The Neuroscience of Free Will: Believing in a Soul or Something Else?

[JoeDawg]

I might think that my will is free, but the person pushing my buttons knows that it isn't.

So does the person pushing your buttons have freewill? :)

I don't think autonomy is distinct from internal conditions. One of the components of any understanding of freewill is distinctness from one's environment. You can't have a completely holistic view of the world, and marry that to individual intent.

I don't think freewill independent of biology makes any sense. Even a soul, something made of completely separate substance from a body, would need to interact with that body in order to implement its will, which means it would need a way to physically connect with that body. So dualism in the supernatural sense is both illusory and self-contradictory.

But that just means a dualistic understanding of freewill is faulty, not that we can't have a valid understanding of freewill within the scope of determined processes. We can certainly manipulate the brain, both via direct surgical interaction as well as more subtley with things like advertising or even more subtle means, but those are by definition external influences.

Things do get problematic when we start trying to differentiate internal vs. external. But its a similar problem with any attempt at definition. The important part seems to be what we consider essential to the system, or rather, how we define identity. Is the fact I grew up with certain influences a factor in my decision making? Of course, it is. Does having a science background, or lack thereof, influence what choices I make. Certainly.

Freewill though, seems to be more a matter of, at the time the decision was made, was I acting withing the parameters of my identity?

Was I free to act, and is this what my accumulated identity intended?

I don't think there is a simple answer here, the words being used are vague and still ill-defined, but that doesn't mean they aren't descriptive. I do have a sense of self, I do feel I can make decisions. The fact I'm not completely free to do anything I please doesn't mean I don't have freedom. One of the limitations on freedom is we can't unchoose, but that doesn't mean we didn't have choices.

 

[ThomasT]

So does the person pushing your buttons have freewill? :)

As you've mentioned, the extent of one's freedom to choose or act is always constrained. So I guess it makes sense to speak in terms of degrees of autonomy. There is subjective behavior that we can call 'will'. The extent to which I deem my will and choices and behavior free would seem to depend on the extent to which I can identify limiting or causal factors regarding those things. Likewise, if I'm talking about the freedom of someone else's will based on inferences from his behavior and what I know about conditions antecedent and possibly related to it.

I don't think autonomy is distinct from internal conditions. One of the components of any understanding of freewill is distinctness from one's environment. You can't have a completely holistic view of the world, and marry that to individual intent.

My metaphysics is holistic. For practical purposes it's necessary to 'draw lines'. It sometimes useful to treat bounded systems as individual autonomous agents, even if I believe that nothing in our Universe can be said to be truly autonomous or independent.

Freewill though, seems to be more a matter of, at the time the decision was made, was I acting withing the parameters of my identity?

Was I free to act, and is this what my accumulated identity intended?

I think it depends on the context within which the behavior is observed and evaluated. Your replies, Descarz2000's replies, and others, are 'pushing my buttons' and to some extent determining my behavior. And I yours. Of course there's our unique individual histories to consider, and if we were actually able to take everything into account then I suspect that we would find not only that our behavior (including our wills) isn't as free as we would like to think it is, but that it isn't free in any sense.

I don't think there is a simple answer here, the words being used are vague and still ill-defined, but that doesn't mean they aren't descriptive. I do have a sense of self, I do feel I can make decisions. The fact I'm not completely free to do anything I please doesn't mean I don't have freedom. One of the limitations on freedom is we can't unchoose, but that doesn't mean we didn't have choices.

I too have a sense of self and of personal responsibility for my actions. I assume that everyone does. I'm certainly making choices. But that doesn't mean that my behavior isn't, fundamentally, a function of some fundamental physical dynamic(s) and forces set in motion at the beginning of our Universe. I'm a fatalist, a determinist. The Universe, Reality, it's all unfolding, evolving, in the only way that it can, given the initial conditions and fundamental dynamic. The fact that we can't unchoose, that the past is always different from the future, that 'reality' never 'rewinds', the irreversibility of 'time', supports this view, ... I think.

Of course, I behave as if I believe that I'm a truly autonomous agent, relatively free from coercive pressures, who deals with what life presents to him in often ingenious ways, and who is learning.

I agree that sorting out the semantics of any inquiry into the how's and why's of the physical world is not a simple task.

 

[ThomasT]

ThomasT, I agree with your statements; I too feel the specific configuration of the brain is determined by prior internal and external conditions, but 'determined' meaning 'previous states' dictate the outcome. However, they are inherently unpredictable and unknowable. An example of what would be unknowable and out of reach to an objective observer/researcher is 'qualia'.

Yes, 'knowledge' of the 'deep reality' of Nature might be said to be unattainable. At least one interpretation of quantum theory says this. Saying that Nature is inherently unpredictable isn't a good way to phrase it, imho. Maybe better to just say that certain experimental preparations always produce random results, and there doesn't seem to be any way around that.

I'm not familiar with 'qualia'. I'll look it up when I get time and get back to you. Are you advocating this as a useful concept? Maybe you could give a brief definition or description?

 

[JoeDawg]

My metaphysics is holistic. For practical purposes it's necessary to 'draw lines'. It sometimes useful to treat bounded systems as individual autonomous agents, even if I believe that nothing in our Universe can be said to be truly autonomous or independent.

I would agree in the sense that within any system 'absolute' autonomy makes no sense, it would essentially mean the thing is, and is not, part of the system, but that has more to do with the fact that 'absolutes' is a faulty notion. When we talk about freedom it is implicitly about degrees of freedom or it is self-contradictory.

Holistic worldviews(which conflict with reductionist ideas) are just as problematic for me, although I do agree that distinctions are sometimes more a matter of practicallity and utility than any essential nature. As humans I think we tend to overstate the case, beyond what is logical, when it comes to our understanding of freewill and especially causation (the problem of induction).

Of course there's our unique individual histories to consider, and if we were actually able to take everything into account then I suspect that we would find not only that our behavior (including our wills) isn't as free as we would like to think it is, but that it isn't free in any sense.

I think our freedom derives from the fact that we are, at least, semi-independent entities, that we have the ability to view ourselves that way, and that other semi-independent entities exist. To the extent that we are separate from each other we have the ability to act and to the extent that we understand that we can, we have a will.

I too have a sense of self and of personal responsibility for my actions. I assume that everyone does. I'm certainly making choices. But that doesn't mean that my behavior isn't, fundamentally, a function of some fundamental physical dynamic(s) and forces set in motion at the beginning of our Universe.

Again, I don't think determinism excludes freewill, rather it seems essential to it. Apart from the fact that randomness seems to exist on the quantum scale(I don't really think this impacts freewill, but it is a limit on determinism) I think the problem is when we are too reductionist and view everything too simply, ignoring the nature of complex systems. Scientists tend to do this because reductionism can be very useful in their work, but I think it ignores the fact that that the universe seems to operate on different levels. (The problem of quantum gravity seems to support this, not to mention the idea of emergent properties.)

I'm a fatalist, a determinist. The Universe, Reality, it's all unfolding, evolving, in the only way that it can, given the initial conditions and fundamental dynamic. The fact that we can't unchoose, that the past is always different from the future, that 'reality' never 'rewinds', the irreversibility of 'time', supports this view, ... I think.

Assuming the arrow of time is an essential part of the universe, I think we need to take it into consideration, but we also need to be wary of it, since our understanding of time is implicitly subjective. The fact that we only precieve time one way, is by no means conclusive. And again, I think reductionism is the issue not determinism, with regards to freewill.

 

[Descartz2000]

ThomasT, I agree that 'inherent unpredictability' may not be the most accurate concept to convey, or maybe it is. However, measurements that produce random results leaves one begging for more information, whereas, 'inherently unpredictable' answers the question.

Qualia: the experience of pain when stubbing one's toe, a headache, the taste of something, sensory experience.

As it relates to prior states of the brain and external conditions, the physical aspects of the brain's activity can be measured, at least in principle, down to the individual neurons that are firing. However, the experience can not be measured by an objective viewer.

 

[Descartz2000]

ThomasT, I agree that 'inherent unpredictability' may not be the most accurate concept to convey, or maybe it is. However, measurements that produce random results leaves one begging for more information, whereas, 'inherently unpredictable' answers the question.

Qualia: the experience of pain when stubbing one's toe, a headache, the taste of something, sensory experience.

As it relates to prior states of the brain and external conditions, the physical aspects of the brain's activity can be measured, at least in principle, down to the individual neurons that are firing. However, the experience can not be measured by an objective viewer.

 

[Pythagorean]

People have competing motivations.

I want to be healthy.
I want to eat cake all the time.

Without intention and action though, freewill is meaningless.

This is where the problem starts, you want to define freewill based on the idea that you can choose before choosing. You can't make a choice without intention. So choosing an intention makes no sense. This is more a linguistic problem than a philosophical problem, you're using the fact you can use intention as a verb, and as a noun, to create a paradox.

"to intend intention"

Then, you have a problem of infinite regress.

But a choice is really a matter of intention and action.

Do I want to do this?
Do I have the ability?

Sorry about the necro-reply, haven't been to physicsforums for a while and noticed this old thread bumped to the first page.

I really don't think I'm tricking you with linguistics here. Let me put it another way:

The process that your brain undergoes when you feel like you're making a decision may be a completely determined process and what you think is a choice is just the experience of your brain doing the computations between input (sensory) and output (action).

So the question, once again, is "do we choose our choices?" Or are our choices predetermined by our genetics and experiences; a result of a completely determined physical process.

 

[JoeDawg]

Sorry about the necro-reply, haven't been to physicsforums for a while and noticed this old thread bumped to the first page.

I really don't think I'm tricking you with linguistics here. Let me put it another way:

The process that your brain undergoes when you feel like you're making a decision may be a completely determined process and what you think is a choice is just the experience of your brain doing the computations between input (sensory) and output (action).

So the question, once again, is "do we choose our choices?" Or are our choices predetermined by our genetics and experiences; a result of a completely determined physical process.

Ugh, 'predetermined' is an ugly useless word. If its predetermined, its determined.
Again the language problem
I think decisions are determined by our histories.
But reducing it to input/output is a reductionist oversimplification, however.
Freewill depends on determinism.
I can't choose an action, if every choice ends in a random result.

The fact you made a choice doesn't mean you didn't have a choice.
And the fact you can predict a choice doesn't mean you don't have a choice.

Random vs determined is not the issue.
And stating that one must be 'completely free' or 'not free at all' is a false dichotomy.

Freedom is about autonomy, its about our degree of separateness from the complex system that we inhabit.

 

[Descartz2000]

Pythagorean, 'choosing our choices' seems to be based on the physical processes of the brain; the 'computations' that unfold. If not, what then is doing the choosing? It would require a little mystical man or agent inside of the brain that is making that choice. Even top-down principles fall apart as this would require the 'choosing' to be separate from the physical processing, something beyond it.

 

[ThomasT]

Thinking more about what JoeDawg and Descartz2000 have said:
I guess I believe that our will's are free and that we act as autonomous agents to the extent that our internal processing of our sensory experience is determining our actions.

Regarding subjective experience not being objectifiable ("measurable by an objective viewer"), I think that its objectifiability is demonstrated in the coordination of our collective behavior. Think of a stop light as measuring the objectiveness or similarity of our subjective experiences of the colors green and red. Well, for most drivers anyway.

 

[JoeDawg]

Regarding subjective experience not being objectifiable ("measurable by an objective viewer"), I think that its objectifiability is demonstrated in the coordination of our collective behavior. Think of a stop light as measuring the objectiveness or similarity of our subjective experiences of the colors green and red. Well, for most drivers anyway.

Your example is more about consensus than objectivity. Drivers agree to follow rules.
Objectivity is more about assessing something without the prejudice of perspective.

Which makes relativity a total bugger.

Objectivity is an ideal, not a reality. But science has a number of strategies that are at least somewhat convincing with regards approaching objectivity.

 

[Pythagorean]

Pythagorean, 'choosing our choices' seems to be based on the physical processes of the brain; the 'computations' that unfold. If not, what then is doing the choosing? It would require a little mystical man or agent inside of the brain that is making that choice. Even top-down principles fall apart as this would require the 'choosing' to be separate from the physical processing, something beyond it.

No, it wouldn't require a mystical man or agent in the brain. I'm in no way suggesting a Cartesian Theater. In fact, to paraphrase Daniel Dennett, I think a successful theory of consciousness will take the foreman out of the factory. Treat the brain as a machine, a system like the weather.

Let me present you with a question. Do you think a single photon in the double-slit experiment "choose" which slit they go through in the same way we make decisions?

Ugh, 'predetermined' is an ugly useless word. If its predetermined, its determined.
Again the language problem
I think decisions are determined by our histories.
But reducing it to input/output is a reductionist oversimplification, however.
Freewill depends on determinism.
I can't choose an action, if every choice ends in a random result.

The fact you made a choice doesn't mean you didn't have a choice.
And the fact you can predict a choice doesn't mean you don't have a choice.

Random vs determined is not the issue.
And stating that one must be 'completely free' or 'not free at all' is a false dichotomy.

Freedom is about autonomy, its about our degree of separateness from the complex system that we inhabit.

true, free will would depend on "determinism", but I don't think I'm talking about the philosophy determinism.

What I'm arguing is that our process from input to output is no different then a rock (when thrown in the air) "deciding" to head back towards Earth. It's just a much more complicated process.

I also don't really believe there's any dichotomy here either. In fact, I think it's least probable that we are either entirely free or not free at all. Ultimately, I believe free will (and it's apparent opposite) are both products of our imagination. A byproduct of the limitation of words in communication between two or more parties.

 

[WhoWee]

What I'm arguing is that our process from input to output is no different then a rock (when thrown in the air) "deciding" to head back towards Earth. It's just a much more complicated process.

I also don't really believe there's any dichotomy here either. In fact, I think it's least probable that we are either entirely free or not free at all. Ultimately, I believe free will (and it's apparent opposite) are both products of our imagination. A byproduct of the limitation of words in communication between two or more parties.

It does appear that we are all programmed with the same basic operating system. Multiple subroutines begin pre-birth and some "decisions" are purely reactive and subconscious.

As a baby develops thought is "trained" by experience, organizational processes, discipline, weighting of importance and grouping of inputted information. Accordingly, some brains are trained and operated better than others.

Like computers, some brains seem to operate with greater processing and/or memory capacity.

However, I can make the same observations about my cats and puppies.

We all need to breathe, pump blood and digest food. I choose to use simple words. We all shape our arguments to enforce our opinions.

Thought processes are clearly computer-like. However, personality, imagination and inspiration are much harder to evaluate, prove, and dismiss as rudimentary.

 

[ThomasT]

Your example is more about consensus than objectivity. Drivers agree to follow rules.
Objectivity is more about assessing something without the prejudice of perspective.

The hypothesis is that we humans detect and process stimuli in essentially the same way. An objective test of this is to observe the behavior of drivers wrt traffic signals.

We see that the behavior of drivers wrt traffic signals is extremely predictable. The conclusion, wrt this and other sorts of public behavior that's coordinated vis various conventions, and the fact that we can communicate at all, is that we detect and process stimuli in essentially the same way, and that there is a world external to all of us that has certain universal properties. The discovery and communication of those properties requires that we follow certain rules, adhere to certain conventions.

Which makes relativity a total bugger.

Not really. The success of special relativity is further evidence of the commonality of our detection and processing faculties, and the universality of certain aspects of the physical world. SR is a set of definitions and conventions based in part on the assumptions that we get all of our information about the world via the electromagnetic field, and that we all detect and process that info (em stimuli) in basically the same way. If we weren't part(s) of an absolute physical reality evolving independently of frames of reference, then theories of it, and in fact any meaningful communication at all between us, would be impossible.

Objectivity is an ideal, not a reality. But science has a number of strategies that are at least somewhat convincing with regards approaching objectivity.

I think I agree with you on this.

 

[JoeDawg]

What I'm arguing is that our process from input to output is no different then a rock (when thrown in the air) "deciding" to head back towards Earth. It's just a much more complicated process.

Ah, but think of it this way. When you are 'throwing the rock in the air', you are actually accelerating rock molecules in a certain direction. The acceleration will depend, among other things, on how solid the rock substance is, and how much resistance is given by the air.

'Throwing' the same amount of individual rock molecules (rock dusk) in the air will produce a different result (and probably coughing). So its not just, input A = output B, the structure and complexity of the 'object' effects the result. To a certain degree this is purely a definitional problem... rock vs rock dust...

But objects that are part of a system act and react differently, than objects in an individual context. The more complex the system, the more dependencies, the more change in the way each individual acts.

Ultimately, I believe free will (and it's apparent opposite) are both products of our imagination. A byproduct of the limitation of words in communication between two or more parties.

I think the way people have defined freewill in the past has been problematic, I think much of what we do is on the level of simple programming, but I do think the autonomy implicit in objects, the distinctiveness and separateness of being, allows for a level of freedom.

 

[cam875]

if you conducted an experiment twice exactly the same, technically without QM you would get the exact same results. Obviously its impossible to conduct an experiment twice exactly the same since in your examples you gave variables that are constantly changing. I think that's what gives us the illusion of free will, the variables are always changing and giving us different outcomes to similar tasks.

 

[ThomasT]

In fact, to paraphrase Daniel Dennett, I think a successful theory of consciousness will take the foreman out of the factory. Treat the brain as a machine, a system like the weather.

I think we can predict our behavior much better (most of the time anyway) than we can predict the weather. Try producing a thunderstorm using operant conditioning.

Our behavior, and the internal and external systems and dynamics that determine it, emerges from maybe a single fundamental dynamic. But there's no way to explain or understand or control our behavior in terms of this fundamental dynamic. The complexity arising out of countless iterations produces incomprehensibly complex bounded wave structures (such as us) whose behavior might be termed 'autonomous' or 'free' to the extent that it's effectively determined by the internal structures and dynamics and not external ones.

Of course external conditions and stimuli are also effective determinants of behavior. But we are continually 'internalizing' our environment, and as a result our behavior can become less predictable with respect to it.

Let me present you with a question. Do you think a single photon in the double-slit experiment "choose" which slit they go through in the same way we make decisions?

No. The behavior of light at the photon scale is understandable (to the extent that it's predictable) in terms of more fundamental physical dynamics than is our behavior.

Our complexity makes us 'self-determining' to a certain extent.

What I'm arguing is that our process from input to output is no different then a rock (when thrown in the air) "deciding" to head back towards Earth. It's just a much more complicated process.

But that would be missing the point. We and our behavior are products of the same fundamental dynamic(s) that produced rocks and determine their behavior, but our "decisions" and "choices" (and, thus, our behaviors) are, unlike a rock's behavior, often as much determined by internal as by external stimuli. Rocks don't, and can't, do anything like what we call decisions and choices.

In fact, I think it's least probable that we are either entirely free or not free at all. Ultimately, I believe free will (and it's apparent opposite) are both products of our imagination. A byproduct of the limitation of words in communication between two or more parties.

Nothing in the Universe, including us, is free in the sense that it (or we) might operate in ways that contradict the fundamental physical dynamic(s) of the Universe. However, as higher order, complex emergent phenomena, we do exhibit a certain range of what I think can properly be termed 'self-determination'.

I think this is what JoeDawg has been saying. If not I apologize. Anyway, this is how I've come to think about 'free will' (vis this thread) -- until or unless I change my mind again.

 

[ThomasT]

How can I know the extent to which anybody's behavior is determined more by internal or by external factors? That is, how can I know the extent to which someone is acting autonomously?

For that matter, since we're continually internalizing environmental factors, then ...

Uh oh, I'm confusing myself again.

 

[JoeDawg]

Nothing in the Universe, including us, is free in the sense that it (or we) might operate in ways that contradict the fundamental physical dynamic(s) of the Universe. However, as higher order, complex emergent phenomena, we do exhibit a certain range of what I think can properly be termed 'self-determination'.

I think this is what JoeDawg has been saying. If not I apologize. Anyway, this is how I've come to think about 'free will' (vis this thread) -- until or unless I change my mind again.

I find discussions of 'emergence' interesting. Mainly, I think the jury is still out. Saying freewill is an illusion is like saying reality is an illusion.
You're really not saying much of anything.

 

[Pythagorean]

But that would be missing the point. We and our behavior are products of the same fundamental dynamic(s) that produced rocks and determine their behavior, but our "decisions" and "choices" (and, thus, our behaviors) are, unlike a rock's behavior, often as much determined by internal as by external stimuli. Rocks don't, and can't, do anything like what we call decisions and choices.

I didn't literally mean "no different"

Our complexity makes us 'self-determining' to a certain extent.

prove it? Or at least give me a valid argument why that should be.

as higher order, complex emergent phenomena, we do exhibit a certain range of what I think can properly be termed 'self-determination'.

I think this is what JoeDawg has been saying. If not I apologize.

Expand on this more, show me what you see.



A small theory I've cooked up in the past:

I compare behavior to a path-independent integral, in which only the starting and ending points are relevant. You can take any path to compute the intergral (so of course, we expose this in science/math and construct the simplest path).

That is to say, we all ultimately share the same ultimate fate regardless of our desire to choose, for instance we all die... but we have many different options for the path we chose to take to that final point.

 

[Moridin]

The difference between a rock and a human and the reason such a comparison is invalid is because a human can (deterministically) simulate reality and anticipate likely consequences of their actions and act to avoid what it deems as bad consequences. A rock can't.

Furthermore, choice is real, it is simply the (deterministic) process of selection between hypothetical alternatives.

Freedom evolves by Dennet is a very good book to read.

 

[Pythagorean]

The difference between a rock and a human and the reason such a comparison is invalid is because a human can (deterministically) simulate reality and anticipate likely consequences of their actions and act to avoid what it deems as bad consequences. A rock can't.

Furthermore, choice is real, it is simply the (deterministic) process of selection between hypothetical alternatives.

Freedom evolves by Dennet is a very good book to read.

That doesn't necessarily make the comparison invalid. What I'm comparing is the amount of freewill involved. You call the process of a human responding to inputs with an output "choice". You call the rock responding to inputs with an output and you call it "physics".

What you seem to implying is that there's some special thing (like a soul?) that sets our more complicated series of physical events apart from those in nonliving things.

I'm saying it's just as possible that our choices have no free will behind them, just like the rock doesn't. That we simply experience the process decision-making but don't actually make the decision.

 

[JoeDawg]

I compare behavior to a path-independent integral, in which only the starting and ending points are relevant. You can take any path to compute the intergral (so of course, we expose this in science/math and construct the simplest path).

That is to say, we all ultimately share the same ultimate fate regardless of our desire to choose, for instance we all die... but we have many different options for the path we chose to take to that final point.

I'd say you're overapplying math. Its useful in describing life, but that doesn't mean that it implies some quality that exists. The number 1 is useful in this way too, but whether it actually corresponds to objects 'out there', as opposed to just being a convenient way of grouping things on the level we exist, is unknown. Old question of how the observed pattern is actually a part of the thing described.

Interesting idea, but I'm not sure that life is as much a thing as a process. If the latter, then the path taken is just as important to its existence. Its just that its not important to you, for your purposes.

 

[Pythagorean]

I'd say you're overapplying math. Its useful in describing life, but that doesn't mean that it implies some quality that exists. The number 1 is useful in this way too, but whether it actually corresponds to objects 'out there', as opposed to just being a convenient way of grouping things on the level we exist, is unknown. Old question of how the observed pattern is actually a part of the thing described.

Interesting idea, but I'm not sure that life is as much a thing as a process. If the latter, then the path taken is just as important to its existence. Its just that its not important to you, for your purposes.

It's not meant to be taken too literally. The important aspect that I gained from that analogy is that freewill and "determined" or not mutually exclusive.

 

[JoeDawg]

It's not meant to be taken too literally. The important aspect that I gained from that analogy is that freewill and "determined" or not mutually exclusive.

I agree they aren't mutually exclusive.

You're taking the 'river' approach to causality then?

Remove or move a drop or two of water and the river doesn't notice, it still ends up in the ocean. That sounds more like the idea of 'fate' rather than determinism to me, that is, it doesn't much matter what action you take, it all ends the same way.

 

[ThomasT]

I'm saying it's just as possible that our choices have no free will behind them, just like the rock doesn't.

I essentially agree. I'd just say that rocks are definitively less self-motivated than humans.

We're just sorting out the meaning of the term 'free will'. If our thoughts and actions are determined by antecedent events, then I agree that 'free will' is something of a misnomer. Sometimes our thoughts and actions are more effectively, or more obviously, determined by external events and conditions, and sometimes, apparently anyway, more by internal conditions or principles of action that we call our own.

That we simply experience the process decision-making but don't actually make the decision.

This is saying the same thing I think. Saying that we make decisions doesn't mean that those decisions aren't determined by our internal and external histories.

 

[ThomasT]

That sounds more like the idea of 'fate' rather than determinism to me, that is, it doesn't much matter what action you take, it all ends the same way.

It's difficult to separate determinism and fatalism, isn't it? I mean, I think determinism implies fatalism.

I don't think fatalism says that the present and future wouldn't be different if the past and present had been different. It just says that, in fact, the past wasn't something different. It was what it was. And the present is what it is. And the future is a function of what was and what is, not what might have been.

Even for a fatalist, our decisions and choices determine the future. However, our decisions and choices are determined by antecedent states (and any underlying dynamics that we can infer from the way states change), so the future is determined -- we just don't know what it's going to be yet because our knowledge of Nature is incomplete.

 

[JoeDawg]

It's difficult to separate determinism and fatalism, isn't it? I mean, I think determinism implies fatalism.

Oedipus is a good example of fate. It pretty much didn't matter how good a person he was, or how good a king. He was fated to kill his father and marry his mother. No matter what he did, he would end up doing that. Outside forces were driving him in a certain direction, like a curse.

So its not determinism in any modern sense, meaning its not about one thing logically following another, its about no matter how illogical or improbable... this or that, will happen, because its already written.

A very strict kind of determinism has the same result of course, but fatalism implies a foreknowledge of some sort, whereas determinism doesn't. You don't really need to know anything more than what is probable with determinism and in fact it might be impossible to know the outcome given a complex enough determinist system.

 

[Pythagorean]

I agree they aren't mutually exclusive.

You're taking the 'river' approach to causality then?

Remove or move a drop or two of water and the river doesn't notice, it still ends up in the ocean. That sounds more like the idea of 'fate' rather than determinism to me, that is, it doesn't much matter what action you take, it all ends the same way.

Not necessarily. The only reason we all head towards to the same "fate" is a statistical result of the laws of the universe. Contamination and entropy; our system (of life) is so complex that the whole thing remaining stable forever is an unreasonable request.

So it's the rules in the beginning that came first, the end is just the result.

Sometimes our thoughts and actions are more effectively, or more obviously, determined by external events and conditions, and sometimes, apparently anyway, more by internal conditions or principles of action that we call our own.

To me, this is independent of freewill. A cloud has internal forces and external forces in the same way. From my (a materialist's) perspective, in a human, they're the motion and configuration of particles in your brain which is a result of genetic and environmental conditions.

Of course, I don't have the best understanding of what free-will is still. Most of the time it's explained to me, I fail to see how the same definitions don't apply to the weather or the water cycle; why we should have freewill but they shouldn't.

 

[Moridin]

That doesn't necessarily make the comparison invalid. What I'm comparing is the amount of freewill involved. You call the process of a human responding to inputs with an output "choice". You call the rock responding to inputs with an output and you call it "physics".

What you seem to implying is that there's some special thing (like a soul?) that sets our more complicated series of physical events apart from those in nonliving things.

I'm saying it's just as possible that our choices have no free will behind them, just like the rock doesn't. That we simply experience the process decision-making but don't actually make the decision.

No, the difference is that the brain (no soul needed) can simulate the likely consequences of our action and act to avoid (="decide"), whereas this is not possible for a rock. Now, because a choice (selection of one alternative) is deterministic, does not make it any less of a choice. The main problem with what you have outlined is that we are not just experiencing the process of decision-making and standing outside like a ghost unable to do anything, the process of decision-making itself is a part of who we are.

 

[Pythagorean]

No, the difference is that the brain (no soul needed) can simulate the likely consequences of our action and act to avoid (="decide"), whereas this is not possible for a rock.

You're still missing the point if you think this argument is a valid. You're not showing me how freewill entered into the decision-making process. How it compares to a rock is that there was no free will involved. You can redefine "decide" all you like, but you still haven't made any argument why free-will should be a part of the decision making process.

Now, because a choice (selection of one alternative) is deterministic, does not make it any less of a choice. The main problem with what you have outlined is that we are not just experiencing the process of decision-making and standing outside like a ghost unable to do anything...

I already know what your conclusion is... I'm looking for a valid argument, not for you to restate your obvious conclusion again.

In other words, prove it.

the process of decision-making itself is a part of who we are.

That I agree with, and I also think we are unique in this way. This, of course, is not an argument for free-will.

 

[ValenceE]

Hello to all,

This ‘free will’ subject really makes for one very interesting exchange of ideas and thoughts about ourselves and the world around us. Here’s a first draft of some thoughts of mine…

I do believe humans are endowed with a decision making process that transcends the determined, instinctive, conditioned or emotionally driven state of being that are common to all of Earth’s nature and inhabitants.

Everything created on this planet (and everywhere else) is as it should be. Physically, everything is subjected to Universal laws and evolves, always being subjected to these laws.

I also believe that free will is not an emergent phenomenon, that it is not the product of a material object or group of objects like cells or brain, in the same sense as thoughts would be.

Furthermore, a rock doesn’t think like we think… its immaterial component is strictly related to internal and external energy exchanges. It cannot move from A to B on its own and only needs to be, to exist. It ‘lives’ in a determinist world, all of its parts subjected to, and obeying those same Universal laws.

Same goes for our Sun and all the magnificent stars and cosmological bodies we marvel at.

Same goes for the Flora, which has more ‘freedom’ to move about, interacting better with the environment than the mineral realm. Alas, Flora can only strech and keep its sight towards the sun while reaching deeper into the ground, doing its amazing photosynthesis thing, but still cannot go on a trip to visit a distant cousin.

For elementary life, freedom of movement doesn’t bring cognitive reality but it certainly gives the moving entity a lot more possibilities of interacting with its environment, however still being subjected to the Universal laws. While on the go, an amoeba cannot resist its energy replenishment cycle and cannot ‘decide’ what the intake will consist of and when it will take place. Light years away from choosing between steak and pasta, on the happy hour menu.

The closer you get to the ‘higher order’ living beings, the more possibilities are offered to interact with the environment. I strongly believe that, the more complex interaction network something possesses, the more knowledge is gained and the more refined and elaborate the thought process can evolve, transforming itself into a decision making process.

Possibilities are no longer available only naturally, letting the laws apply, but also through a new pathway… being willed.

Now, that remains within the grasp of the deterministic physical world, still no freewill at work here, only being conditioned by acquired knowledge, on the verge of being emotional…

‘nough for now , regards,

VE

 

[Moridin]

You're still missing the point if you think this argument is a valid. You're not showing me how freewill entered into the decision-making process. How it compares to a rock is that there was no free will involved. You can redefine "decide" all you like, but you still haven't made any argument why free-will should be a part of the decision making process.

Yes, I have. The problem is that you think that free will means a magical fairy, rather than the ability to act in accordance with your values. Compatibilist freedom (or "free will") like this is a necessary part of decision making by definition.

That I agree with, and I also think we are unique in this way. This, of course, is not an argument for free-will.

It certainly is! Humans make virtual models of reality and anticipate likely outcomes of their actions and determine actions to avoid bad consequences. This is what is meant by free will and this is an accurate description of human decision making.

 

[Stratosphere]

The brain and the body act almost as a vehicle for somthing that is not physical what ever that may be. There is no proof against that somthing.

 

[Pythagorean]

The brain and the body act almost as a vehicle for somthing that is not physical what ever that may be. There is no proof for that somthing.

fixed for accuracy

 

[Stratosphere]

fixed for accuracy

There is no proof against it either, if you can find me something that disproves it, I would love to see it.

 

[Pythagorean]

Yes, I have. The problem is that you think that free will means a magical fairy, rather than the ability to act in accordance with your values. Compatibilist freedom (or "free will") like this is a necessary part of decision making by definition.

Or the problem is that you think free will actually exists. Perhaps it's insulting for some people to be compared to a rock.

How about a photon? Photons make deterministic decisions that appear to be arbitrary choices. Do you think photons have free-will?

 

[Pythagorean]

There is no proof against it either, if you can find me something that disproves it, I would love to see it.

the point is that the burden of proof is on you to show your claim has validity.

 

[Stratosphere]

the point is that the burden of proof is on you to show your claim has validity.

Did you not read my original post? I already stated that I cannot prove that I am correct nor can you prove you are correct. I have stated my opinion, nobody said you must agree with it.

 

[ValenceE]

Hello Pythagorean.

sorry, not sure i understand what you mean by ' fixed for accuracy '... care to elaborate ?



ragards,

VE

 

[Moridin]

Or the problem is that you think free will actually exists. Perhaps it's insulting for some people to be compared to a rock.

How about a photon? Photons make deterministic decisions that appear to be arbitrary choices. Do you think photons have free-will?

Can photons simulate reality and predict the outcome of their actions and act to avoid unpleasant consequences? I have already disproven your rock analogy, by the way, but I noticed you avoided that.

 

[cam875]

but the point against that, is that your decision making ability is physical along with everything else in some peoples minds. Therefore its all just an interaction of matter according to the true laws of the universe giving us the illusion of choice. Thats one side of the spectrum.

 

[Pythagorean]

Can photons simulate reality and predict the outcome of their actions and act to avoid unpleasant consequences? I have already disproven your rock analogy, by the way, but I noticed you avoided that.

You didn't disprove the rock analogy; The only reason I avoided it was so that people wouldn't seek BS arugments simply because of their emotional response to being associated with a rock.

You're not even addressing the comparison, you're comparing different aspects that obviously aren't the same (particularly the process of causality) and then claiming that you've disproved my analogy. There's no way to disprove my analogy because it makes a currently unfalsifiable claim (not to say that improvements in neuroscience won't be able to someday falsify these kinds of claims).

Are you really having that much trouble comprehending my point that our decisions are physically determined and that any human concepts like "me" and freewill are sensations that could easily be byproducts of the physical process of decision-making? Your arrogance is unfounded: you couldn't have disproved my rock analogy given that you don't even understand it. You're still focused on the differences between us and rocks. cam875 seemed to have gotten it in his post (#92) so I don't think it's my half of the communication that's at err here.

We give names to these things you mention: simulating reality, predicting outcomes, avoiding unpleasant outcomes. But these processes, like a rock falling through gravity, require no "free will" on part of the body carrying out the operations. They are happening exactly as they would anytime you put those particular particles in those particular states at that particular time.

 

[JoeDawg]

But these processes, like a rock falling through gravity, require no "free will" on part of the body carrying out the operations. They are happening exactly as they would anytime you put those particular particles in those particular states at that particular time.

I think the problem with this, is your understanding of freewill.

Its true, a rock will fall with gravity. But in fact, even a vaguely similar rock will also fall. Even a rock that looks entirely different, or is made up of a different sort of stone will fall. You would really need to have something very different from a rock before it would not fall.

However, with a person, many things can happen. Two very similar people, even identical twins may react differently given identical circumstances, that is identical external influences. So people are not rocks. The analogy is faulty.

A rock has no internal causality (or none that is relevant to the gravity example). No variable within the rock entity will make it do something other than what the external force acting upon it causes.
A person can react in an autonomous fashion to external stimuli, in a way that is distinct from even very similar people.

A better comparison would be to something like a tornado or hurricane. Both would have a distinctly 'internal set of variables' as well as a distinctly 'external' set.
But what does a person have, if anything, that a hurricane does not?

A person's internal causation includes a modeling system that allows it to simulate and predict the impact of many types of external causal forces.

The ability of this prediction allows the person to 'choose'. Its still entirely deterministic and predictable, given enough information about internal and external states. But in this case the person entity, can react to the external, before the external has an impact on the entity, entirely based on its internal modeling. This gives it the ability to avoid the influence of external causality, at least in a limited fashion. Limited freedom from external causality.

This is not 'freewill' in the sense of complete freedom from causality, but that's an inherently self-contradicting idea that comes from a radically dualist idea of existense.

 

[Pythagorean]

I think the problem with this, is your understanding of freewill.

I'm not surprised

Its true, a rock will fall with gravity. But in fact, even a vaguely similar rock will also fall. Even a rock that looks entirely different, or is made up of a different sort of stone will fall. You would really need to have something very different from a rock before it would not fall.

However, with a person, many things can happen. Two very similar people, even identical twins may react differently given identical circumstances, that is identical external influences. So people are not rocks. The analogy is faulty.

I never said people were rocks. I compared their ability to choose their actions. But your argument isn't without flaw itself. I never even implied that two identical twins will act the same: they have completely different configurations. All that is the same about them is their appearance. Twins still have different brains susceptible to the slightest different initial conditions (after all, neurons can be modeled as a nonlinear system). This is similar to two coupled-harmonic oscillators, which even if they had the same exact parameteres (in terms of mass and size), if they are started with even slightly different initial conditions, they will exhibit completely different behavior with increasing time. Not only do twins have different initial conditions, they're parameters are not exactly the same despite them looking the same to your macroscopic eyes.

Different rocks will have different rotational motions as they fall based on their mass distribution. No rock will ever be the same from another rock in terms of structure or it's exact motion and interaction with air resistance.

A rock has no internal causality (or none that is relevant to the gravity example). No variable within the rock entity will make it do something other than what the external force acting upon it causes.
A person can react in an autonomous fashion to external stimuli, in a way that is distinct from even very similar people.

Falling through gravity was a specific action of the rock. Gravity isn't the only force acting on the rock, it's just the most obvious, typical example of a force on the rock. If you want to get into the internal causalities of rocks, we can go there too. Solid State, thermodynamics, magnetic domains...

A better comparison would be to something like a tornado or hurricane. Both would have a distinctly 'internal set of variables' as well as a distinctly 'external' set.
But what does a person have, if anything, that a hurricane does not?

Tornado and hurricanes are more complex in their physical interactions with the rest of the universe than rocks are, so in that respect they're a lot better example. Still, I don't feel like the rock analogy has failed it's purpose. At least one other poster acknowledged my meaning.

A person's internal causation includes a modeling system that allows it to simulate and predict the impact of many types of external causal forces.

I addressed this. You have internal microprocesses that you call 'predicting' and 'simulating' (that of course, is a product of inputs from the external world in a first place through a long line of genetic coding). Rocks have internal microprocesses like phonons and magnons. Similar to genetic coding, rock cycles would not be the same at all if previous rock cycles didn't exist. There is an element of 'memory' that transcends generations of rocks.

We can find similar comparisons with the weather system.

The ability of this prediction allows the person to 'choose'. Its still entirely deterministic and predictable, given enough information about internal and external states. But in this case the person entity, can react to the external, before the external has an impact on the entity, entirely based on its internal modeling. This gives it the ability to avoid the influence of external causality, at least in a limited fashion. Limited freedom from external causality.

it's not "entirely based on it's internal modeling" as if the internal modeling is the end of the line. That internal modeling is the product of external influences. It's just a very delayed, statistical response to external influences.

Why is this long-term reaction of ours to external stimuli called a "choice"? What's so special about it if it's just as deterministic and predictable as any other event?

This is not 'freewill' in the sense of complete freedom from causality, but that's an inherently self-contradicting idea that comes from a radically dualist idea of existense.

I should hope we're not talking about that kind of freewill. I was actually hoping you'd be able to convince me of the actual 'free will'. The concept that we actually can make choices independent of the external world. But you haven't, so I'm going to go smoke another cigarette, since i don't believe I have the freewill to quit. When I get lung cancer, expect a law suit.

 

[JoeDawg]

I never said people were rocks. I compared their ability to choose their actions. But your argument isn't without flaw itself. I never even implied that two identical twins will act the same: they have completely different configurations.

But that's the point. Two rocks that are similar, to the same degree that twins are, will invariably act the same way. But twins don't have to. Its not just that people aren't rocks, but they have a very specific ability 'to act differently' even given comparable similarity and the same external cause.

Different rocks will have different rotational motions as they fall based on their mass distribution. No rock will ever be the same from another rock in terms of structure or it's exact motion and interaction with air resistance.

Yes, this is true, but the same could be said about two people. The important part is that if I take a random sample, two rocks, and let gravity work on them, then they are more than likely going to act the exact same way. Two persons, even very similar ones, on the other hand, have internal processess that can and often do affect the way external causes effect them.

Now, if one rock is magnetic, and the other is not, it may act differently with the same external force acting on it. So an internal aspect can have an effect on the outcome. But in the case of a person, it is still different, because the magnetism is a static property, a rock either is magnetic or not, there is no process occurring in the rock. (Assuming its not an electromagnet)

it's not "entirely based on it's internal modeling" as if the internal modeling is the end of the line. That internal modeling is the product of external influences. It's just a very delayed, statistical response to external influences.

But this is important. Because it can be delayed, it can interact with current processes or other processes delayed for different amounts of time. The causality, which would normally reside at the edge or even outside the system, now resides inside the system. Causality is internal, even when outside influences are involved. This we call 'the will'.

I can for example remember that rain is wet, and that rain makes me cold. Then instead of getting rained on, I can get shelter when I see a rain cloud. The rock's memory may have certain causal effects, but it doesn't allow for action. The hurricane's internal processes allow for action, but without a modelling system, it doesn't allow for intention.

Turning intention into action is the essense of choice.
Freewill is a compound word after all.
Will is basically just the ability to intend something to happen, based on personal identity, which is wholely deterministic, of course.
Freedom allows for the act to occur, both the ability to take action and the ability to avoid external obstacles to the action.

Rocks can only react to direct stimulus, they can't predict via indirect stimulus and can't then intend action.

Why is this long-term reaction of ours to external stimuli called a "choice"? What's so special about it if it's just as deterministic and predictable as any other event?

Well, its special to us because we can do it, and its useful to us, and we can see that most things in nature can't do it. Whether it has any objective specialness... doesn't seem like a question that is either answerable or of much value, IMO.

When I get lung cancer, expect a law suit.

If you don't fall down an elevator shaft before then, I will.