Joint Response
I decided to respond to you three (Tom, FZ and LG) all in the same post because it helped me make a few points I wanted to make.
Originally posted by Tom
We have two kinds of logic: deductive and inductive.
The former is concerned with arguments whose premises give absolute support[/color] to their conclusions. . . . The latter is concerned with arguments whose premises give probable support[/color] to their conclusions. . . . Since those are the only two kinds of logic at our disposal, I state that absolute truths about reality (known absolutely!) are beyond the capacity of human logic.
Nicely reasoned. That is exactly the conclusion philosophers came to after two millennia of rationalistic speculation. It reminds me of a friend I had who was always dreaming big dreams, but doing little to realize them. In his dreams he was always on the verge of success, and so when friends tried to warn him he was headed for trouble, he would answer with some part of his perfect dream. He got away with that until the day reality came down on him so hard he finally woke up. Similarly, with pure rationality there is no meaningful test of what one reasons because like a fox watching the henhouse, the only test is the idea’s own internal logic.
The great thing about pragmatism is that it assumes there is a reality (which let’s say is all that exists, or potentially can exist), that it works in very specific ways (i.e., there’s nothing arbitrary about reality), and therefore a perfect test of one’s theories is to find ways to apply the theory. If a theory is in line with the rules of reality, it will work on some level. How well it works indicates how in line with reality it is. If only part of it works, then it needs adjustment, and so on. That feedback from reality, to me, is the most powerful teacher that could possibly exist because reality is the truth waiting right there for us to discover.
Now, the most impassioned debates here seem to be about the nature of reality, primarily between those who say material reality is probably all there is, and those who say there is at least “something more” which is probably immaterial. Although the main theme of this thread is about reason, I also was hoping better debates might happen between those two groups by suggesting reasoning standards both sides could agree to.
I have something else I want to say about your first post in this thread, but I am going to save it for my response to FZ.
Originally posted by FZ+
But there is also absolutely no evidence for any alternative, which puts chemogenesis as a imperfect, but only workable hypothesis. At least, unlike the other possibilities, we can investigate it. And it is perfectly reasonable, according to the available evidence. Though that of course does not imply it is true.
I am glad you said that because it is the example I need to demonstrate the bias that stems from believing something too strongly.
In Tom’s first post here he asked if when applying the pragmatic reasoning concept I was proposing, it might not be a good idea to test a theory by “. . . looking for instances in which it fails.” I still don’t think that should be the primary approach (in philosophy at least), but I think he is right too. The way I would do it is, after all the ways an idea is shown to work, then look for how it fails to work (of course, some ideas are so bad they
only fail to work, so you can just jump right to that).
Okay, you say chemogenesis is “perfectly reasonable according to available evidence,” but really it isn’t and I think if you weren’t over-committed to a materialistic explanation for life you already would have seen that.
There is a major problem for the materialist theory there which I can’t believe isn’t noticed. The problem is that chemistry cannot be shown to spontaneously exhibit, on its own, the kind of functional and organizational system building that is present in even the simplest life form. The inferential leap from amino acids spontaneously forming and such to the sort of consistent self-organizing change needed to reach life is HUGE.
You say “there is also absolutely no evidence for any alternative,” but not only is that not a good enough reason to assume chemogenesis, that missing organizing force actually
is evidence of a type. Say you were a detective investigating a report of vandalism to a house. You go there and find it is covered in mustard. There are no people around, no mustard jars, no evidence of any kind that the mustard came from somewhere else. Would you conclude that the house is oozing mustard on its own? Isn’t the lack of a means for getting that mustard there really evidence it must be somewhere else because houses are never known to ooze mustard?
Similarly, how can materialists conclude that chemistry does it alone when they can’t duplicate the kind of self-organization necessary for life? How do you build other materialist theories, such as purely physical explanations of consciousness, on top of a theory which has such a colossal evidence gap in it? Where at least is the doubt of the materialist explanation (for chemogenesis), and the openness to another variety of force present in life that
would explain such self-organization?
I say the way materialists casually roll past the spontaneous self-organizing problem is a symptom of blind faith; they so are “blinded” by their belief in materialism they cannot see just how significant the chemogenesis issue is. In terms of the theme of this thread, it doesn’t matter how successful a discipline is in other areas, it doesn’t mean they get to circumvent the standards of evidence and proof for their pet theories.
I have a little more to say about this which I will do while answering LG.
Originally posted by Lifegazer
Then I disagree with him too, on this particular issue. Actually, science is the proof that he is wrong. Reason has obviously unveiled facts about reality. The physical-laws are facts, are they not?
Actually, scientific-reason has unveiled facts about the order within our sensations. I argue that an extension of reasoning can unveil the source of these sensations. What possible reason insists that reason cannot discuss the causality of sensation?
I think you are mixing together ideas that need to be considered separately to make sense. Using Tom’s explanation of logic types, you are mixing deductive and inductive logic together and then talking about them as though they are the same. The word “proof” in science represents a deductive process that culminates in observation (experience). When reason has helped lead researchers to setting up the correct experiment that proves something, that often was helped along by induction. Induction cannot prove something that needs to be experienced, it can only posit the reasonability of searching for certain verifying experiences.
When you claim your mind hypothesis cannot be disproved, all you are really saying is that we have no way to test it by way of experience. The same thing is true of say, Zeus . . . that is, we cannot experience him either but there is no reason to be certain of a theory that believes in him because he can’t be disproved.
Then you argue for the efficacy of “extension of reasoning.” But what are you extending reason from? This is exactly the problem with rationalism sans experience, your house is built on an uncertain foundation. It’s the same criticism of the materialist notion of building consciousness theories on top of a non-existent foundation of chemogenesis. Don’t you think you first better establish that your foundation is correct before you start building a bunch of theoretical rooms on it? If so, how do you create a foundation?
This is where I think you need to come up to speed because if you study the history of success with philosophical ideas, it is dominated by those which could be demonstrated they “work.” The working philosophies have so outdistanced all that old rationalistic stuff that many thinkers today believe classic philosophizing is dead. For something to be said to work, one has to be able to witness it working. This then, is the standard for proof -- that you link your claims to experience.
Are we who think there is something more to reality than physics left without recourse to proof? When it comes to objective proof, it appears we are; that does not mean there isn’t inner or subjective experience which reveals the “something more” to reality. It just means the only witness to that is to be the subject himself.
If there is “something more” to reality than physics, are we left without a means to challenge materialist claims that physics and mechanics is it? Not at all. If you have faith that “something more” is necessary to explain how at least life and consciousness “work,” then the materialist argument is going to have problems, and that is where you focus your attention (i.e., on exposing the problems). And it doesn’t mean you can’t have your theory, it only means you have to stop trying to rationally “prove” it. Let the facts or lack of facts naturally lend support to your concept.