The main assumption of the CI is that state vectors can be identified with physical systems, i.e. that each state vector describes all the properties of the system it represents. Let's label that assumption (1). I said that if we add this on top of QM, we get a contradiction, but that's not quite right. What we get is many worlds. So QM+(1) contradicts the assumption that there's only one world. Let's label that assumption (2). Obviously, (2) should also be considered part of the definition of the CI.
So I'm not going to argue that QM+(1) is logically inconsistent, I'm going to argue that CI=QM+(1)+(2) is. The argument can't be made rigorous, since the assumptions (1) and (2) aren't mathematical statements. An informal argument is the best anyone can do.
The Schrödinger's cat thought experiment has taught us that the linearity of the SE implies that if microscopic systems can be in superpositions, then so can macroscopic systems. The details of this part of the argument are included both in Ballentine's 1970 article and in his more recent textbook. (Section 9.2).
(A calculation that includes decoherence effects would change the argument somewhat, but not enough to solve the problem).
Suppose that we prepare a large and complicated system, e.g. a system that includes you, in a state like |this>+|that>, where |this> and |that> describe two different experiences you can have in there. Now the problem is that (1) says that |this>+|that> is a complete description of the physical system. Clearly this means that neither |this> nor |that> can be a complete description of the physical system, and this means that what you actually experience as a part of that system is no more than half the story. If the complete description includes both of your possible experiences, then so does reality. Otherwise it wouldn't be a complete description.
Therefore QM+(1) implies that there are many worlds. This means that QM+(1)+(2) is inconsistent.