The Illusion of Free Will: A Scientific Perspective

[skeptic2]

No one is saying that choices are made out of the blue. There are many factors that weigh in choices but those factors are not deterministic.

For instance there are many factors that determine how one drives a car. There are personal preferences, which lane to drive in; there are physical laws, how fast you can stop; there are legal laws, stopping at a red light; and there are desires, stopping off for a latte on the way home from work. None of these represent a causal relationship to how one drives nor are they chaotic in nature.

For the universe to be deterministic, all those factors must have existed at the Big Bang, otherwise known as Deism.

 

[Pythagorean]

I think I've addressed your comments in post #90. Not sure if you saw it before you posted.

 

[Maui]

Free will is kind of a ghost.

So you want to delve into the fundamental nature of things and you singled out 'free will' as if it's the only thing that appears like a ghost under very close scrutiny?

It would imply that we can evade causality, which is a strange concept (something we could find "rather absurd" as well). It has no evidence, so far, it's just a feeling we (including myself) have. But I think you have to really face that feeling and question it if you want to have an honest discussion.

I've pushed a lot of bounderies and I am questioning everything all the time, probably past the safe sanity level. There exists a personal experience, that's all i can say. I can believe a framework if it fits all the evidence and stick to a worldview that i would consider correct. If it fits some of the evidence, but not other, i revert to "my personal experience" framework and remain sceptical.When determinism addresses the issue i raised in post 82, i may join the camp.

 

[Pythagorean]

So you want to delve into the fundamental nature of things and you singled out 'free will' as if it's the only thing that appears like a ghost under very close scrutiny?

Freewill is the red hering in behavior science. It's not needed to explain anything. It's a feeling we have (that's been questioned by Libet's experiments) so I do so on rational grounds agasinst my natural intuition. Though, by now, I've developed an intution about causality in behavior.

When determinism addresses the issue i raised in post 82, i may join the camp:
[...POST 82...]
What does determinism say about feeling pain? What/who/how feels pain? Seems like we have a new entity.

Again, this is independent of whether things are deterministic or not. We could feel pain whether we did so as a passive observer or an active observer. This is the "hard problem of consciousness". It's not solved.

However, it does fit into determinism. It's an evolutionary mechanism. Pain and pleasure are the mechanisms that allow for survival (pleasure leads to sustainance and reproduction, pain leads to death).

 

[Travis_King]

When determinism addresses the issue i raised in post 82, i may join the camp.

What does determinism say about feeling pain? What/who/how feels pain? Seems like we have a new entity.

Determinsm says nothing about feeling pain. That isn't in its purview. The nature of the self is quite a different question than the nature of the interactions of extant things, both living and non.

Do you know what determinism actually argues? It isn't simply, "Free will is wrong"...

Edit, Seems Pythagorean beat me to it.

 

[chiro]

One thing I think people should really think about is what information people have, what they don't have, what they are assuming based on what they don't have and as a product of what they have (i.e. inference) and also how far the projectification of information is being made.

The projectification of information means that you start with a tonne of information and you project it down to a tiny sub-space for something like a lower descriptive capacity in order to be able to make sense of it.

In a lot of these examples, the space being considered is extremely narrow and basically doesn't take into account the myriad of other information, relationships and dependencies that exist.

When people talk about determinism, funnily enough people often talk about a form of local determinism rather than a global determinism and so they focus on an extremely narrow form of cause and affect which is always going to result in problems from the start.

 

[Nikitin]

determinism seems like a bunch of BS to me. I mean, sure, if the universe behaved like a clock-work and had 0 degree of randomness, then determinism would be guaranteed.

However, from what I've understood from quantum mechanics, I'm fairly sure atoms behave randomly to a certain degree. Ergo there can never be any determinism.

 

[Travis_King]

Determinism on a macro scale doesn't necessarily require determinism on a quantum scale...

 

[Pythagorean]

determinism seems like a bunch of BS to me. I mean, sure, if the universe behaved like a clock-work and had 0 degree of randomness, then determinism would be guaranteed.

However, from what I've understood from quantum mechanics, I'm fairly sure atoms behave randomly to a certain degree. Ergo there can never be any determinism.

Cohered macro-systems (ensembles of quantum particles) behave in a deterministic manner. Furthermore, quantum effects have been shown not to play a relevant role in decision making in the brain (there were a few papers published in response to Penrose, whose view is considered crackpot by physical chemists and neuroscientists).

 

[Maui]

Again, this is independent of whether things are deterministic or not. We could feel pain whether we did so as a passive observer or an active observer. This is the "hard problem of consciousness". It's not solved.

So there obviously exists something that feels pain and it can not be accounted for in physical terms, but we are somehow supposed to believe that that same "it" that feels pain and can reason can not make sovereign decisions? If there is a hard problem of conciosuness, there is a hard problem of free will.

 

[Travis_King]

You are still misunderstanding determinism, Maui. Decisions are A-OK within a deterministic framework. Determinism speaks to the mechanisms by which those decisions are made.

 

[Nikitin]

How do you know that these "macro-systems" behave _perfectly_ deterministically? As long as there is some randomness on the atom-level, there must be randomness on the macro level, even if it is statistically insignificant..

In addition, our brains work purely by chemical reactions and electrical impulses. If atoms and molecules behave randomly when those take place, our thoughts cannot be perfectly deterministic.

----

disclaimer: I have only started my first year in uni... so don't murder me now.

 

[Maui]

Determinsm says nothing about feeling pain. That isn't in its purview. The nature of the self is quite a different question than the nature of the interactions of extant things, both living and non.

What do you mean by "nature of the interactions of extant things"? And what does it have to do with free will or determinism?

Do you know what determinism actually argues? It isn't simply, "Free will is wrong"...

I do. I am not sure you are seeing a conflict between freewill and determinism and that may be the source of your confusion.

 

[Maui]

How do you know that these "macro-systems" behave _perfectly_ deterministically? As long as there is some randomness on the atom-level, there must be randomness on the macro level, even if it is statistically insignificant..

In addition, our brains work purely by chemical reactions and electrical impulses. If atoms and molecules behave randomly when those take place, our thoughts cannot be perfectly deterministic.

----

disclaimer: I have only started my first year in uni... so don't murder me now.

The question in qm is indeterminism vs determinism and i'd say it is irrelevant in this topic.

 

[Travis_King]

Nikitin, I think it'd be worth while to point out that there is a huge difference between a system which operates deterministically and one which is determinable. Let's not fall prey to the common problem of mixing up determinism with fatalism.

The is randomness on the quantum scale, so they say. I'm not quantum mechanics expert, but the real thing to understand is that while on the quantum scale things operate probabilistically, what they actuallly wind up doing doesn't really matter in the macro scale. If I have an atom of Hydrogen, then I will have one electron. Always. Which exact crazy-little-bits of matter are there at the quantum level at any given time won't change that. A Hydrogen atom will act like a hydrogen atom. This is increasingly true as we get higher and higher up in scale.

The human brain is a network of chemicals and neurons, billions and billions of them, all well above the quantum scale. I don't know enough about brownian motion and how that applies at this scale to talk to it, but two things are immediately true about indeterminsm:

1) The reactions and impulses in our brains are not random, but are with certainty tied to the stimuli received from within and from without. Were this not the case, we could not function.

2) Even if it was the case, which it isn't, random motion does not allow for any will. Randomness is, for all intents and purposes, worse for a free-willer than determinism.

What do you mean by "nature of the interactions of extant things"? And what does it have to do with free will or determinism?

What's not to get? It's a pretty straightforward statement, I think...The way matter and energy interacts with other matter and energy.

What doesn't that have to do with free will and determinism?

 

[Nikitin]

What's the difference between determinism and determinable?

Anyway: Let's say the electron moves randomly around the Hydrogen. What consequences will this have? Well, for one, electrons have negative charge, and thus are able to effect other charged particles around them. If the electron moves randomly, it thus will be able to randomly affect its charged neighbours, leading to random behaviour.

Stuff like this taken to the next level will mean that are thought processes are subject to randomness, and thus are free from determinism.

1) The reactions and impulses in our brains are not random, but are with certainty tied to the stimuli received from within and from without.

How are they not random to some degree, if the atoms themselves behave randomly?

Were this not the case, we could not function.

No. I'm not saying that the randomness is so big that the output will be completely random and utterly unpredictable. I am saying that there would be a very small degree of randomness..

You're saying that what somebody thinks is perfectly predictable if the conditions are known beforehand. I'm saying that it's predictable what the general thought will be if the conditions are known beforehand, but not perfectly predictable due to some inherent randomness.

2) Even if it was the case, which it isn't, random motion does not allow for any will. Randomness is, for all intents and purposes, worse for a free-willer than determinism.

How so? Determinism removes free will because thoughts are predictable according to determinism. Thus there is no such thing as free will. If determinism is taken out of the equation due to randomness, then there is nothing ruling free will. It will just be a result of mostly the conditions beforehand, and some randomness.

PS: even if randomness on the atom-level isn't relevant, this is http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_theory . I'm fairly sure that something as complex as the human brain cannot possibly be perfectly deterministic.

 

[Travis_King]

How so? Determinism removes free will because thoughts are predictable according to determinism. If determinism is taken out of the equation due to randomness, then there is nothing ruling free will. It will just be a result of mostly the conditions beforehand, and some randomness.

I'll probably reply at greater length later, but for now:

What you are doing is not making room for free will. Adding radnomness to the process means that, while the system is not determinable (therefore, it would seem, not deterministic) it can rigidly adhere to causality (the driving force behind determinism, and the real objection to the standard "Free will"). Which is to say, while you can't predict what Person X will do or think at time Y, due to this randomness, you can confidently say that it is a direct result of all antecedent events and conditions plus whatever randomness directly affected his thoughts immediately preceding time Y.

I don't really see anyone coming up with a coherent argument against causality, as it seems to be pretty self evident and logically and physically consistent.

I don't recall who said it, (Maui, I think) but whoever noted that I do not find a problem between free will and determinism is more or less correct. Mainly because I don't think either are entirely coherent and consider my thoughts on the subject as more compatibilist, of sorts.

 

[Nikitin]

Wow, those were allot of complex words I've never heard about. English isn't my 1st language, but I'll try to reply:

What you are doing is not making room for free will. Adding radnomness to the process means that, while the system is not determinable (therefore, it would seem, not deterministic) it can rigidly adhere to causality (the driving force behind determinism, and the real objection to the standard "Free will"). Which is to say, while you can't predict what Person X will do or think at time Y, due to this randomness, you can confidently say that it is a direct result of all antecedent events and conditions plus whatever randomness directly affected his thoughts immediately preceding time Y.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but are you saying that determinism doesn't require the future to be theoretically determinable? I thought the entire point about determinism was perfect determinability... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism According to wikipedia, determinism's definition is "If conditions X are met, then Y will happen with 100% certainty". If that is the case, how on Earth is free will possible? Free will would be simply ruled by the conditions.

A degree of randomness, on the other hand, removes the problems of perfectly predictable determinism. If you think that randomness destroys free will just like determinism, then how can you think that it is possible at all for true free-will to exist?

For me, for free will to exist, it must have that little unpredictability to make it free from the constraints of causality. Otherwise we are all just slaves of a perfect mechanical clock-work universe, determinable from the period of Big Bang, and to its end. Basically, imo, randomness during our thought processes is what makes the thought processes ours.

 

[Travis_King]

Nikitin, yep, generally determinism will say that the state of the world at any given time is a direct and necessary result of the antecedent (prior) events and conditions. What I was saying, though, is that causality is really what does away with the traditional view of "Free will", not necessarily determinism.

A degree of randomness rules out determinism (as in, condition X leads directly and perfectly to Y), yes, but not the mechanism of determinism which rules out what we call libertarian free will, which is, of course, causality.

Think about it. Say we have a deterministic system. Let's call it "My brain".
Let's then call all of the antecedent events and conditions: 1+2.
Determinism says that 1+2=3, right?
Enter the random variable 0.001, we now have 1+2+0.001=3.001
So while determinism is false (since we cannot get 3.001 from only the antecedent events and conditions: 1+2), we haven't changed the actual decision making mechanism.

That's a long winded way of saying that while the random variable makes it so the "my brain" is not perfectly determinable based on past events and conditions, the random event doesn't give my brain any more freedom (it's still simple addition), it just makes it unpredictable.

Now, as far as free will goes, randomness doesn't help at all (as I've said). First off, randomness doesn't divorce us from causality. Randomness introduces more variables, making the result unpredictable, but you still have effects as the result of causes. It's just that instead of:
CAUSE --> EFFECT
you have:
CAUSE + random variable --> EFFECT
Same mechanism, just a different result.

Think about it, how does randomness aid in the freedom of will. They are opposing ideas. Your will can't be random; if it is, how is it yours?

then how can you think that it is possible at all for true free-will to exist?

This question is really the crux of the issue. I don't. But that is because the very idea proposed by libertarian free will is fundamentally incoherent (it's silly, doesn't make sense).

A true view of free will must account for the fact of causality. Any view of free will which does not have causality at it's core is incoherent. Causes are a fundamental part of the way the world works, "will" is necessarily driven by reasons.

My basic viewpoint is basically this:
1. I am, in every important and realizable way, everything I see, do, hear, touch, feel, know, think, experience, etc. and nothing more.
There is no homunculus, pre-existing "me", or "soul".

2. Those things are determined by external factors [I cannot choose what I see or what things I experience any more than I can choose my genetic code or my biological predispositions]

3. Thus, "I" am a being created as a result of, and continually changed by, external factors.

4. When speaking of "will" we necessarily imply a being which will be doing the willing. I.e. "I"

5. Thus, the question of personal free will asks if "I" --a being created qua external factors-- can make decisions of my own volition.

6. SO. If "I" am every single factor and influence that I have ever experienced, and any decision I make comes directly from those experiences and nothing else [how could it?], then were comes the external forces that would take away free will [that is, those that are not the set of external forces that constitute "I"]? Where comes the issue of causality with respect to my "will"?

Then, all decisions made by "I" are capable of being completely free of outside forces. "I" will act exactly how "I" will act, and no different. But "I" act freely and of "my" own volition.

As far as I'm concerned, causality is a necessary part of my free will. I act, necessarily, as "I" will to act.

 

[Maui]

A true view of free will must account for the fact of causality. Any view of free will which does not have causality at it's core is incoherent. Causes are a fundamental part of the way the world works, "will" is necessarily driven by reasons.

Look up "emergent behavior", you may change your mind about causality. If it were that simple to reduce everything down to a simple mechanistic framework, science would have been a sealed package. The world is most definitely not mechanistic at its core and you failed to explain how causality accounts for that which feels pain. Had you made these assertions in the biology forum, they would have been technically fine with me in that narrow field, and i wouldn't debate them. But since you are making them here and it implies holding a conviction of a correct worldview, i'd say you are completely wrong.

My basic viewpoint is basically this:
1. I am, in every important and realizable way, everything I see, do, hear, touch, feel, know, think, experience, etc. and nothing more.
There is no homunculus, pre-existing "me", or "soul".

2. Those things are determined by external factors [I cannot choose what I see or what things I experience any more than I can choose my genetic code or my biological predispositions]

3. Thus, "I" am a being created as a result of, and continually changed by, external factors.

4. When speaking of "will" we necessarily imply a being which will be doing the willing. I.e. "I"

5. Thus, the question of personal free will asks if "I" --a being created qua external factors-- can make decisions of my own volition.

6. SO. If "I" am every single factor and influence that I have ever experienced, and any decision I make comes directly from those experiences and nothing else [how could it?], then were comes the external forces that would take away free will [that is, those that are not the set of external forces that constitute "I"]? Where comes the issue of causality with respect to my "will"?

Then, all decisions made by "I" are capable of being completely free of outside forces. "I" will act exactly how "I" will act, and no different. But "I" act freely and of "my" own volition.

As far as I'm concerned, causality is a necessary part of my free will. I act, necessarily, as "I" will to act.

That there is a you that feels(among other things) implies strongly something different - that you are a conscious mind attached to a physical body. Anything else is either incomplete, incoherent or against observational evidence. The fact that you are writing here and exchanging information speaks much more about your conscious mind than of your physical processes.

By the way, causality is unable to account not only for conscious awareness and free will in humans, but for every other observable thing in reality in even a semi-adeqaute manner. You should probably take a closer look at the world and see if it's really made of mechanistic stuff or from something else entirely.

 

[Travis_King]

You are speaking of dualism and have the gall to say that a physical explanation of consciousness has no basis in observational evidence?

 

[Maui]

For me, for free will to exist, it must have that little unpredictability to make it free from the constraints of causality. Otherwise we are all just slaves of a perfect mechanical clock-work universe, determinable from the period of Big Bang, and to its end.

No, reductionism and determinism are failures in physics, more so in philosophy. We could be missing a whole class of properties that are still unaccounted for.

Basically, imo, randomness during our thought processes is what makes the thought processes ours.

There is a degree of unpredictability at every scale, does that mean there is some form of mind that calls its processes "ours"? Can processes be conscious?

 

[Maui]

You are speaking of dualism and have the gall to say that a physical explanation of consciousness has no basis in observational evidence?

That "something" is feeling pain is observationally evident. It has no explanation in a physical framework. What is it you are you asking?

 

[Travis_King]

Your argument is ridiculous. I don't understand how feeling pain can't be explained physically...Are you being serious?

Is your argument along the lines of, "sensory reactions can be described physically, but not the experience or conscious sensation of those senses?"

 

[Maui]

Is your argument along the lines of, "sensory reactions can be described physically, but not the experience or conscious sensation of those senses?"

Yes, the first person account of experience can't be explained physically.

 

[Travis_King]

Well, that's not true. It hasn't been explained (demonstratably, with certainty; as there are many theories--the scientific kind--and evidentially supported hypotheses), but that doesn't mean it can't be explained.

 

[Maui]

Nothing in the laws of physics and biology as we know them today pre-supposes conscious behavior. Deterministic behavior - yes, conscious - no.

 

[Travis_King]

Good, science shouldn't be pre-supposing anything.
It isn't "pre-supposed" because it is generally understood to be a property, or emergent phenomenon, of the complex neural network. It's not a fundamental property of the universe, it's a unique quirk of biology.

 

[chiro]

Also I think it's important to mention a good definition of truth.

A good definition of truth is something that is universal and without exception, and unfortunately what many call truths are things that are so non-universal and so narrow, that it really boggles my mind at how something can be justified as truth.

Most scientists really want to find truth, and in the context of above it ends up being something that comes down to a consensus based conclusion of said proposed "truths" even if they are only "partial truths" (as most things are).

But unfortunately a lot of investigation is very narrow and thus the tendency is to try and extrapolate something from that scenario that is "universal" and you can see where the problems lie.

I realize that in order to analyze and make sense of things you need to reduce things to whatever working level you can, but the point I am making is that a lot of people do tend to forget that they narrow things down, and atomize things in such a way that they lose the rest of what they are working with.

Finally with regard to pre-supposing, everyone will do this at some point.

Science is largely a cumulative process and people will be shaped by not only what they uniquely experience and discover, but also what they believe to be true even if they haven't verified it themselves.

Again we all do it at some point and it's more effecient to find people we have a degree of trust for to tell us what their own experiences like if they don't have an agenda and are as unbiased as possible: it just doesn't make sense to do it all yourself unless you consider it really really important.

 

[Maui]

Well, that's not true. It hasn't been explained (demonstratably, with certainty; as there are many theories--the scientific kind--and evidentially supported hypotheses), but that doesn't mean it can't be explained.

If you know of such a hypothesis that doesn't state or imply that consciousness is an illusion, do share it with us. Otherwise, it wouldn't be a model - if i am unable to repay the bank, i can't just say "the money you gave me was illusory".