I Issues on notation and concept of entanglement

  • #101
vanhees71 said:
But that's what's behind what he is saying!
The way I see it, you deeply disagree with Schwartz. He seems to be saying that gauge invariance is just a convenient mathematical trick which makes some calculations easier, while you seem to saying that gauge invariance is a deep truth without which it is absolutely impossible to get correct physical results.
 
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  • #103
Demystifier said:
I am fine with that, but then I can't understand why do you often praise the book on Bohmian mechanics by Durr.
The book (Verständliche Quantenmechanik: Drei mögliche Weltbilder der Quantenphysik) is not just on Bohmian mechanics. But it is indeed well written, easy to read, and clears up quite some confusion.

But I also share your confusion, because that book also talks about relativistic Bohm-Dirac theory, but vanhees71 seemed pretty sure that there is no such thing.
 
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  • #104
gentzen said:
But I also share your confusion, because that book also talks about relativistic Bohm-Dirac theory, but vanhees71 seemed pretty sure that there is no such thing.
Yes, but in this case I can understand @vanhees71 because this theory is a Bohmian interpretation of relativistic QM, not of relativistic QFT, while @vanhees71 thinks that relativistic QM is wrong even in an orthodox form.
 
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  • #105
Demystifier said:
The way I see it, you deeply disagree with Schwartz. He seems to be saying that gauge invariance is just a convenient mathematical trick which makes some calculations easier, while you seem to saying that gauge invariance is a deep truth without which it is absolutely impossible to get correct physical results.
Well, it may well depend on a reader's opinion which meaning he reads into the words of an author.

In my understanding what Schwartz does here is to underline the important difference between global symmetries, which indeed have observational consequences in terms of conservation laws a la Noether, while a local gauge symmetry indicates a redundancy in the description of the dynamics of a physical model.

Let's stick with electrodynamics and Abelian gauge symmetry. On the quite general level we are discussing here there's not so much difference for the more general non-Abelian case.

In classical electrodynamics the Maxwell equations summarize about 200 years of empirical knowledge about electromagnetic phenomena in terms of fields, at the time a brand-new concept discovered by Faraday to solve the old enigma of actions at a distance disturbing the physicists since Newton's gravitational froce law (including Newton himself). The Maxwell equations are written in terms of the observable fields ##\vec{E}## and ##\vec{B}## (the electric and magnetic field or taken together the electromagnetic field) and the charge-current densities ##\rho## and ##\vec{j}##.

Using the homogeneous Maxwell equations you get the potentials, i.e., there exists a scalar field ##\Phi## and a vector field ##\vec{A}## such that (working with natural Heaviside-Lorentz units with ##c=1##)
$$\vec{B}=\vec{\nabla} \times \vec{A}, \quad \vec{E}=-\vec{\nabla} \Phi - \partial_t \vec{A}.$$
Then it's immediately clear that the physical situation, given by ##\vec{E}## and ##\vec{B}##, is not in one-to-one correspondence with the potentials, because for given ##(\vec{E},\vec{B})## any other potentials connected to one solution by a gauge transformation
$$\vec{A}'=\vec{A}-\vec{\nabla} \chi, \quad \Phi'=\Phi+\partial_t \chi$$
leads to the same fields, because
$$\vec{\nabla} \times \vec{A}'=\vec{\nabla} \times \vec{A}=\vec{B}, \quad -\vec{\nabla} \Phi'-\partial_t \vec{A}' = -\vec{\nabla} \Phi-\partial_t \vec{A} + \partial_t \vec{\nabla} \chi -\vec{\nabla} \partial_t \chi=-\vec{\nabla} \Phi-\partial_t \vec{A}=\vec{E}.$$
So the physical fields ##\vec{E}## and ##\vec{B}## determine the potentials only modulo a gauge transformation with an arbitrary scalar field ##\chi## and thus the physics is not in the potentials but only in the potentials modulo a gauge transformation. A gauge transformation is not a symmetry, because it just expresses the redundancy of the description of the theory in terms of the potentials, i.e., the physical situation is described not uniquely by the potentials but only modulo a gauge transformation. In other words there are more field degrees of freedom used than are physical dynamical fields.

This becomes clear using the action principle. It turns out that the canonically conjugate field momentum of ##\Phi## is identically 0, i.e., ##\Phi## cannot be a true dynamical degree of freedom. This leads to characteristic trouble when trying to use canonical quantization and you either have to fix a gauge and then quantize canonically or you use the general formalism for Hamiltonian systems with constraints a la Dirac.

The upshot is that indeed a local gauge symmetry is not a symmetry as a global one. While the global symmetry before introducing the em. field of the free matter fields (usually Klein-Gordon or Dirac), i.e., the symmetry under multiplication with spacetime independent phase factors, yields the conservation law of a charge-like quantity in the "gauged version", i.e., after introduction of the electromagnetic field charge conservation follows from the Bianchi identity and not as an independent conservation law.

Another important conclusion, not correctly discussed in almost all textbooks on QFT (the one exception coming to my mind is Duncan, The conceptual framework of QFT), including my favorite Weinberg, is that local gauge symmetries cannot be spontaneously broken. Indeed, if you try to spontaneously break a local gauge theory you do not end up with a degenerate vacuum/ground state but with an equivalence class of different representations of the ground state connected by gauge transformations, i.e., the ground state is not degenerate as you might expect from the analogous case of a spontaneously broken global symmetry. In the latter case you get massless Goldstone modes as physical degrees of freedom, while for a local gauge symmetry indeed there are no such massless Goldstone modes, because the "would-be Goldstone fields" are just absorbed via a gauge transformation into the gauge fields, providing for the additional 3rd degree of freedom of a massive vector field and so providing a mass to the gauge fields (or some of the gauge fields depending on the pattern of the would-be symmetry breaking of the gauge group, as in the electroweak part of the standard model where you have four gauge fields based on the gauge group ##\mathrm{SU}(2) \times \mathrm{U}(1)##, which is "pseudo-broken" to ##\mathrm{U}(1)##, making three of the four gauge fields massive by eating up 3 would-be Goldstone modes into three of the gauge fields, which then get the W and Z boson fields and keeping one massless, describing the photon).

Another argument comes from the representation theory of the Poincare group. If you want to construct a microcausal theory of massless spin-1 fields you realize that it must be a gauge theory if you don't want continuous polarization degrees of freedom, which indeed is not observed in Nature.

What I understand Schwartz means with a "mere convenience" is that in perturbation theory you like to work with manifestly Dyson renormalizable models to calculate (a priori not physical!) proper vertex functions as building blocks to get S-matrix elements (physical!). It depends on a gauge whether the theory on the level of the proper vertex functions is manifestly renormalizable or not. E.g., if you try to work with physical field degrees of freedom for a Higgsed gauge theory, i.e., with the would-be Goldstone's absorbed and only having the corresponding massive gauge bosons the usual power counting doesn't work out anymore, because the gauge-field propgator is not of counting order ##-2## but of order ##0## (because of the contribution ##\propto k_{\mu} k_{\nu}/(m^2 k^2)## for a massive spin-1 field). However, you can choose another gauge ('t Hoofts ##R_{\xi}## gauge, where the gauge-field propagator indeed has the "right" power counting)). Then you have the would-be Goldstone fields left in the formalism, but they together with the usual Faddeev-Popov ghosts conspire to eliminate order by order in the loop/##\hbar## expansion of perturbation theory the also unphysical gauge-field degrees of freedom. The S-matrix is gauge invariant and the unitary gauge just is a limit of the ##R_{\xi}## gauges. This shows that the S-matrix depends only on physical degrees of freedom and is unitary and no causality/locality constraints are violated.
 
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  • #106
Demystifier said:
When you ask me, does it actually help?
It helps to understand your view. It does not help to see why you hold it!
 
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  • #107
gentzen said:
The book (Verständliche Quantenmechanik: Drei mögliche Weltbilder der Quantenphysik) is not just on Bohmian mechanics. But it is indeed well written, easy to read, and clears up quite some confusion.

But I also share your confusion, because that book also talks about relativistic Bohm-Dirac theory, but vanhees71 seemed pretty sure that there is no such thing.
As I said, I can appreciate a textbook that explains a theory well, which I don't consider useful. I can accept Bohmian the Bohmian interpretation for non-relativistic QM, because it doesn't contradict any observations nor is it intrinsically inconsistent. Nevertheless I don't think that it adds anything to minimal interpreted QM as a physical theory. Maybe some philosophers feel less uneasy having the illusion of a deterministic interpretation, and I generally think one should be tolerant concerning other people's (quasi-)religious believes.

What is inacceptable for me is a reinterpretation of a valid physical theory which violates the fundamental physical meaning of the theory. In the case of relativistic QFT there seems not to exist a Bohmian reinterpretation respecting causality in some way. The trouble is that a Bohmian theory must be nonlocal and it seems hard to find a nonlocal but still causal relativistic theory at all. I'm not sure, whether there aren't even "no-go theorems" to find such a theory, but I think it's pretty probable that such a no-go theorem may be valid.

It's also hard to believe that a consistent point-particle interpretation of relativistic QFT. Note that even (interacting) classical point-particle theories don't work in the relativistic realm. Even the standard mixed particle-field framework (classical relativistic electron theory a la Dirac) is flawed and can be made valid only in a very limited case as an effective theory (the Landau-Lifshitz approximation to the Abraham-Lorentz-Dirac equation is the best model one has today).

Also pure field theoretical approaches like the many models Einstein and Schrödinger investigated seem not to work.

BTW: The book by Dürr is available in English too now:
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783030400675
 
  • #108
vanhees71 said:
It's the only book, where I thought to understand what's behind Bohmian mechanics.
A quote from the book (Durr and Teufel, Bohmian Mechanics):
"It is often said that the aim of Bohmian mechanics is to restore determinism in the quantum world. That is false. Determinism has nothing to do with ontology. What is “out there” could just as well be governed by stochastic laws, as is the case in GRW or dynamical reduction models with, e.g., flash ontology [12, 13]. A realistic quantum theory is a quantum theory which spells out what it is about. Bohmian mechanics is a realistic quantum theory. It happens to be deterministic, which is fine, but not an ontological necessity. The merit of Bohmian mechanics is not determinism, but the refutation of all claims that quantum mechanics cannot be reconciled with a realistic description of reality."

If this little paragraph doesn't make sense to you, then you have absolutely no idea what's behind Bohmian mechanics.
 
  • #109
vanhees71 said:
Maybe some philosophers feel less uneasy having the illusion of a deterministic interpretation
No, they feel less uneasy having the illusion of an ontic interpretation. But of course, since ontic doesn't mean measurable or deterministic, for you it means absolutely nothing.
 
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  • #110
vanhees71 said:
What is inacceptable for me is a reinterpretation of a valid physical theory which violates the fundamental physical meaning of the theory.
I think I understand you now. "Reinterpretation" and "meaning" refer to philosophic or religious (rather than scientific) aspects of a theory. But since reinterpretations are unacceptable for you, it means that you are dogmatic about it, so in your case it's more a religion than a philosophy. Which is perfectly OK, many great physicists were religious. :smile:
 
  • #111
Demystifier said:
A quote from the book (Durr and Teufel, Bohmian Mechanics):
"It is often said that the aim of Bohmian mechanics is to restore determinism in the quantum world. That is false. Determinism has nothing to do with ontology. What is “out there” could just as well be governed by stochastic laws, as is the case in GRW or dynamical reduction models with, e.g., flash ontology [12, 13]. A realistic quantum theory is a quantum theory which spells out what it is about. Bohmian mechanics is a realistic quantum theory. It happens to be deterministic, which is fine, but not an ontological necessity. The merit of Bohmian mechanics is not determinism, but the refutation of all claims that quantum mechanics cannot be reconciled with a realistic description of reality."

If this little paragraph doesn't make sense to you, then you have absolutely no idea what's behind Bohmian mechanics.
Ok, there is a bit too much philosophical gibberish in the book too. SCNR.
 
  • #112
Demystifier said:
I think I understand you now. "Reinterpretation" and "meaning" refer to philosophic or religious (rather than scientific) aspects of a theory. But since reinterpretations are unacceptable for you, it means that you are dogmatic about it, so in your case it's more a religion than a philosophy. Which is perfectly OK, many great physicists were religious. :smile:
We are discussing all the time philosophical issues. For me there is no need at all for another interpretation than the standard minimal interpretation of relativistic QFT. Why should I introduce an interpretation for it which contradicts the fundamental concepts behind it, among them locality? I'm indeed at a loss, what you understand under "ontology". I thought, it's trying to answer the question what "really is". One answer is modern science, and in my opinion it's the only answer that makes sense, i.e., it is a method to make mental pictures (theories) about what really is based on objective observations of Nature.

If for an ontic interpretation you don't need determinism, then I don't know, why to bother about Bohmian mechanics at all, because for me the only merit is that for non-relativistic (and only for non-relativistic) QM it is a successful deterministic interpretation which does not contradict the very fondations of QM as a physical theory describing phenomena correctly within it's realm of validity. For relativistic QFT there seems not to be a version of Bohmian mechanics that is satisfactory, because it contradicts the very foundation of relativity, i.e., causality, which afaik is only realized in terms of local (quantum) fields, and at least the version you propose on your slides seems not to be consistent with this, particularly not for gauge theories, where you define the gauge fields (potentials) as observables.

This has nothing to do with religion or dogmatism but in the believe that a non-minimal interpretation is of little to no value if it contradicts the fundamental properties of the underlying conceptual framework of the minimally interpreted theory. In science minimal interpretations with the least unnecessary ballast are most useful.
 
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  • #113
vanhees71 said:
I'm indeed at a loss, what you understand under "ontology". I thought, it's trying to answer the question what "really is".
It is less about "what really is" and more about "what would be sufficient to exist". It is a (mathematical) model, and a model can need more or less "ontological commitments" for its constructions. Bohm's original proposal is quite "expensive" in this respect.

Just like for nonlocality, one can ask the question whether this is just an artifact of Bohm's original proposal, or whether this is nearly unavoidable for any similar model. And this question has indeed been asked and partially answered:
Quantum computing and hidden variables by Scott Aaronson, 2005 (https://journals.aps.org/pra/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevA.71.032325)
Exponential complexity and ontological theories of quantum mechanics by Alberto Montina, 2008 (https://journals.aps.org/pra/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevA.77.022104)
 
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  • #114
entropy1 said:
As a follow up question I want to put forward this: A singlet state of entangled particles is notated in a superposition of product states as: |up,down⟩−|down,up⟩. It is not clear to me if this singlet state describes measurement outcomes or wavefunctions. Nevertheless, when the measurement is done, it represents both measurement outcome and wavefunction.
I think it means to represent the wave function therefore it is actually interesting to bring those things into interactions to see if they interact differently from other states.

... So assume you would have two photon pairs in a |up,down⟩−|down,up⟩ i.e. 4 photons in total. Now let's take one out of each pair and bring then into a two photon HOM interference. Now that state actually makes a difference for the interaction itself and specifically the parts we think not locally present at the interference do play a role in the HOM calculation. The question is how indistinguishable the remaining part of the states are to make the mixing term interfere destructively.

But if there is doubt about distinguishibility, one should take into account that once a two photon interference was done, they become indistinguishible either way. So even if there was double about it on the one side of the experiment, when the other side of the experiments does the same, it becomes hard to find an argument why the interference shouldn't appear. But that would make it seem like the outcome depends on what the away side of the experiment decides to do, i.e. the interaction of such states does not look very local.
 
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