The Illusion of Free Will: A Scientific Perspective

[Nikitin]

What's the difference between determinism and determinable?

Anyway: Let's say the electron moves randomly around the Hydrogen. What consequences will this have? Well, for one, electrons have negative charge, and thus are able to effect other charged particles around them. If the electron moves randomly, it thus will be able to randomly affect its charged neighbours, leading to random behaviour.

Stuff like this taken to the next level will mean that are thought processes are subject to randomness, and thus are free from determinism.

1) The reactions and impulses in our brains are not random, but are with certainty tied to the stimuli received from within and from without.

How are they not random to some degree, if the atoms themselves behave randomly?

Were this not the case, we could not function.

No. I'm not saying that the randomness is so big that the output will be completely random and utterly unpredictable. I am saying that there would be a very small degree of randomness..

You're saying that what somebody thinks is perfectly predictable if the conditions are known beforehand. I'm saying that it's predictable what the general thought will be if the conditions are known beforehand, but not perfectly predictable due to some inherent randomness.

2) Even if it was the case, which it isn't, random motion does not allow for any will. Randomness is, for all intents and purposes, worse for a free-willer than determinism.

How so? Determinism removes free will because thoughts are predictable according to determinism. Thus there is no such thing as free will. If determinism is taken out of the equation due to randomness, then there is nothing ruling free will. It will just be a result of mostly the conditions beforehand, and some randomness.

PS: even if randomness on the atom-level isn't relevant, this is http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_theory . I'm fairly sure that something as complex as the human brain cannot possibly be perfectly deterministic.

 

[Travis_King]

How so? Determinism removes free will because thoughts are predictable according to determinism. If determinism is taken out of the equation due to randomness, then there is nothing ruling free will. It will just be a result of mostly the conditions beforehand, and some randomness.

I'll probably reply at greater length later, but for now:

What you are doing is not making room for free will. Adding radnomness to the process means that, while the system is not determinable (therefore, it would seem, not deterministic) it can rigidly adhere to causality (the driving force behind determinism, and the real objection to the standard "Free will"). Which is to say, while you can't predict what Person X will do or think at time Y, due to this randomness, you can confidently say that it is a direct result of all antecedent events and conditions plus whatever randomness directly affected his thoughts immediately preceding time Y.

I don't really see anyone coming up with a coherent argument against causality, as it seems to be pretty self evident and logically and physically consistent.

I don't recall who said it, (Maui, I think) but whoever noted that I do not find a problem between free will and determinism is more or less correct. Mainly because I don't think either are entirely coherent and consider my thoughts on the subject as more compatibilist, of sorts.

 

[Nikitin]

Wow, those were allot of complex words I've never heard about. English isn't my 1st language, but I'll try to reply:

What you are doing is not making room for free will. Adding radnomness to the process means that, while the system is not determinable (therefore, it would seem, not deterministic) it can rigidly adhere to causality (the driving force behind determinism, and the real objection to the standard "Free will"). Which is to say, while you can't predict what Person X will do or think at time Y, due to this randomness, you can confidently say that it is a direct result of all antecedent events and conditions plus whatever randomness directly affected his thoughts immediately preceding time Y.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but are you saying that determinism doesn't require the future to be theoretically determinable? I thought the entire point about determinism was perfect determinability... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism According to wikipedia, determinism's definition is "If conditions X are met, then Y will happen with 100% certainty". If that is the case, how on Earth is free will possible? Free will would be simply ruled by the conditions.

A degree of randomness, on the other hand, removes the problems of perfectly predictable determinism. If you think that randomness destroys free will just like determinism, then how can you think that it is possible at all for true free-will to exist?

For me, for free will to exist, it must have that little unpredictability to make it free from the constraints of causality. Otherwise we are all just slaves of a perfect mechanical clock-work universe, determinable from the period of Big Bang, and to its end. Basically, imo, randomness during our thought processes is what makes the thought processes ours.

 

[Travis_King]

Nikitin, yep, generally determinism will say that the state of the world at any given time is a direct and necessary result of the antecedent (prior) events and conditions. What I was saying, though, is that causality is really what does away with the traditional view of "Free will", not necessarily determinism.

A degree of randomness rules out determinism (as in, condition X leads directly and perfectly to Y), yes, but not the mechanism of determinism which rules out what we call libertarian free will, which is, of course, causality.

Think about it. Say we have a deterministic system. Let's call it "My brain".
Let's then call all of the antecedent events and conditions: 1+2.
Determinism says that 1+2=3, right?
Enter the random variable 0.001, we now have 1+2+0.001=3.001
So while determinism is false (since we cannot get 3.001 from only the antecedent events and conditions: 1+2), we haven't changed the actual decision making mechanism.

That's a long winded way of saying that while the random variable makes it so the "my brain" is not perfectly determinable based on past events and conditions, the random event doesn't give my brain any more freedom (it's still simple addition), it just makes it unpredictable.

Now, as far as free will goes, randomness doesn't help at all (as I've said). First off, randomness doesn't divorce us from causality. Randomness introduces more variables, making the result unpredictable, but you still have effects as the result of causes. It's just that instead of:
CAUSE --> EFFECT
you have:
CAUSE + random variable --> EFFECT
Same mechanism, just a different result.

Think about it, how does randomness aid in the freedom of will. They are opposing ideas. Your will can't be random; if it is, how is it yours?

then how can you think that it is possible at all for true free-will to exist?

This question is really the crux of the issue. I don't. But that is because the very idea proposed by libertarian free will is fundamentally incoherent (it's silly, doesn't make sense).

A true view of free will must account for the fact of causality. Any view of free will which does not have causality at it's core is incoherent. Causes are a fundamental part of the way the world works, "will" is necessarily driven by reasons.

My basic viewpoint is basically this:
1. I am, in every important and realizable way, everything I see, do, hear, touch, feel, know, think, experience, etc. and nothing more.
There is no homunculus, pre-existing "me", or "soul".

2. Those things are determined by external factors [I cannot choose what I see or what things I experience any more than I can choose my genetic code or my biological predispositions]

3. Thus, "I" am a being created as a result of, and continually changed by, external factors.

4. When speaking of "will" we necessarily imply a being which will be doing the willing. I.e. "I"

5. Thus, the question of personal free will asks if "I" --a being created qua external factors-- can make decisions of my own volition.

6. SO. If "I" am every single factor and influence that I have ever experienced, and any decision I make comes directly from those experiences and nothing else [how could it?], then were comes the external forces that would take away free will [that is, those that are not the set of external forces that constitute "I"]? Where comes the issue of causality with respect to my "will"?

Then, all decisions made by "I" are capable of being completely free of outside forces. "I" will act exactly how "I" will act, and no different. But "I" act freely and of "my" own volition.

As far as I'm concerned, causality is a necessary part of my free will. I act, necessarily, as "I" will to act.

 

[Maui]

A true view of free will must account for the fact of causality. Any view of free will which does not have causality at it's core is incoherent. Causes are a fundamental part of the way the world works, "will" is necessarily driven by reasons.

Look up "emergent behavior", you may change your mind about causality. If it were that simple to reduce everything down to a simple mechanistic framework, science would have been a sealed package. The world is most definitely not mechanistic at its core and you failed to explain how causality accounts for that which feels pain. Had you made these assertions in the biology forum, they would have been technically fine with me in that narrow field, and i wouldn't debate them. But since you are making them here and it implies holding a conviction of a correct worldview, i'd say you are completely wrong.

My basic viewpoint is basically this:
1. I am, in every important and realizable way, everything I see, do, hear, touch, feel, know, think, experience, etc. and nothing more.
There is no homunculus, pre-existing "me", or "soul".

2. Those things are determined by external factors [I cannot choose what I see or what things I experience any more than I can choose my genetic code or my biological predispositions]

3. Thus, "I" am a being created as a result of, and continually changed by, external factors.

4. When speaking of "will" we necessarily imply a being which will be doing the willing. I.e. "I"

5. Thus, the question of personal free will asks if "I" --a being created qua external factors-- can make decisions of my own volition.

6. SO. If "I" am every single factor and influence that I have ever experienced, and any decision I make comes directly from those experiences and nothing else [how could it?], then were comes the external forces that would take away free will [that is, those that are not the set of external forces that constitute "I"]? Where comes the issue of causality with respect to my "will"?

Then, all decisions made by "I" are capable of being completely free of outside forces. "I" will act exactly how "I" will act, and no different. But "I" act freely and of "my" own volition.

As far as I'm concerned, causality is a necessary part of my free will. I act, necessarily, as "I" will to act.

That there is a you that feels(among other things) implies strongly something different - that you are a conscious mind attached to a physical body. Anything else is either incomplete, incoherent or against observational evidence. The fact that you are writing here and exchanging information speaks much more about your conscious mind than of your physical processes.

By the way, causality is unable to account not only for conscious awareness and free will in humans, but for every other observable thing in reality in even a semi-adeqaute manner. You should probably take a closer look at the world and see if it's really made of mechanistic stuff or from something else entirely.

 

[Travis_King]

You are speaking of dualism and have the gall to say that a physical explanation of consciousness has no basis in observational evidence?

 

[Maui]

For me, for free will to exist, it must have that little unpredictability to make it free from the constraints of causality. Otherwise we are all just slaves of a perfect mechanical clock-work universe, determinable from the period of Big Bang, and to its end.

No, reductionism and determinism are failures in physics, more so in philosophy. We could be missing a whole class of properties that are still unaccounted for.

Basically, imo, randomness during our thought processes is what makes the thought processes ours.

There is a degree of unpredictability at every scale, does that mean there is some form of mind that calls its processes "ours"? Can processes be conscious?

 

[Maui]

You are speaking of dualism and have the gall to say that a physical explanation of consciousness has no basis in observational evidence?

That "something" is feeling pain is observationally evident. It has no explanation in a physical framework. What is it you are you asking?

 

[Travis_King]

Your argument is ridiculous. I don't understand how feeling pain can't be explained physically...Are you being serious?

Is your argument along the lines of, "sensory reactions can be described physically, but not the experience or conscious sensation of those senses?"

 

[Maui]

Is your argument along the lines of, "sensory reactions can be described physically, but not the experience or conscious sensation of those senses?"

Yes, the first person account of experience can't be explained physically.

 

[Travis_King]

Well, that's not true. It hasn't been explained (demonstratably, with certainty; as there are many theories--the scientific kind--and evidentially supported hypotheses), but that doesn't mean it can't be explained.

 

[Maui]

Nothing in the laws of physics and biology as we know them today pre-supposes conscious behavior. Deterministic behavior - yes, conscious - no.

 

[Travis_King]

Good, science shouldn't be pre-supposing anything.
It isn't "pre-supposed" because it is generally understood to be a property, or emergent phenomenon, of the complex neural network. It's not a fundamental property of the universe, it's a unique quirk of biology.

 

[chiro]

Also I think it's important to mention a good definition of truth.

A good definition of truth is something that is universal and without exception, and unfortunately what many call truths are things that are so non-universal and so narrow, that it really boggles my mind at how something can be justified as truth.

Most scientists really want to find truth, and in the context of above it ends up being something that comes down to a consensus based conclusion of said proposed "truths" even if they are only "partial truths" (as most things are).

But unfortunately a lot of investigation is very narrow and thus the tendency is to try and extrapolate something from that scenario that is "universal" and you can see where the problems lie.

I realize that in order to analyze and make sense of things you need to reduce things to whatever working level you can, but the point I am making is that a lot of people do tend to forget that they narrow things down, and atomize things in such a way that they lose the rest of what they are working with.

Finally with regard to pre-supposing, everyone will do this at some point.

Science is largely a cumulative process and people will be shaped by not only what they uniquely experience and discover, but also what they believe to be true even if they haven't verified it themselves.

Again we all do it at some point and it's more effecient to find people we have a degree of trust for to tell us what their own experiences like if they don't have an agenda and are as unbiased as possible: it just doesn't make sense to do it all yourself unless you consider it really really important.

 

[Maui]

Well, that's not true. It hasn't been explained (demonstratably, with certainty; as there are many theories--the scientific kind--and evidentially supported hypotheses), but that doesn't mean it can't be explained.

If you know of such a hypothesis that doesn't state or imply that consciousness is an illusion, do share it with us. Otherwise, it wouldn't be a model - if i am unable to repay the bank, i can't just say "the money you gave me was illusory".

 

[Nikitin]

Nikitin, yep, generally determinism will say that the state of the world at any given time is a direct and necessary result of the antecedent (prior) events and conditions. What I was saying, though, is that causality is really what does away with the traditional view of "Free will", not necessarily determinism.

A degree of randomness rules out determinism (as in, condition X leads directly and perfectly to Y), yes, but not the mechanism of determinism which rules out what we call libertarian free will, which is, of course, causality.

Think about it. Say we have a deterministic system. Let's call it "My brain".
Let's then call all of the antecedent events and conditions: 1+2.
Determinism says that 1+2=3, right?
Enter the random variable 0.001, we now have 1+2+0.001=3.001
So while determinism is false (since we cannot get 3.001 from only the antecedent events and conditions: 1+2), we haven't changed the actual decision making mechanism.

That's a long winded way of saying that while the random variable makes it so the "my brain" is not perfectly determinable based on past events and conditions, the random event doesn't give my brain any more freedom (it's still simple addition), it just makes it unpredictable.

Why would randomness make 1+2=3.001? If that was the case, we would be ruled by randomness, and thus lose our free will. The randomness I'm speaking of would simply leave room for alternative thought-processes. Say you have 2 identical people on 2 identical worlds. In 20 years, they would be in the same place according to determinism. Though if you add randomness to the equation, both they and the worlds would be somewhat different.

Now, as far as free will goes, randomness doesn't help at all (as I've said). First off, randomness doesn't divorce us from causality. Randomness introduces more variables, making the result unpredictable, but you still have effects as the result of causes. It's just that instead of:
CAUSE --> EFFECT
you have:
CAUSE + random variable --> EFFECT
Same mechanism, just a different result.

Think about it, how does randomness aid in the freedom of will. They are opposing ideas. Your will can't be random; if it is, how is it yours?

There is only one argument against free will - if our thoughts are ruled by determinism, or by randomness, then we aren't free. I agree that in that case our will wouldn't be free.

However, if determinism is broken in such a way that our thoughts are ruled nearly entirely by causality, but not completely, then we do indeed have free will. Random chance wouldn't rule us, it would just add to our thought processes like causality does, and make room for creativity. Basically, if neither causality or chance is ruling over our thoughts, then nobody is and thus our wills are free of any control from any agent.

This question is really the crux of the issue. I don't. But that is because the very idea proposed by libertarian free will is fundamentally incoherent (it's silly, doesn't make sense).

A true view of free will must account for the fact of causality. Any view of free will which does not have causality at it's core is incoherent. Causes are a fundamental part of the way the world works, "will" is necessarily driven by reasons.

My basic viewpoint is basically this:
1. I am, in every important and realizable way, everything I see, do, hear, touch, feel, know, think, experience, etc. and nothing more.
There is no homunculus, pre-existing "me", or "soul".

2. Those things are determined by external factors [I cannot choose what I see or what things I experience any more than I can choose my genetic code or my biological predispositions]

3. Thus, "I" am a being created as a result of, and continually changed by, external factors.

4. When speaking of "will" we necessarily imply a being which will be doing the willing. I.e. "I"

5. Thus, the question of personal free will asks if "I" --a being created qua external factors-- can make decisions of my own volition.

6. SO. If "I" am every single factor and influence that I have ever experienced, and any decision I make comes directly from those experiences and nothing else [how could it?], then were comes the external forces that would take away free will [that is, those that are not the set of external forces that constitute "I"]? Where comes the issue of causality with respect to my "will"?

Then, all decisions made by "I" are capable of being completely free of outside forces. "I" will act exactly how "I" will act, and no different. But "I" act freely and of "my" own volition.

As far as I'm concerned, causality is a necessary part of my free will. I act, necessarily, as "I" will to act.

How can you consider such a will free, if it is like a mechanical machine? I am confused: do you believe in determinism or not?

Maui,

There is a degree of unpredictability at every scale, does that mean there is some form of mind that calls its processes "ours"? Can processes be conscious?

If such thoughts are unique to us, why wouldn't they be ours? The main point here is if those thoughts are free or not.

 

[Maui]

Maui,
If such thoughts are unique to us, why wouldn't they be ours? The main point here is if those thoughts are free or not.

My comment addressed this statement:

Basically, imo, randomness during our thought processes is what makes the thought processes ours.

Both randomness and determinism are poor explanations of consciousness and the supposed free will. In your example you stated that slight, inpredictable variations in the processes in the brain add up to a new entity that we call our thoughts(as far as i was able to understand your point). This could well be how aspects of one's character are formed, however they are poor explanations of other aspects of human behavior - like the mental picture that we call 'reality' or the entity that feels pain or pleasure, or being aware, or dreaming or planning to change the course of the the future, etc. If these are illusions, than what is not, considering that you only have solid proof for their existence and everything else is unprovable. You are compelling us to hold the rational belief that the outside reality exists, and hold a further belief that what that world implies is that the observations of conscious choices from the first belief are illusions. Sounds rather contrdictory to me and a bit illogical.

 

[Travis_King]

If you know of such a hypothesis that doesn't state or imply that consciousness is an illusion, do share it with us. Otherwise, it wouldn't be a model - if i am unable to repay the bank, i can't just say "the money you gave me was illusory".

There are no peer reviewed scientific works (note: not philosophical works) that I know of that claim consciousness is an illusion. Illusion is a philosophical word, not a scientific one.

What's an illusion, how would we test that hypothesis?

 

[Travis_King]

Why would randomness make 1+2=3.001? If that was the case, we would be ruled by randomness, and thus lose our free will. The randomness I'm speaking of would simply leave room for alternative thought-processes. Say you have 2 identical people on 2 identical worlds. In 20 years, they would be in the same place according to determinism. Though if you add randomness to the equation, both they and the worlds would be somewhat different.

If "randomness" has a directive, then it isn't random. Your two-worlds idea is accurate, but not for the reason you'd hoped. Yes, the worlds would be slightly, or greatly, different. But that does not rule out a deterministic framework. If the world otherwise operates deterministically (that is, were there no randomness, it would be completely determined) but you add in some funny random subatomic events that change things at the macro (say, human) level, you'll have a different world, but that doesn't mean any more freedom was involved. You've added more elements into the equation, but they are random, and they still have the effect of directly causing the next "state of the world".

There is only one argument against free will - if our thoughts are ruled by determinism, or by randomness, then we aren't free. I agree that in that case our will wouldn't be free.

There are plenty more than that.

However, if determinism is broken in such a way that our thoughts are ruled nearly entirely by causality, but not completely, then we do indeed have free will.

That isn't true. If you need free will to be divorced from causality, then you need to then introduce something which is outside of the causal chain, and yet still influenced by "you" in some way.

Random chance wouldn't rule us, it would just add to our thought processes like causality does, and make room for creativity.

Creativity isn't random...I don't see how randomness would help with creativity.

How can you consider such a will free, if it is like a mechanical machine? I am confused: do you believe in determinism or not?

I believe I am exclusively the product of things that were out of my control. The world (external) and my physiology (internal) work to shape me. I believe in a determinism of sorts, I do not believe the world is predictable, though.

How is the will I described unfree? Yes, these external things determine (shape) who I am and what I think, but not in a billiard ball way. Despite this, I still experience thought, and emotion, and decision-making. When I decide to pour a bowl of Cheerios it isn't something that is magically out of my control because the world operates according to physical laws. I want to, and so I do.

That want? Sure, determined. But does it change the fact that I actually do want to?

Free will, I think, is incoherent. I believe in personal will. And I believe that we make our own decisions. I just recognize that at some level the decisions I make are a natural progression of the system (the universe) through time.

You have to define what you mean by free, as that is the cause of pretty much all miscommunication in arguments about "free" will. We can proceed from there.

 

[Maui]

There are no peer reviewed scientific works (note: not philosophical works) that I know of that claim consciousness is an illusion. Illusion is a philosophical word, not a scientific one.

Yes but i was asking to see the hypothesis that attempts to explain mind in physical terms(that you mentioned) here:

It hasn't been explained (demonstratably, with certainty; as there are many theories--the scientific kind--and evidentially supported hypotheses)...

We are in the philosophy forum and philosophical topics like the philosophy of mind are normally handled by philosophical references. I am sure you will be safe quoting philosophers arguments, e.g. Daniel Dennett considers free will to be an illusion.

What's an illusion, how would we test that hypothesis?

It was you who claimed free will did not exist and it's another way of saying it's an illusion. Or did you change your mind?

 

[Travis_King]

Just because we are discussing philosophy doesn't mean we should forget about science...You are also taking that idea out of context. Free will and consciousness are obviously different things. I don't think you'd get Dennett to admit that he believes consciousness is an illusion.

I said the "free will" that most people are talking about is incoherent. I believe we have will, and that it is usually free from coercion. I don't think our freedom will is an illusion, I think we are wrong in our understanding of what it is.

As I said previously, just because we haven't explained consciousness physically yet doesn't mean it has its roots in the non-physical.

 

[bohm2]

As I said previously, just because we haven't explained consciousness physically yet doesn't mean it has its roots in the non-physical.

There's also a problem with defining "physical" since some argue that the concept of matter/physical itself is open and evolving (physics has not ended) so the mind-body problem can't even be posed in any reasonable way since we lack a definite concept of body/matter/physical.

I've regurgitated this before but in my opinion, the strongest argument put forth for the possibility of "free will" are positions that are able to challenge the following premise:

The presumption in favor of upward causation and explanation (from microphysical to macrophysical) that comes with causal completeness is what cuts free agency out of the picture, whether this causation is deterministic or partly random.

If it can shown that there exists the possibility for some type of 'downward causation' between the macroscopic/microscopic domains, then maybe "free will" can occur? Determinism or non-determinism are not relevant, in my opinion. So, it's been argued that a indeterministic universe would not help the "free will" position anymore than a deterministic universe, as others above argued. It seems that would just lead to a "random will"?

 

[Maui]

Just because we are discussing philosophy doesn't mean we should forget about science...

You can provide both, but so far you have provided none to substantiate your assertion that something seemingly immaterial like personal experience can be accounted for in deteministic and reductionistic frameworks:

as there are many theories--the scientific kind--and evidentially supported hypotheses

You are also taking that idea out of context. Free will and consciousness are obviously different things.

Free will requires consciousness, of the type that isn't illusory(by this i mean the obvious feeling of being conscious, that some claim to be wrong or overrated).

I don't think you'd get Dennett to admit that he believes consciousness is an illusion.

His words:

"Dan Dennett: The illusion of consciousness"

http://www.ted.com/talks/dan_dennett_on_our_consciousness.html

I said the "free will" that most people are talking about is incoherent. I believe we have will, and that it is usually free from coercion. I don't think our freedom will is an illusion, I think we are wrong in our understanding of what it is.

As I said previously, just because we haven't explained consciousness physically yet doesn't mean it has its roots in the non-physical.

As bohm2 pointed out, there's work to be done explaining the physical. All our explanations of nature(including the theory of evolution) are schemes of how things develop, not what they are. You could raise the same questions on matter, time and space. If you are seeking an understanding of personal experience, you must consider all aspects of the events that unfold. As far as i am conerned, emergence could be the most fundamental creative mechanism of Nature - from the emergence of a universe, life, and consciousness to the existence of a macro scale(emergence normally produces higher levels of order from lower, some people are searching for a fundamental super-symmetry in nature that gets broken to account for the observed reality).

BTW, i made no claims how consciousness arises, it could be emergent or otherwise. I was merely pointing out the inconsistencies in the physical account and was looking to see more arguments and how well they would hold.

 

[Pythagorean]

I don't see any inconsistencies in physical accounts, just a lack of a complete story. But that's the case with all physical sciences. We can always find more data, more relationships, more theory.

A more recent framework utilizes "integrated information theory". Guilio Tononi developed a mathematical formula to measure quantities of consciousness from information theory.

 

[audioloop]

Free will requires , of the type that isn't illusory(by this i the obvious feeling of being conscious, that some claim to be wrong or overrated).

His words:

"Dan Dennett: The of "

http://www.ted.com/talks/dan_dennett_on_our_consciousness.html

http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Psychology/Social/?view=usa&ci=9780199897599

..."Most of us believe that we are an independent, coherent self--an individual inside our head who thinks, watches, wonders, dreams, and makes plans for the future. This sense of our self may seem incredibly real but a wealth of recent scientific evidence reveals that it is not what it seems--it is all an illusion.
Who we are is, in short, a story of our self--a narrative that our brain creates. Like the science fiction movie, we are living in a matrix that is our mind. But Hood concludes that though the self is an illusion, it is an illusion we must continue to embrace to live happily in human society."


---
but i know that, i am not a rock a table, a star
so WHO feel, live or experience that "illusion", maybe you or peter or carl?
---


from John-Dylan haynes brain researcher

In contrast, Haynes and colleagues now show that brain activity predicts even up to 7 seconds ahead of time how a person is going to decide. But they also warn that the study does not finally rule out free will:
... "Our study shows that decisions are unconsciously prepared much longer ahead than previously thought. But we do not know yet where the final decision is made. We need to investigate whether a decision prepared by these brain areas can still be reversed."...


To Do or Not to Do: The Neural Signature of Self-Control
http://www.jneurosci.org/content/27/34/9141.full.pdf



even animals
Observations of scent-marking and discriminating self from others by a domestic dog (Canis familiaris): tales of displaced yellow snow

 

[Bill_McEnaney]

To see why I doubt that any scientific argument can prove that hard determinism is true, suppose that it is true. Then it'll guarantee that scientists will draw the conclusions that they do draw, even when those conclusions are false. So I suggest that if hard determinism is true, scientists should distrust their judgment when they argue for that determinism or for any other theory. Maybe my argument hints at why I believe that the Enlightenment was a mixed blessing at best?

 

[Bill_McEnaney]

A post ago, I should have told you that I wrote that post partly because I wanted to undermine scientism. Scientism fans believe that science is our only source of genuine knowledge. But if I've argued soundly a post ago, it's hard to see how we can know whether we know anything that we think that we discover by reasoning. Maybe an argument for determinism is can give strong evidence for skepticism. But I don't know of any scientist who would be, say, a Pyhronian skeptic, someone who believes that we can know only how things seem to us.

 

[bohm2]

But I don't know of any scientist who would be, say, a Pyhronian skeptic, someone who believes that we can know only how things seem to us.

I always assumed that the practise of science is very compatible with Pyrhonian skepticism.

 

[Travis_King]

You can provide both, but so far you have provided none to substantiate your assertion that something seemingly immaterial like personal experience can be accounted for in deteministic and reductionistic frameworks:

Of course not, I'm not a neuroscientist, you know. But you haven't demonstrated why a deterministic framework rules out personal experience, either. This isn't asking you to "prove a negative", as it were, but if you are asserting that we can have no personal experience if determinism were true, then you've got to back that up somehow.

All signs point to consciousness (and thus personal experience) being a direct result of our neural network and the way it interacts with our body, our environment, and itself.

Free will requires consciousness, of the type that isn't illusory(by this i mean the obvious feeling of being conscious, that some claim to be wrong or overrated).

I don't know that anyone doubts that we experience free will; especially not consciousness.

 

[Travis_King]

To see why I doubt that any scientific argument can prove that hard determinism is true, suppose that it is true. Then it'll guarantee that scientists will draw the conclusions that they do draw, even when those conclusions are false. So I suggest that if hard determinism is true, scientists should distrust their judgment when they argue for that determinism or for any other theory. Maybe my argument hints at why I believe that the Enlightenment was a mixed blessing at best?

This is a misunderstanding of the situation. Assuming that scientists follow rigorous methods, then whether or not their conclusions are "determined" is irellevant. If they "do science" properly, their results will be accurate.

 

[bohm2]

Some might find this fairly recent (2010) and comprehensive review article on "free will experiments" interesting:

Free will debates: Simple experiments are not so simple
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2942748/pdf/acp-06-047.pdf

 

[Bill_McEnaney]

This is a misunderstanding of the situation. Assuming that scientists follow rigorous methods, then whether or not their conclusions are "determined" is irellevant. If they "do science" properly, their results will be accurate.

But how do you know that determinism will allow scientists to know that those results are accurate? Even if they're inaccurate, determinism may guarantee that scientists will believe that those results are accurate. If Pyhronian skepticism is true, we can know only how things seem to us, not how they actually are. If it's true, we can't know how they actually are, even when they actually are the way they seem. How much good will correctness and rigor do us if we can't know whether anything is either rigorous or correct?

 

[Travis_King]

I don't understand how you are using the word determinism. It's not a moving, intervening entity...it's a description of the way the universe may function. If we have limitations of perception such that we can never know anything, that isn't the result of a deterministic framework.

I don't understand how determinism:

may guarantee that scientists will believe that those results are accurate

By what mechanism of determinism would this be the case?

 

[Maui]

I don't understand how you are using the word determinism. It's not a moving, intervening entity...it's a description of the way the universe may function.

What's the likelihood of the universe being deterministic and you knowing anything that resembles truth?

If we have limitations of perception such that we can never know anything, that isn't the result of a deterministic framework.

I thought perception was also a deterministic event and the way things seem to play out.
Without some sort of emergent free will science would be saying goodbye to veracity and "Hello deterministic events". You'd have no control over ANYTHING, including scientific theories and propositions.

 

[Maui]

This is a misunderstanding of the situation. Assuming that scientists follow rigorous methods, then whether or not their conclusions are "determined" is irellevant. If they "do science" properly, their results will be accurate.

This is entirely incorrect. It's saying that a book's story is entirely correct because the events in it follow proper science as defined within the story's plot. It sounds a bit like "the Bible is true because the Bible says so"