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## Main Question or Discussion Point

Gödel's incompleteness theorem only applies to logical languages with countable alphabets. So it does not rule out the possibility that one might be able to prove 'everything' in a language with an uncountable infinite alphabet.

Is that a loophole in Godel's Incompleteness Theorem?

Doesn't that imply that there can be monist conceptions of logic, and hence pluralism and instrumentalism are irrelevant or even invalid given that you could keep on expanding the countable alphabet up until infinity?

Is that a loophole in Godel's Incompleteness Theorem?

Doesn't that imply that there can be monist conceptions of logic, and hence pluralism and instrumentalism are irrelevant or even invalid given that you could keep on expanding the countable alphabet up until infinity?