What is the Role of Ontology in Epistemic Differences and Entity Connections?

[AKG]

I am only equalling you. That's how I argue. The more dogmatic and staunch you get, the more I must become the same. If you'd remained (or, rather, if you'd ever been) open-minded and ready to change your views when a good argument presented itself, I would have been likewise.

I have to say, that's terrible. I don't see what you gain by being closed-minded. In philosophical debate, regardless of what position you hold and what position you're attacking, there is never anything to be lost by being open-minded and honest. That you think that matching closed-mindedness with dishonest closed-mindedness on your part is a "good tactic" suggests that you really miss the point.

 

[Mentat]

This only makes my point about be selectively skeptical. I don't buy this "I can't disagree with myself in public" business. If it's a different thread what difference does it make? If anything, I would think it is exactly what a person who doesn't believe what they are saying would be doing.

That's because you define "belief" differently than I do. Anyway, I've tried that before (countering a view I hold on one thread, with a statement on another) and people inevitably end up quoting me to myself.

I did not say that well-roundedness comes from age. This implies that it doesn't come from anything else except age. I said it comes "with" age. This doesn't preclude that there are other ways to get it. Besides when I said this we were NOT talking about a philosophical point. I was merely making a personal observation about being able to see through agendas etc. It seems clear to me now that you are overly sensitive to this issue.

I just don't like "personal observations" in the middle of philosophical debates.

I have taken some that are professionally administered. It is quite shocking.

I have taken only one administered professionally, and its results were similar (I can only remember the emode one verbatum, but I have tested myself numerous times).

See above.

Well, I am sorry for having taken offense. I guess I could have taken it better if I hadn't had to deal with elderly condescension for as long as I can remember.

I would be glad to do this but the problem that we keep having is that your "arguments" only point to the fact that you aren't communicating like a person would be if they were truly interested in communicating. It's almost as if the real point is to impress people and not to communicate with them. Sorry if I'm mistaken but it sure does come off this way.

But have you really been paying attention? If you had, you'd have realized that my historicaly approach to "qualia" and "subjective conscious experience" and the like is an attack on the terms being used, their actual usefulness/meaningfulness, and whether they can be dispensed with. So how can I deign to use these terms if they are the very things I'm attacking?

Well now, I couldn't agree more. This is exactly my point! This is what I mean when I talk about this medium being difficult to communicate with. It seems we agree on this and didn't even know it. Of course a word is not intrinsically useful. I have been saying this forever. This is why I am saying that you can't tell me my words are "empty". Empty when compared to what? There is nothing intrinsic to compare it's content to. The language game you describe is all that language is. There is no other way to use language. So whatever conclusions you are coming to about philosophy because of this view can also be drawn about the very view you are defending. It just seems to end in an "everything is nonsense" conclusion.

The difference is that I am talking about the etymology of your terms, and am thus critiquing the same game that philosophers of mind are playing. I'm glad we agree about language-games (for now), but philosophers of mind believe that they are playing chess (explaining consciousness and human interaction) when in fact they are playing with checker-pieces ("qualia", et cetera), and that is the point of my critique.

And how is it that Rorty's language game has escaped his own criticism?

Rorty's game is merely a critique of how another game is being played, in light of the history and propriety of the pieces being used. That philosophy has placed itself in the position of "judge of all fields of study", because of this misuse of pieces, is what is being attacked.

Just as "multiple drafts" is a part of your language game.

Yes, but I don't claim that they have any special value. They merely help explain consciousness, rather than leading us off into dead-ends and "hard problems".

Perhaps that is true about the word. But it isn't true about my experience.

And if your reports about your "experience" were biased by the vocabulary in which you've been brought up?

It is relevant because biased viewpoints are generally supported by flawed arguments and the biased participant usually isn't able to see the flaw that is so obvious to everyone else. How else should I attempt to point this out to you except to point out the bias? Perhaps I should just give up.

Attack the argument, not the arguer. If I am biased, it is only insomuch as a the chess-player with the white pieces is biased. If he's making a bad move, to defend the white king, then you should attack the move, not the player's bias.

OK fine. As I've said, I have an interest in understanding other legitimate views. But as a "real" skeptic and not just an actor, I expect to be convinced. And being subjected to accusations of being "wrong" or brainwashed by Kant without successfully convincing me doesn't sit well with me.

Wittgenstein referred to his approach as a "therapy of philosophy". Many people don't like to be told that they are mentally imabalanced, but that does not change the job of the therapist.

 

[Mentat]

I have to say, that's terrible. I don't see what you gain by being closed-minded. In philosophical debate, regardless of what position you hold and what position you're attacking, there is never anything to be lost by being open-minded and honest.

I was being open-minded and honest, when I began the thread. I only matched your level of closed-mindedness, I never exceeded it.

 

[Fliption]

That's because you define "belief" differently than I do. Anyway, I've tried that before (countering a view I hold on one thread, with a statement on another) and people inevitably end up quoting me to myself.

Then just tell them that, unlike them, you don't necessarily believe what you are saying. Then they must move on. I think it might be much better to be clear about such things, especially if you are engaging in an academic method as opposed to normal conversation.

Well, I am sorry for having taken offense. I guess I could have taken it better if I hadn't had to deal with elderly condescension for as long as I can remember.

I completely understand.

But have you really been paying attention? If you had, you'd have realized that my historicaly approach to "qualia" and "subjective conscious experience" and the like is an attack on the terms being used, their actual usefulness/meaningfulness, and whether they can be dispensed with. So how can I deign to use these terms if they are the very things I'm attacking?

But this is where I am now assuming that you really do "know" what these terms are referring to but you pretend not to in order to make a point. I cannot honestly believe that you really don't know what these terms refer to. I'm not saying that you know how they are defined. I'm not talking about language. I'm saying that you know what they "refer to". It is an experience. Not a definition. For me, the experience is the reason we have something to explain to begin with.

The difference is that I am talking about the etymology of your terms, and am thus critiquing the same game that philosophers of mind are playing.

Yes and I assumed that this "language game" view was just another example of such philosophy with it's own terminology. Is this not the case?

Rorty's game is merely a critique of how another game is being played, in light of the history and propriety of the pieces being used. That philosophy has placed itself in the position of "judge of all fields of study", because of this misuse of pieces, is what is being attacked.

I'm not sure I understand how he escapes the language dilemma. The way I understand this, there are no instances of words being used that aren't participating in some sort of language game. So the words of Rorty are just another game.

Yes, but I don't claim that they have any special value. They merely help explain consciousness, rather than leading us off into dead-ends and "hard problems".

I would argue these terms don't address the hard problem at all.

And if your reports about your "experience" were biased by the vocabulary in which you've been brought up?

But I'm not trying to explain my reports. I am trying to explain my experience.

Attack the argument, not the arguer. If I am biased, it is only insomuch as a the chess-player with the white pieces is biased. If he's making a bad move, to defend the white king, then you should attack the move, not the player's bias.

To make my point, the analogy would need to be tweaked. The biased player doesn't understand or respect the rules of chess and wishes to change them when they allow for an advantage for his white pieces. This fact must be pointed out by the opponent.

Wittgenstein referred to his approach as a "therapy of philosophy". Many people don't like to be told that they are mentally imabalanced, but that does not change the job of the therapist.

That a philosopher would label his own work as the therapy of his entire field seems a bit arrogant to me. Most philosophers think their work is an improvement on those that preceded them so I'm not sure what Wittgenstein thinks is all that meaningful. You say "no one likes to be told they are mentally imbalanced". I disagree. There is nothing wrong with therapy if there is truth in it. Maybe what people don't like is being told something that they know isn't true.

 

[sd01g]

Why does the epistemic differences established by mind-body distinctions necessitate an ontological divide? What is the defining difference between ontologies? How could two entities, from separate ontologies, ever be connected?

Any related comments or answers are, as always, greatly appreciated .

At the risk of being labeled simple minded I would suggest that the mind-body distinction should be analyzed as the matter-energy distinction. One only needs to think of what happens to the brain when it is deprived of it's energy supply (oxigenated blood) for only 10 minutes.

The MIND is the energy activated functioning brain. NO energy--no MIND. The dual nature of the mind-body produces two separate ontologies the same way matter-energy produces two 'separate ontologies.'

 

[RageSk8]

been a long time

"In contrast to the views of philosopher Daniel Dennett, Edelman accepts the existence of qualia and incorporates them into his brain-based theory of mind."

http://members.tripod.com/~xtro1666/gerald_edelman.htm

Edelman's concept of qualia is very different than the concept of qualia that Dennett rejects. From the site you give:

What the philosophers call “qualia”, the greenness of green and the redness of red, I think is a little too constricted. I believe that qualia are all the states you are experiencing and not experiencing now. Those qualia are those discriminations. So, effectively speaking, the thalamocortical core, or dynamic core as we call it, is responsible for giving rise to all these incredible numbers of discriminations. And, qualia are the discriminations.

This broad version of qualia, unlike the narrow version of qualia found in philosophy, does not have any subjective, intrinsically ineffable characteristics. It goes perfectly well with nominalism. I wish that Edelman had chosen a different word than “qualia” in order to avoid equivocation like this. Personally, I like Edelman’s approach to consciousness a lot. Even though I don’t see any reason why what the brain does isn’t computable, the computational model of the mind has a lot of problems and needs to be (tentatively) abandoned in favor of a neurophysiologic approach.

Anyways... I don’t know really how to further add to this conversation without further sidetracking the conversation into a debate about consciousness (seeing that there are many threads specifically on this subject anyways).


edit: HA! I still have my icon! I guess there is at least one advantage to having registered years ago.

 

[Tournesol]

Edelman's concept of qualia is very different than the concept of qualia that Dennett rejects. From the site you give:

Of course. Dennett's definition is set up to be knocked down.

This broad version of qualia, unlike the narrow version of qualia found in philosophy, does not have any subjective, intrinsically ineffable characteristics.

But the "intriniscally ineffable" characteristics aren't found in C.I Lewis's
original definition either.

It goes perfectly well with nominalism.

?

I don’t know really how to further add to this conversation without further sidetracking the conversation into a debate about consciousness

It's *supposed* to be about consciousness.

 

[Doctordick]

Anything that looks causal could be coincidental -- but where did that assumption ever get anybody ?

To date, absolutely nowhere! And the reason for that is that all explanations are causal in nature. However, in the absence of explanation, the idea of causality completely loses meaning. The interesting thing about that seemingly simplistic statement is that prior to the existence of an explanation causality simply not there. It has to be a brought into existence via explanation itself and that implies that the fundamental nature of explanation needs to be looked at closely in order to see exactly when the need for causality arises.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

I can't see how you can have an "understanding" that doesn't embrace a lot of explaining. Without explanation, all you would have is a vast array of meaningless facts.

I remember this post and I gave the response I did because it was immediately followed by the pure unadulterated adhominem attacks by Wilhelm who I take to be a completely useless Troll (you know, that old "birds of a feather flock together" presumption).

As you say, "all you would have is a vast array of meaningless facts", but that has to be exactly the place where all of what we know must begin. The serious question then is, how to we get from there to here? How do we produce an explanation from nothing but a vast array of meaningless facts. To answer that question, we need a way of representing that vast array of meaningless fact in the complete absence of meaning (the service the concept of a set does admirably- our beginning must be an undefined set which I call A). The second thing we need is an abstract definition of an explanation which does not rely on knowing anything about the meaning of the elements of A. An examination of the consequences of such a definition are quite surprising, at least to me they are.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Tournesol]

I remember this post and I gave the response I did because it was immediately followed by the pure unadulterated adhominem attacks by Wilhelm who I take to be a completely useless Troll (you know, that old "birds of a feather flock together" presumption).

well, it's pretty meaningless in a forum where people in different parts of the world post from different time-zones.

 

[Doctordick]

well, it's pretty meaningless in a forum where people in different parts of the world post from different time-zones.

Again, your response astounds me. I have no comprehension why different time-zones have anything to do with people posting on the same thread at the same time.

Totally confused -- Dick

 

[Tournesol]

Why should posting at the same time have anything to do with the content? Why don't you read what people say carefully and respond accordingly, instead of jumping to conclusions about what 'side' they are on ?