phyzguy said:
There have been so many threads on this that I hesitate to respond to this one. But I will tell you what made it clear to me. Suppose, instead of 3 doors, that there are 1,000,000 doors, with 1 car and 999,999 goats. You choose a door, so your odds of choosing the car are clearly 1/1,000,000. Then the host opens 999,998 doors which all contain goats. Do you really believe that the odds that your door has the car has increased to 50:50? The car didn't move, so how could your odds have increased? Think about it from this standpoint.
This does, actually, add considerable clarity in my mind (whether others think so?), and I think might have, in combination with the last respondent's reply, resolved this for me (whether it satisfies anyone else, I can't say!).
"Do you really believe that the odds that your door has the car has increased to 50:50?" Sort of... they were
already 50:50 before the game started. I'll explain this, in this way:
We have two questions at play here, and I think this might be where the non-intuitive fallacy comes in. There is;
1) 'a game strategy, planning out what a contestant should do once he is in the studio', and
2) 'what to do next, after Monty opens a door'.
These are two questions which appear to be the same thing, which aren't, and I think there is the dilemma. Some people are answering the first, some the second.
OK, so on point 1), let's say the host explains what is going to happen first [in the 1,000 door contest] before the show starts, he says "You will pick one door of 1,000, I will then open up 998 doors that don't have the prize in. You can then choose to swap if you want." I would rest easy, knowing that the odds were certainly not 1/1000. I'd have intuitively said this is immediately
at least 50:50 chance, because whatever door I pick, I will
also still end up with two doors, and a car behind one of them.
However, it is better than 50:50 because
also I have the original chance of my door choice. I don't just have the chance to swap, I have the
original chance that might have been right too! That would be for me to decide.
The chance of me picking 'the car' in the 3 door game, and Monty picking the particular door he does, is 1/6. So the overall chance of me
winning the game with a fixed strategy at the outset is 1/6 + 1/2 = 2/3.
However the chance of me winning,
once and after Monty has opened the door is 50:50.
I hold this principle as axiomatic,
not as intuition. If there are two options and two doors the chance is 50:50.
If that is not true then it is equally wrong to claim the chance is 1/3 if there are three options and three doors.
For n choices behind n doors, for which there is one 'win' option, either the probability
is 1/n or it is
not 1/n. It can't be both, this is
axiomatic.
In a way, I think this is more deeply satisfying. On the one hand, we don't need to question the axiom that
1 choice in n is 1/n. That would be really troubling. So on the other, we have two ways to approach the problem both summing up to 2/3. In the one case, we look at the 'overall game strategy' and in the other we consider the situation at the moment where the contestant is given the option to swap. Yes, it is better and a 2/3 chance if he decides on a fixed strategy before entering the game studio, and yet (non-intuitively) the chance is still 50:50 at the moment he has to make a decision whether to swap.
Is this at all a more satisfactory view of the scenario, or do we need to look more closely at the occasions when "
1 choice in n is not 1/n"?