The Illusion of Free Will: A Scientific Perspective

[Travis_King]

You are still misunderstanding determinism, Maui. Decisions are A-OK within a deterministic framework. Determinism speaks to the mechanisms by which those decisions are made.

 

[Nikitin]

How do you know that these "macro-systems" behave _perfectly_ deterministically? As long as there is some randomness on the atom-level, there must be randomness on the macro level, even if it is statistically insignificant..

In addition, our brains work purely by chemical reactions and electrical impulses. If atoms and molecules behave randomly when those take place, our thoughts cannot be perfectly deterministic.

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disclaimer: I have only started my first year in uni... so don't murder me now.

 

[Maui]

Determinsm says nothing about feeling pain. That isn't in its purview. The nature of the self is quite a different question than the nature of the interactions of extant things, both living and non.

What do you mean by "nature of the interactions of extant things"? And what does it have to do with free will or determinism?

Do you know what determinism actually argues? It isn't simply, "Free will is wrong"...

I do. I am not sure you are seeing a conflict between freewill and determinism and that may be the source of your confusion.

 

[Maui]

How do you know that these "macro-systems" behave _perfectly_ deterministically? As long as there is some randomness on the atom-level, there must be randomness on the macro level, even if it is statistically insignificant..

In addition, our brains work purely by chemical reactions and electrical impulses. If atoms and molecules behave randomly when those take place, our thoughts cannot be perfectly deterministic.

----

disclaimer: I have only started my first year in uni... so don't murder me now.

The question in qm is indeterminism vs determinism and i'd say it is irrelevant in this topic.

 

[Travis_King]

Nikitin, I think it'd be worth while to point out that there is a huge difference between a system which operates deterministically and one which is determinable. Let's not fall prey to the common problem of mixing up determinism with fatalism.

The is randomness on the quantum scale, so they say. I'm not quantum mechanics expert, but the real thing to understand is that while on the quantum scale things operate probabilistically, what they actuallly wind up doing doesn't really matter in the macro scale. If I have an atom of Hydrogen, then I will have one electron. Always. Which exact crazy-little-bits of matter are there at the quantum level at any given time won't change that. A Hydrogen atom will act like a hydrogen atom. This is increasingly true as we get higher and higher up in scale.

The human brain is a network of chemicals and neurons, billions and billions of them, all well above the quantum scale. I don't know enough about brownian motion and how that applies at this scale to talk to it, but two things are immediately true about indeterminsm:

1) The reactions and impulses in our brains are not random, but are with certainty tied to the stimuli received from within and from without. Were this not the case, we could not function.

2) Even if it was the case, which it isn't, random motion does not allow for any will. Randomness is, for all intents and purposes, worse for a free-willer than determinism.

What do you mean by "nature of the interactions of extant things"? And what does it have to do with free will or determinism?

What's not to get? It's a pretty straightforward statement, I think...The way matter and energy interacts with other matter and energy.

What doesn't that have to do with free will and determinism?

 

[Nikitin]

What's the difference between determinism and determinable?

Anyway: Let's say the electron moves randomly around the Hydrogen. What consequences will this have? Well, for one, electrons have negative charge, and thus are able to effect other charged particles around them. If the electron moves randomly, it thus will be able to randomly affect its charged neighbours, leading to random behaviour.

Stuff like this taken to the next level will mean that are thought processes are subject to randomness, and thus are free from determinism.

1) The reactions and impulses in our brains are not random, but are with certainty tied to the stimuli received from within and from without.

How are they not random to some degree, if the atoms themselves behave randomly?

Were this not the case, we could not function.

No. I'm not saying that the randomness is so big that the output will be completely random and utterly unpredictable. I am saying that there would be a very small degree of randomness..

You're saying that what somebody thinks is perfectly predictable if the conditions are known beforehand. I'm saying that it's predictable what the general thought will be if the conditions are known beforehand, but not perfectly predictable due to some inherent randomness.

2) Even if it was the case, which it isn't, random motion does not allow for any will. Randomness is, for all intents and purposes, worse for a free-willer than determinism.

How so? Determinism removes free will because thoughts are predictable according to determinism. Thus there is no such thing as free will. If determinism is taken out of the equation due to randomness, then there is nothing ruling free will. It will just be a result of mostly the conditions beforehand, and some randomness.

PS: even if randomness on the atom-level isn't relevant, this is http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_theory . I'm fairly sure that something as complex as the human brain cannot possibly be perfectly deterministic.

 

[Travis_King]

How so? Determinism removes free will because thoughts are predictable according to determinism. If determinism is taken out of the equation due to randomness, then there is nothing ruling free will. It will just be a result of mostly the conditions beforehand, and some randomness.

I'll probably reply at greater length later, but for now:

What you are doing is not making room for free will. Adding radnomness to the process means that, while the system is not determinable (therefore, it would seem, not deterministic) it can rigidly adhere to causality (the driving force behind determinism, and the real objection to the standard "Free will"). Which is to say, while you can't predict what Person X will do or think at time Y, due to this randomness, you can confidently say that it is a direct result of all antecedent events and conditions plus whatever randomness directly affected his thoughts immediately preceding time Y.

I don't really see anyone coming up with a coherent argument against causality, as it seems to be pretty self evident and logically and physically consistent.

I don't recall who said it, (Maui, I think) but whoever noted that I do not find a problem between free will and determinism is more or less correct. Mainly because I don't think either are entirely coherent and consider my thoughts on the subject as more compatibilist, of sorts.

 

[Nikitin]

Wow, those were allot of complex words I've never heard about. English isn't my 1st language, but I'll try to reply:

What you are doing is not making room for free will. Adding radnomness to the process means that, while the system is not determinable (therefore, it would seem, not deterministic) it can rigidly adhere to causality (the driving force behind determinism, and the real objection to the standard "Free will"). Which is to say, while you can't predict what Person X will do or think at time Y, due to this randomness, you can confidently say that it is a direct result of all antecedent events and conditions plus whatever randomness directly affected his thoughts immediately preceding time Y.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but are you saying that determinism doesn't require the future to be theoretically determinable? I thought the entire point about determinism was perfect determinability... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism According to wikipedia, determinism's definition is "If conditions X are met, then Y will happen with 100% certainty". If that is the case, how on Earth is free will possible? Free will would be simply ruled by the conditions.

A degree of randomness, on the other hand, removes the problems of perfectly predictable determinism. If you think that randomness destroys free will just like determinism, then how can you think that it is possible at all for true free-will to exist?

For me, for free will to exist, it must have that little unpredictability to make it free from the constraints of causality. Otherwise we are all just slaves of a perfect mechanical clock-work universe, determinable from the period of Big Bang, and to its end. Basically, imo, randomness during our thought processes is what makes the thought processes ours.

 

[Travis_King]

Nikitin, yep, generally determinism will say that the state of the world at any given time is a direct and necessary result of the antecedent (prior) events and conditions. What I was saying, though, is that causality is really what does away with the traditional view of "Free will", not necessarily determinism.

A degree of randomness rules out determinism (as in, condition X leads directly and perfectly to Y), yes, but not the mechanism of determinism which rules out what we call libertarian free will, which is, of course, causality.

Think about it. Say we have a deterministic system. Let's call it "My brain".
Let's then call all of the antecedent events and conditions: 1+2.
Determinism says that 1+2=3, right?
Enter the random variable 0.001, we now have 1+2+0.001=3.001
So while determinism is false (since we cannot get 3.001 from only the antecedent events and conditions: 1+2), we haven't changed the actual decision making mechanism.

That's a long winded way of saying that while the random variable makes it so the "my brain" is not perfectly determinable based on past events and conditions, the random event doesn't give my brain any more freedom (it's still simple addition), it just makes it unpredictable.

Now, as far as free will goes, randomness doesn't help at all (as I've said). First off, randomness doesn't divorce us from causality. Randomness introduces more variables, making the result unpredictable, but you still have effects as the result of causes. It's just that instead of:
CAUSE --> EFFECT
you have:
CAUSE + random variable --> EFFECT
Same mechanism, just a different result.

Think about it, how does randomness aid in the freedom of will. They are opposing ideas. Your will can't be random; if it is, how is it yours?

then how can you think that it is possible at all for true free-will to exist?

This question is really the crux of the issue. I don't. But that is because the very idea proposed by libertarian free will is fundamentally incoherent (it's silly, doesn't make sense).

A true view of free will must account for the fact of causality. Any view of free will which does not have causality at it's core is incoherent. Causes are a fundamental part of the way the world works, "will" is necessarily driven by reasons.

My basic viewpoint is basically this:
1. I am, in every important and realizable way, everything I see, do, hear, touch, feel, know, think, experience, etc. and nothing more.
There is no homunculus, pre-existing "me", or "soul".

2. Those things are determined by external factors [I cannot choose what I see or what things I experience any more than I can choose my genetic code or my biological predispositions]

3. Thus, "I" am a being created as a result of, and continually changed by, external factors.

4. When speaking of "will" we necessarily imply a being which will be doing the willing. I.e. "I"

5. Thus, the question of personal free will asks if "I" --a being created qua external factors-- can make decisions of my own volition.

6. SO. If "I" am every single factor and influence that I have ever experienced, and any decision I make comes directly from those experiences and nothing else [how could it?], then were comes the external forces that would take away free will [that is, those that are not the set of external forces that constitute "I"]? Where comes the issue of causality with respect to my "will"?

Then, all decisions made by "I" are capable of being completely free of outside forces. "I" will act exactly how "I" will act, and no different. But "I" act freely and of "my" own volition.

As far as I'm concerned, causality is a necessary part of my free will. I act, necessarily, as "I" will to act.

 

[Maui]

A true view of free will must account for the fact of causality. Any view of free will which does not have causality at it's core is incoherent. Causes are a fundamental part of the way the world works, "will" is necessarily driven by reasons.

Look up "emergent behavior", you may change your mind about causality. If it were that simple to reduce everything down to a simple mechanistic framework, science would have been a sealed package. The world is most definitely not mechanistic at its core and you failed to explain how causality accounts for that which feels pain. Had you made these assertions in the biology forum, they would have been technically fine with me in that narrow field, and i wouldn't debate them. But since you are making them here and it implies holding a conviction of a correct worldview, i'd say you are completely wrong.

My basic viewpoint is basically this:
1. I am, in every important and realizable way, everything I see, do, hear, touch, feel, know, think, experience, etc. and nothing more.
There is no homunculus, pre-existing "me", or "soul".

2. Those things are determined by external factors [I cannot choose what I see or what things I experience any more than I can choose my genetic code or my biological predispositions]

3. Thus, "I" am a being created as a result of, and continually changed by, external factors.

4. When speaking of "will" we necessarily imply a being which will be doing the willing. I.e. "I"

5. Thus, the question of personal free will asks if "I" --a being created qua external factors-- can make decisions of my own volition.

6. SO. If "I" am every single factor and influence that I have ever experienced, and any decision I make comes directly from those experiences and nothing else [how could it?], then were comes the external forces that would take away free will [that is, those that are not the set of external forces that constitute "I"]? Where comes the issue of causality with respect to my "will"?

Then, all decisions made by "I" are capable of being completely free of outside forces. "I" will act exactly how "I" will act, and no different. But "I" act freely and of "my" own volition.

As far as I'm concerned, causality is a necessary part of my free will. I act, necessarily, as "I" will to act.

That there is a you that feels(among other things) implies strongly something different - that you are a conscious mind attached to a physical body. Anything else is either incomplete, incoherent or against observational evidence. The fact that you are writing here and exchanging information speaks much more about your conscious mind than of your physical processes.

By the way, causality is unable to account not only for conscious awareness and free will in humans, but for every other observable thing in reality in even a semi-adeqaute manner. You should probably take a closer look at the world and see if it's really made of mechanistic stuff or from something else entirely.

 

[Travis_King]

You are speaking of dualism and have the gall to say that a physical explanation of consciousness has no basis in observational evidence?

 

[Maui]

For me, for free will to exist, it must have that little unpredictability to make it free from the constraints of causality. Otherwise we are all just slaves of a perfect mechanical clock-work universe, determinable from the period of Big Bang, and to its end.

No, reductionism and determinism are failures in physics, more so in philosophy. We could be missing a whole class of properties that are still unaccounted for.

Basically, imo, randomness during our thought processes is what makes the thought processes ours.

There is a degree of unpredictability at every scale, does that mean there is some form of mind that calls its processes "ours"? Can processes be conscious?

 

[Maui]

You are speaking of dualism and have the gall to say that a physical explanation of consciousness has no basis in observational evidence?

That "something" is feeling pain is observationally evident. It has no explanation in a physical framework. What is it you are you asking?

 

[Travis_King]

Your argument is ridiculous. I don't understand how feeling pain can't be explained physically...Are you being serious?

Is your argument along the lines of, "sensory reactions can be described physically, but not the experience or conscious sensation of those senses?"

 

[Maui]

Is your argument along the lines of, "sensory reactions can be described physically, but not the experience or conscious sensation of those senses?"

Yes, the first person account of experience can't be explained physically.

 

[Travis_King]

Well, that's not true. It hasn't been explained (demonstratably, with certainty; as there are many theories--the scientific kind--and evidentially supported hypotheses), but that doesn't mean it can't be explained.

 

[Maui]

Nothing in the laws of physics and biology as we know them today pre-supposes conscious behavior. Deterministic behavior - yes, conscious - no.

 

[Travis_King]

Good, science shouldn't be pre-supposing anything.
It isn't "pre-supposed" because it is generally understood to be a property, or emergent phenomenon, of the complex neural network. It's not a fundamental property of the universe, it's a unique quirk of biology.

 

[chiro]

Also I think it's important to mention a good definition of truth.

A good definition of truth is something that is universal and without exception, and unfortunately what many call truths are things that are so non-universal and so narrow, that it really boggles my mind at how something can be justified as truth.

Most scientists really want to find truth, and in the context of above it ends up being something that comes down to a consensus based conclusion of said proposed "truths" even if they are only "partial truths" (as most things are).

But unfortunately a lot of investigation is very narrow and thus the tendency is to try and extrapolate something from that scenario that is "universal" and you can see where the problems lie.

I realize that in order to analyze and make sense of things you need to reduce things to whatever working level you can, but the point I am making is that a lot of people do tend to forget that they narrow things down, and atomize things in such a way that they lose the rest of what they are working with.

Finally with regard to pre-supposing, everyone will do this at some point.

Science is largely a cumulative process and people will be shaped by not only what they uniquely experience and discover, but also what they believe to be true even if they haven't verified it themselves.

Again we all do it at some point and it's more effecient to find people we have a degree of trust for to tell us what their own experiences like if they don't have an agenda and are as unbiased as possible: it just doesn't make sense to do it all yourself unless you consider it really really important.

 

[Maui]

Well, that's not true. It hasn't been explained (demonstratably, with certainty; as there are many theories--the scientific kind--and evidentially supported hypotheses), but that doesn't mean it can't be explained.

If you know of such a hypothesis that doesn't state or imply that consciousness is an illusion, do share it with us. Otherwise, it wouldn't be a model - if i am unable to repay the bank, i can't just say "the money you gave me was illusory".

 

[Nikitin]

Nikitin, yep, generally determinism will say that the state of the world at any given time is a direct and necessary result of the antecedent (prior) events and conditions. What I was saying, though, is that causality is really what does away with the traditional view of "Free will", not necessarily determinism.

A degree of randomness rules out determinism (as in, condition X leads directly and perfectly to Y), yes, but not the mechanism of determinism which rules out what we call libertarian free will, which is, of course, causality.

Think about it. Say we have a deterministic system. Let's call it "My brain".
Let's then call all of the antecedent events and conditions: 1+2.
Determinism says that 1+2=3, right?
Enter the random variable 0.001, we now have 1+2+0.001=3.001
So while determinism is false (since we cannot get 3.001 from only the antecedent events and conditions: 1+2), we haven't changed the actual decision making mechanism.

That's a long winded way of saying that while the random variable makes it so the "my brain" is not perfectly determinable based on past events and conditions, the random event doesn't give my brain any more freedom (it's still simple addition), it just makes it unpredictable.

Why would randomness make 1+2=3.001? If that was the case, we would be ruled by randomness, and thus lose our free will. The randomness I'm speaking of would simply leave room for alternative thought-processes. Say you have 2 identical people on 2 identical worlds. In 20 years, they would be in the same place according to determinism. Though if you add randomness to the equation, both they and the worlds would be somewhat different.

Now, as far as free will goes, randomness doesn't help at all (as I've said). First off, randomness doesn't divorce us from causality. Randomness introduces more variables, making the result unpredictable, but you still have effects as the result of causes. It's just that instead of:
CAUSE --> EFFECT
you have:
CAUSE + random variable --> EFFECT
Same mechanism, just a different result.

Think about it, how does randomness aid in the freedom of will. They are opposing ideas. Your will can't be random; if it is, how is it yours?

There is only one argument against free will - if our thoughts are ruled by determinism, or by randomness, then we aren't free. I agree that in that case our will wouldn't be free.

However, if determinism is broken in such a way that our thoughts are ruled nearly entirely by causality, but not completely, then we do indeed have free will. Random chance wouldn't rule us, it would just add to our thought processes like causality does, and make room for creativity. Basically, if neither causality or chance is ruling over our thoughts, then nobody is and thus our wills are free of any control from any agent.

This question is really the crux of the issue. I don't. But that is because the very idea proposed by libertarian free will is fundamentally incoherent (it's silly, doesn't make sense).

A true view of free will must account for the fact of causality. Any view of free will which does not have causality at it's core is incoherent. Causes are a fundamental part of the way the world works, "will" is necessarily driven by reasons.

My basic viewpoint is basically this:
1. I am, in every important and realizable way, everything I see, do, hear, touch, feel, know, think, experience, etc. and nothing more.
There is no homunculus, pre-existing "me", or "soul".

2. Those things are determined by external factors [I cannot choose what I see or what things I experience any more than I can choose my genetic code or my biological predispositions]

3. Thus, "I" am a being created as a result of, and continually changed by, external factors.

4. When speaking of "will" we necessarily imply a being which will be doing the willing. I.e. "I"

5. Thus, the question of personal free will asks if "I" --a being created qua external factors-- can make decisions of my own volition.

6. SO. If "I" am every single factor and influence that I have ever experienced, and any decision I make comes directly from those experiences and nothing else [how could it?], then were comes the external forces that would take away free will [that is, those that are not the set of external forces that constitute "I"]? Where comes the issue of causality with respect to my "will"?

Then, all decisions made by "I" are capable of being completely free of outside forces. "I" will act exactly how "I" will act, and no different. But "I" act freely and of "my" own volition.

As far as I'm concerned, causality is a necessary part of my free will. I act, necessarily, as "I" will to act.

How can you consider such a will free, if it is like a mechanical machine? I am confused: do you believe in determinism or not?

Maui,

There is a degree of unpredictability at every scale, does that mean there is some form of mind that calls its processes "ours"? Can processes be conscious?

If such thoughts are unique to us, why wouldn't they be ours? The main point here is if those thoughts are free or not.

 

[Maui]

Maui,
If such thoughts are unique to us, why wouldn't they be ours? The main point here is if those thoughts are free or not.

My comment addressed this statement:

Basically, imo, randomness during our thought processes is what makes the thought processes ours.

Both randomness and determinism are poor explanations of consciousness and the supposed free will. In your example you stated that slight, inpredictable variations in the processes in the brain add up to a new entity that we call our thoughts(as far as i was able to understand your point). This could well be how aspects of one's character are formed, however they are poor explanations of other aspects of human behavior - like the mental picture that we call 'reality' or the entity that feels pain or pleasure, or being aware, or dreaming or planning to change the course of the the future, etc. If these are illusions, than what is not, considering that you only have solid proof for their existence and everything else is unprovable. You are compelling us to hold the rational belief that the outside reality exists, and hold a further belief that what that world implies is that the observations of conscious choices from the first belief are illusions. Sounds rather contrdictory to me and a bit illogical.

 

[Travis_King]

If you know of such a hypothesis that doesn't state or imply that consciousness is an illusion, do share it with us. Otherwise, it wouldn't be a model - if i am unable to repay the bank, i can't just say "the money you gave me was illusory".

There are no peer reviewed scientific works (note: not philosophical works) that I know of that claim consciousness is an illusion. Illusion is a philosophical word, not a scientific one.

What's an illusion, how would we test that hypothesis?

 

[Travis_King]

Why would randomness make 1+2=3.001? If that was the case, we would be ruled by randomness, and thus lose our free will. The randomness I'm speaking of would simply leave room for alternative thought-processes. Say you have 2 identical people on 2 identical worlds. In 20 years, they would be in the same place according to determinism. Though if you add randomness to the equation, both they and the worlds would be somewhat different.

If "randomness" has a directive, then it isn't random. Your two-worlds idea is accurate, but not for the reason you'd hoped. Yes, the worlds would be slightly, or greatly, different. But that does not rule out a deterministic framework. If the world otherwise operates deterministically (that is, were there no randomness, it would be completely determined) but you add in some funny random subatomic events that change things at the macro (say, human) level, you'll have a different world, but that doesn't mean any more freedom was involved. You've added more elements into the equation, but they are random, and they still have the effect of directly causing the next "state of the world".

There is only one argument against free will - if our thoughts are ruled by determinism, or by randomness, then we aren't free. I agree that in that case our will wouldn't be free.

There are plenty more than that.

However, if determinism is broken in such a way that our thoughts are ruled nearly entirely by causality, but not completely, then we do indeed have free will.

That isn't true. If you need free will to be divorced from causality, then you need to then introduce something which is outside of the causal chain, and yet still influenced by "you" in some way.

Random chance wouldn't rule us, it would just add to our thought processes like causality does, and make room for creativity.

Creativity isn't random...I don't see how randomness would help with creativity.

How can you consider such a will free, if it is like a mechanical machine? I am confused: do you believe in determinism or not?

I believe I am exclusively the product of things that were out of my control. The world (external) and my physiology (internal) work to shape me. I believe in a determinism of sorts, I do not believe the world is predictable, though.

How is the will I described unfree? Yes, these external things determine (shape) who I am and what I think, but not in a billiard ball way. Despite this, I still experience thought, and emotion, and decision-making. When I decide to pour a bowl of Cheerios it isn't something that is magically out of my control because the world operates according to physical laws. I want to, and so I do.

That want? Sure, determined. But does it change the fact that I actually do want to?

Free will, I think, is incoherent. I believe in personal will. And I believe that we make our own decisions. I just recognize that at some level the decisions I make are a natural progression of the system (the universe) through time.

You have to define what you mean by free, as that is the cause of pretty much all miscommunication in arguments about "free" will. We can proceed from there.

 

[Maui]

There are no peer reviewed scientific works (note: not philosophical works) that I know of that claim consciousness is an illusion. Illusion is a philosophical word, not a scientific one.

Yes but i was asking to see the hypothesis that attempts to explain mind in physical terms(that you mentioned) here:

It hasn't been explained (demonstratably, with certainty; as there are many theories--the scientific kind--and evidentially supported hypotheses)...

We are in the philosophy forum and philosophical topics like the philosophy of mind are normally handled by philosophical references. I am sure you will be safe quoting philosophers arguments, e.g. Daniel Dennett considers free will to be an illusion.

What's an illusion, how would we test that hypothesis?

It was you who claimed free will did not exist and it's another way of saying it's an illusion. Or did you change your mind?

 

[Travis_King]

Just because we are discussing philosophy doesn't mean we should forget about science...You are also taking that idea out of context. Free will and consciousness are obviously different things. I don't think you'd get Dennett to admit that he believes consciousness is an illusion.

I said the "free will" that most people are talking about is incoherent. I believe we have will, and that it is usually free from coercion. I don't think our freedom will is an illusion, I think we are wrong in our understanding of what it is.

As I said previously, just because we haven't explained consciousness physically yet doesn't mean it has its roots in the non-physical.

 

[bohm2]

As I said previously, just because we haven't explained consciousness physically yet doesn't mean it has its roots in the non-physical.

There's also a problem with defining "physical" since some argue that the concept of matter/physical itself is open and evolving (physics has not ended) so the mind-body problem can't even be posed in any reasonable way since we lack a definite concept of body/matter/physical.

I've regurgitated this before but in my opinion, the strongest argument put forth for the possibility of "free will" are positions that are able to challenge the following premise:

The presumption in favor of upward causation and explanation (from microphysical to macrophysical) that comes with causal completeness is what cuts free agency out of the picture, whether this causation is deterministic or partly random.

If it can shown that there exists the possibility for some type of 'downward causation' between the macroscopic/microscopic domains, then maybe "free will" can occur? Determinism or non-determinism are not relevant, in my opinion. So, it's been argued that a indeterministic universe would not help the "free will" position anymore than a deterministic universe, as others above argued. It seems that would just lead to a "random will"?

 

[Maui]

Just because we are discussing philosophy doesn't mean we should forget about science...

You can provide both, but so far you have provided none to substantiate your assertion that something seemingly immaterial like personal experience can be accounted for in deteministic and reductionistic frameworks:

as there are many theories--the scientific kind--and evidentially supported hypotheses

You are also taking that idea out of context. Free will and consciousness are obviously different things.

Free will requires consciousness, of the type that isn't illusory(by this i mean the obvious feeling of being conscious, that some claim to be wrong or overrated).

I don't think you'd get Dennett to admit that he believes consciousness is an illusion.

His words:

"Dan Dennett: The illusion of consciousness"

http://www.ted.com/talks/dan_dennett_on_our_consciousness.html

I said the "free will" that most people are talking about is incoherent. I believe we have will, and that it is usually free from coercion. I don't think our freedom will is an illusion, I think we are wrong in our understanding of what it is.

As I said previously, just because we haven't explained consciousness physically yet doesn't mean it has its roots in the non-physical.

As bohm2 pointed out, there's work to be done explaining the physical. All our explanations of nature(including the theory of evolution) are schemes of how things develop, not what they are. You could raise the same questions on matter, time and space. If you are seeking an understanding of personal experience, you must consider all aspects of the events that unfold. As far as i am conerned, emergence could be the most fundamental creative mechanism of Nature - from the emergence of a universe, life, and consciousness to the existence of a macro scale(emergence normally produces higher levels of order from lower, some people are searching for a fundamental super-symmetry in nature that gets broken to account for the observed reality).

BTW, i made no claims how consciousness arises, it could be emergent or otherwise. I was merely pointing out the inconsistencies in the physical account and was looking to see more arguments and how well they would hold.

 

[Pythagorean]

I don't see any inconsistencies in physical accounts, just a lack of a complete story. But that's the case with all physical sciences. We can always find more data, more relationships, more theory.

A more recent framework utilizes "integrated information theory". Guilio Tononi developed a mathematical formula to measure quantities of consciousness from information theory.

 

[audioloop]

Free will requires , of the type that isn't illusory(by this i the obvious feeling of being conscious, that some claim to be wrong or overrated).

His words:

"Dan Dennett: The of "

http://www.ted.com/talks/dan_dennett_on_our_consciousness.html

http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Psychology/Social/?view=usa&ci=9780199897599

..."Most of us believe that we are an independent, coherent self--an individual inside our head who thinks, watches, wonders, dreams, and makes plans for the future. This sense of our self may seem incredibly real but a wealth of recent scientific evidence reveals that it is not what it seems--it is all an illusion.
Who we are is, in short, a story of our self--a narrative that our brain creates. Like the science fiction movie, we are living in a matrix that is our mind. But Hood concludes that though the self is an illusion, it is an illusion we must continue to embrace to live happily in human society."


---
but i know that, i am not a rock a table, a star
so WHO feel, live or experience that "illusion", maybe you or peter or carl?
---


from John-Dylan haynes brain researcher

In contrast, Haynes and colleagues now show that brain activity predicts even up to 7 seconds ahead of time how a person is going to decide. But they also warn that the study does not finally rule out free will:
... "Our study shows that decisions are unconsciously prepared much longer ahead than previously thought. But we do not know yet where the final decision is made. We need to investigate whether a decision prepared by these brain areas can still be reversed."...


To Do or Not to Do: The Neural Signature of Self-Control
http://www.jneurosci.org/content/27/34/9141.full.pdf



even animals
Observations of scent-marking and discriminating self from others by a domestic dog (Canis familiaris): tales of displaced yellow snow

 

[Bill_McEnaney]

To see why I doubt that any scientific argument can prove that hard determinism is true, suppose that it is true. Then it'll guarantee that scientists will draw the conclusions that they do draw, even when those conclusions are false. So I suggest that if hard determinism is true, scientists should distrust their judgment when they argue for that determinism or for any other theory. Maybe my argument hints at why I believe that the Enlightenment was a mixed blessing at best?

 

[Bill_McEnaney]

A post ago, I should have told you that I wrote that post partly because I wanted to undermine scientism. Scientism fans believe that science is our only source of genuine knowledge. But if I've argued soundly a post ago, it's hard to see how we can know whether we know anything that we think that we discover by reasoning. Maybe an argument for determinism is can give strong evidence for skepticism. But I don't know of any scientist who would be, say, a Pyhronian skeptic, someone who believes that we can know only how things seem to us.

 

[bohm2]

But I don't know of any scientist who would be, say, a Pyhronian skeptic, someone who believes that we can know only how things seem to us.

I always assumed that the practise of science is very compatible with Pyrhonian skepticism.

 

[Travis_King]

You can provide both, but so far you have provided none to substantiate your assertion that something seemingly immaterial like personal experience can be accounted for in deteministic and reductionistic frameworks:

Of course not, I'm not a neuroscientist, you know. But you haven't demonstrated why a deterministic framework rules out personal experience, either. This isn't asking you to "prove a negative", as it were, but if you are asserting that we can have no personal experience if determinism were true, then you've got to back that up somehow.

All signs point to consciousness (and thus personal experience) being a direct result of our neural network and the way it interacts with our body, our environment, and itself.

Free will requires consciousness, of the type that isn't illusory(by this i mean the obvious feeling of being conscious, that some claim to be wrong or overrated).

I don't know that anyone doubts that we experience free will; especially not consciousness.

 

[Travis_King]

To see why I doubt that any scientific argument can prove that hard determinism is true, suppose that it is true. Then it'll guarantee that scientists will draw the conclusions that they do draw, even when those conclusions are false. So I suggest that if hard determinism is true, scientists should distrust their judgment when they argue for that determinism or for any other theory. Maybe my argument hints at why I believe that the Enlightenment was a mixed blessing at best?

This is a misunderstanding of the situation. Assuming that scientists follow rigorous methods, then whether or not their conclusions are "determined" is irellevant. If they "do science" properly, their results will be accurate.

 

[bohm2]

Some might find this fairly recent (2010) and comprehensive review article on "free will experiments" interesting:

Free will debates: Simple experiments are not so simple
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2942748/pdf/acp-06-047.pdf

 

[Bill_McEnaney]

This is a misunderstanding of the situation. Assuming that scientists follow rigorous methods, then whether or not their conclusions are "determined" is irellevant. If they "do science" properly, their results will be accurate.

But how do you know that determinism will allow scientists to know that those results are accurate? Even if they're inaccurate, determinism may guarantee that scientists will believe that those results are accurate. If Pyhronian skepticism is true, we can know only how things seem to us, not how they actually are. If it's true, we can't know how they actually are, even when they actually are the way they seem. How much good will correctness and rigor do us if we can't know whether anything is either rigorous or correct?

 

[Travis_King]

I don't understand how you are using the word determinism. It's not a moving, intervening entity...it's a description of the way the universe may function. If we have limitations of perception such that we can never know anything, that isn't the result of a deterministic framework.

I don't understand how determinism:

may guarantee that scientists will believe that those results are accurate

By what mechanism of determinism would this be the case?

 

[Maui]

I don't understand how you are using the word determinism. It's not a moving, intervening entity...it's a description of the way the universe may function.

What's the likelihood of the universe being deterministic and you knowing anything that resembles truth?

If we have limitations of perception such that we can never know anything, that isn't the result of a deterministic framework.

I thought perception was also a deterministic event and the way things seem to play out.
Without some sort of emergent free will science would be saying goodbye to veracity and "Hello deterministic events". You'd have no control over ANYTHING, including scientific theories and propositions.

 

[Maui]

This is a misunderstanding of the situation. Assuming that scientists follow rigorous methods, then whether or not their conclusions are "determined" is irellevant. If they "do science" properly, their results will be accurate.

This is entirely incorrect. It's saying that a book's story is entirely correct because the events in it follow proper science as defined within the story's plot. It sounds a bit like "the Bible is true because the Bible says so"

 

[Travis_King]

What's the likelihood of the universe being deterministic and you knowing anything that resembles truth?

What is the likelihood of me having an apple and you having an orange?

I thought perception was also a deterministic event and the way things seem to play out. Without some sort of emergent free will science would be saying goodbye to veracity and "Hello deterministic events". You'd have no control over ANYTHING, including scientific theories and propositions.

You have control in the sense that determinism describes how (or by what mechanism) the components of the system function. If it's the case that as a result of a deterministic universe humans have collectively come up with veracity in science, then it is entirely likely and plausible that they will continue to be veracious in this way.

This is entirely incorrect. It's saying that a book's story is entirely correct because the events in it follow proper science as defined within the story's plot. It sounds a bit like "the Bible is true because the Bible says so"

Yet another gross overexaggeration.

Perhaps I should have used the term logically consistent, or reliable, as opposed to accurate (though I debate this on the grounds that if something is logically consistent and repeatable, then I can think of no reason why it should not be called "accurate" as well). But my point was not to demonstrate how the skeptic is wrong, but rather that this idea:

suppose that it is true. Then it'll guarantee that scientists will draw the conclusions that they do draw, even when those conclusions are false

Is untrue. If a scientist is doing his work with veracity and rigorous methods, then he should trust that repeatable conclusions are accurate. Whether we are somehow misguided and things which accurately explain observable phenomena are in some way false (or the explanations unknowable) is a matter for epistemologists. Just becasue determinism is true, a biologist needn't worry that his conclusions about observable, repeatable biological phenomena are false.

Determinism doesn't lead you away from truth simply because you have "no choice" but to go along with it. If it is determined that a person does good science and comes up with a good conclusion, then that's fine, if it is logically consistent and coherent, then others will agree. If his science is crap, then his conclusion will be crap, and others will point this out.

Logic, mathematics, all these systems which we use to examine our world. Are you suggesting that, despite constant efforts and demonstrating their consistency and coherence and applicability, that a deterministic framework means that this cohesion is an illusion? That we are fooling ourselfs into believing that 1+1=2, when in reality it doesn't?

 

[Maui]

What is the likelihood of me having an apple and you having an orange?

Well, you clearly missed the point, in a deterministic environment there is no such thing as 'likelihood'.

You have control in the sense that determinism describes how (or by what mechanism) the components of the system function.

Then you have a a very skewed perception of what 'control' means. 'Describes how' is very different to 'control'. You should discard 'control' and use 'You describe how determinism describes the components...' which is tautologiocal statement.

If it's the case that as a result of a deterministic universe humans have collectively come up with veracity in science, then it is entirely likely and plausible that they will continue to be veracious in this way.

The question is how would humans, being deterministic processes, come up with veracity in science? You are not making sense and substituting unknowns with impossible and unseen miracles.

Yet another gross overexaggeration.

Perhaps I should have used the term logically consistent, or reliable, as opposed to accurate (though I debate this on the grounds that if something is logically consistent and repeatable, then I can think of no reason why it should not be called "accurate" as well).

What you refer to as 'logically consistent' can only be regarded as 'logically consistent' by those who believe a forced deterministic 'conclusion' is carrying any weight at all. One of the distinctive features of free will is that we can doubt. If one has no doubts about one's beliefs, i guess one could label oneself a deterministic voice let off by a chemical goo.

Is untrue. If a scientist is doing his work with veracity and rigorous methods, then he should trust that repeatable conclusions are accurate. Whether we are somehow misguided and things which accurately explain observable phenomena are in some way false (or the explanations unknowable) is a matter for epistemologists. Just becasue determinism is true, a biologist needn't worry that his conclusions about observable, repeatable biological phenomena are false.

A biologist would have all the resons in the world to doubt his conclusions had they been predetermined by events in the 17th century. I see no reason to even call them 'conclusions'.

Determinism doesn't lead you away from truth simply because you have "no choice" but to go along with it. If it is determined that a person does good science and comes up with a good conclusion, then that's fine, if it is logically consistent and coherent, then others will agree. If his science is crap, then his conclusion will be crap, and others will point this out.

Do you even understand that whether 'others will agree' was something that was decided by events in the far past and logic had no say in it in any imaginable way?

Logic, mathematics, all these systems which we use to examine our world. Are you suggesting that, despite constant efforts and demonstrating their consistency and coherence and applicability, that a deterministic framework means that this cohesion is an illusion? That we are fooling ourselfs into believing that 1+1=2, when in reality it doesn't?

If we are not thinking but producing noise in accordance with events in the past, 1+1=2 can only be 'true' within the plot that has been developing for billions of years.

 

[Travis_King]

Well, you clearly missed the point, in a deterministic environment there is no such thing as 'likelihood'.

That clearly wasn't your point.

The question is how would humans, being deterministic processes, come up with veracity in science? You are not making sense and substituting unknowns with impossible and unseen miracles.

I really don't understand how this is ruled out by determinism? Care to explain this further?

What you refer to as 'logically consistent' can only be regarded as 'logically consistent' by those who believe a forced deterministic 'conclusion' is carrying any weight at all. One of the distinctive features of free will is that we can doubt. If one has no doubts about one's beliefs, i guess one could label oneself a deterministic voice let off by a chemical goo.

Does my conclusion that 1+1=2 lose it's logical consistency in a deterministic framework?

A biologist would have all the resons in the world to doubt his conclusions had they been predetermined by events in the 17th century. I see no reason to even call them 'conclusions'.

No, he wouldn't. How do you justify this claim? If a hypothesis is made, and the experiment by which it is tested is directly observable, and a repeatable and coherent conclusion is drawn based on those results, what does it matter if the events were determined? I don't see how a need for free will comes into this at all.

Do you even understand that whether 'others will agree' was something that was decided by events in the far past and logic had no say in it in any imaginable way?

Do you understand that whether or not determinism is true, things are still carried out by people (the agents of events). The scientific community will agree with something if it is logically consistent and repeatable. Are you proposing that determinism, what, tricks people into thinking things? That sounds like fatalism, not determinism.

If we are not thinking but producing noise in accordance with events in the past, 1+1=2 can only be 'true' within the plot that has been developing for billions of years.

C'mon now.

 

[Maui]

No, he wouldn't. How do you justify this claim? If a hypothesis is made, and the experiment by which it is tested is directly observable, and a repeatable and coherent conclusion is drawn based on those results, what does it matter if the events were determined?

So you still fail to see a difference between being forced to make a decision and making the decision on your own? What if someone were to put a gun to your wife's head and demanded that she acknowledged that she were a jihadist? You would accept that for truth? Really?

I don't see how a need for free will comes into this at all.

Because you are obviously unable to tell apart forced behavior from voluntary one.

Do you understand that whether or not determinism is true, things are still carried out by people (the agents of events). The scientific community will agree with something if it is logically consistent and repeatable. Are you proposing that determinism, what, tricks people into thinking things? That sounds like fatalism, not determinism.

When did i claim the community wouldn't agree? Their actions would be determined by small variations of input parameters in the brain, so why should we be concerned what they have to say? As far as free will is concerned, both determinism and fatalism preclude free will and it's determinism which tricks people into 'thinking' things, if one were to hold a deterministic view of the world.

C'mon now.

Good point. Reminds me that a lot of times we produce deterministic noise. But sometimes there's a signal, we call it 'ideas'(they drive the world) and I've come to appreciate it when the signal to noise ratio is above 50%. The bright minds who are able to produce a signal seem to be the ones who set us the most apart from the animal kingdom and the reigns of determinism.

 

[Bill_McEnaney]

Is untrue. If a scientist is doing his work with veracity and rigorous methods, then he should trust that repeatable conclusions are accurate. Whether we are somehow misguided and things which accurately explain observable phenomena are in some way false (or the explanations unknowable) is a matter for epistemologists. Just becasue determinism is true, a biologist needn't worry that his conclusions about observable, repeatable biological phenomena are false.

Travis, is determinism true or isn't it? You seem to be contradicting yourself. First, you say that determinism untrue. Then you tell us that "Just because it is true . . ."

Determinism doesn't lead you away from truth simply because you have "no choice" but to go along with it. If it is determined that a person does good science and comes up with a good conclusion, then that's fine, if it is logically consistent and coherent, then others will agree. If his science is crap, then his conclusion will be crap, and others will point this out.

Consistency is a necessary condition for truth, not a sufficient condition for it. A proposition or a set of propositions is true only if it's consistent, but not if and only if it's consistent. Truth implies consistency, but consistency doesn't imply truth. Propositions are mutually consistent if and only if they can be true together. They're true if and only if they conform to reality.

Truths can be incoherent. For example, the can be irrelevant to one another. In fact, their truth and their consistency may be the only logical properties that they have in common.

Logic, mathematics, all these systems which we use to examine our world. Are you suggesting that, despite constant efforts and demonstrating their consistency and coherence and applicability, that a deterministic framework means that this cohesion is an illusion? That we are fooling ourselfs into believing that 1+1=2, when in reality it doesn't?

Of course not. My point is that if laws of nature guarantee that we'll believe what we in fact do believe, even when that belief is false, we may be unable to know whether we know anything.

 

[Travis_King]

Travis, is determinism true or isn't it? You seem to be contradicting yourself. First, you say that determinism untrue. Then you tell us that "Just because it is true . . ."

How should I know?

In these discussions there is typically in an implicit agreement that we'll assume one way or the other. Generally when talking about determinism we assume the positive.

Consistency is a necessary condition for truth, not a sufficient condition for it. A proposition or a set of propositions is true only if it's consistent, but not if and only if it's consistent. Truth implies consistency, but consistency doesn't imply truth. Propositions are mutually consistent if and only if they can be true together. They're true if and only if they conform to reality.

Sure. Still don't get your point.

Mine is that whether or not the universe operates deterministically, if our observations don't conform to reality then our conclusions are inadequate.

Yes, if it is the case that our observations don't conform to reality, that the conclusions that we draw are inaccurate. Then, I suppose determinism is indirectly responsible for that. But determinsm itself does not preclude accurate observation of reality.

It is equally likely that our observations perfectly reflect reality, in which case every conclusion, having been determined by the initial state of the universe, is perfectly capable of being accurate, or true.

Of course not. My point is that if laws of nature guarantee that we'll believe what we in fact do believe, even when that belief is false, we may be unable to know whether we know anything.

But you are not looking at the whole picture. Why does it guarantee the things we believe? How? It's not an operator, constantly fidgeting and adjusting our minds to shape our beliefs. That's what I meant when I said it describes the way the world works.

When you believe something, you do so for reasons. You have evidence, you have theories, you have experiences to weigh this evidence against, you have subconscious motivations for your beliefs, biases, etc. These things all factor into your forming a belief. This is the mechanism by which a deterministic universe would "guarantee" your belief.

Do you see what I mean about determinism not being the problem? If it is the case that we act rationally and our observations relfect reality, then conclusions drawn in a deterministic universe can be accurate, or true. If our observations do not accurately reflect reality, then our conclusions are suspect. But this does not change whether we have a deterministic framework or not.

Can you give a hypothetical example of what you mean by laws of nature guaranteeing a belief that is false?

If we look at it, it happens all the time on the individual scale. If I as a youth mistakenly believe that 1+1=3, then as you say, determinism guaranteed that I would hold a false belief. But then a teacher corrects me. "No, Travis, 1+1=2." That correction is part of the continuing deterministic chain of events, so after that I hold the belief that 1+1=2. Determinism guaranteed that, as well.

EDIT: And I still don't really see how free will helps us...

 

[Travis_King]

So you still fail to see a difference between being forced to make a decision and making the decision on your own? What if someone were to put a gun to your wife's head and demanded that she acknowledged that she were a jihadist? You would accept that for truth? Really?

Admittedly, my view of the self is probably putting a bias on what you mean by "forcing you to make a decision".

What does it mean to make a decision "on your own". When you make a decision, you are doing it because you want to for the most part, right? If determinism is true, the want doesn't go away. You still want to do that thing, and when you do it, I don't understand why it automatically becomes something that is not your own.

The problem, I think, stems from what we mean by "you", not the cause of the decision.

Because you are obviously unable to tell apart forced behavior from voluntary one.

Forced by what, may I ask?

Because the mechanism by which determinism would "force" you to do something would be, basically, by "making" you feel your desires, emotions, and motivations. Basically, determinism "forces" you to choose as you want to choose?

it's determinism which tricks people into 'thinking' things, if one were to hold a deterministic view of the world.

Where do you get this idea from?

Good point. Reminds me that a lot of times we produce deterministic noise. But sometimes there's a signal, we call it 'ideas'(they drive the world) and I've come to appreciate it when the signal to noise ratio is above 50%. The bright minds who are able to produce a signal seem to be the ones who set us the most apart from the animal kingdom and the reigns of determinism.

So now we come to the crux of things. Does the rest of the extant universe operate deterministically, and it is only our consciousness which divorces us from that?

 

[Bill_McEnaney]

Everyone,

I'm sorry I may not know how to answer your questions now when I've just listened to the Stanford Encyclopedia's article about causal determinism. Unfortunately, the physics is too, too hard for me because I'm too ignorant about the mathematics that it uses.

After my computer read me the encyclopedia article, one description of determinism sound much like Carl Hempel's Hypothetico-Deductive Model of Scientific Explanation. To sum it up, Hempel believes that with a set of initial conditions and the laws of nature, you can deduce what will happen. The laws and the conditions imply that the events will happen.

The encyclopedia article suggests to me that for determinism to work the way Hempel's model says that scientific explanation works, you'd need to know everything about the universe's current state, however elusive that knowledge may be.

Travis, I misinterpreted what you told us about consistency, coherence, cohesion and repeatability. Although I didn't think much about Plato's Early Socratic Dialogues, my misinterpretation of you thoughts reminded me that in those dialogues, Socrates believes that logical consistency is a sufficient condition for truth. You seemed pragmatic enough to settle for consistency, coherence, cohesion and repeatability if scientific arguments were inconclusive. I'm sorry because I suspect that I barely skimmed what you wrote. Shame on me and on my impulsive streak.

 

[Pythagorean]

So you still fail to see a difference between being forced to make a decision and making the decision on your own? What if someone were to put a gun to your wife's head and demanded that she acknowledged that she were a jihadist? You would accept that for truth? Really?

This really is a non sequitor. It has nothing to do with the discussion of determinism. The question isn't whether you can make choices, but whether you actually choose to make choices. That is, determinism doesn't contest "will", it contests "free will".

Consider a system... information enters the system and it does an internal calculation and the system move five feet left; alternatively, an external force pushes it five feet left. The question of whether those internal calculations are deterministic is different than the question of whether the influence came from internally or externally.

 

[Travis_King]

Bill, this question has been debated for centuries...it seems you aren't alone in not knowing the answers!

With regards to your last point, yea, mostly I take a pragmatic stance on the idea of "truth". However I do recognize that the pragmatic "necessary conditions" for truth are not really all that convincing from an epistemological standpoint.

I know some people who hear the pragmatic argument and think it amounts to saying, "Well, this seems to be good enough. Let's stop here, I'm pretty sure we're ok saying we 'know' this to be a 'truth'." It's hard to say who's right.

For anyone else still reading, I'd like to see a discussion on what the necessary conditions are for "free". As one might have deduced from my argument a couple pages back, I believe that freedom is whatever we want to do. Our freedom is only challenged by coercion, which is to say anything which 'forces' us or demands that we do something which we do not agree with, or which we do not want to, or cannot, do.