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This came to me in the middle of the night. Literally. I got up and wrote it down at 4:09am. Having lain awake in bed pondering it for at-least an hour. I clearly need to get out more.
Scientific belief is a funny thing...
Inductivism hasn't had it easy in the last century or two. While most people, when asked 'what is scientific reasoning', or 'proof', would explain something along inductivist lines, philosophers of science have, in general, been moving away from it for sometime, to favour falsificationism.
Inductivism:
You observe the world, and make conclusions based on your observations. In its extreme (naive) interpretation, this makes coroberating experimental evidence "proof" of a theory. X is seen therefore A is true.
Falsificationism:
You conjecture, then, if your theory is not disproved by observed facts, it remains valid. Nothing can be proven. Only disproved. If evidence is not observable, the theory is not scientifically 'falsifiable'. Rendering it less scientifically meaningful. X is not seen, therefore A is not true.
It is far easier to argue the case for falsificationism. So its been winning most arguments for a while now.
But one of the arguments against inductivism is questionable...
David Hume raised the issue that there is no logical reason to believe the future will resemble the past. Despite this being incredibly counter intuitive. As such, basing belief of future reality on evidence (i.e. inducing it) is not a sound belief structure. This is often used as evidence against inductivism. Why should reality be temporally fractal (self similar over time)? Why are the laws of physics the same today as yesterday, but more importantly why do we believe them to be the same tomorrow?
While Einstein wasn't as fan of inductivism:
he may help squash this attack. At least little.
My thought that woke me up, was that Einstein's relativistic simulataneity means that one person's future is another person's present. And that events (reality) do not have a universal now. All phenomina are dependent on what some observer references will perceive as future events, and others present. Thus future events must be adhering to similar rules to those we are seeing, else unobservable events would be being observed by those observers.
For and excellent illustration of Einstein's Train/Embankment simulataneity Thought Experiment see: http://www.primacausa.com/relativity/animations/simultaneity_from_embarkment.html [Broken]
Now imagine if Hume were right. When M observes the two events, A and B (to him, occurring simultaneously) and M' has already seen event A' but is yet to see B' (the 3rd Key frame in the above link's illustration). While M knows the two events as fact, if the laws of physics changed for M' between this point in time and the next frame when he sees A' occur, A' would not be the same event (having been subject to different laws) as A (which is already observed fact). This incongruous reality would, to my mind, be paradoxical, and therefore 'evidence' of a fractal reality throughout time. In short a 'reason' to believe that the future will resemble the past.
Thoughts?
Scientific belief is a funny thing...
Inductivism hasn't had it easy in the last century or two. While most people, when asked 'what is scientific reasoning', or 'proof', would explain something along inductivist lines, philosophers of science have, in general, been moving away from it for sometime, to favour falsificationism.
Inductivism:
You observe the world, and make conclusions based on your observations. In its extreme (naive) interpretation, this makes coroberating experimental evidence "proof" of a theory. X is seen therefore A is true.
Falsificationism:
You conjecture, then, if your theory is not disproved by observed facts, it remains valid. Nothing can be proven. Only disproved. If evidence is not observable, the theory is not scientifically 'falsifiable'. Rendering it less scientifically meaningful. X is not seen, therefore A is not true.
It is far easier to argue the case for falsificationism. So its been winning most arguments for a while now.
But one of the arguments against inductivism is questionable...
David Hume raised the issue that there is no logical reason to believe the future will resemble the past. Despite this being incredibly counter intuitive. As such, basing belief of future reality on evidence (i.e. inducing it) is not a sound belief structure. This is often used as evidence against inductivism. Why should reality be temporally fractal (self similar over time)? Why are the laws of physics the same today as yesterday, but more importantly why do we believe them to be the same tomorrow?
While Einstein wasn't as fan of inductivism:
"Physics constitutes a logical system of thought which is in a state of evolution, whose basis (principles) cannot be distilled, as it were, from experience by an inductive method, but can only be arrived at by free invention. The justification (truth content) of the system rests in the verification of the derived propositions (a priori / logical truths) by sense experiences (a posteriori / empirical truths). ... Evolution is proceeding in the direction of increasing simplicity of the logical basis (principles). .. We must always be ready to change these notions - that is to say, the axiomatic basis of physics - in order to do justice to perceived facts in the most perfect way logically. (Einstein, Physics and Reality, 1936)"
he may help squash this attack. At least little.
My thought that woke me up, was that Einstein's relativistic simulataneity means that one person's future is another person's present. And that events (reality) do not have a universal now. All phenomina are dependent on what some observer references will perceive as future events, and others present. Thus future events must be adhering to similar rules to those we are seeing, else unobservable events would be being observed by those observers.
For and excellent illustration of Einstein's Train/Embankment simulataneity Thought Experiment see: http://www.primacausa.com/relativity/animations/simultaneity_from_embarkment.html [Broken]
Now imagine if Hume were right. When M observes the two events, A and B (to him, occurring simultaneously) and M' has already seen event A' but is yet to see B' (the 3rd Key frame in the above link's illustration). While M knows the two events as fact, if the laws of physics changed for M' between this point in time and the next frame when he sees A' occur, A' would not be the same event (having been subject to different laws) as A (which is already observed fact). This incongruous reality would, to my mind, be paradoxical, and therefore 'evidence' of a fractal reality throughout time. In short a 'reason' to believe that the future will resemble the past.
Thoughts?
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