robertjford80 said:
Show that Gödel's theorems should give someone who uses a calculator something to worry about.
You really ought to be more specific about which theorems of Gödel you mean. But assuming you mean the incompleteness theorems, then they have little applicability to calculator computations. Then again so does nearly the entirety of mathematics so that really says very little.
I'm also not quite sure that you're using inconsistent in the same way that I do. To me inconsistent means: 'leads to contradictions.'
This is, more or less, the correct notion of inconsistency.
What contradictions do Peano's Axioms lead to?
Probably none because we generally assume that PA is consistent. However the incompleteness theorems tell us the following two things:
- PA is either incomplete or inconsistent.
- If PA were consistent, then it could not prove its own consistency.
You seem to be confused about the meaning of incompleteness, so on this point refer to my response below.
You might even have a different meaning for 'incompleteness'. To me incompleteness means that you cannot prove the axioms.
My meaning of incompleteness is the standard one and yours is completely off the mark. What incompleteness roughly means is that there are statements expressible in our axiom schema that are neither provable nor unprovable. Note that within any particular such scheme the axioms are vacuously provable, and as a result, this is very different from not being able to prove axioms. I repeat: If you cannot understand this difference, then do not proselytize about the role of logic in mathematics. If you want the difference explained to you, then start a new thread about the matter.
So again, why are these theorems such a big deal? They are massively overhyped.
I agree that these theorems get over-hyped and as pwsnafu has already said the primary interest in these theorems is historical. What the theorems guarantee, however, is that any set of axioms strong enough to express most of modern mathematics will necessarily have undecidable statements*. So effectively the theorems tell us to stop looking for an all encompassing set of axioms for mathematics and instead just look for something sufficient.
*These undecidable statements are not the axioms of our set theory. Rather they are things like the Whitehead Problem or the Continuum Hypothesis or the existence of large cardinals.