suprised said:
I am not claiming that I know, that's why I was writing "loosely". But the point is pretty obvious, in that classical geometry or weakly coupled physics just corresponds, again loosely speaking, to the boundary of the full parameter space. Clearly this boundary is much "less" than the full parameter space itself. Away from the boundary, ordinary notions of geometry generically break down.
I'm with you that the notions of geometry and manifold must break down in more general cases. I have no objection to, on the contrary. I'm rather fishing for what the more generalized structures are (agreeing they aren't manifolds) and from my perspective, beeing able to count/measure them are a key point. In fact my point would be that a constraint is that they have to be measurable, or we are on the wrong track.
suprised said:
A problem for inference. I think to be able to make inferences/predictions/expectations and to LEARN about nature is what this is all about, I presume we agree. I try to not loose this focus must never be lost in mathematics.
Normally: one theory => one inference (though it can be inductive rather than deductive).
Now if a theory is not known, but rather we have a space of theories, and accordingly a space of inferences, then if there is any physical basis between this space, then there theory space itself should be the result of another inference: ie you have a bigger theory, from which other (more specific) theories follow. And if this theory is a proper inference, there must exists a justified measure on the theory space.
My point beeing that, if some kind of ideas come up with this theory space, without a measure or means of inference and selection I would personally take this as a clear sign that something just isn't right about that reasoning.
Note that I am not picking on the NOTION of theory space or theory of theory; that is somehow the ambition ST has. This is good. What I feel, is that this "theory of theory" may in fact not be a proper inferencial theory.
Of course no one has all these answers, but I was just trying to pick in a constructive way. I think said before but I think that lack of this measure is because the theory space is describe from an external perspective (say the chair of the physicist) rather than from each subsystem of the universe.
This is why this theory space that is Externally described, IS not measureable from the inside. This is also why it's not an intrinsic theory in the first place.
I think curing this in ST therms, means providing a more clever solution to the landscape problem, in terms of some evolution. And I'm not just talking about antrophics I think something more in line with smolins evoluiotary law is neeeded. If ST is generalized, beyond strings and beyond manifolds, (meaning it's not really "strings" anymore) then I do see how the string program might converge in this direction. So it doesn't look totally dark to me. My favoured picture involves a discrete combinatorial approach where strings may be explained as large complexit limits of such discrete structures, in a way where the continuum strings are just limiting cases. And it's when you TAKE the limit, you loose contact with ground. So it seems the historial starting point of ST is responsbile for plenty of confusion. Maybe there is an alternative starting point... that makes more sense also to ignorant people like me.
/Fredrik