The Neuroscience of Free Will: Believing in a Soul or Something Else?

[JoeDawg]

How does compatibalism allow for any kind of mental causation, free or otherwise? Phenomenal properties of mind can not cause a physical change in any deterministic physical system - only physical properties can invoke physical changes in deterministic physical systems (ie: computational structures). If phenomenal properties can't cause physical changes, and yet we maintain that these phenomenal properties 'reliably correspond' to the physical changes, then we have a much more serious issue, which is how these phenomenal properties could have ever come about since they are not needed and don't have any causal influence over a physical system.

Mental causation is a different problem. Without 'some kind' of mental causation, I agree freewill would be impossible. But there is still plenty of debate about mental causation.

This is like saying, "For a deterministic, computational chicken, why did the chicken cross the road." and in responce a compatibalist might incorrectly suggest "because he wanted to get to the other side." The problem here is in suggesting a desire by the chicken (ie: a phenomenal property of the chicken's mind) somehow influenced the deterministic physical system (ie: the chicken and its behavior/physical states). The truth is that the chicken crossed the road because the individual parts of the chicken interacted and resulted in the chicken crossing the road.

This is a category error. You asked 'why the chicken(object) crossed the road', not why the chicken(parts) crossed the road. Which means you're not answering the question, you're criticizing the question from an extremely reductionist perspective. This is a linguistic issue; what is the object of the verb? And what does it mean to be an object?

The question 'why did the chicken-parts cross the road?', however is nonsensical.
The, just as silly, answer is, because they were parts of the chicken.

Holism vs reductionism is an old, and unsettled arguement.

Another silly question, that might show you more what I mean is:

Why was the road crossed by the chicken?
Because the road refused to move.

The compatibalist has to respond to the concern of why these phenomenal experiences should correspond with physical states in a way that is appropriate and generally truth-conductive. Compatibalism fails on the grounds that it has no way of explaining this reliable correspondence.

Compatibalism is about the logic of choice in a determinstic universe. It does not address physical states separate from phenomena. Hume was an strict empiricist, physical states as separate from phenomenal experience, have no meaning.

Kant talked about this with regards to 'things in themselves', but this goes beyond compatibalism, which is only about choice. If you believe consciousness is entirely epiphenomenal, then the question of conscious freewill is a moot point. But that doesn't address the question of freewill, it just dismisses it. Epiphenomalism is, however, problematic for a whole bunch of reasons.

 

[Q_Goest]

This is a category error. You asked 'why the chicken(object) crossed the road', not why the chicken(parts) crossed the road. Which means you're not answering the question, you're criticizing the question from an extremely reductionist perspective.

Sorry JoeDawg but I believe you've missed the point.

 

[Blenton]

I believe we have free will, however we are bound by the universe and ultimately our free will is only a construct of physical laws of nature, as to say when the big bang happened, the laws of nature were set in such a way to lead me to exist at this time and my actions are still a product of these laws.

 

[WaveJumper]

I think we are bound to lose both free will, locality and realism in our desire to understand everything. If this is right, that'd be the highest price paid ever for being curious.

 

[Moridin]

It’s because phenomenal properties are not measurable that makes my above line of reasoning so strong (it’s not my line of reasoning, but I’ll explain if your interested). So these non-measurable phenomenal properties are supposed to reliably correspond per compatibalism. That’s why I say that compatibalists don’t even understand the problem, because compatibilism makes this kind of category mistake.

No, it is not a categorical mistake, because you are still guilty of greedy reductionism and stating empty tautologies. You further make the absurd claim that "phenomenal properties" are not measurable, when we already clearly establish that such properties are physical and therefore by definition measurable on our level of analysis. How do you know they are not measurable? Naturally, not currently measurable does not imply impossibility of measurement in principle. As for your example, we know that pain is just an electrochemical event in a material brain. I cannot understand how this could be so unclear from your perspective?

To your second point regarding evolution, there still exists therefore, a problem which must be explained by any evolutionary theory of consciousness. Why should non-measurable properties arise at all?

You further your creationist assault of the science of evolution by asserting that evolution is false as well as, again, making the odd claim that something physical can also not be measured on our level of analysis. As I've explained in my earlier post, there is no problem, since organisms that can better and more accurately simulate their surroundings have an enormous advantage over those who cannot do it as accurately.

In other words, there must be psychophysical laws which are supervenient on the physical, and have causal influence over those physical processes which are seemingly random from an objective perspective. So rather than being a “death knell” as you put it, psychophysical laws which supervene on ‘emergent’ physical structures allow for moral responsibility without invoking an external agent.

Yet again, this is nothing more than greedy reductionism. You are reducing past the level of analysis that the phenomena itself is on, kind of like trying to analyze the causes of WWII by talking about quantum mechanics.

The moment you assert that your actions are not determined by who you are (that is, your material brain) and the facts of reality, all forms of freedom and moral responsibility goes down the drain. This is a completely uncontroversial statement. Furthermore, your reply instantly self-destructs since in order to take part in a rational discussion, you must presuppose determinism with respect to human action.

 

[Q_Goest]

Moridin,
Of course I’m a greedy reductionist! <smile> That’s what computationalism is all about. That’s the basis of classical mechanics (but NOT quantum mechanics) and the basis of computationalism. Have you taken any physics and/or engineering courses yet? Do you understand what a free body diagram is or a control volume and what philosophy these concepts use to model classical systems? Are you at least somewhat familiar with finite element and multiphysics analysis? Even the brain is commonly modeled computationally (ie: classically) as individual neurons firing only because of those local, classical signals acting directly on the synapses. And a neuron can be modeled by breaking IT down into a series of resistances and capacitances as is done for example by GENESIS software. Classical mechanics relies on and is modeled using a ‘greedy reductionist’ philosophy. Without this philosophy, classical mechanics/physics and engineering would have to be completely rewritten and restructured. Let’s not go there…

Note that there are also fundamental, philosophical differences between classical mechanics and quantum mechanics which should also be understood in order to discuss greedy reductionism, but I have to assume you’re also not aware of those philosophical differences. Greedy reductionism has trouble when applied at the level of interacting molecules since emergence can in fact take place at this level (see for example, Kronz and Tiehen, “Emergence and Quantum Mechanics” or Stapp, “Why Classical Mechanics Cannot Naturally Accommodate Consciousness but Quantum Mechanics Can”)

As for calling such views I hold as being “creationist”, again that seems to be nothing more than an attempt at an insult. Note also IDers have attempted to use Chalmers’ anti-materialistic views against him. These ideas come from people who don’t understand the basics of the philosophy of science, so you may call me a creationist but I can only assume that is your attempt at an insult.
http://fragments.consc.net/djc/2008/10/the-problem-of-consciousness-meets-intelligent-design.html

Regarding measuring qualia, I’d like to understand how you can suggest that qualia are objectively measurable. Even Dennett wouldn’t suggest this (in fact, I have to believe he would vehemently object to suggesting such things as qualia are objectively measurable, especially after having read “Quining Qualia”).

 

[Descartz2000]

In short form:

Bio/phys comes first, consciousness is the result; therefore, free-will is an illusion unless it is non-physical.

 

[JoeDawg]

In short form:

Bio/phys comes first, consciousness is the result

This is a position you can take, but its also overly simplistic. We are not talking about one neuron firing, but rather a complex system. We can't even predict the weather with much accuracy. The brain is similarly complex. Whether consciousness can then influence the physical is still an open question. Without a solid definition of what consciousness is, you're just blowing hot air. One does not have to be a dualist to acknowledge we don't really know what consciousness is. You don't. I don't.

For instance. We have two hemispheres in our brain, if consciousness is the sum of interaction between the two, then consciousness as the sum of the two could then influence the separate parts differently. Its still physical in the sense that its electro-chemical, but the interactions are on the 'level of information'. Just like the ones and zeroes in a computer are not equivalent to the complete works of shakespeare saved to a harddrive.

And no, I'm not saying this is the way it works. But neuroscience is in its infancy, making claims about what consciousness is, isn't even meteorology, its closer to astrology.

 

[ThomasT]

Who still believes in a true 'soul like' free will?

Believing in free will is the same as believing in the unpredictability of a dice role, or the randomness of the results of individual quantum experimental trials.

Free will refers to our inability to specify causes for the choices we make, or for our behavior in general. Where you can specify the cause(s), then, by definition, your choice wasn't free and your behavior was determined.

Hasn't neuroscience done enough to refute this ancient idea?

Do we need neuroscience to understand that the notion of souls as immaterial agents who act according to free will is a product of our ignorance and our imagination?

And if not true free will, then what guides human behavior?

The term FREE WILL is applicable when we don't know what guides our behavior, when we can't predict it. That is, it's not precisely an illusion but a term that refers to our ignorance. We use terms like free will, luck, and accident in place of "I don't know how or why that happened".

Presumably, there's a fundamental unifying dynamic(s) governing behavior in all regimes at all scales. This hasn't been discovered yet, so (also because of technological challenges) we're stuck with randomness, unpredictability and free will (and, for some, even souls).

 

[JoeDawg]

Believing in free will is the same as believing in the unpredictability of a dice role, or the randomness of the results of individual quantum experimental trials.

If something happens randomly, it by definition is not chosen. Freewill demands that an action be intended. Freewill is about autonomy, not predictability.

If I know a person in peru let go of a ball yesterday, but I don't know the outcome (I don't live in peru), and I say I think gravity acted on it. I'm making a prediction. The fact it happened in the past doesn't change that fact. It also doesn't mean it was any less the person's choice to drop it. If a person tells me they are going to do something, and then they do it, that doesn't mean the didn't make a choice, having knowledge of an act and limiting the freewill of an act are not the same.

 

[Descartz2000]

JoeDawg, I don't see how consciousness influencing the physical aspects of the brain is an open question. This would imply consciousness is somehow 'separate' from the physical process. I agree that neuroscience is in it's infancy, but I think enough is understood about the brain (neurons, dendrites, glial cells, etc) and their processes, to infer that consciousness is based on a physical process. And if so, then as a consequence, consciousness can not be the executive decision maker. The chain of command would have to start higher up the chain, something prior to the experience of consiousness. In other words, 'consciousness' needs a base or platform from which to process, and that process is most likely physical and occurs prior to the experience. Thanks for your previous reply. It made me think.

 

[Descartz2000]

ThomasT, I agree with your statement below:

"Presumably, there's a fundamental unifying dynamic(s) governing behavior in all regimes at all scales. This hasn't been discovered yet, so (also because of technological challenges) we're stuck with randomness, unpredictability and free will (and, for some, even souls)."

 

[WaveJumper]

The underlying reality. Too bad it may forever be inaccessable for humans. Einstein spent the last 30 years of his life chasing this dream.

 

[JoeDawg]

JoeDawg, I don't see how consciousness influencing the physical aspects of the brain is an open question. This would imply consciousness is somehow 'separate' from the physical process.

Consciousness seems to be a physical process, not a separate physical (or even supernatural) thing. But that process is complex, not trivial. When neurons fire, its not a one to one causation.

Multiple neurons have to fire together and in response to other neurons firing. They follow the logic of the system. In fact, there are also different parts of the brain, different systems, that communicate with each other, that interact as well as function separately. Consciousness is the entire process. With a neural net you get a self-reflective property that you don't have with just one neuron or even two or three. The fact that the neurons are apart of such a system influences the way they fire, and when, so causation can go both ways. The parts affect the whole and the whole affects the parts. I'm not arguing for a homunculus, or seat of consciousness. But if you look at something like the placebo effect you have one system influencing another, and not in a strictly physical fashion, but by transmitting information. Its the structure of what gets transmitted, the whole message that causes the effect.

And I may be wrong of course, but pure epiphenomenalism just doesn't make much sense.

In other words, 'consciousness' needs a base or platform from which to process, and that process is most likely physical and occurs prior to the experience.

I agree it needs a base and I do think hardware, or wetware in this case, is necessary, but the 'hardware' doesn't make decisions, it just allows those decisions to be made in a deterministic fashion.

 

[ThomasT]

If something happens randomly, it by definition is not chosen. Freewill demands that an action be intended. Freewill is about autonomy, not predictability.

If I know a person in peru let go of a ball yesterday, but I don't know the outcome (I don't live in peru), and I say I think gravity acted on it. I'm making a prediction. The fact it happened in the past doesn't change that fact. It also doesn't mean it was any less the person's choice to drop it. If a person tells me they are going to do something, and then they do it, that doesn't mean the didn't make a choice, having knowledge of an act and limiting the freewill of an act are not the same.

Ok, I'm trying to sort this out. I agree that autonomy doesn't seem to have exactly the same meaning as unpredictability.

The way I approach any question or statement is to first try to get a good idea of the physical referents of the terms involved.

So, what is autonomy about? How do we use the word? It refers to freedom, or independence, doesn't it? What sorts of behavior(s) are free from, independent of, physical constraints? How would I determine that my actions are free from, independent of, eg., in the case of human 'will', all internal or external physical conditions?

It seems that this is never the case, because we can alter human behavior by altering internal and/or external physical conditions.

I might think that my will is free, but the person pushing my buttons knows that it isn't.

I think maybe I'm missing your point(s) or some important points in this discussion. Any help or elaboration is appreciated.

 

[ThomasT]

From Descartz2000 and JoeDawg's exchanges (and from some source or sources that I don't recall) I'm thinking that the idea of free will comes from the brain monitoring itself.

A decision or choice corresponds to a specific configuration (or set thereof) of the hard(wet)ware, and that configuration (or set thereof) is determined by prior internal and external conditions.

 

[Descartz2000]

ThomasT, I agree with your statements; I too feel the specific configuration of the brain is determined by prior internal and external conditions, but 'determined' meaning 'previous states' dictate the outcome. However, they are inherently unpredictable and unknowable. An example of what would be unknowable and out of reach to an objective observer/researcher is 'qualia'.

 

[Descartz2000]

JoeDawg, how would you explain Libet's studies and those that followed after him? It seems his research indicates the experience happens after the processing happens in the unconscious part of the brain.

 

[JoeDawg]

JoeDawg, how would you explain Libet's studies and those that followed after him? It seems his research indicates the experience happens after the processing happens in the unconscious part of the brain.

I wouldn't presume to 'explain' them, I think Libet's work is fascinating.
But there are multiple factors at work here.

There is the decision making process, there is the action in response to that decision, and there is the conscious awareness of that decision and that action.

All the studies seem to show is that decision-making is a complicated process, not necessarily that freewill doesn't exist.

For instance, the fact that the subjects were not aware of making a decision right away doesn't eliminate freewill. It could just mean that self-awareness is a much more complicated thing than simple decision making. Being self-relfective would reasonably require more brain power.

Similarly, taking action based on a decision also requires more neural processing.

It may even be true that rudimentary decision making is different from a more complex type. Quite a lot of our everyday life, once learned, when we are young, becomes almost autonomic. Consider: walking down the street. We don't choose to put one foot ahead of the other on a regular basis. We just walk. Even choosing a direction is sometimes less a conscious act than simply following a routine. So we aren't really deciding that consciously.

Which means any 'test' we do, which involves feedback from our bodies either verbal or physical in some other way, will have other dependencies.

I don't claim to know what consciousness is, or that freewill is this or that. But one has to differentiate between observation and explanation in science. I think science has come a long way from viewing the 'soul' as the seat of consciousness. But that doesn't mean we need to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Freewill may be an illusion, and/or certain understandings of freewill may be inconsistent. I just don't see the evidence eliminating it quite yet. And, obviously, I don't see a problem with determinism and freewill existing together.

 

[Descartz2000]

JoeDawg, I have no issues with compatibilism. And I have to give you props for your statement: "It may even be true that rudimentary decision making is different from a more complex type". This has crossed my mind as well.

 

[JoeDawg]

I might think that my will is free, but the person pushing my buttons knows that it isn't.

So does the person pushing your buttons have freewill? :)

I don't think autonomy is distinct from internal conditions. One of the components of any understanding of freewill is distinctness from one's environment. You can't have a completely holistic view of the world, and marry that to individual intent.

I don't think freewill independent of biology makes any sense. Even a soul, something made of completely separate substance from a body, would need to interact with that body in order to implement its will, which means it would need a way to physically connect with that body. So dualism in the supernatural sense is both illusory and self-contradictory.

But that just means a dualistic understanding of freewill is faulty, not that we can't have a valid understanding of freewill within the scope of determined processes. We can certainly manipulate the brain, both via direct surgical interaction as well as more subtley with things like advertising or even more subtle means, but those are by definition external influences.

Things do get problematic when we start trying to differentiate internal vs. external. But its a similar problem with any attempt at definition. The important part seems to be what we consider essential to the system, or rather, how we define identity. Is the fact I grew up with certain influences a factor in my decision making? Of course, it is. Does having a science background, or lack thereof, influence what choices I make. Certainly.

Freewill though, seems to be more a matter of, at the time the decision was made, was I acting withing the parameters of my identity?

Was I free to act, and is this what my accumulated identity intended?

I don't think there is a simple answer here, the words being used are vague and still ill-defined, but that doesn't mean they aren't descriptive. I do have a sense of self, I do feel I can make decisions. The fact I'm not completely free to do anything I please doesn't mean I don't have freedom. One of the limitations on freedom is we can't unchoose, but that doesn't mean we didn't have choices.

 

[ThomasT]

So does the person pushing your buttons have freewill? :)

As you've mentioned, the extent of one's freedom to choose or act is always constrained. So I guess it makes sense to speak in terms of degrees of autonomy. There is subjective behavior that we can call 'will'. The extent to which I deem my will and choices and behavior free would seem to depend on the extent to which I can identify limiting or causal factors regarding those things. Likewise, if I'm talking about the freedom of someone else's will based on inferences from his behavior and what I know about conditions antecedent and possibly related to it.

I don't think autonomy is distinct from internal conditions. One of the components of any understanding of freewill is distinctness from one's environment. You can't have a completely holistic view of the world, and marry that to individual intent.

My metaphysics is holistic. For practical purposes it's necessary to 'draw lines'. It sometimes useful to treat bounded systems as individual autonomous agents, even if I believe that nothing in our Universe can be said to be truly autonomous or independent.

Freewill though, seems to be more a matter of, at the time the decision was made, was I acting withing the parameters of my identity?

Was I free to act, and is this what my accumulated identity intended?

I think it depends on the context within which the behavior is observed and evaluated. Your replies, Descarz2000's replies, and others, are 'pushing my buttons' and to some extent determining my behavior. And I yours. Of course there's our unique individual histories to consider, and if we were actually able to take everything into account then I suspect that we would find not only that our behavior (including our wills) isn't as free as we would like to think it is, but that it isn't free in any sense.

I don't think there is a simple answer here, the words being used are vague and still ill-defined, but that doesn't mean they aren't descriptive. I do have a sense of self, I do feel I can make decisions. The fact I'm not completely free to do anything I please doesn't mean I don't have freedom. One of the limitations on freedom is we can't unchoose, but that doesn't mean we didn't have choices.

I too have a sense of self and of personal responsibility for my actions. I assume that everyone does. I'm certainly making choices. But that doesn't mean that my behavior isn't, fundamentally, a function of some fundamental physical dynamic(s) and forces set in motion at the beginning of our Universe. I'm a fatalist, a determinist. The Universe, Reality, it's all unfolding, evolving, in the only way that it can, given the initial conditions and fundamental dynamic. The fact that we can't unchoose, that the past is always different from the future, that 'reality' never 'rewinds', the irreversibility of 'time', supports this view, ... I think.

Of course, I behave as if I believe that I'm a truly autonomous agent, relatively free from coercive pressures, who deals with what life presents to him in often ingenious ways, and who is learning.

I agree that sorting out the semantics of any inquiry into the how's and why's of the physical world is not a simple task.

 

[ThomasT]

ThomasT, I agree with your statements; I too feel the specific configuration of the brain is determined by prior internal and external conditions, but 'determined' meaning 'previous states' dictate the outcome. However, they are inherently unpredictable and unknowable. An example of what would be unknowable and out of reach to an objective observer/researcher is 'qualia'.

Yes, 'knowledge' of the 'deep reality' of Nature might be said to be unattainable. At least one interpretation of quantum theory says this. Saying that Nature is inherently unpredictable isn't a good way to phrase it, imho. Maybe better to just say that certain experimental preparations always produce random results, and there doesn't seem to be any way around that.

I'm not familiar with 'qualia'. I'll look it up when I get time and get back to you. Are you advocating this as a useful concept? Maybe you could give a brief definition or description?

 

[JoeDawg]

My metaphysics is holistic. For practical purposes it's necessary to 'draw lines'. It sometimes useful to treat bounded systems as individual autonomous agents, even if I believe that nothing in our Universe can be said to be truly autonomous or independent.

I would agree in the sense that within any system 'absolute' autonomy makes no sense, it would essentially mean the thing is, and is not, part of the system, but that has more to do with the fact that 'absolutes' is a faulty notion. When we talk about freedom it is implicitly about degrees of freedom or it is self-contradictory.

Holistic worldviews(which conflict with reductionist ideas) are just as problematic for me, although I do agree that distinctions are sometimes more a matter of practicallity and utility than any essential nature. As humans I think we tend to overstate the case, beyond what is logical, when it comes to our understanding of freewill and especially causation (the problem of induction).

Of course there's our unique individual histories to consider, and if we were actually able to take everything into account then I suspect that we would find not only that our behavior (including our wills) isn't as free as we would like to think it is, but that it isn't free in any sense.

I think our freedom derives from the fact that we are, at least, semi-independent entities, that we have the ability to view ourselves that way, and that other semi-independent entities exist. To the extent that we are separate from each other we have the ability to act and to the extent that we understand that we can, we have a will.

I too have a sense of self and of personal responsibility for my actions. I assume that everyone does. I'm certainly making choices. But that doesn't mean that my behavior isn't, fundamentally, a function of some fundamental physical dynamic(s) and forces set in motion at the beginning of our Universe.

Again, I don't think determinism excludes freewill, rather it seems essential to it. Apart from the fact that randomness seems to exist on the quantum scale(I don't really think this impacts freewill, but it is a limit on determinism) I think the problem is when we are too reductionist and view everything too simply, ignoring the nature of complex systems. Scientists tend to do this because reductionism can be very useful in their work, but I think it ignores the fact that that the universe seems to operate on different levels. (The problem of quantum gravity seems to support this, not to mention the idea of emergent properties.)

I'm a fatalist, a determinist. The Universe, Reality, it's all unfolding, evolving, in the only way that it can, given the initial conditions and fundamental dynamic. The fact that we can't unchoose, that the past is always different from the future, that 'reality' never 'rewinds', the irreversibility of 'time', supports this view, ... I think.

Assuming the arrow of time is an essential part of the universe, I think we need to take it into consideration, but we also need to be wary of it, since our understanding of time is implicitly subjective. The fact that we only precieve time one way, is by no means conclusive. And again, I think reductionism is the issue not determinism, with regards to freewill.

 

[Descartz2000]

ThomasT, I agree that 'inherent unpredictability' may not be the most accurate concept to convey, or maybe it is. However, measurements that produce random results leaves one begging for more information, whereas, 'inherently unpredictable' answers the question.

Qualia: the experience of pain when stubbing one's toe, a headache, the taste of something, sensory experience.

As it relates to prior states of the brain and external conditions, the physical aspects of the brain's activity can be measured, at least in principle, down to the individual neurons that are firing. However, the experience can not be measured by an objective viewer.

 

[Descartz2000]

ThomasT, I agree that 'inherent unpredictability' may not be the most accurate concept to convey, or maybe it is. However, measurements that produce random results leaves one begging for more information, whereas, 'inherently unpredictable' answers the question.

Qualia: the experience of pain when stubbing one's toe, a headache, the taste of something, sensory experience.

As it relates to prior states of the brain and external conditions, the physical aspects of the brain's activity can be measured, at least in principle, down to the individual neurons that are firing. However, the experience can not be measured by an objective viewer.

 

[Pythagorean]

People have competing motivations.

I want to be healthy.
I want to eat cake all the time.

Without intention and action though, freewill is meaningless.

This is where the problem starts, you want to define freewill based on the idea that you can choose before choosing. You can't make a choice without intention. So choosing an intention makes no sense. This is more a linguistic problem than a philosophical problem, you're using the fact you can use intention as a verb, and as a noun, to create a paradox.

"to intend intention"

Then, you have a problem of infinite regress.

But a choice is really a matter of intention and action.

Do I want to do this?
Do I have the ability?

Sorry about the necro-reply, haven't been to physicsforums for a while and noticed this old thread bumped to the first page.

I really don't think I'm tricking you with linguistics here. Let me put it another way:

The process that your brain undergoes when you feel like you're making a decision may be a completely determined process and what you think is a choice is just the experience of your brain doing the computations between input (sensory) and output (action).

So the question, once again, is "do we choose our choices?" Or are our choices predetermined by our genetics and experiences; a result of a completely determined physical process.

 

[JoeDawg]

Sorry about the necro-reply, haven't been to physicsforums for a while and noticed this old thread bumped to the first page.

I really don't think I'm tricking you with linguistics here. Let me put it another way:

The process that your brain undergoes when you feel like you're making a decision may be a completely determined process and what you think is a choice is just the experience of your brain doing the computations between input (sensory) and output (action).

So the question, once again, is "do we choose our choices?" Or are our choices predetermined by our genetics and experiences; a result of a completely determined physical process.

Ugh, 'predetermined' is an ugly useless word. If its predetermined, its determined.
Again the language problem
I think decisions are determined by our histories.
But reducing it to input/output is a reductionist oversimplification, however.
Freewill depends on determinism.
I can't choose an action, if every choice ends in a random result.

The fact you made a choice doesn't mean you didn't have a choice.
And the fact you can predict a choice doesn't mean you don't have a choice.

Random vs determined is not the issue.
And stating that one must be 'completely free' or 'not free at all' is a false dichotomy.

Freedom is about autonomy, its about our degree of separateness from the complex system that we inhabit.

 

[Descartz2000]

Pythagorean, 'choosing our choices' seems to be based on the physical processes of the brain; the 'computations' that unfold. If not, what then is doing the choosing? It would require a little mystical man or agent inside of the brain that is making that choice. Even top-down principles fall apart as this would require the 'choosing' to be separate from the physical processing, something beyond it.

 

[ThomasT]

Thinking more about what JoeDawg and Descartz2000 have said:
I guess I believe that our will's are free and that we act as autonomous agents to the extent that our internal processing of our sensory experience is determining our actions.

Regarding subjective experience not being objectifiable ("measurable by an objective viewer"), I think that its objectifiability is demonstrated in the coordination of our collective behavior. Think of a stop light as measuring the objectiveness or similarity of our subjective experiences of the colors green and red. Well, for most drivers anyway.