seen as a strong indicator that the explanation (that function being represented by phi) is the wrong explanation. That sort of gets us out of that dilemma: i.e., it certainly can't occur with a flaw free explanation.

The problem with infinity is a bit more subtle. Division by infinity is no mathematical difficulty but it is a bothersome result anyway as it generates a probability function \vec{\phi}(B(t))\cdot\phi}(B(t))/A which is identically zero which means the probability of any individual B(t) is exactly zero. Not exactly the result we were looking for though it is indeed a very rational expectation. When we open up the possibilities to an infinite number of cases, we should expect the probability of a specific one to go to zero.

Actually, the solution to this difficulty is quite straight forward. If the number of possibilities is infinite, we cannot concern ourselves with a specific result. We must instead resort to comparing collections of possibilities (which essentially amounts to comparing two integrals over different ranges). In essence, that means that it is the ratio of one probability to another which interests us where both probabilities are taken over limited sets of possibilities. Here we can take advantage of a very simple observation: the factor A was introduced solely to assure that the probability was not greater than one. When we are dealing with ratios of probabilities, this constraint is simply not necessary. That is essentially the issue behind the common concept of “normalization” in quantum mechanics. It is the form of the function itself and how it changes with circumstances which is significant.

So to review what I have just done, I have introduced a mechanism for guaranteeing that the constraints embodied in the concept of probability are no longer an extraneous constraint. Since any explanation can be seen as a function yielding the probability for a specific B(t), it follows that the solution to the epistemological problem (finding an explanation) amounts to picking a phi which is consistent with the actual points in our ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table. Since phi is unconstrained in any way, a flaw free explanation of the known past certainly exists (it is after all a finite point fitting problem) and all of the possibilities are included in the set of functions being considered (which is explicitly, all of them).

Hopefully I have not confused you. If I have, I will do my best to straighten things out.

I can sort of kind of understand what you are saying (for the most part), but I don't quite get what it says about quantum mechanics :I

I'll try to give a more meaningful reply if you try and sort out my confusions :P

-Anssi

 

[Tosh]

To return to the thread:

Is time an illusion? No comment, but I would ask another question,

Is time relevant to us?
As time passes, we lose a part of ourselves. If we don't use it for good, it is wasted.

 

[Langbein]

But why not just answer what time is ?

If it can be wasted it will have to be "something" ?

An illusion can not be wasted, can it ?

If we are living in time, and using or wasting time, and doing things like earning money per hour, paying interrest per year, etc, somebody should now what time is ?

 

[Doctordick]

Hi Anssi, I am sorry I confused you. Sometimes I write a lot without realizing the various ways what I write can be taken; to paraphrase an old cliche, there are more ways to misinterpret what is being said than is dreamt of in your philosophy (which is really the essence of our conversation and I, of all people, should remember that). It is no fault of yours but you have missed intended central point of my ramblings.

The essence of magic is the misdirection of attention and physics has much to do with magic (it makes a lot of sense unless you happen to question something they can not answer). It is often very easy to miss a simple point simply because other issues catch your attention so I perhaps shouldn't have put so many varied issues in a single post; but it does tend to reveal those misunderstandings so I suppose I can be excused. I hadn't intended to send you off on a wild goose chase through google.

I think that the most important comment in my post was, “After all, one could say simply say, “the explanation must make sense” but how in the world would one represent such a constraint?” I will try to reassert my point a little differently.

I had proved earlier that expectations could be seen as a mathematical function of what was being asked: i.e., expectations as a probability (a number bounded by zero and one) and the description of the circumstance being asked about (a collection of numerical references to ontological elements). Think of the issue this way: any circumstance may be described by a collection of numbers (think of it as someone typing input into a computer) and what we would like to discover is a computer program which would output the probability that the circumstance being so described is actually a valid description of reality. If such a program existed, it would go a long way towards passing the Turing test (it would certainly “know” when you were lying and when you were telling the truth). If that weren't an intelligent program, it certainly would know how to make intelligent judgments.

Well, let's go back and look at that problem again. If there existed such a program, that program would be a member of the collection of “all possible programs” wouldn't it? If it doesn't exist, so what? That simply means it doesn't exist and that is no more than “tough cookies” so to speak; if it doesn't exist, you can be pretty sure no one will find it: i.e., it is a total waste of time to consider that possibility (we might as well just go drink some beer). The real problem here is that the set of “all possible programs” is a pretty large set to search. Neither you nor I am apt to find it just by looking for it. And neither is anyone else.

And exactly what are scientists doing anyway? Aren't they out there, looking for the truth? Putting forth possibilities and looking for problems in their suggestions? In reality, isn't that almost the definition of “the scientific method”? I would rather sit back and think a little; ask myself, “exactly what am I looking for?”

The only reason I brought up the “quantum mechanics and square root” thing was that there is currently a little fire behind the perspective that “square roots” are important functions with characteristics which might explain some things. As I said, “many physicists try to relate new mathematical systems to their problems in the hope that the new relationships will prove useful”.

What I was trying to point out was that absolutely every square root is something which can be squared. In fact, it is possible to define a very specific process which gives universality to the concept: i.e., an operation which always yields a positive definite scalar. A universal concept which can be applied to any conceivable function. Given that we are looking for a function which yields a probability, should one really be surprised to find that the behavior of “square roots” is an important issue?

To put it another way, let's go look at that computer program which yields a yes/no answer to the question, “was what was typed in true description of reality or not?” Now, let us attach to a computer a device which performs a very simple operation. Let the output of the first computer be a collection of n numbers (make n as large as you wish) and let the attached device square each of those numbers and then add them together to generate a final result. The result is clearly a positive definite number. If we “normalize that number” (divide it by the largest number possible given the n you chose with bit width of numbers in the system) then the output will be a number bounded by zero and one. It can certainly be interpreted as a probability.

Now, there are two questions I want to ask about that circumstance. If, the AI program we originally discussed, exists, can it be implemented on the combination I have just described. The answer is of course “yes”. That program is to produce a single number bounded by zero and one and that output can certainly be squared so the added device has not blocked the search for that program in any way (if the original program exists, one can add a simple step which generates the positive square root of that correct answer and the added device will simply square it and give us back the correct answer). The second, more important question, is; has that added device eliminated a single program from the set of “all possible programs” to be examined?. It should be clear to you that the correct answer to that question is a resounding “no”.

To put it another way, any procedure which is to yield a number bounded by zero and one (i.e., a probability) must involve an operation which guarantees the output lies in that range (i.e., an operation which is analogous to squaring) and one should not be surprised that, things that can be “squared” (i.e., square roots) are important functions to examine. If we are to be objective about this, we must eliminate no possibilities.

That is the central issue of my attack; I am being very careful to eliminate no possibilities. Defining the last operation required to develop a probability to be a vector dot product satisfies a required obvious constraint and, at the same time, eliminates no possible procedures (often referred to as methods). I have defined[/color] an explanation to be “a method of obtaining expectations” from given known information. The vector phi is the output of some unknown function and the probability that the argument of that function, B(t) is a valid entry in our ”what is”, is “what is”[/color] table is defined to be a vector dot product of that vector with itself (essentially, the square of its magnitude). If phi is indeed the function we are looking for then the square of that function is the probability density of seeing B(t). The important fact here is that no possibility has been eliminated by this representation: i.e., if a solution exists, phi exists.

I apologize that I misspoke in my last post: I referred to the vector dot product as the probability when it is not; it is the probability density (this has to do with the fact that the possibilities are infinite and our sum over all possibilities must become an integral). Sorry about that.

Most of the above seems pretty clear, but here I get a bit lost. A function can yield a vector, but to get a scalar product we need two vectors. Can we get a positive definite number from a single mathematical function?

Of course we can; but I hope what I have just written above clarifies why we are not interested in looking for such a thing.

Another thing I didn't get from the post was whether there is a specific meaning to a scalar product, or could we use any method of "obtaining positive definite number from any mathematical function"?

Sure; the issue isn't how we do it but rather the fact that it has to be done in order to obtain a probabilistic result. If you come up with a method which is applicable to every possible function and can be laid out as a well defined procedure, it would work just as well as the one I am using.

After some googling, I assume "phi" it just represents any mathematical function. But I must be getting something wrong because if we have a function which gives the maximum of, say, 100, then dividing some result from between 0 and 100 by 10, will not necessarily give us a result less than 1... What am I reading wrong?

Very simple, I was sloppy. I showed the dot product being divided by A when I should have shown each phi divided by the square root of A (exactly the same thing but easy to confuse). One normally presumes that phi is the function being normalized, not the actual probability. Plus that, the magnitude of phi squared is, as I said above, the probability density, not the probability. If that bothers you let me know and I will go into it in more detail (it is actually quite a simple issue).

I can't really understand mathematical expressions too well (especially since I can hardly see them as the symbols generated by LaTeX are so incredibly small :( )

Could I ask what browser you are using? I am using “FireFox” in its default mode and the font in the LaTex expressions seems to be actually larger than the font in the main text. Maybe you have some preference set strangely. Sorry I can't help as I am quite ignorant of such things but quite surprised to hear of your difficulty. All the windows machines and “the Internet Explorer” seem to yield about the same result.

I can sort of kind of understand what you are saying (for the most part), but I don't quite get what it says about quantum mechanics :I

The only reason I even bring up quantum mechanics is that it is the most successful theory ever proposed and, by the time we finish, it will be quite obvious why it is so successful. What I am presenting to you is actually a logical deduction of quantum mechanics itself. Along with that, I will show you some subtle flaws in modern physics and their perspective on quantum mechanics.

By the way, the single most significant question asked by most scientists is, “where do we go from here?” That question makes the implicit assumption that “where we are” is significant. That is not the question I ask; I simply ask, where should we be going? What is important about the difference is that “where we are” can have no bearing on the answer; the answer must be universal.

Looking to hear from you again -- Dick

 

[Tosh]

But why not just answer what time is ?

If it can be wasted it will have to be "something" ?

An illusion can not be wasted, can it ?

If we are living in time, and using or wasting time, and doing things like earning money per hour, paying interrest per year, etc, somebody should now what time is ?

Each moment is a temporary physical object...is that ok?

Neither can we hold or imagine the boundaries of the universe.

 

[Doctordick]

Each moment is a temporary physical object...is that ok?

Not for me it isn't! I want a little more than your word for it.

Neither can we hold or imagine the boundaries of the universe.

Another statement of seeming "absolute" belief. If you can't prove it to me, I am going to continue my search for the boundries to our understanding under the presumption that "the universe" is a concept we dreamed up. What you need to do is prove to me that your concept of "the universe" is as accurate a representation as you seem to think it is.

Have fun -- Dick