Is Time Merely Constant Change?

[AnssiH]

Obviously, an abstract mental model of reality is not "the way reality is" and I'm sure that there can be any number of mental models. But surely some models must be more successful than others. The simple model I proposed above incorporates motion without time, whilst allowing for the flow, or dynamic component, of reality. I just wondered what you thought about it in terms of "success".

Well it's ok if you find it helpful to think in those terms, but it doesn't yet suffice as an explanation for the observed (timewise) topology of events. I.e. it doesn't address what causes the observed "time dilation" effects. (If the success is measured by its prediction capabilities, it comes off short here)

In this view it might not be appropriate to call the effect "time dilation" though, but rather think of it as a slowdown to the physical processes/motion.

 

[AnssiH]

I think it is a tad more than "a set of rules"; the field of math also includes a great number of constructs which follow from those rules. As I have said elsewhere, it is my opinion that the field of mathematics can be defined as the "invention and study of self consistent systems". The reason self consistency is so significant an issue is the fact that "answers to questions" are what most all logical thought is concerned with and "self consistency" means that the answers to questions (within a self consistent system) are the same independent of the logical path followed within the system. That is, any system which is not internally self consistent fails in its central purpose (it fails to provide answers to questions).

That is a constraint far in excess of: "basically a set of rules that we made up".

That's true, certainly.

Quite true; but otherwise a rather worthless piece of information. As you have already pointed out yourself,
everything you presume is essentially an abstract system whose relationship with reality is unknown. And yet, there are a lot of very rational people who put a lot of faith in their personal abstract construct (their world view) is that world view no more than a random act or is there something more subtle going on here? It seems to me that, to ignore such a question, is to preach ignorance as a preferred world view and I really don't think that is your intention.

No it's not. If I have an intention here, I think it is similar to that of Kuhn, to point out to those rational people that their "rational beliefs" are not exclusively based on objective knowledge, to shake their convictions to their views. As a concrete example I would like to point towards the mock battles between different QM interpretations. I would expect all those views to be very far from reality. I could say they are all sitting at an equal distance from the truth, but of course there's no objective way to measure such a thing ;)

Does that have to be true? I think not! I think, if one is careful about how one puts things, considerably more can be deduced. In fact, I am prepared to show you how; that is, if I can get you to back off the idea that such a thing is impossible.

Ok, I'll try it for a fit. How much is "considerably more" though?

Oh, I have noticed that. It seems to be an issue no one wants to look at carefully. I was trained as a physicist and, by the time I received my Ph.D. I was pretty disappointed with physics because they had no interest in examining their ontological assumptions. Of course, I didn't know that was my problem at the time because I hadn't any experience with philosophical issues; all I knew was that their conclusions were based on very mushy foundations. I ended up looking at things which were of no interest to the physics community at all. Over the years, I discovered a rather humorous fact: physicists I approached said I was doing philosophy (which was outside their interest), philosophers told me I was doing mathematics (which was outside their interest) and mathematicians said I was doing physics (which was outside their interest). So certainly whatever I was doing was clearly outside everyone's interest.

Yeah, I have noticed similar thing, and it is kind of unfortunate. Most physicists don't understand philosophy and go on the record saying rather silly things (like regarding how they view relativity or quantum behaviour), and most philosophers don't understand enough about physics to be able to say much of anything about these matters. I would think quite a few philosophers would have a thing or two to say about the reality of spacetime for example, if they actually understood relativity enough to say something about it. Most of them just know few little factoids about relativity, but might not have even heard of relativity of simultaneity.

As I have said before, if our purpose is to "understand", the first concept we must have in our mind is "an explanation". Without a concept of "an explanation", how can we possibly understand anything? My definition of "an explanation" is quite simple: I define "an explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from given known information. Can you work with that definition?

Yeah, that sounds like a definition I would also tack on "explanation".

Although then I also look at it as the same thing as making a prediction based on a model of something, or revising the model. I.e. "obtaining expectations" is "making prediction" and that is done based on a model which is basically the "known information". Am I jumping too far ahead with this?

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Rade, I don't know if you are just trying to throw miscellaneous roadblocks into rational thought or are truly as unaware of what I have said as you appear.

Suppose the following "set" of statements of "known information", an example I picked up from the internet:
L All males who take birth control pills fail to get pregnant
K Mr. Jones is a male who has been taking birth control pills
E Mr. Jones fails to get pregnant
Now, from Salmon (1989) we read that "nomic expectability" is the essence of scientific explanation and must result from lawful connections between units of a set. And, we see that each of the statements above (L,K,E) form a logical sequence of truth statement units and thus combined meet the criterion of having nomic expectability.
But, have we "explained" anything about the association of males, becoming pregnant, and birth control pills by application of nomic expectability alone to our set of known information? Of course not.

This is a complete misrepresentation of the problem of creating an explanation. You give three English statements as the whole of your "known information" omitting all the information necessary to understand what those symbolic representations mean. An explanation is, the method of obtaining expectations[/color] given "ALL" the known information (no knowledge outside the "known information" is to be omitted). Think of giving the symbolic known information to an alien who has no knowledge of the symbols whatsoever. It is fundamentally a decoding problem: making presumptions as to what the symbols mean and then trying to find intepretations which are consistent with all known information. Not a trivial process.

What is missing in your definition of explanation is a new factor, that we can call (X), which is independent of "a method of obtaining expectation" and accounts for directional features that add "relevance".

And why is that not part of the method of "obtaining expectations".

If I have an intention here, I think it is similar to that of Kuhn, to point out to those rational people that their "rational beliefs" are not exclusively based on objective knowledge, to shake their convictions to their views.

Certainly what you say is true; however, people have been saying that for hundreds of years with little impact. My position is that there is another much more important issue here. There is very strong evidence that their "rational beliefs" are indeed based on something verging on objective knowledge or how do you explain the accomplishments of the hard sciences. My original purpose, some fifty years ago, was to understand what that agreement was really based upon. How do we manage to come up with these "rational beliefs", it being quite evident that millions upon millions of fertilized eggs of human beings come into existence every year who possesses not the first idea of what reality is and yet within a few short years reach overwhelming agreement about unbelievable volumes of this supposedly "objective knowledge". All the philosophers say, "you can't do that!" Somebody is wrong here.

How much is "considerably more" though?

More than you would ever be interested in examining (to look at the whole of it, you would need a good education in mathematics). But, for the time being, let's just take a peek at what I am talking about.

Although then I also look at it as the same thing as making a prediction based on a model of something, or revising the model. I.e. "obtaining expectations" is "making prediction" and that is done based on a model which is basically the "known information". Am I jumping too far ahead with this?

Not at all; I find you seeming to think very much along the same lines with which I approached this problem those many years ago. The only comment I am moved to make is that I make it a point to differentiate between "an ontology" and "a valid ontology". Models are essentially based on "an ontology", not necessarily "a valid ontology". Since ontology is the subject of existence itself and reality is "what exists", I use the adjective "valid" to indicate that I am talking about "what really exists": what reality is (even if I do not know what that is).

Rade started a thread, "Creating an Exact Science" supposedly to facilitate my desire to transform ontology into an exact science. After a few posts on that thread, I got disgusted with what seemed to me to be a desire on his part to develop a mock battle for the shear fun of it; however, I may have misjudged him. At the moment, from my perspective, the two threads have quite the same purpose. I would rather post to one or the other. Or at least ask that interested parties read both threads as sometimes issues will come up which have already been covered in the other thread and I hate to put things down twice.

But, to get started here, I will state my first supposedly exact assertions in the field of ontology (which have already been posted on the other thread). You might find it worthwhile to read that post as I think I make a few comments quite germane to some philosophical aspects of my approach.

There are at least three things which I think I can correctly say about that unknown "valid ontology" I would like to talk about. First, it fulfills the definition of "a set"; the Wikipedia Free Encyclopedia says that "a set" can be thought of as any collection of distinct things considered as a whole. Those things can be anything, from objects, thoughts, ideas, concepts ..., so one certainly cannot deny the usefulness of the label. Second, any reasonable understanding of "the universe" must be based in some way upon that "valid ontology"; that is no more than saying that any reasonable understanding of the universe should be based on the universe (at least partially if that understanding is not to be a total fabrication). And finally, it is quite reasonable to presume there are elements of that "valid ontology" of which we are ignorant and which would most probably be destructive to our most well thought out speculative edifices.

If you can accept these three statements as representing a "correct" foundation for the study of ontology, I will present my first revelation consistent with that foundation.

Looking forward to your response -- Dick

 

[Exitsign]

I think time is an illusion and since time has such an intimate relationship with space, I believe space is an illusion as well. Time, as we measure it is just a measurement of movement so I believe motion is an illusion as well.

There is a religion that thinks that way. Hinduism or Buddhism, not sure. They believe that life is and illusion as well and when you die you become One with god (small g)

 

[sd01g]

.

Just like in a universe with just one object there is no "speed" for the object to measure, so there is no "time" for it to measure. There is no backdrop called "empty space", this is a figment of imagination. Similarly, we cannot measure time itself. That's right, time cannot be measured. We cannot claim that "time" moves at certain speed at all. If you feel the need to reply "I measure time with my wristwatch all the time", think more.

QUOTE]

You were making sense until you stated that 'time can not be measured.' Empirically, time is what is measured by a clock (hour glass, sun dial, calender, etc). If there are no time measuring devices, there is no empirical time, only movement. Rational time, to which you are probably refering, is imaginary, as is a universe with just one object. Whether or not empty space exists is not known.

 

[AnssiH]

But, to get started here, I will state my first supposedly exact assertions in the field of ontology (which have already been posted on the other thread). You might find it worthwhile to read that post as I think I make a few comments quite germane to some philosophical aspects of my approach.

There are at least three things which I think I can correctly say about that unknown "valid ontology" I would like to talk about. First, it fulfills the definition of "a set"; the Wikipedia Free Encyclopedia says that "a set" can be thought of as any collection of distinct things considered as a whole. Those things can be anything, from objects, thoughts, ideas, concepts ..., so one certainly cannot deny the usefulness of the label. Second, any reasonable understanding of "the universe" must be based in some way upon that "valid ontology"; that is no more than saying that any reasonable understanding of the universe should be based on the universe (at least partially if that understanding is not to be a total fabrication). And finally, it is quite reasonable to presume there are elements of that "valid ontology" of which we are ignorant and which would most probably be destructive to our most well thought out speculative edifices.

If you can accept these three statements as representing a "correct" foundation for the study of ontology, I will present my first revelation consistent with that foundation.

Well it's hard to say whether I am interpreting your text correctly. You are saying that the valid ontology is a set (of rules?) and any consequent knowledge of reality is associated with this set one way or another... Are you talking about some kind of bottom-most set of knowledge from which everything else we know of follows?

When you say there are elements in the valid ontology of which we are ignorant, are you just saying there currently are elements of which we are ignorant, or that there must always be elements of which we are ignorant or otherwise we cannot function?

Either way, I can't see how I could disagree.

At the same time I'm thinking that perhaps your further assertions give me a better idea about what you are saying...

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

You were making sense until you stated that 'time can not be measured.' Empirically, time is what is measured by a clock (hour glass, sun dial, calender, etc). If there are no time measuring devices, there is no empirical time, only movement. Rational time, to which you are probably refering, is imaginary, as is a universe with just one object. Whether or not empty space exists is not known.

Yeah, the subject was about the "nature of time", and especially in the context of relativity (and spacetime) it must be noted that clocks don't measure time as such since they too are physical objects "obeying the spacetime", i.e. when you are measuring how long does it take for a car to move from LA to New York, you are more properly measuring how many circles a clock does while the car does its motion. You are always only comparing two motions, even when you are measuring time in your mind (assuming materialism). I am saying that we should pay attention to the topology of events in spacetime rather than to the idea about flow of time.

However, I am not saying that spacetime is the only good ontology. I am just saying that we should pay attention to the topology of events that it presents as there undeniably is something to it. This "something" is not necessarily relativity of simultaneity however.

I have one problem with your assertions though;

If there are no time measuring devices, there is no empirical time, only movement.

Any motion can be thought of as a time measuring device if we so wish. We just need to pick any two moving things like a waterfall and the moon and say "the waterfall passes 3 million liters of water per moon cycle". All we did is we compared the motion of the moon to the motion of the waterfall. We don't know how time passed in a metaphysical sense during the experiment.

 

[sd01g]

Yeah, the subject was about the "nature of time", and especially in the context of relativity (and spacetime) it must be noted that clocks don't measure time as such since they too are physical objects "obeying the spacetime", i.e. when you are measuring how long does it take for a car to move from LA to New York, you are more properly measuring how many circles a clock does while the car does its motion. You are always only comparing two motions, even when you are measuring time in your mind (assuming materialism). I am saying that we should pay attention to the topology of events in spacetime rather than to the idea about flow of time.

However, I am not saying that spacetime is the only good ontology. I am just saying that we should pay attention to the topology of events that it presents as there undeniably is something to it. This "something" is not necessarily relativity of simultaneity however.

I have one problem with your assertions though;


Any motion can be thought of as a time measuring device if we so wish. We just need to pick any two moving things like a waterfall and the moon and say "the waterfall passes 3 million liters of water per moon cycle". All we did is we compared the motion of the moon to the motion of the waterfall. We don't know how time passed in a metaphysical sense during the experiment.

Thanks for the response. I would suggest that there is no such thing as 'time as such'. If there is no matter/energy present in a given space, there is no time present in that given space. If there is only consistent uniform motion in a given space, there is still no time in that space-only movement. However, if a rationial thought process supplies a unit of time, such as a second or a minute, measured by a clock (or equivelent) to that consistent uniform motion, then, and only then, time is present. When considering time, the interesting part is how the uniform motion measured by the various clocks are affected by changes in speed, gravitational fields and thermal variations.

 

[isabeau]

"When you sit with a nice girl for two hours, it seems like two minutes. When you sit on a hot stove for two minutes, it seems like two hours that's relativity." -- Albert Einstein

time is an illusion . Our biology/internal clock even runs different to how we 'measure time' once daylight is taken out of the equasion.

 

[Rade]

...But, to get started here, I will state my first supposedly exact assertions in the field of ontology (which have already been posted on the other thread)... You might find it worthwhile to read that post as I think I make a few comments quite germane to some philosophical aspects of my approach. If you can accept these three statements as representing a "correct" foundation for the study of ontology, I will present my first revelation consistent with that foundation.

Hello Doctordick, let me comment on your "three exact assertions" about the concept you present "valid ontology".

As you know, ontology is a "field of study", thus we can define your concept "valid ontology" = a field on study about "what reality is, even if I do not know what it is". Thus, we must hold as true:

"valid ontology" = study of "existence"​

Now, you claim three assertions about the study of existence (valid ontology), the first being that existence is a "set", and I find this to be logical, thus we can say "existence" = "the set of all that exists". (and you will recall from another thread I made the point that ALL philosophy must start with the statement "existence exists"), which is nothing more than your first assertion that "existence is the set of all that exists".

But, I do not accept your second assertion. You present your second assertion to be: "that any reasonable understanding of the universe should be based on the universe". This is false because a very reasonable understanding of the universe (as understood by Einstein) requires that the universe be understood as a transformation from another universe (perhaps via black holes), thus the concept of a "valid ontology" of this universe is not as you suggest a simple set of all that exists in this universe, but the set of what exists in all possible universes connected to this universe. And since I hold Einstein to be a reasonable person, and he has presented a reasonable alternative to your second assertion, then I hold your second assertion to be false. Now, as to your third assertion: "it is quite reasonable to presume there are elements of "valid ontology" of which we are ignorant", is the same as saying "humans do not know all that exists". Now, many would hold that humans do not know anything that exists, and since such a holding is also reasonable, I find your third assertion to be false because it is reasonable that it is incomplete (that is, not only are humans ignorant of some elements of the set of all that exists, they are ignorant of all such elements--100% of them). I am not aware of any philosophy that holds that humans know (or can know) all that exists. So, I find only 1 of 3 of your assertion to be true.

 

[Ghostfaith]

I can no longer see time. All I recognize is the morphing and changing of energies/masses/matters. This concept of time we have is slowly deteriorating from my mind. There is no time, all things are just constantly changing? Nothing ever really leaves us... and nothing is ever really born new in terms of energy. So all that we have is all that we have and it never goes anywhere except for changing into differenent physical, dimensional, and material states? So everything is not really passing... only changing. Time will never leave us, we must learn to leave time.

That's a fascinating experience sounds like you have there, OE - I also have had some experiences like that. Good for you!

 

[Ghostfaith]

If I crunch a chip down to nothing, does that
mean chips don't exist ?

(crunches chip).

Interesting. Is that the correct question, do you think, T?? What if we say "Does THAT chip still exist?"

Isn't it about seeing "categories" such as time, when indivdual "portions" of time or space can "be", on their own - "crunched" or otherwise. Isn't it about how we look at things - mass categories?

 

[Ghostfaith]

I've never understood the appeal of this question to people. Is length an illusion?

Is that the right question to ask? Further back in that we could say "Is illusion an illusion...?"

What does that really ask?

THAT'S a good question to ask, lol. The problem is in language use,in my view. Saying "Length is an illusion" is a bit of a game - it doesn't in any way "define" "length", it just widens the fuzzy meaning of "illusion" to include things like "length".

Length is a property of physical objects in that each and every one of them has spatial extent.

There's an interesting sub-premise in your thinking - that is, that physical objects "can" possesses qualities. Much as Aristotle thought I suppose - not that I knew him, lol. But "length" is not "possessed" by any object - "possessed" is a judgement, existing solely in conceptual space.

Each and every one of them also has temporal extent, which means they can be measured not only with how long they are in space, but how long they exist in time.

Interesting. The masurement of time is always just that- a measurement. Lao Tzu said "Without long there is no short" - kind of pre-empting Derrida, all that while back.

Here is the problem - it's deeperint he archaeology of the means by which we examine time than we normally think. To "measure" time requires a sense of temporal awareness - we simply have to move from one point in time to another in order to measure the temporal span of a thing. So we never step "outside" of the "sense" of time - so even fromt he point of view of someone who believes in objective perspectives, you never get an objective perspective on time - you are always using the thing you are measuring as anspect of the mechanism by which you measure itself. For example, how do I measure an hour? I wait an hour - or I get a clock that runs for an hour... Do I measure it into existence? A bit too crude, that, I think - but is getting to the point of it.

To say that time exists because we can measure it would require some means of measuring time that transcends time as the key measurement of time - kind of a tautological or "incestuous" proof otherwise - see Wittgenstein. But if we remove the human sense of time, then are generating a new concept? Isn't "time" actually a concept relating to human experience of states of events changing, and a sense of connectivity between them? Connectivity is also a conceptual creation - see Hume.

But,t hat all being by the by, to say that "time exists" never narrows down what time is, in ym view - it just widens the meaning of "existence"... see Heidegger.

The Hundred Years War, for instance, occurred in England and France over a 116 year period. Spatially, it had an amorphous extent that cannot strictly be referred to in terms of length and breadth, but if you want to speak of maxima only, then it had a spatial length and breadth, as well as a height. It also had a temporal extent, of 116 years.

Well, interesting example because the Hundred Years War was actually a series of wars. What you are pointing out there is how humans like to categorise "mass amounts" of onformation by "folding" them into neat conceptual packets. Looking back, we have generated the concept of "the Hundred Years War" but did the thing we mean by that even exist at the time for the people involved? The experienced wars - but the concept of "The HUndred Years War" is an external "folding" of information - "The HUndred Years War" is not an event, it's a label for an event, replete with modern judgements. See Foucault.

When we ask whether time is an illusion, what are we asking?

We're asking if we can further refine language use which is being pushed to the extent of its lmeaning.

Is this extent real? What the heck does that mean? Between the beginning and the end of the war, the Earth orbited the sun 116 times; that's all the statement means.

That's what time is. It is not illusory to say that the Earth revolved around the sun 116 times between the beginning and end of the war; it's a factually correct statement.

Well, to my mind what you are saying there is "Why would I ever need to look at the complex way language is related to meaning? After all, my everyday language use is perfectly adequate for describing the world."

Which is cool. To paraphrase Gramsci, common sense is the practical ideology of the ruling paradigm. But, measuring the meaning of a thing from within its own meaning system is a bit like proving that hours exist by waiting an hour - seems right, at first, and seems pointless to question.

What is the difference between reifying time and reifying "change" but not calling it time? A physical object need not change to have temporal extent, so it seems to me that the only difference is that they do not really refer to the same thing. Nonetheless, they are both properties of objects, not objects themselves, so if we reify one, why not the other? If we simply want to say that time is not fundamental to the universe in that the universe could exist without any passage of time, fine, but human intelligence is not fundamental to the universe either, and neither are human personalities or human bodies. Does that mean there is a meaningful sense in which we do not exist?

Well, tell you who should ask about that- The Buddha. Buddhist philosophy is based on a profound concept relating to just that - the non-existence of self.

 

[Ghostfaith]

OK, then your argument derives from a contradiction, for "two different words" never denote the "same concept". Every word (except proper names) is a symbol for a single unique concept that stands for an infinite number of entities of a certain kind.

Hi Rade - I don't thinkthat's true. Bit of Plato in your thinking there? Not that that's a bad thing, lol.

The relationship between words and concepts is a bit tricker than that, I'm afraid. The meaning of a wordisn't just "given" - it relies on context. All of our concepts are a bit "fuzzy" until defined by context. It's not true to say that one word=one definite concept.

Even proper names - if someone loves you, and someone hates you, they use the same noun to describe you, but have completely different concepts of what "you" means. Point being that concepts exist in conceptual space - not "out there" with perfect, idealised meanings. The same word can have thousands of different meanngs - in fact, each time it is used is a unique use - see Wittgenstein.

Until you have integrated a mental unit by means of a specific word, you cannot form "a concept".

Well that just can not be true. Concepts are not only linguistic, and even linguistic concepts don't necessarily impart concrete meaning. What does "be cool" mean, concretely? What does "blow me!" mean? Its literal sense, or something else?

 

[Ghostfaith]

You are correct, “we can never know”;

Well, that depends on "know", of course - and also on how we use knowledge. If we want to build on our premises, thinking that the "direction of knowledge" is always like that - going forwards, conclusion upon premise and so on - then we can generate posers that we can't asnwer ad infinitum. But that's about how language workd, not about how the universe works. For example, asking if time exists is a question about linguistics, masquerading as a question about the universe.

Knowledge can have a reversed direction - insteadof building on our premises to answer questions, we can investigate the archaeology of our conceptual structures, to find out why the questions gained meaning in the first place.

We CAN know - or at least, we can be aware of and understand EVERYTHING that is within our conceptual structure - because we ourselves bought the meaning of every aspect of it at every stage. Langauge is full of contradictions - it is always a "dirty tool" for deconstructing itself, and yet, that is only a problem if we are still obsessed with the "forward direction of knowledge" - building linguistic models. In fact, awareness and understanding can be non-linguistic - and understanding ourlanguage use can generate non-linguistic understanding of howit artificially generates conceptual depth.

however, we must admit of the possibility that a true foundation exists: i.e., that a given attempt to communicate a specific ontology might be based upon a true foundation.

No - we don't have to admit that, in my view. In fact, we can prove that it doesn't exist, just by re-tracing the steps we used to generate our ontology.

"True" is an ideological creation, strictly within that meaning-set - so we can demonstrate to ourselves absoloutely that there is no "true" base.

After all, it seems everyone believes their personal ontology is valid; one of them (the billions which exist) could be right.

That presupposes that everyone is processing information in the same way. Many people actively approach information by negating it - even their own beliefs and methods.

Again, you cannot know that it is true; however, you can certainly determine if it is false.

Yes - I agree, although of course "false" is also an ideological creation... "bonded" to it is the ideology of "true"... But I agree - we can dismantle our meaning structures and show how things are "artificial" - rather than false, to my mind.

Any specific ontology exists because it explains reality to the person who believes in it.

I agree. Scenario fulfillment.

 

[Rade]

...The meaning of a word isn't just "given" - it relies on context. All of our concepts are a bit "fuzzy" until defined by context. It's not true to say that one word=one definite concept...

Thank you for your interest in my comments. I agree that concepts cannot be formed outside a context, and that the "meaning" of a word is not just given as an axiom. When it is claimed, as in my previous post, that "Every word (except proper names) is a symbol for a single unique concept that stands for an infinite number of entities of a certain kind", what is being claimed is that a "word" for concept [A] is nothing more than a symbol used to communicate the contextual relationship between the {a}, {a'}, {a''} concrete units of [A], and that the "word" has no meaning other than that of the concept [A] it symbolizes. And here we do not have a theory of concept formation from our dear ancient Plato, but from our dear contemporary Ayn Rand. Thus, it most clearly is true to say that one word = one concept if you accept the Rand theory of concept formation, for as she wrote : "Every word we use (with the exception of proper names) is a symbol that denotes a concept, i.e., that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind" (A. Rand, 1979, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology"). Of course one cannot understand such a statement in a vacuum, one must read Rand.

 

[mosassam]

it doesn't address what causes the observed "time dilation" effects.

Trying miserably to get even a superficial grasp of Relativity. A quick question or two about time dilation. Does the relative difference between two time measuring devices represent two different "Now"s? Or, does the difference represent a change in the relationship/interconnectedness of the two devices in the same Now moment? Or, most probably, does it represent something mind-bendingly different?
I'm not sure if 'represent' is the right word
(in fact, I'm not sure of much!)

 

[B.E.M]

Hi, I actually thought it was the concept of a 'now' (that time flows past)rather than time, which physics does not seem to require. Is there a good duscussion on this?

(I read the first couple of pages of this thread and the last couple. Learnt nothing, but my brain hurts.. apologies if all this was covered concisely between 3 and 16 )

 

[Ghostfaith]

Thank you for your interest in my comments.

You are welcome.

I agree that concepts cannot be formed outside a context, and that the "meaning" of a word is not just given as an axiom.

Hmmm.. interesting *sub message* to what you are saying there... as if it is *almost* given, maybe? Understanding that meanings are defined and applied is important, in my view - otherwise wordslike *reality* and *consciousness* would not be still causing such massive debate. But, even within those debates all that really happens is that the terms are re-defined -never explained. A change of contextual elements simply "widens the cradle", so to speak.

When it is claimed, as in my previous post, that "Every word (except proper names) is a symbol for a single unique concept that stands for an infinite number of entities of a certain kind", what is being claimed is that a "word" for concept [A] is nothing more than a symbol used to communicate the contextual relationship between the {a}, {a'}, {a''} concrete units of [A], and that the "word" has no meaning other than that of the concept [A] it symbolizes.

I am clear on what you are saying. I personally challenge "just" when people say "I am just saying..." or "It just means..." and I encourage others to do so also. Nothing is "just..." nothing at all - nothig is, everything has become.

"Just" allows un-noticed pre-suppostions to infect your thinking. It does not "just" mean that at all. Simply by using symbols to relate an idea -as in the example - you have distorted perception of it by causing the observer to unconsciously associate the symbol-base you are using with an actual state of affairs - i.e. his own word use - which generates a completely artificial sense. This is an "Analogy osmosis" whereby the analogy affects our perception of the thing that we hoped to makle clearer.

When it is claimed, as in my previous post, that "Every word (except proper names)

That in itself shows a lack of clarity of thought - hopefully on Rand's part, becuase I am not really greatly impressed by Rand, to be honest. People are also concepts - inability to distinguish between a conceptual sturcture and an actual thing it refers to is a basic error in thought. Think about anyone you know. The "concept" of them exists whether they are in the roolwith you, away, or dead. The name you use for them does not refer to "them" it refers to your concept of them, and only sometimes to their actual physical mass. There is a difference between "where is David?" and "David is very nice!"

is a symbol for a single unique concept that stands for an infinite number of entities of a certain kind",

That's just pop philosophy to me. All concepts are unique if we define unique in specific ways. I'm reminded of Wittgenstein drawing a circle and saying is it a circle? And then exploring the ontology of circles - pointing out that every circleis unique, and only *exists* as a circle within mental human categories.

To say that single concepts "stand" for an infinite number of entities of a certain kind is just not true - it's meaningless word play, based on artificial senses being applied to things like "entitiy" - it doesn't define what a colour is in any way, it just fuzzy-fies "entitiy" so that it can include colour.

Most of all, it fails to understand that language doesn't work as a coded map of objective reality, it works entirely within its own structures - it is not only the "map" but also the "mapped". Colours don't "exist" at all, except as human concepts, so all human word play regarding colour remains entirely within a conceptual nexus.

what is being claimed is that a "word" for concept [A] is nothing more than a symbol used to communicate the contextual relationship between the {a}, {a'}, {a''} concrete units of [A], and that the "word" has no meaning other than that of the concept [A] it symbolizes.

Bah - it's a round about way of saying nothing. I'm reminded of Piero Sraffa's insulting gesture to Wittgenstein.

And here we do not have a theory of concept formation from our dear ancient Plato, but from our dear contemporary Ayn Rand.

Well, I'm thinking replace "is a symbol for a single unique concept" with "Ideal form" and " that stands for an infinite number of entities of a certain kind" with well, infinite variations, and it's just a kind of muddled up, re-hashed Plato. Not as smart or original as Plato, I'll grant you.

Thus, it most clearly is true

I'm sorry? Could you please say that again?

And here we do not have a theory of concept formation from our dear ancient Plato, but from our dear contemporary Ayn Rand. Thus, it most clearly is true"

Is clearly true because Ayn Rand said it? No wonder people think she is some kind of cult figurehead, lol. It's clearly true at all - it's not even true, never mind clearly true. Rand never properly questrions her own ideological assumptions relating to objectivism - which accounts for a lot of this muddle.

to say that one word = one concept if you accept the Rand theory of concept formation, for as she wrote : "Every word we use (with the exception of proper names) is a symbol that denotes a concept, i.e., that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind" (A. Rand, 1979, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology"). Of course one cannot understand such a statement in a vacuum, one must read Rand.

Understanding it is easy. Understand why it is wrong - that is another matter.

 

[Doctordick]

Well it's hard to say whether I am interpreting your text correctly. You are saying that the valid ontology is a set (of rules?)

No, you are apparently getting things backwards. Saying that "a valid ontology is a set" is certainly not saying "every set is an ontology". I am simply saying that, whatever a "valid ontology" might be (and, with regard to this statement, it makes utterly no difference as to what it is), it can be regarded as a set because a set can be a collection of "anything". The only reason I put forth this assertion is because I want to be able to use a vocabulary which allows me to refer to an element of this "valid ontology" without requiring that I define the element.

... and any consequent knowledge of reality is associated with this set one way or another... Are you talking about some kind of bottom-most set of knowledge from which everything else we know of follows?

Philosophers divide issues into two different categories, ontology and epistemology. Take a look at "Definitions of Ontology on the Web". For example, "An ontology is a controlled vocabulary that describes objects and the relations between them in a formal way, and has a grammar for using the vocabulary terms to express something meaningful within a specified domain of interest. The vocabulary is used to make queries and assertions. Ontological commitments are agreements to use the vocabulary in a consistent way for knowledge sharing.[/color] ..." An ontology is what stands behind your logical arguments: i.e., what your explanation of reality (the epistemology you propose) presumes to exists.

When you say there are elements in the valid ontology of which we are ignorant, are you just saying there currently are elements of which we are ignorant, or that there must always be elements of which we are ignorant or otherwise we cannot function?

If, "a valid ontology" is to be identified with "reality" (i.e., what really exists) then certainly you must accept the fact that, no matter what ontology you might believe to be "valid", the possibility exists that there is some element of reality (that valid ontology) of which you are ignorant (to think otherwise is to believe you are infallible).

I am saying three very simple things: first, any ontology can be referred to as a set; second, an acceptable epistemology must be based on reality in some way (i.e., it is reasonable to presume there are aspects of that valid ontology in our beliefs) and third, there are truths (valid ontological elements) of which we are ignorant.

Either way, I can't see how I could disagree.

Neither can I. Do I take that to mean you will accept those three assertions as objectively true statements?

At the same time I'm thinking that perhaps your further assertions give me a better idea about what you are saying...

I don't know what further assertions you are talking about. I only asked you about those three.

Let me know if you will accept those three statements as a valid presentation of the problem -- Dick

PS Rade has once again reaffirmed that he has utterly no interest in exact science but would much rather do his best to create a mock battle by searching out obscure methods of misinterpreting what I say.

 

[Rade]

(most recent post)

I am saying three very simple things:
first, any ontology can be referred to as a set;
second, an acceptable epistemology must be based on reality in some way (i.e., it is reasonable to presume there are aspects of that valid ontology in our beliefs)
third, there are truths (valid ontological elements) of which we are ignorant.

PS Rade has once again reaffirmed that he has utterly no interest in exact science but would much rather do his best to create a mock battle by searching out obscure methods of misinterpreting what I say.

Hello again Doctordick. But I do have an interest in what you have to say, and I see that you took a very great interest in my previous post because I now read above that you have significantly modified your "three simple things" (what you view as axioms of your philosophy) in direct response to my critical review. Now, such a response by you in reaction to my comments is not an example of a "mock battle"--I call it good thinking on your part.

Just so you (and others) are clear about what I say here, let us take a look at how you stated your "three simple things" before you read my post a few days ago:

(Previous post, a few days ago)

There are at least three things which I think I can correctly say about that unknown "valid ontology" I would like to talk about.
First, it {eg, valid ontology}fulfills the definition of "a set"...
Second, any reasonable understanding of "the universe" must be based in some way upon that "valid ontology"; that is no more than saying that any reasonable understanding of the universe should be based on the universe...
third, And finally, it is quite reasonable to presume there are elements of that "valid ontology" of which we are ignorant and which would most probably be destructive to our most well thought out speculative edifices.

Now, as to your "first simple thing" we see that you now (most recently) hold that "any" ontology can be referred to as a set, whereas, just a few days ago you limited your argument to a very specific type of ontology, what you then called a "valid ontology" (thus clearly a non-valid ontology cannot be referred to as a set). But I ask, how can an axiomatic concept so simple change its form so quickly in your mind, unless it really is/was not in your mind as simple ?

Then, as to your "second simple thing" we read that you now remove completely the concept of the "universe" (after I explained to you that its use was improper), but more significantly, we read that the entire logical structure of this second axiomatic "thing" has been modified to discuss "reality" and not the "universe", which are two completely different concepts. Again I ask (and not in mocking voice) how can a "thing" so very simple completely change form in your mind in a few days ?

As to your "third very simple thing" I see only that it has changed form, yet the meaning appears to be intact--but again, if the words you used just a few days ago were so simply known to you as "correct" (your word), I ask, why have they changed at all ?

How can you seriously expect me (and others) to believe that you have discovered some new philosophy already worked out in your mind long ago based on axioms (eg, simple things) that you now change in meaning from one day to another ? No mock battles here Doctordick, just the inconvenient reality of the truth of the words you express.

 

[Rade]

Understanding it is easy. Understand why it is wrong - that is another matter.

Dear Ghostfaith--I am constantly amused at the reaction of professional philosophers to the name (and philosophy) of Ayn Rand. Of course nothing you have stated above meets the bar of being a critical review of the statement I cited by Rand (the one that you "understand why it is wrong"), for the simple reason that you do not show in your post (1) any knowledge of how Rand derives her theory of concepts from axiomatic statements and then defines the two critical aspects of the statement--"words" and "concepts" and their logical connection, nor (2) did you provide any alternative theory of concepts (and words) to support your "correct understanding" as opposed to Rands "false understanding".

But, this thread about "is time an illusion" is no place for serious discussion about philosophy that links "words" and "concepts" -- so I will start a new thread on the topic, and I hope you will join the discussion.

 

[mosassam]

But, this thread about "is time an illusion"

Hurrah, someone finally noticed.
Can anyone help - it seems established that Time is an abstract notion that has no objective reality. If so, how does "time dilation" occur, surely this demonstrates the objective existence of time. If not, what does it demonstrate?
PS is it possible for DoctorDick and AnssiH to have their own thread where they can discuss DD's big theorem without interruption, and maybe a separate thread for discussion of their progress?

 

[AnssiH]

Trying miserably to get even a superficial grasp of Relativity. A quick question or two about time dilation. Does the relative difference between two time measuring devices represent two different "Now"s?

I assume you mean the relative difference of the (timewise) speed of two time measuring devices(?)

Or, does the difference represent a change in the relationship/interconnectedness of the two devices in the same Now moment? Or, most probably, does it represent something mind-bendingly different?
I'm not sure if 'represent' is the right word
(in fact, I'm not sure of much!)

Well I think I understand what you are asking about.

In the most straightforward interpretation of relativity each measuring device has got their own "now"-moment that includes different events simultaneously. I.e. the objects do not share simultaneity. This is often suggested to be unequivocally true and this is also what Einstein often asserted to be what reality is like.

But actually relativity of simultaneity is not observable at all. Only time dilation is. This is why all the talk about the topology of events before, and that is what Einstein himself also noted at some point.

So there is no way to devise an experiment that could tell us whether or not in reality there is such a thing as a universal "now"-moment after all and time dilation is just "a change in the relationship/interconnectedness of the two devices in the same Now moment?", because the experiment devices are also physical objects that obey all the laws they are "measuring" (i.e. they cannot measure what spacetime is like without existing outside of spacetime).

Which just reminds us that relativity is a model, and your questions are basically about how should we interpret the model.

I hope I answered the right question.

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

Hi, I actually thought it was the concept of a 'now' (that time flows past)rather than time, which physics does not seem to require. Is there a good duscussion on this?

No, apparently :)

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

No, you are apparently getting things backwards. Saying that "a valid ontology is a set" is certainly not saying "every set is an ontology". I am simply saying that, whatever a "valid ontology" might be (and, with regard to this statement, it makes utterly no difference as to what it is), it can be regarded as a set because a set can be a collection of "anything". The only reason I put forth this assertion is because I want to be able to use a vocabulary which allows me to refer to an element of this "valid ontology" without requiring that I define the element.

Okay, if I'm reading you correctly, then I cannot agree that this should be considered "necessarily true".

Am I right to assume that what you are saying is the same as asserting; "what exists is a set", i.e. that reality is made of a number of things (where "thing" can refer to a force or a law or "anything") rather than just one thing?

The view where this cannot be said to be true is incidentally the view that I hold. To point out some "thing that exists" is to assume metaphysical identity to some stable pattern. That is, to assume that a rock is something that has got temporal and spatial identity to it even when we don't define it that way (as oppose to being more accurately kind of a "stable pattern" we care to name). Of course we cannot say that the rock certainly does have metaphysical identity (even one of a "pattern"); that it is metaphysically "one thing". (This is obviously different from asking whether or not the rock exists. It just questions its ontological nature)

Extrapolating this to anything we can point at leads me to think that it is intrinsic to the brain to classify reality into "things" (forces, objects), to assume identity to stable patterns ("stable behaviour", if you will), in order to build a predictive model of reality.

That is to say that we cannot understand any system without breaking it into elements that have got stable identity to themselves in our minds. When we find different perspectives to understand the same system, we are basically just braking it into different sorts of elements that nevertheless form a working predictive model. Hence I say our worldview is made of semantical elements.

In the questions of ontology we ask what are the elements that are more than semantics; what is the set that truly exists. And here I would like to point out that just because our understanding is intrinsically about classifying reality into a (semantical) set of elements, it is also limited to think of or to comprehend anything as a set of elements. This doesn't mean that reality must also be made of a set of some sort. It may be that to classify reality into a set is to confuse its true nature, so to speak.

Am I just confused about what you are saying, or would you say the first assumption is not necessarily true anymore?

Are you talking about some kind of bottom-most set of knowledge from which everything else we know of follows?

Philosophers divide issues into two different categories, ontology and epistemology. Take a look at "Definitions of Ontology on the Web". For example, "An ontology is a controlled vocabulary that describes objects and the relations between them in a formal way, and has a grammar for using the vocabulary terms to express something meaningful within a specified domain of interest. The vocabulary is used to make queries and assertions. Ontological commitments are agreements to use the vocabulary in a consistent way for knowledge sharing.[/color] ..." An ontology is what stands behind your logical arguments: i.e., what your explanation of reality (the epistemology you propose) presumes to exists.

Yeah, and epistemology is also in many ways "standing behind" ontology (can't form ontology without knowledge and without also considering what and how knowledge is, like I did above)

I've always found it really hard to keep ontology and epistemology as separated discussions because they are married to such an extent. The reasoning just goes round and round from one to another. This is related to when I say our worldview is without a root; that it is a self-supporting structure without any explicit truth to our knowledge.

This is why I asked if in your view there exists a root to our knowledge when we dig deep enough, as oppose to all ontological assertions being capable of only supporting each others (to form a self-coherent worldview but nothing more).

If, "a valid ontology" is to be identified with "reality" (i.e., what really exists) then certainly you must accept the fact that, no matter what ontology you might believe to be "valid", the possibility exists that there is some element of reality (that valid ontology) of which you are ignorant (to think otherwise is to believe you are infallible).

Yeah I agree that "there exists the possibility that there are elements of reality of which we are ignorant", or a more proper way to word it considering what I said above; "we don't necessarily know everything about reality".

And additionally, in my particular view I assume there necessarily is something of which we are ignorant, in the sense that we are limited to classifying reality into objects when at the same time we understand we can do this in great many ways without giving up any predictive powers and it is not given that there is any sort of "correct way" to classify reality into elements.

I am saying three very simple things: first, any ontology can be referred to as a set; second, an acceptable epistemology must be based on reality in some way (i.e., it is reasonable to presume there are aspects of that valid ontology in our beliefs) and third, there are truths (valid ontological elements) of which we are ignorant.
Neither can I. Do I take that to mean you will accept those three assertions as objectively true statements?

If I understood you correctly this time, then I don't readily agree with the first assertion...

The second assertion, well, I certainly would not accept any epistemology that is not in line with an ontological assertions, but they pretty much necessarily are in line with each others as long as they are found from the same self-coherent worldview (i.e. are believed by the same person). So I can say I basically agree.

The third I agree with as well.

I don't know what further assertions you are talking about. I only asked you about those three.

I was referring to you saying "If you can accept these three statements as representing a "correct" foundation for the study of ontology, I will present my first revelation consistent with that foundation."

I thought perhaps your revelation would explain to me better why you set those three assertions the way you did. Because I am not quite sure if you are saying what I think you are.

Perhaps it would also be helpful to hear what led you to those assertions.

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

Hurrah, someone finally noticed.
Can anyone help - it seems established that Time is an abstract notion that has no objective reality. If so, how does "time dilation" occur, surely this demonstrates the objective existence of time. If not, what does it demonstrate?

Referring to my previous post to you (#264), in common terms it either demonstrates the objective existence of time, or that the physically observable motion of objects proceeds at different speeds in different conditions (any time measuring device is more properly a "motion measuring device"; any clock has got internal motion whose speed defines how much time it measures, atomic clocks measure the motion of the atom, etc...)

I.e. you can look at it as if there are objects that move through time dimension at different rates, or as if there are objects that just move (internally) at different rates in certain conditions. Both perspectives give you the same physically observable behaviour. And both raise many difficult questions.

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Am I right to assume that what you are saying is the same as asserting; "what exists is a set", i.e. that reality is made of a number of things (where "thing" can refer to a force or a law or "anything") rather than just one thing?

Yes, I am asserting that "what exists is a set"; however, as far as being accurate goes, a set can consist of "just one thing"; in fact, the existence of the "NULL" set implies that a set can consist of nothing at all. It follows that the first statement makes utterly no constraint as to what this "valid ontology" consists of. As I said, the only reason I put it in was to provide me with a vocabulary for referring to elements of reality.

Hence I say our worldview is made of semantical elements.

A collection of "semantical elements" is a set; so your view is certainly included. Certainly it is possible that a "valid" set of semantical elements might exist; if that is the case than that set could at least be called a reference to a "valid ontology".

This doesn't mean that reality must also be made of a set of some sort. It may be that to classify reality into a set is to confuse its true nature, so to speak.

Now that assertion you will have to clarify. What you are saying is that something exists which cannot be thought of as a set. How would you handle the set, "that which exists"?

Yeah, and epistemology is also in many ways "standing behind" ontology (can't form ontology without knowledge and without also considering what and how knowledge is, like I did above)

A defined ontology certainly requires an acceptable epistemology for justification, but that doesn't imply the "defined ontology" is valid. That is exactly why I wish to work with an undefined ontology.

I've always found it really hard to keep ontology and epistemology as separated discussions because they are married to such an extent. The reasoning just goes round and round from one to another.

This is a direct result of limiting your interest to "defined ontologies".

This is related to when I say our worldview is without a root; that it is a self-supporting structure without any explicit truth to our knowledge.

Saying it is "a self-supporting structure" is quite a different thing from saying it is "without any explicit truth", and the difference is a critical element.

This is why I asked if in your view there exists a root to our knowledge when we dig deep enough, as oppose to all ontological assertions being capable of only supporting each others (to form a self-coherent worldview but nothing more).

This is a question to be laid aside until the issue of creating that "self-supporting structure" is completely understood. So let us not worry about it for the time being.

And additionally, in my particular view I assume there necessarily is something of which we are ignorant, in the sense that we are limited to classifying reality into objects when at the same time we understand we can do this in great many ways without giving up any predictive powers and it is not given that there is any sort of "correct way" to classify reality into elements.

My only complaint with this comment is that it is a mere opinion and we shouldn't be concerned with opinions here. Not if we are intending to be exact about our conclusions.

If I understood you correctly this time, then I don't readily agree with the first assertion...

In that case, I want to know why you think that assertion is invalid.

I was referring to you saying "If you can accept these three statements as representing a "correct" foundation for the study of ontology, I will present my first revelation consistent with that foundation."

I thought perhaps your revelation would explain to me better why you set those three assertions the way you did. Because I am not quite sure if you are saying what I think you are.

Perhaps it would also be helpful to hear what led you to those assertions.

What led me to those assertions is the fact that philosophers talk about ontologies all the time without making any statements as to what a valid ontology should be. How can you look for something if you have no idea as to what it is you are looking for?

I am still waiting for your response -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

Yes, I am asserting that "what exists is a set"; however, as far as being accurate goes, a set can consist of "just one thing"; in fact, the existence of the "NULL" set implies that a set can consist of nothing at all. It follows that the first statement makes utterly no constraint as to what this "valid ontology" consists of. As I said, the only reason I put it in was to provide me with a vocabulary for referring to elements of reality.

I see. So this also means you recognize that we cannot comprehend the functions (derive any predictions) of any system without classifying it into a set of components that we assume to exhibit such and such behaviour under such and such conditions?

A collection of "semantical elements" is a set; so your view is certainly included. Certainly it is possible that a "valid" set of semantical elements might exist; if that is the case than that set could at least be called a reference to a "valid ontology".

Yeah, although then the case would be that the best we can do is to have a reference to a valid ontology (instead of actually having the valid ontology itself). And I don't actually expect there is a valid set of semantical elements. But that is just an opinion too. :)

This doesn't mean that reality must also be made of a set of some sort. It may be that to classify reality into a set is to confuse its true nature, so to speak.

Now that assertion you will have to clarify. What you are saying is that something exists which cannot be thought of as a set. How would you handle the set, "that which exists"?

Now here's the beef. I cannot actually "handle" any system without classifying it into such a set, and this is why it seems to me that everything is made of some sort of fundamental set (of elements). This is how I think, but it is not necessarily how things are at all. When you try to "figure out" any system you form a mental image about how it works by assuming some components that behave in some predictable ways (so to be able to predict the behaviour of the system, which is what "figuring it out" means). This is clearly a good survival method; to make meaningful predictions about reality around you.

What this has to do with ontology is that we cannot presume reality must be made of some fundamental set of elements. This is not that different from what people like Thomas Kuhn are observing, only I don't only question the reality of the elements that exist in our most succesfull models of reality, but I also question the ontological validity of defining reality into any sort of "set".

This is not to question the validity of such a thing as far as making predictions go. It is entirely possible that we can define a set of elements that produces 100% success rate for our predictions, but we still could not know whether our particular method of classification is true to reality in any ontological sense.

Also I would like to say that whether or not this is valid philosophy, it certainly seems like a useful paradigm in that it makes you more aware of the distinction between models and reality. It makes you ask yourself more readily questions like, where does the boundary between atom and space lie (and subsequently what do we mean by space and why should we expect it to be a valid concept at all, etc...)

I.e. it gives you some ideas about epistemology that most people seem to be completely ignorant of.

Keep in mind that to classify reality into a set is to assume metaphysical identity onto some stable patterns. We often do this while knowing it is physically unjustified (according to our best physical models). Like when we assume identity onto a shadow (we think it is the same shadow over some space and time region, while knowing this is not "really" so; we just see it so semantically). I.e. I am noting that it could be wrong to assume metaphysical identity to ANYTHING (temporal nor spatial, and this includes the identity we tend to assume to "space" and "time" also)

This would also mean that it is not more valid to see reality as a one big canvas either. This would be a case of assuming identity to this canvas without justification (which would constraint us to define all the other phenomena accordingly).

This is what I meant when I claimed we are not playing 21 questions with the nature but all by ourselves, and this is why I've been claiming ontology is unanswerable; because the very method with which we comprehend reality is not a method for answer it.

So, is this something you have already considered and come to conclude that we can still say valid ontology certainly is some kind of a set?

Saying it is "a self-supporting structure" is quite a different thing from saying it is "without any explicit truth", and the difference is a critical element.

Can you still try and explain what the difference is, because I don't think I got it...?

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

Oh, I just thought of an analogy which, while not completely elegant, should give you a better idea of what I'm trying to say.

Imagine a being that is only able to conceive reality in form of numbers and mathematical formulas (and performs predictions this way).

So whatever the true nature of reality might be, that being can only think and perceive numbers and formulas, and since it can perform accurate predictions with many different formulas, it can only come to ask such ontological question as, what is the real fundamental formula with which nature itself calculates its functions (motion).

We on the other hand conceive reality in form of semantical things. Everything we see are different things in interaction with each others. The ontological question we ask is thus "what are the THINGS that really exist".

So I am questioning if this is a valid ontological question at all. It is possible, if not even likely, that to ask what "things" exist is already presupposing too much. It is not given that reality performs its functions in terms of "things in interaction", just because our thinking works this way (for clear evolutionary reasons). So if that is the case, we can at most come to form a 100% accurate MODEL of reality, but we cannot form more sublime understanding (which is what ontology would be asking for).

If I understand your assertion about "set" correctly, it seems to me that you are presupposing in true ontology there are "things" (with real metaphysical identity)