Ultimate question: Why anything at all?

[Deveno]

as a direct consequence of reading this thread, i started looking about for related stuff, which lead me to various places.

one of those places was the introduction to a book called "The Master and his Emissary." while i have not read it in depth, it occurs to me that there is a partial answer of sorts to bohm2's pessimism, which is:

only half of our brain is concerned with the "dissection" of reality into a self-consistent model. the other half sees things on a more holistic level, is perfectly happy with ambiguity, and non-linguistic apprehension. the resolution of reality into its constituent parts, can only take us so far, either our devices cannot extend our senses far enough, or our ability to logically deconstruct can only produce models which "make sense" to us. the nature of the beast is probably beyond such a reductionist approach, but that doesn't leave us with nothing. we have our intuitions, and our imaginations with which to transcend such limitations.

if i understand the implications of this (and perhaps i do not), it means that we have an entire set of separate tools with which to select the theories our analysis devises. we can leverage our innate "dualness" to our advantage. one sees this in the joy of discovery the experimentalist makes: his mind conjures up a possible reality, and his experience either validates this, or invalidates this. we can "dissassociate" but we can also "connect", and the very nature we have allows us to do either/or.

it may be that we never know exactly "why" we are here. but i believe we may yet gain some insight into "how". and this, in itself, will be a satisfaction of sorts, because we know how deeply interrelated form and function are.

there is good reason, given how fruitful it has been, to regard the "inside" and "outside" of "us" as distinct, it gives us a flexibility in reacting to our world that many creatures simply do not have. but i feel we should not forget, that in many ways, this is our own construct, a way we seek to understand, and as such, is somewhat less than the totality of what is actually transpiring. we are the observed, as well as the observers, such a distinction is (for lack of a better word) theoretical.

apeiron's conception of "the vague" sounds very reminiscent to me of the zen concept of the void: it is not something, it is not nothing, everything exists "in" it, but not like the wall i frequently bang my head against. it is what you get when you lose the quality of distinction, which (the act of distinguishing is what i am referring to) creates (amongst other things) dualities, logical structures, and (more pertinently for us) the sense of identity.

i consider it likely that this "vague" is, and always has been with us, that time itself, is a kind of "something" like space and sub-atomic particles are. mathematically, it's sort of like the null set: the null set doesn't have any members (so it's unique), but on the other hand, has every single property and quality that anything can possibly have. the only thing you need to get from the null set to something that has some definite quality is..."not". you draw a line, a boundary, and then you have opposition. you divide an indivisible whole, and then many things are possible. as soon as we put a bracket around the null set, like so:

{Ø}, then boom! out comes most of mathematics. if the universe (multi-verse) is indeed some sort of structure which has discernable underlying principles (a view espoused by max tegmark, for example, but which certainly has its detractors), then this is all you need to "explain" all this stuff going on around us. one tiny pair of brackets. one slash. and then there was two.

and such an event(?) could certainly rapidly seek to organize itself, as a dynamical system. sort of like a match burning, drawing on context (available energy) until its all used up (heat death). if this is true (and who knows, i could be very wrong), and humanity survives long enough, we will probably witness some fantastic acts of creation going on in the galaxies around us. should be quite a show.

 

[apeiron]

apeiron's conception of "the vague" sounds very reminiscent to me of the zen concept of the void: it is not something, it is not nothing, everything exists "in" it, but not like the wall i frequently bang my head against. it is what you get when you lose the quality of distinction, which (the act of distinguishing is what i am referring to) creates (amongst other things) dualities, logical structures, and (more pertinently for us) the sense of identity.

All early attempts at metaphysics started with the idea of the vague forming itself dichotomously to become the crisply something. So you find it in both East and West thought circa 6th century BC. It is there in the I Ching, Taoism and Buddhism (dependent co-arising). Zen is a later echo.

To the first thinkers, this was the obvious way realities develop. But it was the Christian tradition in particular that invented the idea of "something from nothing", creation ab initio. And then modern science got going with the rediscovery of atomist philosophy - a doctrine also dependent on the idea of nothingness, of a true void.

We can say that the original conception of nature was organic - realities developed from vague states of potential by a dichotomous separation into complementary definite things. And the modern conception is mechanical - realities are manufacture by construction, the lumping of parts into arrangements that make functional wholes.

It is this mechanical view that McGilchrist bemoans as "left brain thinking".

And he is sort of right. The brain itself has an organic logic. Relax your mind (as in meditation) and it goes vague. It is not a nothingness but a state of humming potential. Then use your mind and it becomes brightly about something when it separates experience into figure and ground, event and context. There is the something we are definitely attending, and the penumbra of all that situates it, gives it meaning - because it has with equal definiteness been suppressed.

And this dichotomous style of processing is basic to brain architecture. The left/right divide is just one of them.

So material reality, our minds, and our logic, can all work the same way - organically. But the Western tradition has chosen a mechanical conception of all three instead. It kind of works. It is certainly simpler. But ultimately it is a frustrating and limiting view of life - McGilchrist's argument.

 

[bohm2]

I don't think the concept of "vagueness" really helps. It seems one could still ask "Why vagueness rather than nothing"?

 

[apeiron]

I don't think the concept of "vagueness" really helps. It seems one could still ask "Why vagueness rather than nothing"?

Again, we know there is a something - our reality - and so that is a strong constraint on any speculation. Whatever gave rise to our somethingness, or stands in some other way as its contextual other, has to be able to satisfy this constraint.

Somethingness has no coherent connection to nothingness. Well, you can subtract away a lot of things, but you are still going to be left with something (the world that has been made empty). And you can't do any better trying to come the other way either - imagining a nothingness suddenly bursting forth with a somethingness (even a QM fluctuation needs to take place in something).

Vagueness on the other hand has a natural connection to the crisp. As things become less crisply developed, they become more vague. And out of a vague potential, something could always crisply develop.

So two ontologies. Only one of which can carry the causal relationship which we seek, already knowing that something does indeed exist.

Perhaps it is not an ultimate answer. There still seems to be the possible question of why anything - even a vagueness? But then can we really wish away naked possibility, the "existence" of raw potential, in the final analysis? Is it not in fact the limit on not existing? If there is nothing else, there is still always possibility.

So the fact that things exist, logically implies that things were always possible. It also logically implies that things were never impossible.

So we can say a generalised state of possibility must have existed. And a generalised state of impossibility - an actual state of nothingness - cannot exist.

Then vagueness is our label for that generalised state of possibility. We no longer have to worry about nothingness as a rival ontic primitive.

Impossibilities - the definite absence of things - can only arise as a later development, the emergence of crisp constraints on what is otherwise rawly possible.

 

[Albuquerque]

I believe your last approach clarify´s the problem in a more tangible way regarding what you meant with vagueness...

My perspective upon the very meaning on a why, concerning any matter to which we can remark a final why, brings me to think that absolute why´s never ask what they seam to ask...they are a projection ad infinitum towards complexity but not a projection to a final justification, as a final justification cannot itself be justified...
Thus asking for the purpose of a spatio temporal process where time itself cannot come out of nothingness once time is the justification on any transition renders the question invalid of any meaning...
In that light my best answer to a final Why it is very simply a just Because...and Reality as the LAW ends up being very much about that...it strikes me as the profound meaning of Truth itself...That, which is the case, and that cannot be put into question.

 

[bohm2]

Thus asking for the purpose of a spatio temporal process where time itself cannot come out of nothingness once time is the justification on any transition renders the question invalid of any meaning...

Some physicists have argued that entaglement, non-locality, etc. may be interpreted in this way. Gisin argues:

Yet, amazingly, quantum physics predicts entirely different kinds of correlations, called non-local correlations for reasons described below. Physics has a word for the cause of these non-local correlations: entanglement. But physics offers no story in space and time to explain or describe how these correlations happen. Hence, somehow, nonlocal correlations emerge from outside space-time (for an explanation of this provocative terminology see appendix A).

From Appendix A:

What could it mean that nonlocal correlations emerge from outside space-time?

Who has ever started a physics course with equation and not with a story? Clearly, in physics we need stories as much as equations. For this purpose we have a catalogue of possible tools to tell our stories. Until recently, all stories took place in space-time. But, this story-toolbox evolves as our theories evolve in parallel with our mathematics toolbox; see for example the tools used today to talk about the deformation of space-time in general relativity. However, as we have seen in section II no story in space-time can describe nonlocal correlations: we have no tool in our story-toolbox to talk about nonlocal correlations. Hence, we usually say things like "event A influences event B", or "event A has a spooky action at a distance on event B" or "event A causes a collapse of the wave-function at location B". But we know that this is all wrong: there is no time ordering between the events A and B; hence no story in time is appropriate. Moreover, the distance between A and B is irrelevant; hence the distance should not occur in our story. The usual reaction to this situation is to give up the search for any story, i.e. in some sense to give up the very possibility to make sense of nonlocal correlations, i.e. to understand them. Some physicists simply claim that the maths are too complicated, hence we can't complement the equations by good stories. But we have seen that the maths are trivial: this can't be an excuse to give up! Admittedly we need to enlarge our story-toolbox. A difficulty is that the new tool must include some strange features that can't be described within space-time.

Are There Quantum Effects Coming from Outside Space-time? Nonlocality, free will and "no many-worlds"
http://lanl.arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1011/1011.3440v1.pdf

Video summary (this French guy has a really good sense of humour):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9WnV7zUR9UA

But I'm not sure if this non-locality and its implications really solves anything with respect to this question of "Why something rather than nothing". Even a purely Tegmarkian position (Platonic view) that stuff like mathematical objects are "real" (even though they don't exist in space-time) and are necessarily true and that's what our science is actually discovering, seems incapable of solving this problem, I think?

 

[Albuquerque]

Even if true, I don´t think our "angular" description of reality is exclusive once what reality objectively refers to in the first place is to the very relation itself between subject and object, observer and observed, and not to the thing "per si", which on its own is not only devoid of any potential but equally devoid of any justification and meaning...that said my position is no more in favour of "minds" as complex (maybe complicated) observers then it is on atoms as more linear "observers", as interacting agents, who process information around them on their own particular and limited way, say through electromagnetism and so on...as I see it to "observe" stands for getting affected by something more then "aware" of something which strikes me as a very obscure term...in resume, as long as I keep believing in causality for all its convenience, I am not particularly inclined to make minds a special and unique miraculous form of relation, although I believe its entertaining to have one...
Being is not about observers about time or about Why, and thus not even about reason...if anything, LAW which is the expression of Being, is the very prime condition of what "reason" stands for in its being there...Why ? Because !

 

[bohm2]

Now, I'm confused as I always thought that with respect to the ontolgy of space-time there were only two options:

1. Relationist: space and time could not exist without matter.
2. Dualist substantivalist ("container/bucket"): spacetime is the container/bucket and material objects are the contained (objects in the container).

With (1), if you remove matter there's "nothing" left. With (2), if you remove the objects the bucket/container/empty set still remains. But apparently there's a third option:

3. Monist substantivalist: There is no need for the dualism of the container and the contained (or for fundamental containment relations):

Spacetime is substance enough. There is no need for the dualism of the containe(r?) and the contained (or for fundamental containment relations). When God makes the world, she need only create spacetime. Then she can pin the fundamental properties directly to spacetime.

Spacetime the one substance
http://www.jonathanschaffer.org/spacetime.pdf

So I'm guessing that in this third ontology, if one removes that "one" stuff, nothing should remain? But what about stuff that may not be described as propagating in space-time like quantum correlations? Gisin has argued that:

quantum correlations somehow arise from outside spacetime, in the sense that no story in space and time can describe how they occur.

Quantum nonlocality based on finite-speed causal influences leads to superluminal signaling
http://lanl.arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1110/1110.3795v1.pdf

Are There Quantum Effects Coming from Outside Space-time? Nonlocality, free will and "no many-worlds"
http://lanl.arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1011/1011.3440v1.pdf

I mean, if stuff like these quantum correlations defy spatio-temporal descriptions, it seems that all 3 views are somehow flawed? Although I'm guessing the relationist view would still be safe?

 

[Maui]

Now, I'm confused as I always thought that with respect to the ontolgy of space-time there were only two options:

1. Relationist: space and time could not exist without matter.
2. Dualist substantivalist ("container/bucket"): spacetime is the container/bucket and material objects are the contained (objects in the container).

With (1), if you remove matter there's "nothing" left. With (2), if you remove the objects the bucket/container/empty set still remains. But apparently there's a third option:

3. Monist substantivalist: There is no need for the dualism of the container and the contained (or for fundamental containment relations):



Spacetime the one substance
http://www.jonathanschaffer.org/spacetime.pdf

So I'm guessing that in this third ontology, if one removes that "one" stuff, nothing should remain? But what about stuff that may not be described as propagating in space-time like quantum correlations? Gisin has argued that:



Quantum nonlocality based on finite-speed causal influences leads to superluminal signaling
http://lanl.arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1110/1110.3795v1.pdf

Are There Quantum Effects Coming from Outside Space-time? Nonlocality, free will and "no many-worlds"
http://lanl.arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1011/1011.3440v1.pdf

I mean, if stuff like these quantum correlations defy spatio-temporal descriptions, it seems that all 3 views are somehow flawed? Although I'm guessing the relationist view would still be safe?

Classical concepts like matter, space and time are linked together by motion. DO you understand what motion is? I don't. I don't think anybody does(i haven't seen anyone who does and certainly haven't seen anyone who understands quantum motion). We have a description, classical in nature that is deeply flawed. It implies that objects cease to exist at point X and reappear at Y a moment later. A quantum description would imply that we don't know what happens to object when in transition from X to Y, or if it moved at all. It would appear to require a measurement(a specific conscious inquiry), thus a strong point can be made for Wheeler's participatory universe, which imo is a better and more consistent ontology than the ones you listed.

 

[apeiron]

So I'm guessing that in this third ontology, if one removes that "one" stuff, nothing should remain?

To motivate his arguments, Schaffer presumes substance as irreducible, fundamental, non-derivative, etc. So already many other possible ontologies are ruled out. He then is examining whether substantivism itself is monistic or dual.

In the context of the "why anything" question, Schaffer would still face the challenge of why substance and not an absence of substance.

A broader view of possible ontologies would be this...

http://www.wylieb.com/Philosophy/Teaching/ActualTeaching/PHIL2109/Metaphysics10.htm

Is there such a thing as space? If so, what kind of thing is it?...Here are two views:

A bottom-up view. Space is composed from its points, much as a record collection is composed from its records...

A top-down view. The parts of space are ontologically dependent on space itself, just like...

And I would then add the third ontic possibility of holism - space is a result of the hierarchical interaction of these two directions of causality, of local construction and global constraint.

With the further developmental ontology that adds then a notion of time, the gradient of change made available as the vague becomes crisp.

So broadly speaking, I would agree with Schaffer that fundamentally all would be one, and duality would arise out of this. But the fundamental is not the one-ness of substance but the one-ness of naked potentiality.

I mean, if stuff like these quantum correlations defy spatio-temporal descriptions, it seems that all 3 views are somehow flawed? Although I'm guessing the relationist view would still be safe?

So QM is incompatible with substantivism? Yes, it is amusing Schaffer employs QFT to argue for monistic substance, yet fails to mention the little issue of non-locality. Locality is of course built into the substance view axiomatically.

The relational view, by constrast, is based on an ontology of form, or global, downward acting, constraints. And clearly, non-locality fits quite nicely with the idea of global constraints.

But again, a complete view would have to marry both aspects of causality, the substantial and the formal. It is not a case of either/or, but the interactionist story of both. Then to unite these two things under one monism, we have to step back to somewhere. So both must emerge from something like raw potential via a process of mutal development.

 

[bohm2]

Then to unite these two things under one monism, we have to step back to somewhere. So both must emerge from something like raw potential via a process of mutal development.

I agree. I'm not sure what to call it though but it seems to have some properties similar to the same "stuff" that gave birth to our universe, in that it defies spatio-temporal explanation. I mean there must be some remnant of this pre big-bang stuff somewhere? Maybe it's this quantum correlations that seem to defy space-time descriptions? I've always felt the same about our mental/phenomenal stuff/qualia (as per McGinn's argument) but I'm sure I will be accused of being a mystic and I really hate being associated with anything like that. I still like Kastner's paper I posted previously. I just realized he's posted on this forum and I didn't even know about it until today. Interestingly, Schaffer does try to bring forth a complete monist model in a later paper:

Monism: The Priority of the Whole
http://www.jonathanschaffer.org/monism.pdf

I'm actually sympathetic to his "priority monist" view. It seems more reasonable than "existence monism" and also more in line with relationism than substantivalist ontology but maybe I'm confused. I'm guessing you would argue that neither has priority and both the macro and micro should be equal?

 

[apeiron]

Interestingly, Schaffer does try to bring forth a complete monist model in a later paper:

Yes, and note how Schaffer again waves away the issue of possiblia. So this is not a "complete" approach, or only complete within a carefully chosen reference frame that is based on the crisply existing and excludes the vaguely possible.

In particular I will assume that there is a world and that it has proper
parts. More precisely, I assume that there is a maximal actual concrete
object—the cosmos—of which all actual concrete objects are parts. I should
stress that I am only concerned with actual concrete objects. Possibilia,
abstracta, and actual concreta in categories other than object are not my
concern...

I'm guessing you would argue that neither has priority and both the macro and micro should be equal?

Yes. At least neither would have causal priority, even though one might be granted temporal or developmental priority.

Among philosophers who take vagueness/potential seriously, like Anaximander, Aristotle and Peirce, you do have something perhaps coming first - some kind of "substantial" act, a spontaneous fluctuation, that gets things going. And then after this comes the revealed possibility of substantial action being met by the countering force of emergent constraints.

With Peirce, this is his doctrine of firstness, secondness and thirdness - the spontaneous acts, the possibility thence of dyadic interactions, followed by the "taking of habits" or regularisation of physical laws, which is the emergence of form/constraints.

But while a temporal progression can be projected on to the issue of development, at the level of causality, neither the local nor the global would be prior, in the sense of being more important, more fundamental, carrying more weight in the scheme of things.

 

[Albuquerque]

...how come speaking on potential can be related with not having constrains ? How come increasing the spectrum from set to power set is said to be related with vagueness ? Either there is causality in place and mechanic relation from the beginning or the whole foundation goes down the drain as magic, no matter what direction you choose to approach the problem be it holistic or not...
...as for time, one can easily extend the concept from the "classical" relativist perspective of space time and apply it to any kind of change process who proves to be more fundamental...motion does n´t appeal to me either, but such is beside the point of what time ends up standing for in practical terms which again is change...one must be careful on how one stacks words together or we end up creating words to address the same phenomena needlessly...as I see it time cannot be removed out of the equation nor some sort of meta space call it what you will...there must exist an axis of order for whatever meta substance there is with a simple rule as simple as present not present relating the discrete bits of such axis...("not present" would stand for null rather then absent...meaning null as being countered by an opposite direction of a mirrored nature or something similar...absence is more a matter of ilusion then a matter of fact the way I see it...)

 

[Albuquerque]

If you find the time and the appeal, I would like you to clarify as most as possible your notion of "vagueness" as I may be missing some fundamental idea in your view which would be unfortunate...maybe you could start by defining some model for freedom at large...my dull imagination cannot wrap my head around any concept of pure freedom no matter how much I try...in that sense your wise input would be greatly appreciated !

 

[apeiron]

If you find the time and the appeal, I would like you to clarify as most as possible your notion of "vagueness"...

I collected some grounding ideas and literature references in this thread...

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=301514

 

[Maui]

I agree. I'm not sure what to call it though but it seems to have some properties similar to the same "stuff" that gave birth to our universe, in that it defies spatio-temporal explanation.

Space, matter(chairs, cars, etc.), time and motion are classical concepts, they are derivative(and secondary) and comprized of the momentary excitation of the respective field(this - the field ontology - is by far the single and only ontology that stands all evidence thrown at it). There is no other ontology and there are no particles('particles' are the classical momentary state of the field - sorry, language fails me here). Matter is a state of the field, why reality is like that, would be a very good question for philosophers to answer. Perhaps fields have a mind of their own(joking ).

If quantum mechanics hasn't profoundly shocked you, you haven't understood it yet - N. Bohr

 

[apeiron]

Matter is a state of the field, why reality is like that, would be a very good question for philosophers to answer.

Fields are just another modelling concept. They have the advantage in that they are both local and global, so do offer a holistic approach.

A field can define a space by filling it, while locally specifying its material content. Local particles can be described as excitations and so given a contextual definition. Etc.

So if reality is holistic and systematic in its causality, we should expect a field ontology to be good at capturing that essential local~global organisation.

Of course, like any analogy, there are then shortcomings. Fields have no memory, no persistence. All is flux. So it is hard to represent history or gradients.

So classical wave mechanics has been a useful mental concept for modelling material reality. But note that soliton modelling and superconductor modelling from condensed matter physics are now also common mental concepts being employed in fundamental physics, along with network theory (as in loop quantum gravity).

And also, the essence of a "field" in any of these descriptions is that it preserves locality. Whereas QM creates a problem in that regard.

 

[Maui]

Fields are just another modelling concept. They have the advantage in that they are both local and global, so do offer a holistic approach.

They are the only consistent model of reality there is.

A field can define a space by filling it, while locally specifying its material content. Local particles can be described as excitations and so given a contextual definition. Etc.

No, a field doesn't fill space, space is relative and e.g. the gravitational field defines space-time as per GR. Fields define and make up spacetime

So if reality is holistic and systematic in its causality, we should expect a field ontology to be good at capturing that essential local~global organisation.

My long standing gripe with causality has always been that it's a secondary(derivative) concept(like matter, space and time). You are looking for the organizing principles where they don't exist.

Of course, like any analogy, there are then shortcomings. Fields have no memory, no persistence. All is flux. So it is hard to represent history or gradients.

Memory is a secondary, emergent concept as well(a property of the field?). Classical realism of objects as a fundamental characteristic of reality has been dead for a while.

And also, the essence of a "field" in any of these descriptions is that it preserves locality. Whereas QM creates a problem in that regard.

QFT doesn't pressupose realism, so no problem in that respect with QM.

 

[apeiron]

Classical wave mechanics had some success in mimicing reality. But it's still a spectacular failure at high speeds, energies and small scales. Philosophically, it's dead.

QFT doesn't pressupose realism, so no problem in that respect with QM.

But what is a "relativistic quantum field" then? We have various formal descriptions for making calculations, but no single mental image of what we are talking about.

If you are talking classically, then you can claim that particles are just local excitations. But what you are talking about with QFT is precisely what people complain they cannot imagine in terms of "just waves", or "just particles" either.

So your use of the word "field" here is a placeholder for that hoped-for deeper appreciation of what may be the ontological reality. And as such, it does not actually rule out a more particle-based approach as you want to claim.

For example this is a good discussion of the problems for both camps: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quantum-field-theory/#Ont

Many of the creators of QFT can be found in one of the two camps regarding the question whether particles or fields should be given priority in understanding QFT. While Dirac, the later Heisenberg, Feynman, and Wheeler opted in favor of particles, Pauli, the early Heisenberg, Tomonaga and Schwinger put fields first (see Landsman 1996). Today, there are a number of arguments which prepare the ground for a proper discussion beyond mere preferences...

So even quantum field theory is not with any certainty a "field theory".

And then there is the issue of what a quantum gravity theory would be. Would it look even less like a classical notion of a field (as with a spin foam, or a string condensate, or whatever)?

So OK, you can call the ultimate concept of reality "a field". But how are you actually now defining a field? What does the word mean concretely here?

If we cannot spell this out, then the concept is simply a placeholder and carries no ontological weight. It becomes another way of saying "we don't know". Or perhaps, we don't know, but we are sure it means particles are not real, locality isn't fundamental, etc.

 

[Maui]

But what is a "relativistic quantum field" then? We have various formal descriptions for making calculations, but no single mental image of what we are talking about.

If we leave physics and return to philosophy - fields would be the Ultimate Reality as far as we know(and probably can know). That which exists and is real in the sense that it's the substrate of being.

If you are talking classically, then you can claim that particles are just local excitations. But what you are talking about with QFT is precisely what people complain they cannot imagine in terms of "just waves", or "just particles" either.

So your use of the word "field" here is a placeholder for that hoped-for deeper appreciation of what may be the ontological reality. And as such, it does not actually rule out a more particle-based approach as you want to claim.

For example this is a good discussion of the problems for both camps: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quantum-field-theory/#Ont

That is a good article and it very well portraits why a particle explnation of QFT is untenable.

And then there is the issue of what a quantum gravity theory would be. Would it look even less like a classical notion of a field (as with a spin foam, or a string condensate, or whatever)?

To my knowledge - all appraoches of QG involve a variant of emergence/symmetry breaking.

So OK, you can call the ultimate concept of reality "a field". But how are you actually now defining a field? What does the word mean concretely here?

If we cannot spell this out, then the concept is simply a placeholder and carries no ontological weight. It becomes another way of saying "we don't know". Or perhaps, we don't know, but we are sure it means particles are not real, locality isn't fundamental, etc.

I won't let you push me off the cliff on this (there's literature about Wheeler's beliefs, Bohm's beliefs, etc. on this issue in particular, they wrote extensively and would be more appropriate for a forum with more relaxed rules, i'd rather keep my points at their maximum). Otherwise, the field ontology is the triumph of human thought over reality(don\t ask if they are different, i don't know)

 

[apeiron]

If we leave physics and return to philosophy - fields would be the Ultimate Reality as far as we know(and probably can know). That which exists and is real in the sense that it's the substrate of being.

My argument here is that when examined closely, the notion of a "field" has long become a notion about a simple potential - ie: a vagueness.

The substrate of being now has properties such as "infinite degrees of freedom", which then get "collapsed" due to the emergence of global constraints.

To my knowledge - all appraoches of QG involve a variant of emergence/symmetry breaking.

Precisely. They presume a fundamental unoriented potential, a vagueness, and then the actual world emerges via symmetry breaking.

So this is no longer a "field" concept, because fields are what emerge. But an unlimited potential of infinite dimensions is perhaps a little "field-like" when we try to imagine it. It is an uber-field possibly.

But by definition, a vagueness lacks locality and other definite features. These actual properties of fields have to emerge via development, or symmetry breaking.

 

[bohm2]

I think a lot of this hinges on what the wave function means. Given Bell's and now PBR, it seems that our best model of "reality" at least at the microscale can no longer be directly interpretable as a local beable. If one wants to use some dualistic "cut" as in Copenhagen, there are difficulties as Maudlin points out:

The reason that this problem does not come up in practice is because the ‘standard’ interpretation is a legacy of the Copenhagen view, and the Copenhagen view does not postulate wavefunction monism. Copenhagenism insisted on the necessity of having a classical description somewhere, the description of the ‘measurement situation’: the infamous Copenhagen ‘cut’ was exactly between a quantum realm and a classical realm. And the classical description would, of course, be in terms of local beables, so there is no problem applying a spacetime transformation to it. Within this sort of a dualistic picture the problem of spacetime transformations of the wavefunction can be approached. The problem, of course, is that this sort of dualistic ontology is impossible to take seriously: no one ever thought that there were really two different sorts of physical systems, the classical and the quantum, that somehow interact. If that were the view, then the ‘cut’ would be a matter of physical fact: somewhere the classical and quantum bits of ontology would actually meet. Furthermore, it is evident that the ‘classical objects’, measuring apparatus and so on, are composed out of ‘quantum stuff’ (electrons, protons, and so on), so this cannot really be a dualistic ontology. In the confused morass of Copenhagenism, the observation that the ‘cut’ could, For All Practical Purposes, be moved about at will within a large range was taken to show that the cut itself corresponded not to a physical fact but to a convention, or something like that. But if the theory can be formulated without a cut at all, let it be so formulated. Having removed the cut and put everything in the quantum ontology, one would evidently remove all the local beables, and all the problems we have been discussing would return.

And the problem is also nobody seems to know the meaning of this larger space (3N dimensions)where the wave function lives. But it is at clearly at odds with the local classical field as Einstein notes:

It is further characteristic of these physical objects that they are thought of as arranged in a space-time continuum. An essential aspect of this arrangement of things in physics is that they lay claim, at a certain time, to an existence independent of one another, provided these objects ‘are situated in different parts of space’. Unless one makes this kind of assumption about the independence of the existence (the ‘being-thus’) of objects which are far apart from one another in space—which stems in the first place from everyday thinking— physical thinking in the familiar sense would not be possible. It is also hard to see any way of formulating and testing the laws of physics unless one makes a clear distinction of this kind. This principle has been carried to extremes in the field theory by localizing the elementary objects on which it is based and which exist independently of each other, as well as the elementary laws which have been postulated for it, in the infinitely small (four-dimensional) elements of space.

Thus, "Einstein notes that in classical field theory all of the beables are local, and local in the strongest sense: the entire physical situation is nothing but the sum of the physical situations in the infinitely small regions of space-time."

 

[apeiron]

I think a lot of this hinges on what the wave function means. Given Bell's and now PBR, it seems that our best model of "reality" at least at the microscale can no longer be directly interpretable as a local beable. If one wants to use some dualistic "cut" as in Copenhagen, there are difficulties as Maudlin points out:

This is again re-stating the fact that locality is not fundamental and at best an emergent feature of reality. So now we move on to consider what is fundamental, and how things like locality might emerge?

Or should we instead keep going back to try to make locality work?

The conversation keeps returning to a point where you are either presuming "something exists fundamentally" or that "everything is emergent".

What is it, in the face of a good understanding of QM, that maintains a faith in the first option?

 

[Maui]

My argument here is that when examined closely, the notion of a "field" has long become a notion about a simple potential - ie: a vagueness.

The substrate of being now has properties such as "infinite degrees of freedom", which then get "collapsed" due to the emergence of global constraints.

Modern physics - turning physicists into philosophers and (at least some) philosophsers into physicists. I'm lovin' it

Precisely. They presume a fundamental unoriented potential, a vagueness, and then the actual world emerges via symmetry breaking.

So this is no longer a "field" concept, because fields are what emerge. But an unlimited potential of infinite dimensions is perhaps a little "field-like" when we try to imagine it. It is an uber-field possibly.

I would not say that it's easy to categorize fields as either real or unreal. There are good arguments that they are both(at the same time). Again, classical baggage(concepts) seem to stand in the way of a better understanding.

But by definition, a vagueness lacks locality and other definite features. These actual properties of fields have to emerge via development, or symmetry breaking.

I applauded you earlier in another thread about introducing ancient thinkers into the discussion with vagueness and potential development(vaguely resembles a wavefunction evolution and 'collapse').

 

[apeiron]

I think a lot of this hinges on what the wave function means.

Further, if you were reading that Kastner paper on a possibilist transactional interpretation of QM, you will have noted that it too takes an "everything emerges from potential" approach to ontology.

Shimony (2009) has similarly suggested that relativistic spacetime can be considered as a domain of actuality emergent from a quantum level of possibilities:

“There may indeed be “peaceful coexistence” between Quantum nonlocality and Relativistic locality, but it may have less to do with signaling than with the ontology of the quantum state. Heisenberg's view of the mode of reality of the quantum state was ... that it is potentiality as contrasted with actuality. This distinction is successful in making a number of features of quantum mechanics intuitively plausible — indefiniteness of properties, complementarity, indeterminacy of measurement outcomes, and objective probability. But now something can be added, at least as a conjecture: that the domain governed by Relativistic locality is the domain of actuality, while potentialities have careers in space-time (if that word is appropriate) which modify and even violate the restrictions that space-time structure imposes upon actual events...” (2009, Section 7, item 2.)

Shimony goes on to note the challenges in providing an account of the emergence of actuality from potentiality, which amounts to ‘collapse.’ PTI suggests that transactions are the vehicle for this process ; and therefore at least part of it must involve processes and entities transcending the spacetime construct.

 

[Maui]

What is it, in the face of a good understanding of QM, that maintains a faith in the first option?

Our observations - you, me, the beauty of nature, love, the relentless human spirit for understanding how things work...

It's obvious at this point that the inner workings of reality are inaccessible to us, things happen, what the heck(ice-cream still tastes good, cold beer too)

 

[bohm2]

I enjoyed reading Kastner's paper but I don't know exactly why but I just don't buy the whole concept of a 'collapse' process. I think any theory that has collapse in it, just seems wrong. I really found the video below (including a double-slit type of experiment) really useful in getting a "picture" of what may be happening. Still, the major problem is the wave can't be that type of guiding wave (e.g. existing in our familiar space-time). But at least, one can get an intuitive sense of how emergence of our familiar space-time may come from this configuration space stuff (whatever it is). Of course, the problem is that a direct mapping from configuration space to the more familiar space-time can't be done in any unique way, as others have argued, because when one tries to do it, the structure of the 3-N space can underwrite more than one set of emergent 3-spaces.The MWI doesn't have a problem with this view because they argue that more than one set of emergent 3-spaces exist at the same time. But I just don't buy MWI, either. But I still like the picture of those silicone drops in the video being our familiar objects in space-time whereas "below" there is some other stuff that defies locality/separability (something unlike the guiding wave depicted in Couder experiments). This is in line with some of Bohm's metaphysics which I'm biased toward.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W9yWv5dqSKk

One paper tries to get a wave to exist in the physical space we are familiar but the model seems really complicated:

This is admittedly a complicated, ugly, and highly contrived theory. (And although it is straightforward to generalize from 2 particles moving in 1 spatial dimension to N particles moving in 3 spatial dimensions, the complexity and ugliness in that more serious context is surely much worse!)...

It is sometimes raised as an objection against pilot-wave theory that, in the theory, the wave function causally influences the particles, but the particles exert no influences back on the wave. (This, it is apparently thought, suggests that the particles are some kind of mere epiphenomenon, which might as well be dropped-a bizarre suggestion, for anyone who understands the crucial role the particles play in making the theory empirically adequate, but still a suggestion one hears sometimes.) To whatever extent one takes such an objection seriously, then, it is of interest to point out its inapplicability to the pilot-wave theory (of exclusively local beables) sketched here: each particle’s motion is dictated just by its own associated pilot-wave field, but the evolution of each pilot-wave field is influenced by all the other particles. Not only, then, do the particles influence the pilot-wave fields, but the particles can quite reasonably be understood as (indirectly) affecting each other (through the various fields). Perhaps those who dislike the causality posited by the usual pilot-wave theory, then, will find the theory sketched here more tolerable...

The theory presented in Section III contains an infinite number of interacting fields on physical space and causal influences from particles onto the fields associated with other particles – but is mathematically equivalent to standard pilot-wave theory in which there is just one wave, on configuration space, and no causation from the particles onto the pilot-wave.

The Theory of (Exclusively) Local Beables
http://lanl.arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0909/0909.4553v3.pdf

 

[bohm2]

Edit: I thought I'd mention that Bohm (at least in his metaphysics) didn't appear to believe in the "reality" of particles:

We have frequently been asked the question “Didn’t Bohm believe that there was an actual classical point-like particle following these quantum trajectories?" The answer is a definite No! For Bohm there was no solid 'particle' either, but instead, at the fundamental level, there was a basic process or activity which left a ‘track’ in, say, a bubble chamber. Thus the track could be explained by the enfolding and unfolding of an invariant form in the overall underlying process.

Zeno Paradox for Bohmian Trajectories: The Unfolding of the Metatron
http://www.freewebs.com/cvdegosson/ZenoPaper.pdf

 

[ryan7585]

In that sense, what you are describing is a justification or reasoning for nihilism, as the discussion about "something vs. nothing" eventually leads towards existential nihilism in the form of a logical conclusion of the argument being presented: if everything is nothing, no thing can have inherent meaning.

It is ultimately, from my perspective, a discussion about what the difference is between ideas and reality.

Nihilism is so ridiculous to me... Regardless of whether everything is nothing, we all have an objective experience which is affected in definite ways by how we interact. A search for "inherant meaning" will ALWAYS yield fruitless results. But contextual meaning can be found in absolutely everything in the universe. It is our experience of it which gives it meaning

How is this not obvious?

 

[bohm2]

Here’s some interesting arguments against the probabilistic argument presented in original post:

Van Inwagen, while not himself a cosmologist, addresses a cosmological question. He proposes to answer the question that is “supposed to be the most profound and difficult of all questions”: “Why is there anything at all?” The argument is elaborate, so I shall jump to the essential step. Van Inwagen presents the premises that there is only one possible world in which there are no beings but there are infinitely many possible worlds in which there are beings. The latter is arrived at by arguing that there are many ways for beings to be but only one way for them not to be. He then urges that the probability of being actual for each possible universe is the same. (I set aside the problem that this instantly conflicts with the requirement that probability measures normalize to unity.) It now follows that the probability “of there being nothing is 0.” It is “as improbable as anything can be” . Hence, no doubt, we are to infer that there being anything at all is as probable as anything can be. Van Inwagen prudently admits that he is “unhappy about the argument...No doubt there is something wrong with it...but I should like to be told what it is”. What is wrong is that it is an instance of the inductive disjunctive fallacy. Our background assumptions are near vacuous and provide completely neutral support for the actuality of each possible world; therefore, they provide completely neutral support for any disjunction of these possibilities. What van Inwagen has done is to represent this neutrality incorrectly by a widely spread probability measure, thereby committing himself fallaciously to the conclusion that a disjunction of all but one of them is strongly supported.

Cosmic Confusions: Not Supporting versus Supporting Not
http://www.pitt.edu/~jdnorton/papers/cosmic_confusion_final.pdf

If one applies probabilities thoughtlessly, one might try to represent the state of complete ignorance by a broadly spread probability distribution over the outcomes. Then the probability of the disjunction can be brought close to unity merely by adding more outcomes. Hence one would infer fallaciously to near certainty for a sufficiently large contingent disjunction of outcomes over which we are individually in complete ignorance. The fallacy is surprisingly widespread. A striking example is supplied by van Inwagen [1996] in answer to the cosmic question “Why is there anything at all?” There is, he asserts, one way for no thing to be, but infinitely many ways for different things to be. Distributing probabilities over these outcomes fairly uniformly, we infer that the disjunction representing the infinitely many ways things can be must attract all the probability mass so that we assign probability one to it.

Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory
http://www.pitt.edu/~jdnorton/papers/Challenges_final.pdf

Zinkernagel summarizes this:

From the perspective of Norton’s critique, it is not hard to see what is wrong with the analogy. When you win the lottery ticket it may be reasonable to infer that other people bought a ticket but, in any case, the very idea of winning a lottery presupposes that other tickets exist and that the winning ticket has been drawn more or less randomly from the collection of tickets. By contrast, our universe being the way it is (“winning the lottery”) does not presuppose that other universes (with different properties) exist-our evidence is simply neutral in this respect. Furthermore, we have no a priori right to presuppose that the values of the parameters characterizing our universe are bestowed on it by some random process-and so no right to presuppose a probability distribution (uniform or otherwise) of the outcomes. Therefore, a judgment of what is natural to infer from our universe being as it is (with us in it) hangs in the air.

Some trends in the philosophy of physics
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8761/

 

[apeiron]

Here’s some interesting arguments against the probabilistic argument presented in original post:

Excellent references for the points made earlier in this thread. Norton skewers Inwagen very nicely.

What Norton calls complete neutrality is of course what Peirce means by vagueness. A realm of pure possibility without any constraints. And so a realm to which the principle of contradiction (ie: of crisp disjunctions) fails to apply.

Bayesian reasoning has to guess at the constraints that might apply to shape pure possibility into some more definite distribution. And where such reasoning goes wrong is when it does not realize this is what it is doing.

It is the same mistake as in trying to apply set theory. Set theory has to presume some global state of constraint to apply to a distribution. Yet vagueness, or neutrality, is something different - it is the truly and profoundly unlimited. There are no constraints by definition. So a larger model of logic is needed to deal with the case - one such as Peircean logic that includes abductive leaps to get things started. And then semiotic constraints where - invoking final cause - it is not local change that is the isssue, but the emergence eventually of limits to change, to the expression of raw possibility.

So Norton provides an argument against all attempts on the "why anything?" question based on conventional probablity approaches - ones that have to already presume constraints on raw possibility. A vagueness doesn't have countable states, not even an infinity of them, as this would already give it something definite, something crisply developed. You have to step back further to a higher level of modelling, one like Peircean semiosis which has that "extra hidden dimension" Norton mentions.

But then of course once armed with the Peircean view, you can start to say something positive about the "why anything?" question.

As I stressed in post #139 - https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3665001&postcount=139 - once you take a view of probability spaces as things that develop, rather than simply exist, then the correct foundational dichotomy of vague~crisp comes into sight. Instead of trying to contrast the likelihood of nothing vs something, we are now talking about the likelihood of the vague yielding the definite. And how that then compares with the universe as we observe its developmental history.

 

[apeiron]

A few more contemporary references which demonstrate that logical and statistical arguments cannot solve this. A deeper view of causal process is needed.

This takes a Zeno type approach in which time sliced infinitely fine means there is no longer a "first moment" and so a universe can be considered self-causing...
http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/smith_reason_universe_exists.htm

Then this one points out the Zeno-ic flaws in this idea...
http://www.google.co.nz/url?sa=t&rc...oc2mCg&usg=AFQjCNHZMeLvW84iV2uxicZeMaYiJzUUfg

[link fixed hopefully - google Could the Universe Cause Itself to Exist? William F. Vallicella otherwise]

(And of course, the Planck scale already creates scientific problems for such approaches - time cannot be sliced infinitely thin.)

Then this is a somewhat useful taxonomy of approaches...that of course fails to mention any Peircean or systems thinking
http://www.skeptic.com/the_magazine/downloads/skeptic13-2_Kuhn.pdf

 

[wuliheron]

Logically the entire argument is meaningless. We define something in terms of nothing and vice versa. Its like north and south, up and down, top and bottom. They're just descriptions we use and there are plenty of things we can say don't exist as well as plenty that do. The idea that you can have nothing without having something is an assumption that just doesn't make logical sense. We have both things that exist and don't exist and you can ask why we have both, but then the answer just comes back to because that is how we define them.

Like a little kid laying in bed contemplating infinity we can go round and round with such thoughts all day long and get nowhere. That's the only thing about this entire subject that is demonstrable. That instead of being the "ultimate" question, its just a waste of time.

 

[apeiron]

Logically the entire argument is meaningless. We define something in terms of nothing and vice versa. Its like north and south, up and down, top and bottom.

But that has been one of the important questions raised. Is nothingness actually complementary to somethingness? Is it a well-formed concept in the first place?

As has been mentioned often enough, some-things and no-things are both about the counting of things. And an absence of things still leaves the issue of the empty space that is left behind as itself a kind of thing. This was the null set problem - the implication still of a container even when it contains nothing.

And even before that, if we imagine subtracting away the existence of all things, that still leaves their possibility, which again is a kind of thingness. Certainly something more than absolute nothingness.

So I believe you end up having to accept a quite different metaphysical dichotomy of vague~crisp as the most fundamental description of degrees of existence and non-existence. Which has its profound implications as explored by Anaximander and Peirce to name a couple of philosophers.

Like a little kid laying in bed contemplating infinity we can go round and round with such thoughts all day long and get nowhere. That's the only thing about this entire subject that is demonstrable. That instead of being the "ultimate" question, its just a waste of time.

It is hardly meaningless to demonstrate there are lines of argument that don't wash. And it is hardly meaningless to expose some assumptions that were being thoughtlessly made. And it is hardly meaningless if a question leads you towards subtler concepts.

 

[wuliheron]

But that has been one of the important questions raised. Is nothingness actually complementary to somethingness? Is it a well-formed concept in the first place?

As has been mentioned often enough, some-things and no-things are both about the counting of things. And an absence of things still leaves the issue of the empty space that is left behind as itself a kind of thing. This was the null set problem - the implication still of a container even when it contains nothing.

And even before that, if we imagine subtracting away the existence of all things, that still leaves their possibility, which again is a kind of thingness. Certainly something more than absolute nothingness.

So I believe you end up having to accept a quite different metaphysical dichotomy of vague~crisp as the most fundamental description of degrees of existence and non-existence. Which has its profound implications as explored by Anaximander and Peirce to name a couple of philosophers.

I'd have to say what is demonstrable trumps concepts any day. I'm aware of things that exist and I'm aware of things that don't exist. I don't have a freight train in my living room, but I do have a couch. To me that's not a question of what is crisp or vague, its a demonstrable fact and the context and content are specific. The more specific I make them, the more demonstrable it becomes, while the less specific the less demonstrable. Its not so much an issue of what is vague or crisp, but what is demonstrable.

It is hardly meaningless to demonstrate there are lines of argument that don't wash. And it is hardly meaningless to expose some assumptions that were being thoughtlessly made. And it is hardly meaningless if a question leads you towards subtler concepts.

Debating concepts that are not demonstrable is the equivalent of reciting nonsense poetry. It might have some psychological or mystical benefit, but it is otherwise demonstrably meaningless. Reasoning begins with what is demonstrable and without that all you've got is something at best self-consistent.

 

[apeiron]

Its not so much an issue of what is vague or crisp, but what is demonstrable.

But this rather mixes up epistemology and ontology then.

Quite clearly, the modelling relationship is founded on our ideas in interaction with our impressions. Or more formally, as in the scientific method, the interaction between concepts and measurements, qualities and quantities.

And we want both those things to be as crisp as possible, not vague.

So a concept like "god" is not a lot of use because the definition is so murky, the ways to "demonstrate" the value of the idea so unfocused.

But other concepts, such as sofa and freight train, are quite crisply defined.

OK, there is some modern furniture you might look at and question whether it really counts as a sofa. Or you might be in a student flat where the "sofa" is an old matress. So on closer examination, all our concepts in fact are somewhat epistemically vague at the fringes - but we can fix that by adding further information, creating a crisper constraint.

Armed with a formal concept (information on formal cause, and also final cause because a key to sofa is "something a few people can comfortably sit on") you can then measure your world in terms of the concept. You can look around and justify an object as a sofa and not something else with crisp certitude.

So you can see that your argument here is not against vague~crisp as an ontic story at all. You are just again asserting the conventional fact that epistemic modelling is working best when it is least vague - when we have developed the crisp concepts that in turn enable the crisp measurements that allow us make our definite claims.

The "why anything" question is important because it makes us confront our established ideas. We have to get back in behind the shop-front of our conventional epistemology.

There is a real intellectual challenge here of course. How do we have a crisp model of vagueness? That seems a self-defeating project.

But again, there is no actual problem if we keep the distinction between ontology and epistemology clear. We can have a crisp model of something that is actually vague.

Debating concepts that are not demonstrable is the equivalent of reciting nonsense poetry. It might have some psychological or mystical benefit, but it is otherwise demonstrably meaningless. Reasoning begins with what is demonstrable and without that all you've got is something at best self-consistent.

You really are sounding like Samuel Johnson, stomping around, kicking stones, and proclaiming "I refute it thus".

But yes, I already agree that concepts need to be demonstrable. However what is it about vagueness that is not demonstrable (once you have found its correct complementary partner, crispness)?

Nothing and something are claimed to be demonstrable states of affairs. Except - as is the subject of this thread - the problem is that what you have to show people is some container that is empty of objects. So this is only about localised absence not global or total nullity.

And likewise, we can point to epistemic vagueness without much trouble, as in the sorites paradox. At what point do a few grains of wheat become a pile, or a lack of hair make a person officially bald?

So there is nothing that you have said which rules out vagueness as a demonstrable concept. You have given no reasons why we cannot define it, and measure the world in those terms.

There is of course a lack of a generally agreed model of vagueness. Which is why this is a metaphysics rather than a science thread.

But to give you an idea of what I have in mind, you can consider the phenomenon of critical opalescence - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_opalescence - that exact point where a gas and liquid are in scalefree balance so that you can't really say (that is demonstrate via measurement) whether you actually have a gas or liquid. The law of the excluded middle no longer applies crisply to this situation.

 

[wuliheron]

For me ontology is just an epistemological idea. We make it all up as we go along. Rules evolve, definitions change, etc. What is vague and what is crisp only have meaning in specific contexts and then the meaning changes with use. Classical Chinese doesn't have a verb "to be" and the Navajo language doesn't even have a future tense. The more we try to ontologize our language the less demonstrable it becomes.

Thus the "why anything" question only exists as an extreme expression of our compulsive desire to ontologize everything and to deny the evidence of our senses and awareness. Of what Heraclitus described as the flux and what Taoists sometimes call the novelty of each breath, each moment, each freight train and couch. Lao Tzu expressed it this way:

Home
Accept and you become whole,
Bend and you straighten,
Empty and you fill,
Decay and you renew,
Want and you acquire,
Fulfill and you become confused.
The sage accepts the world
As the world accepts the Way;
He does not display himself, so is clearly seen,
Does not justify himself, so is recognized,
Does not boast, so is credited,
Does not pride himself, so endures,
Does not contend, so none contend against him.
The ancients said, "Accept and you become whole",
Once whole, the world is as your home.

If you ask a Zen master why there is something rather then nothing he might hit you over the head with a stick. Ask him how to discern between vague and crisp and he'll likely hit you again.

 

[apeiron]

For me ontology is just an epistemological idea. We make it all up as we go along.

This sounds like a contradiction if you have just been demanding that concepts be crisply demonstrable. We don't just to get to make things up. We have to show that they work.

What is vague and what is crisp only have meaning in specific contexts and then the meaning changes with use. Classical Chinese doesn't have a verb "to be" and the Navajo language doesn't even have a future tense. The more we try to ontologize our language the less demonstrable it becomes.

Well yes, but we were talking about a philosophical approach to answering basic questions about reality. So instead of classical chinese or Navajo - languages which work in some particular historical social context - we are considering what is right as philosophy.

Talking about everyday usages of words or habits of grammar is a diversion here.

Thus the "why anything" question only exists as an extreme expression of our compulsive desire to ontologize everything and to deny the evidence of our senses and awareness.

You are just making rhetorical and emotional arguments, not reasoned ones.

What you call compulsive, others could call systematic. What you call denying the evidence of our senses and awareness, others would see as properly examining it.

No one is forcing you to do metaphysics here. But if you want to force others to stop, you have to produce some actual reasons why it is bad (in other words, you have to do some metaphysics to counter metaphysics, ah well ).

Of what Heraclitus described as the flux and what Taoists sometimes call the novelty of each breath, each moment, each freight train and couch. Lao Tzu expressed it this way:

OK, you believe the Eastern way is not to strive in a false and individualistic way but to dissolve back into the unity of the cosmos. Yeah, been there, done that. As a kid I had zen (and judo) training from a Buddhist monk. But I sat there thinking this is stupid letting mosquitoes whine their way towards me in circles and just trying to "omm" their biting presence away.

So I'm happy that it is a notion of life that appeals to some - just like any faith. However I had no problem making a different choice.

Besides, you know from eastern philosophy such as the I Ching and dependent co-arising just how close the parallels are to the kind of systems causality I am talking about here.

The real difference lies in the question of whether what emerges also subsides, or whether what emerges is set upon an ever rising path. The Eastern answer, on the whole, is that what is "right" is a return to the apeiron, the vague. While the Western answer is that individuals should be self-actualising Nietzchian supermen that transcend all limits.

Modern big bang cosmology suggests the real ontological answer here is "both". The universe emerges as a crisp act of individuation - a definite something where there was once only a vaguer "nothing". And yet also the ultimate fate of the universe is the cold fizzle of an infinitely large heat death. A very crisp outcome, yet one that is actually as near a "return to nothingness" as possible. We will all be very zen in the long run.

Now we shouldn't entangle the beliefs of faith with the answers of metaphysics. But you can appreciate that even your faith-based criticisms are not accurate about what has actually been said.

If you ask a Zen master why there is something rather then nothing he might hit you over the head with a stick. Ask him how to discern between vague and crisp and he'll likely hit you again.

My zen master was rather more easy going I guess. He saw the mediation wasn't going down so well so he stuck with the judo. (He could have been a complete fake of course, his life story was a little too fantastic.)

But anyway, in case you are unfamiliar with some of the parallels that exist in the world's various philosophies, here is one passage (sorry, I can't remember where I cut this from though)...

In Theogony the initial state of the universe,or the origin (arche) is Chaos, a gaping void (abyss) considered as a divine primordial condition, from which appeared everything that exists. Then came Gaia (Earth) and Eros (Love). Hesiod made an abstraction because his original chaos is something completely indefinite.[6] In the Orphic cosmogony the unageing Chronos produced Aither and Chaos and made a silvery egg in divine Aither. From it appeared the bisexual god Phanes who is the creator of the world.[7]
Some similar ideas appear in the Hindu cosmology which is similar to the Vedic. In the beginning there was nothing in the universe but only darkness and the divine essence who removed the darkness and created the primordial waters. His seed produced the universal germ (Hiranyagarbha), from which everything else appeared.[8]
In the Babylonian creation story Enuma Elish the universe was in a formless state and is described as a watery chaos. From it emerged two primary gods,one male Apsu and one female Tiamat and a third deity who is the maker Mummu and his power is necessary to get the job of birth.[9]. In Genesis the primordial world is described as a watery chaos and the Earth "without form and void". The spirit of the god moved upon the dark face of the waters and created light.[10]

And some more bits and pieces just to show that this is a recurring theme. Tao, Brahman, Apeiron, Hyle, Quintessence, Bosenazelo, Hunabku, Manitu, Orenda, Wakonda, Wakan, Mana, Ain Soph, Central Monad, there are countless words that dance around a definition of the formless fundamental essence...

Anaximander says that the source and element of all beings[2] is the apeiron, or the Limitless/ Boundary-less/ Without-Definition. Apeiron is therefore the Hellenic equivalent of the Dao of Laozi on the Sinic side. From the apeiron come all the heavens and all that is in the cosmos.
http://www.lawrencechin2011.com/HTcontribution1-philosophy.htm

Ein Sof (or Ayn Sof) in the Kabbalah, is understood as the Deity prior to His self-manifestation in the production of the world, probably derived from Ibn Gabirol's term, "the Endless One" (she-en lo tiklah). Ein Sof may be translated as "no end," "unending," "there is no end," or Infinite.
Ein Sof is the divine origin of all created existence, in contrast to the Ein (or Ayn), which is infinite no-thingness. It was first used by Azriel ben Menahem, who, sharing the Neoplatonic view that God can have no desire, thought, word, or action, emphasized by it the negation of any attribute.

The Kyoto School might even be thought of as recovering a suggestion from one of the first Presocratic philosophers, Anaximander: namely, to think finite beings as determinations, or delimitations, of “the Indefinite” or “the Unlimited” (to apeiron).
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kyoto-school/

In Mahâyâna Buddhism śûnyatâ refers first of all to the fact that all things come into being in “interdependent origination” (Sanskrit: pratîtya-samutpâda; Japanese: engi), and they are therefore “empty” of any independent substantial self-nature or “own-being” (Sanskrit: svabhâva). This thought is closely tied to the basic Buddhist thesis of “no-self” or “non-ego” (Sanskrit: anâtman; Japanese: muga). All beings, including the ego, are interconnected and in flux.

The doctrine of Akasa, or space, as the origin of all things, came rather late in the history of Upanisadic thought. Also in Greek philosophy, the concept of space as the arche of things appeared very late. With Thales, Anaximenes, Heracleitus and Empedocles we meet the conceptions of water, air, fire, and earth, either individually or collectively. It is only when we come to the time of Philolaus that we get to the notion of space as the arche of all things. The first four elements, namely Prthivi, Ap, Tejas and Vayu are more or less tangible; but for Akasa to be regarded as the origin of all things requires a higher philosophical imagination.
These concepts of these two mystics, behad of Kabir and nirbayalu of Kudaluresa, would remind a student of Greek philosophy of the Apeiron of Anaximander against the Peras of Pythagoras. The Peras is a small conception, but the Apeiron brings us quite near to the infinitude that is portrayed in the manifestations of the sublime. The experience of the sublime seems to be almost transcendent and baffling even for the imagination to reach. Anaximander, therefore, regarded the Apeiron as his most fundamental category. It is this aspect of the element of Divinity in all cases of Infinitude which is at the basis of the behad of Kabir and nirbayalu of the Kannada mystic.
It is a long journey from sima to asima, from had to behad, from bayalu to nirbayalu, from peras to apeiron, from space to spacelessness. The concept of Akasa takes one ultimately to nirakasa, the spaceless.
http://www.ignca.nic.in/ps_05013.htm

 

[ThomasT]

... we were talking about a philosophical approach to answering basic questions about reality.

Ok, so for us pedestrians, can you or bohm2 (et al.) synopsize what you think is the best approach in as few words as possible?

The way I see it, the general approach of science (ie., somewhat controlled observation) with philosophy sorting out the meanings of various mathematical expressions designed to describe and predict scientific observations is a pretty good approach.

And from that stuff one can make objectively demonstrated, statistically based inferences/assumptions about more fundamental, ie., underlying, reality.

And of course I don't have any response to the question of why there's anything at all.

 

[chiro]

One thing to consider that in order to define anything you need to also define its complement.

This might be used to explain why something exists by relating to what else would exist if it wasn't that 'something'.

 

[ThomasT]

One thing to consider that in order to define anything you need to also define its complement.

I'm not sure I understand. Suppose I define 'tree'. What's the complement of that?

This might be used to explain why something exists by relating to what else would exist if it wasn't that 'something'.

Well, I think that defining or explaining why anything at all exists leads eventually to an objectively nondemonstrable assumption. We can, for example, assume that there are fundamental dynamical mechanisms/laws, whatever. But where/how did those originate? It's, imho, an unanswerable question.

 

[chiro]

I'm not sure I understand. Suppose I define 'tree'. What's the complement of that?

You describe it in the context of a notion of 'everything'. Doing this helps you relate concepts to one another by talking about them in the context of something synonymous with 'all that can be'.

Well, I think that defining or explaining why anything at all exists leads eventually to an objectively nondemonstrable assumption. We can, for example, assume that there are fundamental dynamical mechanisms/laws, whatever. But where/how did those originate? It's, imho, an unanswerable question.

Well again it can help by considering what else is 'possible' because the comparison to other such things can give the impetus for hypothesizing why something is 'as it is'.

As an example with cosmology we know from research that if the constants were even slightly different we wouldn't have the kind of universe that we have now in its current form.

This is an example of what I mean: you consider what "isn't" observed and compare it to situations that 'could be possible' in the context of some universal domain.

The actual universal domain is not trivial, but we can start with domains that are small enough to be able to consider with our minds yet large enough that they provide enough variability to consider enough of a general set of circumstances with enough variation.

What I mean by this is, is that this thinking gives us a reference point. When we discover something, what happens is that we study something, get relationships (maybe even down to a specific mathematical form) and then from that we wonder 'why is this the way it is?' by trying to consider what we have studied in a more or less isolated state.

By considering what we have found against a more general class of cases, what we do then is to say "Well this is the way it is and upon comparing it to these other cases, it makes sense that this is the way it is due to blah blah blah"

 

[apeiron]

Ok, so for us pedestrians, can you or bohm2 (et al.) synopsize what you think is the best approach in as few words as possible?

If you are talking about "what is philosophy's method" I don't see it as any different from science in essence. You observe. You generalise. You then see with more clarity and can go round the loop again.

So philosophy is the rough cut. And also the exploration of a bunch of approaches. Then science is the refinement of some particular model that is useful in some way. After that comes technology, application.

So far as the particular point about the use of language goes, everyday language is obviously going to be hit and miss when it comes to talk about fundamental reality. It would be the extremely rough cut.

Philosophy would then focus on the rational clarification of useful concepts, and science would pair those concepts with a prescribed method of measurement (a way to quantify a qualitative term).

So metaphysics invented pairings like discrete~continuous, stasis~flux, chance~necessity and many more. Science then uses them. Vague~crisp just seems to be one of the less familiar dichotomies.

 

[apeiron]

I'm not sure I understand. Suppose I define 'tree'. What's the complement of that?

But a tree is not metaphysically fundamental. And indeed, we are proving that fact precisely because we can't think of "not-tree" as indicating anything in particular. Pretty much everything is not-tree.

So this is the power of the method. Only a limited number of complementaries function as complementary. And it is why it was possible for the ancient greeks to make so much rapid progress once they got the knack of what to do. (Socratic dialog, law of the excluded middle, the basics of philosophical thought.)

 

[alt]

Ultimate question: Why anything at all?

Indeed. And after 194 posts and a kaleidoscope of thought, thinkers (here and referenced) etc, it does not seem we are one jot closer to any semblance of an answer to the question posed in the OP title.

The aporia remains - looms larger in fact ..

 

[apeiron]

This paper is good on the parallels between the ancient Eastern and Western views on cosmo-genesis.

Revisiting Ancient Linguistic Worldview: East vs. West; Dao vs. Logos Jia Yuxin Jia Xuelai
http://www.uri.edu/iaics/content/2008v17n4/07%20Jia%20Yuixn%20&%20Jia%20Xuelai.pdf

Then, ontologically, what is Dao? According to Lao Zi, Dao is neither being nor beinglessness. It is both being and beingless. It exists as the transcendental Nothingness. However, it is also a unique form of existence and Lao Zi also indicates that the Dao is an objective entity just as the ancient Western philosophers believe the absolute beginning of the world is Apeiron (water, vapor, fire, or chaos).

As a ‘thing’ Tao is vague and unclear;
Unclear and vague, yet within it is a symbol;
Vague and unclear, yet within it is a thing;
Obscure and dark, yet within it is an essence.
Its essence is truly authentic and within it is what is reliable. (Lao Tzu, Chap. 21)

Very interestingly, cosmo-genetically, the creation and formation of the world in the East somehow follows almost similar process as it is believed in the West. The following model may justify this statement:

East：Nameless ( Dao as transcendent and objective entity ) Name / Language
Heaven (or God) and Earth

West：Apeiron (water, vapor, fire, or chaos) / Logos (God /Word) the universe

However, differences exist. Dao or the nameless existed before the action of Name. Name comes from and after Dao.

I disagree with some of the detail of their characterisation of the Apeiron here. The Dao also has some critical differences in that while Lao Zi stresses the way things remain co-mingled (as in Yin-Yang), the key to Anaximander's cosmo-genesis is the fact that the polarities are moved far apart (and then mix).

However, the idea that the Dao is followed by the Name is indeed something crucial missing from Anaximander's scheme (and was somewhat corrected by Heraclitus' equivalent of Dao~Name in his dichotomy of Primal Fire~Logos).

In modern language, this translates into local degrees of freedom and global constraints. Or initiating conditions and boundary conditions.

And it is a way to think about a self-causing universe - one where in the beginning there is just naked potential (dao, primal fire, apeiron, unlimited degrees of freedom), and then design is called forth from that potential by the system's own future. The Name, Logos, or other terms to describe the future crisp limits of the system which can act backwards/downward as final/formal cause.

This can easily sound mystical. But quantum cosmology is already leading us down this very path of thought. If we talk of a quantum event, its causes are contextual, nonlocal, even retrocausal.

So if we view the big bang as a quantum event, and that this was also some form of collapse of a potential (the "collapse" being the obvious contentious issue in current quantum metaphysics), then what caused the collapse? It has to be in the future of the event. The universe has to be retrospectively fixed in some sense by what it became.

It is a grand sum over histories view in other words. Anything was possible. But just one thing was the least mean path of that infinite potential. And so you have a structured universe bootstrapping out of raw indeterminacy.

 

[jambaugh]

Ultimate question: Why anything at all?

Indeed. And after 194 posts and a kaleidoscope of thought, thinkers (here and referenced) etc, it does not seem we are one jot closer to any semblance of an answer to the question posed in the OP title.

That is because the question is ill posed. "Why" questions have three contexts, causality, explanatory and purpose:
"Why did the bridge collapse?"
"Why does lead become superconducting below a critical temperature?"
"Why did you slap me?"

1. You can't invoke causality outside the domain of existence and indeed doing so is a category error. Causation links events. Existence isn't an event it is a collection of events. Causality works within this collection not upon this collection.
   
2. It may be instructive to try to explain the form of existence such as is done in physics but there are limits there.
   
3. Questions of purpose per-suppose a purpose holder. If I step on a rake in the dark and ask "why did you hit me" I'm asking the purpose behind an accidental event. Before resolving purpose one must resolve the intentional vs accidental nature of the subject. Typically I see questions of purpose in attempts to deduce the existence of God. "There must be a God, else why do we exist?" but these are circular arguments.
   Premise:The "why" question is valid i.e. there is a God ; Conclusion:There is a God. (Personally I am agnostic in that I believe this is a question of faith not deduction.)

I think it is instructive to consider for the moment the mundane topic of interval notation in mathematics. I can represent a bound interval a \le x < b with the notation x\in [a,b). We then extend this bit of language to include unbounded sets by defining a symbol \infty as a place-holder for the absence of a bound. x \in [a,\infty) \equiv a\le x < \infty \equiv a \le x.
And even express: x \in \mathbb{R} =(-\infty,\infty).
But we may then make the error of objectifying this null symbol as if it represented an actual real number. "There must be a number \infty"! This symbol isn't something (in this context) it is a place-holder for nothing when we use a language format which requires this be made explicit.

Now in mathematics we can of course invent infinite "numbers" and treat them as object. But math is a game of mental construction, not in and of itself a study of nature.

We must be careful about similar constructs in philosophy "first cause" "why everything?" etc. should be parsed for their implicit assumptions before we attempt resolving answers.

 

[wuliheron]

Apeiron, I think you have the wrong idea. I am a Pragmatic Taoist, not a mystic, and I would never bring up mysticism in a science forum without expressly calling attention to the fact it is mysticism. Pragmatic Taoism has a lot in common with Philosophical Taoism and Zen, but without all the mysticism. Its not that I have anything against mysticism, it's just not who I am. I'm sorry you had a bad experience with Zen, but that's not my problem and it has nothing to do with what I'm talking about.

When I talk about something being demonstrable I mean that quite literally. A Zen master hitting a student over the head is attempting to prompt them to become more spontaneous. Enlightenment or some sort of mystical experience might be their ultimate goal, but such things are only achieved through spontaneity and, at best, the master can help the student to open the door.

For me spontaneity is the key to awareness which is necessary for discerning what is demonstrable. Its no more mystical then the fact you are more aware and capable of reasoning when awake then asleep. I'd suggest you re-read my post and ask your questions again.

 

[apeiron]

For me spontaneity is the key to awareness which is necessary for discerning what is demonstrable. Its no more mystical then the fact you are more aware and capable of reasoning when awake then asleep.

This is a view of epistemology which I believe is quite wrong. All perception is modelling, never direct experience. The zen idea is mystical for claiming otherwise. You can whack yourself over the head as much as you please, but it won't change things.

 

[apeiron]

That is because the question is ill posed. "Why" questions have three contexts, causality, explanatory and purpose:
"Why did the bridge collapse?"
"Why does lead become superconducting below a critical temperature?"
"Why did you slap me?"

1. 
   
   Aristotle said there are four "why" questions. What you call "causality" here is just effective cause. There is also material, formal and final cause in his analysis. So a bridge exist because someone made it, it is made of something, it has some shape, and there was a reason that caused it to get made.
   
   Reductionists want to reduce all these sources of causality to just the question of effective cause. Though they also need some kind of local material stuff - a substance - that can carry this effective cause as a property or force.
   
   The "why anything" question then leads to a further problem of first cause - primum movens. And a reductionist will read this as the call to find some ultimate kind of effective cause (such as a creating god).
   
   But the point of having a more complex model of causality such as Aristotle's is that primum movens can also be a complicated "four causes" story. As some of the arguments presented in the thread illustrate.
   
   

   [*]You can't invoke causality outside the domain of existence and indeed doing so is a category error. Causation links events. Existence isn't an event it is a collection of events. Causality works within this collection not upon this collection.

   
   Your claim here rest on the assumption that effective cause is "the whole of causality". And that reality is a mereological bundle.
   
   A holistic view would agree that all causes would have to be internal to "existence". A world would have to be ultimately self-causing - and this is a problem!
   
   But there is a richer arsenal of causality available. The holistic view would also be a process view - worlds would develop and endure, or persist rather than exist.
   
   This is in turn what leads to the necessity for a vague~crisp distinction. It underpins a view of holistic causality in which a process can arise from "nothing".
   
   

   [*]Questions of purpose per-suppose a purpose holder. If I step on a rake in the dark and ask "why did you hit me" I'm asking the purpose behind an accidental event.

   
   Again, what reductionists really want to get rid of is teleological cause. And it is easy to supply examples which make it seem obvious the world is just blindly materialistic, absent of purpose, goals, will or meanings, and only humans are different in this regard.
   
   But science still finds it hard not to frame its laws of nature in teleological fashion (thou shalt evolve, thou shalt dissipate, thou shalt gravitate, thou shalt follow the least mean path.)
   
   And a systems thinker will argue that the correct approach to human purpose and meaning is to generalise it. You can "water it down" so that you have a hierarchy of final cause such as
   {teleomaty {teleonomy {teleology}}}, or in more colloquial language, {propensity {function {purpose}}}. See for example - http://cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/viewFile/189/283
   
   I mentioned already the connection between the problem of final cause and the problem of wavefunction collapse. It was not accident that early interpretations wanted to put the cause in the mind of the human observer, more recent ones are trying to put it out in a thermal environment or invoking retrocausality from future constraints.
   
   So this is a very live subject even in science.
   
   The thing to beware of is not turning final cause into another super-species of effective cause. It can't be merely "triggering event" seen on a larger scale (which is the kind of notion of a blue touch paper God you have in mind). It has to be something else, otherwise there is no need to distinguish it as a further aspect of causality.
   
   So final cause needs to be identified with global constraints, downwards causality - some way in which the ends do justify the means.
   
   I would agree that this is the least well developed part of our ideas about causality as yet. But that is what makes it interesting I guess. And asking the "why anything" question is particularly instructive in this regard.
   
   

   Before resolving purpose one must resolve the intentional vs accidental nature of the subject.

   
   Exactly, we must dichotomise to clarify. To be able to model causality, we must divide it suitably.
   
   And here there may actually be novel metaphysics. The greeks did divide things into chance and necessity. But we know that randomness and determinism are still problematic concepts in science. What is a fluctuation really?
   
   There is a general distinction of reality into its local degrees of freedom and global constraints that seems to work. But the story does not seem quite in focus yet.
   
   

   Typically I see questions of purpose in attempts to deduce the existence of God. "There must be a God, else why do we exist?" but these are circular arguments.

   
   Yes, because they are actually just attempts to use the notion of effective cause to explain everything.
   
   

   [*]Now in mathematics we can of course invent infinite "numbers" and treat them as object. But math is a game of mental construction, not in and of itself a study of nature.
   
   We must be careful about similar constructs in philosophy "first cause" "why everything?" etc. should be parsed for their implicit assumptions before we attempt resolving answers.

   
   Correct. Even in metaphysics, we are constructing models of causality. We are breaking things down in ways that seem to work, seem to be true, but we must bear in mind that they still are just models and so may bear secret traces of their makers.
   
   The great yawning silence and banging of heads on tables that usually greets the "why anything" question is the sound of people confronting the limitations of their conceptual tools.
   
   Which is why it is a great question. It forces you to find better conceptual tools.