Ultimate question: Why anything at all?

[SoggyBottoms]

I really don't have anything to add to the above discussion, but this question has crossed my mind a lot. Instead of a philosophical answer, shouldn't the answer lie in physics? Obviously I don't know what it is, but if we ever find an answer, wouldn't it be, for instance, an entropy related argument or something quantum mechanical? E.g., nothingness can't exist, because even in pure nothingness, particles would form or whatever.

It really is such a weird concept, because if nothingness could not exist, then 'something' would have been there for infinity.

 

[chiro]

I really don't have anything to add to the above discussion, but this question has crossed my mind a lot. Instead of a philosophical answer, shouldn't the answer lie in physics? Obviously I don't know what it is, but if we ever find an answer, wouldn't it be, for instance, an entropy related argument or something quantum mechanical? E.g., nothingness can't exist, because even in pure nothingness, particles would form or whatever.

One thing that is subtle (but highly important) is that you always need two definitions to define anyone thing: in other words, if you define what something 'is', you need to define what that same thing 'is not'. If you don't define what something 'is not' then you can't even say what something 'is'.

In terms of nothingness, you need to define what nothingness is not. Is nothing-ness the absence of particles or information? Is a state of absolutely no information possible?

I don't think it is and here is why: in order for something to exist it must be described. If it can be described it has a descriptional/informational/linguistic form of some sort with a non-zero information density. But this is a contradiction of having nothing in this sense.

Thus under the principle that anything that exists needs to be described in some information theoretic manner, true nothingness can not exist. This means that although nothingness may correspond to some kind of complement to a scenario that has a huge information density, it doesn't mean that it really is 'nothing'.

If you can think of any situation that needs no descriptive capacity of any kind, I'd like to hear it.

 

[sigurdW]

One thing that is subtle (but highly important) is that you always need two definitions to define anyone thing: in other words, if you define what something 'is', you need to define what that same thing 'is not'. If you don't define what something 'is not' then you can't even say what something 'is'.

In terms of nothingness, you need to define what nothingness is not. Is nothing-ness the absence of particles or information? Is a state of absolutely no information possible?

I don't think it is and here is why: in order for something to exist it must be described. If it can be described it has a descriptional/informational/linguistic form of some sort with a non-zero information density. But this is a contradiction of having nothing in this sense.

Thus under the principle that anything that exists needs to be described in some information theoretic manner, true nothingness can not exist. This means that although nothingness may correspond to some kind of complement to a scenario that has a huge information density, it doesn't mean that it really is 'nothing'.

If you can think of any situation that needs no descriptive capacity of any kind, I'd like to hear it.

Yes indeed. This a tricky question of fundamental importance...If we refere to an object (=A) then there is what is NOT the object (= not A)...But where is the proof that not A is something of the same kind as A? Meaning that A taken together with not A is not necessarily the object A+Not A?

 

[chiro]

Yes indeed. This a tricky question of fundamental importance...If we refere to an object (=A) then there is what is NOT the object (= not A)...But where is the proof that not A is something of the same kind as A? Meaning that A taken together with not A is not necessarily the object A+Not A?

I didn't say they the two things have to be of the same 'kind' (although some linguistic atom will have some representation of kinds): the important thing is that even 'nothing' is 'something' in a descriptive capacity.

'Nothing' is still 'something' informationally speaking.

In terms of the type, this is a tricky thing. If we resort to set theory then we can always classify anything by referring to A and U\A for some universe U (lets for the moment skip the formalities with classes and go with the intuitive meaning).

Now in a general set, the members themselves could have completely different structures and that is OK, but still the idea of a dual definition (what 'is' and what 'is not') is still defined, at least in a set-theoretic context for a general set with no assumption of explicit type.

 

[NewtonianAlch]

This is the kind of question that makes me bang my head on my desk. Why do people spend time on such useless questions? Oh, I know, philosophy asks the questions that don't need to be asked. <bangs head on desk>

Carry on.

Yes, that's right. Some of the greatest minds in Eastern and Western civilisation wasted their time with useless questions for much of their entire life.

So sad to hear it was all just wasted time, why didn't they realize that?

 

[NewtonianAlch]

Nothing there. As a matter of fact I did a search on your definition, and the only place it appears is in this thread. Please post a link to it, so we can see if you put your own interpretation on a definition. Or if you found some obscure sentence that's not being found. I'm referring to where you said "crisp metaphysical choice".

This brings up a few issues.

Is it really necessary that one must reference a definition that explicitly has in it the term "crisp metaphysical choice"?

Reading what he said, it seemed rather sensible to me. If someone asks you to define "chair" - I bet you can come up a variety of definitions that would resemble nothing that's given in the dictionary but would nevertheless fit the general description of chair.

It is unnecessary to evaluate statements by being a stickler for published definitions, generic descriptions are precisely that, generic, they render the gist of what it is, it need not be formal or meticulous.

In fact, I don't know where he got that from, but it seems like a better definition than you could get from a dictionary.

 

[samm dickens]

I think your set should have only two choices. You have the possibility that nothing exists, and you have all the other choices that reduce to the possibility that something exists. In essence, these are the only two options in the set. Either something exists or nothing exists. Since time is a member of the set of things that exist, existence is independent of those qualities that are contingent on the existence of time. This means that existence has no beginning or end. Things that exist have beginnings and ends, but existence itself does not. Existence simply is or is not. If it is then it cannot cease being, and if it is not then it cannot begin being. Outside of time such changes in state are not possible. Asking why something exists rather than nothing seems pointless. Only one or the other can be true, and if non-existence were true, then this discussion could not be taking place because this universe would not exist. Existence is a necessary Boolean condition whose being is explained by its being. Now things that exist are entirely different from existence because their "existence" is actually experience and they only "exist" insofar as they experience or are experienced; otherwise, they cease to be "things that exist". I mention this because we can't discuss why something rather than nothing exists until we first understand what it means to exist, what is existence.

Samm

 

[WannabeNewton]

I think your set should have only two choices. You have the possibility that nothing exists, and you have all the other choices that reduce to the possibility that something exists. In essence, these are the only two options in the set. Either something exists or nothing exists. Since time is a member of the set of things that exist, existence is independent of those qualities that are contingent on the existence of time. This means that existence has no beginning or end. Things that exist have beginnings and ends, but existence itself does not. Existence simply is or is not. If it is then it cannot cease being, and if it is not then it cannot begin being. Outside of time such changes in state are not possible. Asking why something exists rather than nothing seems pointless. Only one or the other can be true, and if non-existence were true, then this discussion could not be taking place because this universe would not exist. Existence is a necessary Boolean condition whose being is explained by its being. Now things that exist are entirely different from existence because their "existence" is actually experience and they only "exist" insofar as they experience or are experienced; otherwise, they cease to be "things that exist". I mention this because we can't discuss why something rather than nothing exists until we first understand what it means to exist, what is existence.

Samm

O.O...

 

[bohm2]

I think your set should have only two choices. You have the possibility that nothing exists, and you have all the other choices that reduce to the possibility that something exists.

See post 180 for an argument against this type of two-choice argument or Van Inwagen's argument presented in the original post in this thread (e.g. the premises that there is only one possible world in which there are no beings but there are infinitely many possible worlds in which there are beings). To summarize:

What is wrong is that it is an instance of the inductive disjunctive fallacy. Our background assumptions are near vacuous and provide completely neutral support for the actuality of each possible world; therefore, they provide completely neutral support for any disjunction of these possibilities.

Cosmic Confusions: Not Supporting versus Supporting Not
http://www.pitt.edu/~jdnorton/papers/cosmic_confusion_final.pdf

Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory
http://www.pitt.edu/~jdnorton/papers/Challenges_final.pdf

 

[Ken G]

This is the kind of question that makes me bang my head on my desk. Why do people spend time on such useless questions?

This is a valid question, and a long thread, so I don't know if it was taken up. But I think it's fair to include, with the question "why does anything exist?", the question "why ask why in the first place?" In my experience, there are basically two types of people in the context of philosophical discussion-- those who think it is a waste of time (yet are drawn to it anyway, by the desire to state that it is a waste of time), and those who think there is value in pursuing it (obviously, the OPer is in the latter group). Many switch groups-- those in the first group who "don't get it" may have a false sense of what philosophy is for, and when they better understand its purpose, they may (or may not) become more interested in it. And some in the second group have impossible ideas about what philosophy could do for them, eventually become frustrated by the impossibility of their expectations, and end up in the former group! So I would comment that in my opinion, the answer to "why ask why" starts with a better understanding of what philosophy actually is.

Aristotle had a concise dictum about this, that went:
"If you would philosophize, then you would philosophize.
If you would not philosophize, then you would philosophize."

In other words, all our attitudes are fundamentally philosophy of one stripe or another. Hence, the art of philosophy is little more than paying attention to the things that we hold as true-- even if one of those things is holding that "why does anything exist" is a useless question. That's a philosophy too, so all that remains is to dig into that philosophy and see where it comes from-- which is just what philosophers do.

So the point of philosophizing is to dig into the assumptions we are making that lead us to the various attitudes we have. Some don't want to know those assumptions, they may be afraid to find out what it is they have taken to be true that they cannot actually argue is true. The last thing they want is to go from thinking we know something to knowing that we only think something! But that's what philosophy does, like it or not-- the only alternative is the head in the sand approach, a kind of default philosophy.

So I would say that the goal of asking "why is there anything" is not to find a definitive answer to it, but rather, to connect all the possible answers to it with various possibilities about what we may hold as true. Elucidating those connections is the whole point of philosophy, not answering the question. Hence philosophy is a lot like reverse-engineered mathematics-- we start from the conclusions (like "that's a useless question") and reason back to the axioms, rather than the other way around. That this reverse reasoning is not unique is an important aspect of philosophy-- not a bug, but a feature, it leads to good discussions (the forward logic of math does not).

So that's my take on the question "why ask why." As to "why does anything exist", I can't be convinced that the issue has anything to do with probability, because it just seems like a misuse of the concept of probability to me. I think probability is used to reason from what is known to what is not known, it is a way to deal with incomplete information when you already know a lot about what you don't know. But existence is not something we know a lot about what we don't know, it is something we don't know a lot about what we know. We know we exist (it seems a reasonable meaning for the word to apply in this manner), but we don't know why, and we don't know anything about any other possibilities. So I don't think it is the ultimate question, I think it is the ultimate common ground, the ultimate starting point for discussion about any other question. To me, establishing that is the point of asking it-- we start with "can we agree that something exists", and go from there, because if we cannot, then there's no point in attacking more complicated issues about what actually does exist.

What's more, I think this is a very context-related question, as was mentioned early on. In one context, we may say something exists, but in more general terms, we may say that without the contextual information, we cannot say that anything exists. The concept of existence is an effective notion, so we must focus on what we gain by attaching existence to things. I'd say it's a kind of judicial fancy, a mental idealization that serves us. So the question shifts-- "why does it serve us to imagine that anything exists?"

I would answer that, that's just how we think about things, it's what connects with our experience-- it doesn't need to be true, it needs to work, in the appropriate contexts. We say we exist because that's the purpose of the language around the word "exist", and so something exists, and we go from there-- it's a starting point for thought, not a conclusion we can reach. The tricky part is the details of a definition of "exist" such that something does it, or more correctly, such that it serves us to imagine that something does it-- and that definition is what is contextual. In most contexts I can think of, for example, it's important for me to use a meaning of the term "exist" such that I do it, and in many contexts, it's important for me to adopt a meaning such that you do it too. However, it is also important for me to recognize that this is simply a choice I am making-- I don't actually believe that I exist in any kind of objective or context-free way, I think I am largely manipulating images and illusions (not illusions like mirages, which can't satisfy your thirst, but illusions like water, which can satisfy your thirst), because that's the purpose of my brain, and I organize that manipulation so as to produce meaning to terms like "I" and "exist." If you ask me "but who is doing that manipulating", I say, "it serves me to create the judicial fancy that 'I' am doing that, this is the only way I can use language to answer your question. There, I did it again."

 

[sigurdW]

This is a valid question, and a long thread, so I don't know if it was taken up. But I think it's fair to include, with the question "why does anything exist?", the question "why ask why in the first place?" In my experience, there are basically two types of people in the context of philosophical discussion-- those who think it is a waste of time (yet are drawn to it anyway, by the desire to state that it is a waste of time), and those who think there is value in pursuing it (obviously, the OPer is in the latter group). Many switch groups-- those in the first group who "don't get it" may have a false sense of what philosophy is for, and when they better understand its purpose, they may (or may not) become more interested in it. And some in the second group have impossible ideas about what philosophy could do for them, eventually become frustrated by the impossibility of their expectations, and end up in the former group! So I would comment that in my opinion, the answer to "why ask why" starts with a better understanding of what philosophy actually is.

Aristotle had a concise dictum about this, that went:
"If you would philosophize, then you would philosophize.
If you would not philosophize, then you would philosophize."

In other words, all our attitudes are fundamentally philosophy of one stripe or another. Hence, the art of philosophy is little more than paying attention to the things that we hold as true-- even if one of those things is holding that "why does anything exist" is a useless question. That's a philosophy too, so all that remains is to dig into that philosophy and see where it comes from-- which is just what philosophers do.

So the point of philosophizing is to dig into the assumptions we are making that lead us to the various attitudes we have. Some don't want to know those assumptions, they may be afraid to find out what it is they have taken to be true that they cannot actually argue is true. The last thing they want is to go from thinking we know something to knowing that we only think something! But that's what philosophy does, like it or not-- the only alternative is the head in the sand approach, a kind of default philosophy.

So I would say that the goal of asking "why is there anything" is not to find a definitive answer to it, but rather, to connect all the possible answers to it with various possibilities about what we may hold as true. Elucidating those connections is the whole point of philosophy, not answering the question. Hence philosophy is a lot like reverse-engineered mathematics-- we start from the conclusions (like "that's a useless question") and reason back to the axioms, rather than the other way around. That this reverse reasoning is not unique is an important aspect of philosophy-- not a bug, but a feature, it leads to good discussions (the forward logic of math does not).

So that's my take on the question "why ask why." As to "why does anything exist", I can't be convinced that the issue has anything to do with probability, because it just seems like a misuse of the concept of probability to me. I think probability is used to reason from what is known to what is not known, it is a way to deal with incomplete information when you already know a lot about what you don't know. But existence is not something we know a lot about what we don't know, it is something we don't know a lot about what we know. We know we exist (it seems a reasonable meaning for the word to apply in this manner), but we don't know why, and we don't know anything about any other possibilities. So I don't think it is the ultimate question, I think it is the ultimate common ground, the ultimate starting point for discussion about any other question. To me, establishing that is the point of asking it-- we start with "can we agree that something exists", and go from there, because if we cannot, then there's no point in attacking more complicated issues about what actually does exist.

What's more, I think this is a very context-related question, as was mentioned early on. In one context, we may say something exists, but in more general terms, we may say that without the contextual information, we cannot say that anything exists. The concept of existence is an effective notion, so we must focus on what we gain by attaching existence to things. I'd say it's a kind of judicial fancy, a mental idealization that serves us. So the question shifts-- "why does it serve us to imagine that anything exists?"

I would answer that, that's just how we think about things, it's what connects with our experience-- it doesn't need to be true, it needs to work, in the appropriate contexts. We say we exist because that's the purpose of the language around the word "exist", and so something exists, and we go from there-- it's a starting point for thought, not a conclusion we can reach. The tricky part is the details of a definition of "exist" such that something does it, or more correctly, such that it serves us to imagine that something does it-- and that definition is what is contextual. In most contexts I can think of, for example, it's important for me to use a meaning of the term "exist" such that I do it, and in many contexts, it's important for me to adopt a meaning such that you do it too. However, it is also important for me to recognize that this is simply a choice I am making-- I don't actually believe that I exist in any kind of objective or context-free way, I think I am largely manipulating images and illusions (not illusions like mirages, which can't satisfy your thirst, but illusions like water, which can satisfy your thirst), because that's the purpose of my brain, and I organize that manipulation so as to produce meaning to terms like "I" and "exist." If you ask me "but who is doing that manipulating", I say, "it serves me to create the judicial fancy that 'I' am doing that, this is the only way I can use language to answer your question. There, I did it again."

Hi! I felt symphaty reading this, it seems an honest search for truth.
It is true that we don't know what makes existence possible or actual,
all we know is that it is fundamental...
the concept that must stay undefined since otherwise our conceptual apparatus would be circular.

The problem is that a paradox rests at the foundation Aristoteles laid:

So permit me the tell in the traditional sage manner: (using a fairy tale)

Aristoteles was sitting at the fire gnawing bones,

happy that he at last understood the truth in general.

Epimenides sits down beside him and says: This is not so!

A: Oh? Arent we sitting here gnawing bones!?

E: I don't dispute that! You misinterpret me!

E: It is not as I say this very moment!

Aristoteles never found a good answer to Epimenides statement...

Since its false if its true and true if its false.

All progress made so far is to show that paradoxical statements can be excluded and scientific business can go on as usual...
We can't be satisfied with that if we expect to dig deeper into foundations.
So here is what I think is the solution to Epimenides Problem:

Definition:

y is a Liar Identity if and only if y is of the form: x = "x is not true",
and if y is true then x is a Liar Sentence defined by y.

THESIS:No liar identity is Logically true.

Proof (Based on: (a=b) implies (Ta<-->Tb) )

1. Suppose x="x is not true" (assumption)

2. Then x is true if and only if "x is not true" is true (from 1)

3. And we get: x is true if and only if x is not true (from 2)

4. Sentence 3 contradicts the assumption. (QED)

The logical form of the foundation of the Paradox:

1. x is not true.
2. x = "x is not true".

Some values for x makes the liar Identity Empirically true:

1. Sentence 1 is not true.
2. Sentence 1 = " Sentence 1 is not true."

To get to the paradox one must produce " 3. Sentence 1 is true." from sentences 1 and 2.
But since sentence 2 is BOTH Empirically true and Logically false it can not be a well formed sentence!
Therefore no paradox can be derived from sentence 1,or any other liar sentence.

 

[Ken G]

I don't think that works. Simply replace sentence 1 by "1'. Sentence 1' cannot be proven to be true." Also replace Sentence 2. by "2'. Sentence 1' = "Sentence 1' cannot be proven to be true." Then a paradox requires "3'. Sentence 1' is provable to be true." You have presented a proof that Sentence 1 cannot be proven, but following the same argument as what you gave, we can prove that Sentence 1' can also not be proven. That is the proof that Sentence 1' is true, which proves Sentence 3'.

I think the resolution is that logic simply doesn't work on every statement that we can make, self-referential statements being a particularly problematic example.

 

[sigurdW]

I don't think that works. Simply replace sentence 1 by "1'. Sentence 1' cannot be proven to be true." Also replace Sentence 2. by "2'. Sentence 1' = "Sentence 1' cannot be proven to be true." Then a paradox requires "3'. Sentence 1' is provable to be true." You have presented a proof that Sentence 1 cannot be proven, but following the same argument as what you gave, we can prove that Sentence 1' can also not be proven. That is the proof that Sentence 1' is true, which proves Sentence 3'.

I think the resolution is that logic simply doesn't work on every statement that we can make, self-referential statements being a particularly problematic example.

Nice try but I am not impressed much by Goedel Sentences ;)

You believe that the following two sentences are well formed:

1 sentence 1 cannot be proven to be true (extended liar sentence)
2 sentence 1= "sentence 1 cannot be proven to be true" ( extended liar identity)

I will now prove that sentence 2 is logically false!

Let x = "sentence 1" then we assume that:

x = "x cannot be proven to be true" ( extended liar identity)

From the assumption we get:

x can be proven true if and only if "x cannot be proven to be true" can be proven true

The right side can be simplified since sentences that can be proven true are true!

And we get the contradiction:

x can be proven true if and only if x cannot be proven to be true

Next: inspection shows that sentence 2 is empirically true

So here comes the finale!

Your sentence 2 is BOTH empirically true and logically false! And therefore it is not well formed! (QED)
Therefore no paradox can be derived from sentence 1,or any other extended liar sentence.

Please try to UNDERSTAND my technique: I call it my special method for solving paradoxes!

(Its boring to solve paradox after paradox... I will show you the general method later.
But I appreciate your trying to use Goedel to prove me wrong... How I wish he was alive!)

PS I will comment your statement in red later

 

[rkastner]

I just came across this very interesting thread. I understand Bohm2's skepticism re 'collapse'. But the alternative is a 'block world' which has no genuine dynamics and there are some big problems with that whole approach. (Bohm's theory cannot in my view work at the relativistic level: take, for example, coherent states which never have a definite number of particles. How can these be reconciled with persistent Bohmian particles?) I have addressed the 'collapse' issue in terms of spontaneous symmetry breaking in my forthcoming book on PTI. You can see some related material here and in particular I've posted an audio lecture that explains how TI solves the measurement problem (with accompanying PPT): http://transactionalinterpretation.org

I do mention quantum fields in the lecture; I consider these as active agents of possibility.

Here is the book site: http://www.cambridge.org/us/knowledge/isbn/item6860644/?site_locale=en_US

Best regards
Ruth Kastner

 

[sigurdW]

Originally Posted by Evo
This is the kind of question that makes me bang my head on my desk.
Why do people spend time on such useless questions?

... I think it's fair to include, with the question "why does anything exist?", the question "why ask why in the first place?" So I would comment that in my opinion, the answer to "why ask why" starts with a better understanding of what philosophy actually is.

Hence philosophy is a lot like reverse-engineered mathematics-- we start from the conclusions (like "that's a useless question") and reason back to the axioms, rather than the other way around.

So I don't think it is the ultimate question, I think it is the ultimate common ground, the ultimate starting point for discussion about any other question.

To me, establishing that is the point of asking it-- we start with "can we agree that something exists", and go from there, because if we cannot, then there's no point in attacking more complicated issues about what actually does exist.

What's more, I think this is a very context-related question, The concept of existence is an effective notion, so we must focus on what we gain by attaching existence to things. I'd say it's a kind of judicial fancy, a mental idealization that serves us. So the question shifts-- "why does it serve us to imagine that anything exists?"

I would answer that, that's just how we think about things, it's what connects with our experience-- it doesn't need to be true, it needs to work, in the appropriate contexts.

The Ultimate question has an immediate answer: Because something must be the case!

But then a new question needs an answer: Why must something be the case?

And the answer is: Because logic tells us so!

This process goes on, and on, until eventually the Ultimate question gets an Ultimate answer.

... logic simply doesn't work on every statement that we can make, self-referential statements being a particularly problematic example.

What then IS logic?
And why shouldn't it work on every statement that we can make?

Our "common ground" is the English Langauge together with some Logic used!

I personally use Classical Logic (together with all necessary definitions) And I declare it sufficient and consistent!

Definition: Let x be any English sentence then x is a self referent sentence if and only if there is a predicate Z such that x = Zx.

Most Modern Logics (Actually ALL I am aware of.) exclude, in one way or another, self referential sentences in order to escape inconsistency. This has the peculiar effect that paradoxes can't be studied, analysed and solved since ,as it seems, self reference is a necessary condition for a paradox to be derived.

Suppose that x is a selfreferential sentence then:

1 x = Zx
2 Zx = ZZx
3 (x = Zx) implies that (Zx = ZZx) (conclusion)

We have now a logical truth about self reference:
If the right side of the implication is false
then the left side is false as well
and x is not a selfreferential sentence!

This means (among other things) that not all English Statements are accepted by Logic. (QED)

 

[bohm2]

(Bohm's theory cannot in my view work at the relativistic level: take, for example, coherent states which never have a definite number of particles. How can these be reconciled with persistent Bohmian particles?)

Thanks for the links. I have read almost all of them. I thought I should mention (in case you haven't read his papers) that Demystifier (Hrvoje Nikolic) who is a poster and resident Bohmian expert on this forum has published a bohmian model compatible with relativity. He does it by treating time on an equal footing with space and his model does not involve a preferred Lorenz frame. I personally don't like his model for some of the reasons you mention against the block world, I think. Some of his stuff can be found here:

Slide Presentation:
Making Bohmian Mechanics compatible with Relativity and Quantum Field Theory
http://www.tcm.phy.cam.ac.uk/~mdt26/tti_talks/deBB_10/nikolic_tti2010.pdf

Relativistic Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Field Theory
http://www.tcm.phy.cam.ac.uk/~mdt26/local_papers/nikolic_2010d.pdf

Making nonlocal reality compatible with relativity
http://www.tcm.phy.cam.ac.uk/~mdt26/local_papers/nikolic_2010a.pdf

 

[rkastner]

Thanks for these references. The problem w/ any relativistic Bohmian approach is that it cannot address states w uncertain particle number. I didn't find anything in the Nikolic refs that solves this problem. He talks briefly about coherent states in the 2nd one you listed, with an appeal to decoherence and then a claim that the Bohmian model somehow picks up where decoherence leaves off, without saying how this could work (at least I didn't find it).
The premise behind the Bohmian theory is that it is the corpuscular aspect of the measuring device that interacts concretely with Bohmian corpuscle associated with the quantum system. But in the coherent state there is no determinate corpuscle for the measuring device to interact with. Getting coherent states to work out in the Bohmian interp. is not something attainable as an approximate, decohered, observer-level effect. It's the basic premise of the Bohmian interp. that determinate results happen because of determinate particle positions and in coherent states there are never determinate particle positions because there are no determinate particles -- they must keep popping in and out of existence. Even if one wants to argue that the popping in and out can give at least temporary particle positions, these would have to attain the 'equilibrium' distribution required for consistency with the Born Rule. It seems quite ad hoc and farfetched to assert that Bohmian corpuscles popping in and out of existence can never observably deviate from the 'equilibrium' distribution (since no Born Rule violations are ever seen in relevant experiments).

 

[Demystifier]

The problem w/ any relativistic Bohmian approach is that it cannot address states w uncertain particle number. I didn't find anything in the Nikolic refs that solves this problem.

I think you didn't read them carefully.

He talks briefly about coherent states in the 2nd one you listed, with an appeal to decoherence and then a claim that the Bohmian model somehow picks up where decoherence leaves off, without saying how this could work (at least I didn't find it).

I cited some standard decoherence papers where more details can be found.

For the case you are interested in a more detailed discussion of Bohmian mechanics with uncertain number of particles, please open a thread at the Quantum Physics forum.

 

[Ken G]

Your sentence 2 is BOTH empirically true and logically false! And therefore it is not well formed! (QED)
Therefore no paradox can be derived from sentence 1,or any other extended liar sentence.

You are basically saying that self-referential statements can lead to paradoxes so we should just exclude them from our lexicon. The problem with that argument is that Godel found a way to translate that sentence into an arithmetic expression, which is, by definition, well formed in arithmetic. The Godel theorem is considered a theorem that proves incompleteness of arithmetic under the two assumptions that arithmetic is consistent, and that all arithmetic expressions are well formed. It rests on the empirical truth of the Godel statement. If you say the Godel statement is not well formed, then you are dropping the second assumption but keeping the first. The violence to arithmetic is no less than if you had dropped the first and kept the second. That's the whole crux of Godel's argument-- we can easily knock self-referential statements out of our lexicon if we choose, but we can't knock arithmetic statements out of arithmetic, not unless we want to have to show that any arithmetic sentence we write is well formed before we can write it, because that just wouldn't be the syntax of arithmetic. The key point is, semantics and syntax don't mesh seamlessly, not even in arithmetic.

 

[Ken G]

This means (among other things) that not all English Statements are accepted by Logic.

Yes, that's what I meant by logic doesn't work on all statements we can make. As I said above, that doesn't defeat the Godel proof, because the Godel proof is a tautology involving the syntax of arithmetic. If we insert the semantic assumption that the syntax of arithmetic does not lead to semantic contradictions, then we get that the semantics of arithmetic is incomplete, i.e., does not completely follow from any finite set of axioms.

 

[Ken G]

It seems quite ad hoc and farfetched to assert that Bohmian corpuscles popping in and out of existence can never observably deviate from the 'equilibrium' distribution (since no Born Rule violations are ever seen in relevant experiments).

But is that really so ad hoc or farfetched? The key word there might be "observably." Take the principle of least action-- that is often interpreted as a kind of equilibrium principle, yet I'm not aware of observations of deviations from it, so are we not left with the choice of either imagining that the Feynman path integral is something real, or just a mathematical trick, at our liesure?

 

[sigurdW]

You are basically saying that self-referential statements can lead to paradoxes so we should just exclude them from our lexicon. The problem with that argument is that Godel found a way to translate that sentence into an arithmetic expression, which is, by definition, well formed in arithmetic. The Godel theorem is considered a theorem that proves incompleteness of arithmetic under the two assumptions that arithmetic is consistent, and that all arithmetic expressions are well formed. It rests on the empirical truth of the Godel statement. If you say the Godel statement is not well formed, then you are dropping the second assumption but keeping the first. The violence to arithmetic is no less than if you had dropped the first and kept the second. That's the whole crux of Godel's argument-- we can easily knock self-referential statements out of our lexicon if we choose, but we can't knock arithmetic statements out of arithmetic, not unless we want to have to show that any arithmetic sentence we write is well formed before we can write it, because that just wouldn't be the syntax of arithmetic. The key point is, semantics and syntax don't mesh seamlessly, not even in arithmetic.

No! The following is NOT what I am saying: "You are basically saying that self-referential statements can lead to paradoxes so we should just exclude them from our lexicon."

My thoughts are new to you, so you should read more carefully. Logic excludes some predicates for self referential use! Especially the predicate Goedel translates into an arithmetic allowing selfreference...
Thereby he makes the chosen arithmetic inconsistent!

Notice that he says: Either arithmetics is inconsistent or there are undecidable sentences.
Arithmetics gets inconsistent because the Extended Liar identity defining the Goedel sentence is both Empirically true and logically false!

So peano arithmetics gets inconsistent if a liar predicate is translated to it ...
Well that doesn't show the arithmetic in itself to be inconsistent so no harm is done, but since the extended liar identity is not wellformed then logic excludes it and the goedel sentence it defines!

Look at what you say:"If you say the Godel statement is not well formed"

It shows that you don't understand that it is the Liar Identity not the Liar Sentence that is not well formed!

When the Liar Identity is refused then the Liar Sentence it defines is no longer defined!
It is now only a sentence function until something tells us what is meant by its subject.

Look again at the basic definition:

y is a Liar Identity if and only if y is of the form: x = "x is not true",
and if y is true then x is a Liar Sentence defined by y.

So if y is not well formed then x is NOT a liar sentence defined by y.

What I am saying is NEW to everybody and it has far reaching consequences!
Why not try to understand what i AM saying and check my argument for the error
that must be in there somewhere if you are right and I am wrong?

 

[Ken G]

Thereby he makes the chosen arithmetic inconsistent![/U]

The translated arithmetic is just arithmetic, it can be no more or less inconsistent than arithmetic itself. It is an arithmetical statement that, if a proof could be found that the statement was true as an arithmetic statement, it would demonstrate conclusively and without doubt that arithmetic is inconsistent. Hence, if we assume arithmetic is not inconsistent, we must hold that no proof of that arithmetic statement is possible. That renders the statement empirically true when translated back to English. What all this proves is that it is impossible to make a seamless transition from the syntax of arithmetic to the semantics that we wish to associate with arithmetic to lift it out of the rules of pure logic and bring it into contact with the truths that actually make arithmetic useful and are why we teach it in school.

In other words, your method of removing the paradox does not remove the purpose of the Godel theorems. Arithmetic is still either incomplete or inconsistent whenever we attempt to marry syntax and semantics, which is the ultimate goal of arithmetic. It doesn't really matter if logic is saved or not, it is the purpose of logic that is under attack, and it seems to have no defense other than arithmetic serves its purpose and we can continue to assume it is consistent, even if it includes semantically true statements that are logically decidable. The alternative is that arithmetic is inconsistent (either because its axioms are or because logic isn't what it's cracked up to be), which seems far worse and we will never accept that unless we have to. Saving logic is a footnote to all that, it just rules out that last possibility in the parentheses.

It shows that you don't understand that it is the Liar Identity not the Liar Sentence that is not well formed!

Most people regard the Godel sentence as satisfying both roles at once-- it is a liar sentence, and by being a liar sentence, it is a liar identity, because it refers to itself. Your liar identity is nothing but the explicit recognition that the Godel sentence is self-referential, which most people take as implicit in the Godel sentence. I realize that you are being more careful to explicitly separate the sentence from its self-referential character, but everyone agrees that the self-referential character is the troublesome part, not the sentence itself.

It would be easy enough to rule out self-referential statements on the grounds that their self-referential character is not well posed, but the Godel proof circumvents that by translating the sentence into arithmetic, so it cannot be ruled out as an arithmetic statement. This shows that the problem appears when we attempt to attach semantic meaning to arithmetic statements, but that's the whole point of arithmetic, so the Godel proof is indeed a valid limitation on what we would like arithemetic to be. That limitation is normally expressed that we must regard arithmetic as incomplete, if we want it to be consistent, and if we want to attach semantic meaning to syntactic sentences.

When the Liar Identity is refused then the Liar Sentence it defines is no longer defined!
It is now only a sentence function until something tells us what is meant by its subject.

Sure, you recover a syntactic structure by disassociating it with any semantic content. But the issue behind the Godel proof, and paradoxes in general, is the effort to connect syntax with semantics. It is easy to prove that the syntax defines a consistent tautology, what is at issue is whether or not we encounter difficulties when attaching semantic meaning to the syntax. It was hoped we would not, Godel proved that we do. That is also the "point" of a true paradox, to expose the difficulties in attaching semantics to any sufficiently rich syntactic structure.

 

[sigurdW]

Hi Everybody!
I hope I am not interrupting anything by my postings. I am indirectly adressing the topic question!
It contains the concept: Existence.

And I pointed out that it can formulate a basic paradox: It IS not as this very sentence says.
I believe (among other things)that perhaps at bottom of things circular definitions should not always be avoided. That they can contribute to explanations... But vicious circularity leading to paradox must be avoided. I think it can only be done by SOLVING paradoxes, excluding them by forbidding self reference is a necessary evil as long as the solving is not done.

And I propose a... ahem...solution.

I speak about it with Ken G since I decided he is honestly
(but in my opinion somewhat slowly) searching for truth!
You are of course invited to participate at will ;)

 

[sigurdW]

Hi Ken G!

Your liar identity is nothing but the explicit recognition that the Godel sentence is self-referential, which most people take as implicit in the Godel sentence. I realize that you are being more careful to explicitly separate the sentence from its self-referential character, but everyone agrees that the self-referential character is the troublesome part, not the sentence itself.

Ill begin by an attempt to be funny:
Your use of " nothing but" is nothing but an attempt to evade the exact meaning of my statements!

Then I flatly deny that a finite sentence can be self referential all by itself!

Reality is complicated so some simplification/clarification/definition is needed:

Definition: Let x be any English sentence then x is self referential if and only if there is a predicate Z such that x = Zx.

If a sentence x is self referential then it is because of the FACT that x = Zx
and this fact cannot be found within the sentence unless its infinite x = ZZZZZZZZZZZ...x.

I call the fact: Referential identity. And some Referential identities are Liar identities!

Exactly those with Z = "is not true". Then I define "extended" Liar identities to be the cases where Z is synonymous
or enough related to "is not true". (Its a "working" definition to be replaced later)

The point here is that I believe that your concept "self-referential character" = "referential identity" !

I finish this introductory part with extending the concept of referential identity to include all sentences.
A "referential" identity is the identity (a=b) where a is the subject of the sentence Za and b is the object that a refers to.

Now a correspondence theory of truth comes natural and the self referential sentences constitute an interesting model where the referential identities are ordinary identities easy to inspect ;)

 

[rkastner]

Thank you DeMystifier. Unfortunately I do not have time to open a new thread but eagerly await a specific paper and reference in which you or someone else explains how the Bohmian model successfully deals with coherent states since I did not find it in your paper on relativistic Bohmian theory which is where the issue was raised. Feel free to send this to me privately if you wish, thanks, RK

 

[sigurdW]

Hi again!
I think we should seek out our common ground...That we are discussing Goedel is because you evaded my solution of the Liar Paradox. At a point when you were not sure I was serious, and not certain if you really should bother to understand in detail what I was saying :)

The translated arithmetic is just arithmetic, it can be no more or less inconsistent than arithmetic itself. It is an arithmetical statement that, if a proof could be found that the statement was true as an arithmetic statement, it would demonstrate conclusively and without doubt that arithmetic is inconsistent. Hence, if we assume arithmetic is not inconsistent, we must hold that no proof of that arithmetic statement is possible. That renders the statement empirically true when translated back to English. What all this proves is that it is impossible to make a seamless transition from the syntax of arithmetic to the semantics that we wish to associate with arithmetic to lift it out of the rules of pure logic and bring it into contact with the truths that actually make arithmetic useful and are why we teach it in school.

The Goedel statement is in a formal language, and if it really is there and its correct translation to english is a self referent sentence then there must somewhere be a referential identity defining the goedel sentence! And that Referential identity must be a Liar Identity, and therefore the rules of logic has been broken!

In other words, your method of removing the paradox

Hey! I like that: You are the first to admit that I have a method! But it SOLVES not "removes" the paradox.

In other words, your method of removing the paradox]does not remove the purpose of the Godel theorems. Arithmetic is still either incomplete or inconsistent whenever we attempt to marry syntax and semantics, which is the ultimate goal of arithmetic. It doesn't really matter if logic is saved or not, it is the purpose of logic that is under attack, and it seems to have no defense other than arithmetic serves its purpose and we can continue to assume it is consistent, even if it includes semantically true statements that are logically decidable.

Er... don't you mean UNdecidable?

The alternative is that arithmetic is inconsistent (either because its axioms are or because logic isn't what it's cracked up to be), which seems far worse and we will never accept that unless we have to. Saving logic is a footnote to all that, it just rules out that last possibility in the parentheses.Most people regard the Godel sentence as satisfying both roles at once-- it is a liar sentence, and by being a liar sentence, it is a liar identity, because it refers to itself. Your liar identity is nothing but the explicit recognition that the Godel sentence is self-referential, which most people take as implicit in the Godel sentence. I realize that you are being more careful to explicitly separate the sentence from its self-referential character, but everyone agrees that the self-referential character is the troublesome part, not the sentence itself.f.

This is not true! "by being a liar sentence, it is a liar identity, because it refers to itself."
No liar sentence is identical to its liar identity! And no liar sentence is defined unless its liar identity exists (and is true and well formed).

It would be easy enough to rule out self-referential statements on the grounds that their self-referential character is not well posed,

No I have shown that their self-referential character is well defined!

but the Godel proof circumvents that by translating the sentence into arithmetic, so it cannot be ruled out as an arithmetic statement.

This was not necessary...

This shows that the problem appears when we attempt to attach semantic meaning to arithmetic statements, but that's the whole point of arithmetic,

Here your statement has at least two interpretations...And next is your conclusion...Hmmm...And Again...Hmmmm!

so the Godel proof is indeed a valid limitation on what we would like arithemetic to be. That limitation is normally expressed that we must regard arithmetic as incomplete, if we want it to be consistent, and if we want to attach semantic meaning to syntactic sentences.

So I can't follow you here...I just declare that I oppose.

Sure, you recover a syntactic structure by disassociating it with any semantic content. But the issue behind the Godel proof, and paradoxes in general, is the effort to connect syntax with semantics. It is easy to prove that the syntax defines a consistent tautology, what is at issue is whether or not we encounter difficulties when attaching semantic meaning to the syntax. It was hoped we would not, Godel proved that we do. That is also the "point" of a true paradox, to expose the difficulties in attaching semantics to any sufficiently rich syntactic structure.

And the same here...Sigh... it was interesting!

Hopefully you will gather your forces so I can attack! You are defending Goedel and I am after his scalp ;)
Meanwhile I suggest we seek out common ground, or at least a well defined battleground...
Alfred Tarski for instance: He said that natural languages (and all semantically closed languages) are inconsistent because the Liar Paradox can be derived in them, And I oppose! No Liar Paradox can be derived in natural language without breaking the rules of Logic!

Heres my proof again:

Proof (Based on: (a=b) implies (Ta<-->Tb) )

1. Suppose x="x is not true" (assumption)

2. Then x is true if and only if "x is not true" is true (from 1)

3. And we get: x is true if and only if x is not true (from 2)

4. Sentence 3 contradicts the assumption. (QED)

How can the proof be contradicted? By denying the step from 1 to 2?

That is costly! But in case somebody tries...I will provide an independent proof:

First by the Law of Identity:
1 x = x

Next by Double negation of 1:
2 it is not the case that x = "x is not true"

So is it agreed then, that all Liar Identities are logically false!?

And that no contradiction can be correctly derived from:

1 Sentence 1 is not true. (Liar Sentence)
2 Sentence 1 = "Sentence 1 is not true." (Liar Identity)

Meaning no Liar Paradox can be derived with valid means in Natural Language?

Goodby Liar Sentences! Goodby Liar Paradox!

 

[apeiron]

This is a valid question, and a long thread, so I don't know if it was taken up. But I think it's fair to include, with the question "why does anything exist?", the question "why ask why in the first place?"

It is a key question because it gets us to our epistemological limits - or rather the limits of a certain epistemology!

This may be why people get uncomfortable. They feel secure in having a method of accounting for the world. Then they discover it suddenly runs out of road. The choice then is either to honestly question their prior beliefs or to declare any further explorations as "unanswerable questions" or "abstract nonsense".

This is what you so clearly state about syntactic paradoxes. You have a universal method for making well-formed statements. And suddenly there is a crisis because - as with the liar paradox - it hits a limit.

And also in the other off-thread conversation about Bohmian interpretations. Again there is a belief in a method of explanation that hits a limit (and Bohmian mechanics is where people just keep digging anyway).

So there are these well-accepted foundational crises in Godelian incompleteness and Quantum weirdness. And I should mention here the Hard Problem which is taken as the foundational crisis of mind science. Yet for some reason the "why anything" question is being treated by some here as not also a standard foundational crisis.

What the "why anything" question in particular draws attention to is the incompleteness of models of causality based on effective cause - the idea that every event is the result of a chain of events. In physics, this "syntax" gives us the various mechanics, the various models founded on the principle of locality. All useful models, but all limited by the ultimate restrictions of their syntax and unable to talk about the larger semantics that so clearly embeds them.

So when confronted by the "why anything?" paradox, there are two lessons.

The first is the discovery that a familiar epistemology does indeed have hard limits. For it, some questions don't even compute. It finds itself making nonsensical statements about "nothing existing" - well-formed statements, but clearly detached from any proper semantic grounding.

The second lesson ought to be that causality is larger than people stuck within a certain paradigm may have believed it to be. And so the correct response is to explore those larger models, hoping to find the syntax that can unlock that semantics. Is there a better way to talk about reality which brings the two parts of the epistemological method - models and their measurements, ideas and their impressions, syntax and their semantics - back into an orderly relationship?

But it still is a curious situation. Why does the "why anything?" question provoke hostility to a much greater degree than Godelian incompleteness or Quantum weirdness.

I suppose with Godel, people might take comfort in the fact it proves we are smarter than our logics (Penrose's position for example). And maths could carry on producing more maths regardless. It was seen as a problem about where maths came from rather than where it was going.

With Quantum weirdness, many people perhaps are comforted by the feeling that eventually it will get explained away. They will be able to make a locality-preserving explanation stick. They will be able to break through the Planck-scale and unify QFT and GR. Although also there is the counter-fact that QM is just so concretely successful as a model. It actually can be used for making technology. So all the metaphysical challenges can be shoved aside, as in the Copenhagen interpretation, and the method simply employed - a case of using the syntax without worrying about the embedding semantics. Although, as has been mentioned, logical positivism or scientific pragmatism is still a definite philolosophy.

But the "why anything" question gets people's goats. Maybe this is because it seems quasi-religious - it was a reason that gods and other kinds of prime movers were invented. Yet actually even a cursory examination of the question shows that god-style explanations fail as just another variant of effective cause reasoning.

So maybe its time has not properly come? Cosmology is quite a new science really. People are still working through the motions of trying to conjure something out of nothingness, as with the tunnelling out of a quantum vacuum. They are still hoping to demonstrate reality as a necessary mathematical fact, as with string theory, or alternatively, reduce it to some ultimate mathematical contingency, as with Tegmark's multiverse.

Science looks busy in this area. And so there is hope. And when the foundational crisis - the lack of semantic content in apparently well-formed statements like "nothing exists" - is pointed out, the response switches to "oh well, limits are limits, whereof what we cannot speak, thereof we should remain silent, etc." Shush child, don't mention the emperor forgot his pants.

 

[Ken G]

Alfred Tarski for instance: He said that natural languages (and all semantically closed languages) are inconsistent because the Liar Paradox can be derived in them, And I oppose! No Liar Paradox can be derived in natural language without breaking the rules of Logic!

But those two things are saying the same thing: a language is not consistent with logic because it allows a liar sentence to be constructed. The liar sentence is self-referential, which breaks the rules of logic. You claim that a language cannot break the rule of logic because the liar sentence is not self-referential. But it clearly is self-referential, and this has nothing at all to do with logic, it has to do with meaning. The goal of language is to infuse syntax with meaning, so for language to succeed, logic must fail, or vice versa. That's all Tarski is saying as well, you are not disagreeing-- you are merely choosing a different side in the conflict (logic over meaning), but it is the existence of the conflict that is relevant, not which side we choose.

 

[sigurdW]

Hi apeiron!

It is a key question because it gets us to our epistemological limits - or rather the limits of a certain epistemology!

I can accept this as a thesis,but its not very supported.

This may be why people get uncomfortable. They feel secure in having a method of accounting for the world. Then they discover it suddenly runs out of road. The choice then is either to honestly question their prior beliefs or to declare any further explorations as "unanswerable questions" or "abstract nonsense".

This is what you so clearly state about syntactic paradoxes. You have a universal method for making well-formed statements. And suddenly there is a crisis because - as with the liar paradox - it hits a limit.

Ahem...I thought it was sentences supposed to express statements that could be or not be well formed?

And also in the other off-thread conversation about Bohmian interpretations. Again there is a belief in a method of explanation that hits a limit (and Bohmian mechanics is where people just keep digging anyway).

And what is an "off-thread conversation?

So there are these well-accepted foundational crises in Godelian incompleteness and Quantum weirdness. And I should mention here the Hard Problem which is taken as the foundational crisis of mind science. Yet for some reason the "why anything" question is being treated by some here as not also a standard foundational crisis.

Why "crisis", isn't "problem" enough?

What the "why anything" question in particular draws attention to is the incompleteness of models of causality based on effective cause - the idea that every event is the result of a chain of events. In physics, this "syntax" gives us the various mechanics, the various models founded on the principle of locality. All useful models, but all limited by the ultimate restrictions of their syntax and unable to talk about the larger semantics that so clearly embeds them.

Sorry but "clearly" youre unclear.

So when confronted by the "why anything?" paradox, there are two lessons.

The first is the discovery that a familiar epistemology does indeed have hard limits. For it, some questions don't even compute. It finds itself making nonsensical statements about "nothing existing" - well-formed statements, but clearly detached from any proper semantic grounding.

I think your tecnique can be improved, why not try giving some examples now and then?

The second lesson ought to be that causality is larger than people stuck within a certain paradigm may have believed it to be. And so the correct response is to explore those larger models, hoping to find the syntax that can unlock that semantics. Is there a better way to talk about reality which brings the two parts of the epistemological method - models and their measurements, ideas and their impressions, syntax and their semantics - back into an orderly relationship?

I wait eagerly for your results in exploring

But it still is a curious situation. Why does the "why anything?" question provoke hostility to a much greater degree than Godelian incompleteness or Quantum weirdness.

I suppose with Godel, people might take comfort in the fact it proves we are smarter than our logics (Penrose's position for example).

Nope. No fact! Goedel did prove a conjunction... an either or statement.

And maths could carry on producing more maths regardless.

First time we agree.

It was seen as a problem about where maths came from rather than where it was going.

With Quantum weirdness, many people perhaps are comforted by the feeling that eventually it will get explained away. They will be able to make a locality-preserving explanation stick. They will be able to break through the Planck-scale and unify QFT and GR. Although also there is the counter-fact that QM is just so concretely successful as a model. It actually can be used for making technology. So all the metaphysical challenges can be shoved aside, as in the Copenhagen interpretation, and the method simply employed - a case of using the syntax without worrying about the embedding semantics. Although, as has been mentioned, logical positivism or scientific pragmatism is still a definite philolosophy.

Lol!

But the "why anything" question gets people's goats. Maybe this is because it seems quasi-religious - it was a reason that gods and other kinds of prime movers were invented. Yet actually even a cursory examination of the question shows that god-style explanations fail as just another variant of effective cause reasoning.

So maybe its time has not properly come? Cosmology is quite a new science really. People are still working through the motions of trying to conjure something out of nothingness, as with the tunnelling out of a quantum vacuum. They are still hoping to demonstrate reality as a necessary mathematical fact, as with string theory, or alternatively, reduce it to some ultimate mathematical contingency, as with Tegmark's multiverse.

Anybodys guess?

Science looks busy in this area. And so there is hope. And when the foundational crisis - the lack of semantic content in apparently well-formed statements like "nothing exists" - is pointed out, the response switches to "oh well, limits are limits, whereof what we cannot speak, thereof we should remain silent, etc." Shush child, don't mention the emperor forgot his pants.

I would like to know what you mean by: the lack of semantic content in apparently well-formed statements like "nothing exists"

To sum up: What are you saying and why are you saying it?