stevendaryl said:
Sure. At time t=11:00, flip a coin. If it's heads, write down 0. If it's tails, write down 1. At time t=11:30, flip again. Then at time t=11:45. Then at time 11:52:30. Etc. If you time it right, you'll have flipped an infinite number of coins by 12:00, and you will have generated the binary expansion of a random real in [0,1].
I don't whether this was a fully serious post, but it is an interesting thought experiment at any rate.
When I first saw this, my first impression was it is not valid from intuitionistic point of view (so I will first try to see the experiment from this view). In fact, the "first act" of LEJ Brouwer (which you might have read) is essentially very relevant here.
The main issue is how does one record the results of coin flips. If you imagine writing it yourself, the problem quickly becomes that during a finite period of half an hour one can only write finite number of bits.
If one trusts the output of some kind of other mechanism that was supposedly able to store infinite number of bits (during this finite time) ... which we can presumably reuse later on, then the problem quickly becomes that we are then making an empirical assertion that is tied up with our underlying account of physical reality (and that's without bringing up the issue of randomness).
And this is why I mentioned intuitionsim in this post, because it tends to assume highly minimalist assumptions regarding "physical reality" to be able to formulate a coherent mathematical account (I think perhaps something to this effect is also mentioned in the essay (containing the first act) but I don't remember very well). However, if one challenges even those highly minimalist assumptions then it is another matter*** (and another discussion really).
At any rate, it seems to me, the main point that I discussed above will still hold (in a pov different from intuitionism) as long as one believes in mathematical meaning as "more basic" than a certain specific physical model of the world.
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Regarding defining probability of picking an element from A⊆ℝ, I would first consider the problem of defining probability for picking an element A⊆ℕ.
One way for us to consider the probability with some subset A (of N) is to consider increasingly larger subsets:
{0}, {0,1}, {0,1,2}, {0,1,2,3},...
and consider probability in the limit (defined precisely in a suitable way).
Below assume card(ℝ)=##\aleph_1##. One can think in a similar way as in the case of natural numbers. If one assumes a well-order of ℝ (with order-type ω
1) then I don't know of any result that explicitly forbids picking up increasingly larger subsets of ℝ (but I have read that such a description won't be "definable" ... I don't know what that means). After this one can define probability in the limit (defined precisely in a suitable way) I think. But the limit will be to ω
1 instead of ω.
I don't really believe much of anything I said in last paragraph (with any confidence) but that's besides the point.
What is interesting in the case of natural numbers is that probability in the limit will turn out to be 0 for finite sets. So for the case of ℝ, we would want to define both the well-order and selection process in such a way that the probability in the limit will turn out to be 0 for any countable subset of ℝ. Since much of this involves quite advanced notions (it seems to me), I don't have anything meaningful to add beyond this.
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*** In words of Georg Cristoph Lichtenberg:
"Everything happens in the world of the self. This self, within which everything unfolds, resembles in this regard the cosmos of physics, to which the self also belongs by which that cosmos appeared mentally in our representation. … So the circle is complete"