moving finger said:
Exactly.
If one believes it is true, then it follows that one thinks it a fact. You may not believe it is true, in which case you do not think it a fact.
Alternatively, we can admit we do not know whether or not it is a fact and proceed accordingly.
What “question of consciousness” is it that you refer to, and why should it follow that one will be unable to consider this question dispassionately if one believes that consciousness is an information process?
What does it matter what we believe? Either we know that there is no more to consciousness than information processing or we do not. If we do not then we must explore all the possibilities without preconceptions or prior judgements. Otherwise, our research is not dispassionate. This doesn't mean we are not entitled to believe this or that, but we cannot let those beliefs place a limit on our reasoning.
All theories and explanations are based on assumptions (or premises).
This is almost true, but the proviso would be that an explanation may not be based on an assumption as far as the giver of it is concerned.
What is it that you assume about consciousness, could you tell us?
I'm suggesting that anybody looking into this issue should not start by making major assumptions like the one being discussed. How can we hope to work out the truth if we start by assuming what the truth is? (What my particular view is doesn't matter here).
Why would a theory based on the assumption that consciousness is an information process be “rickety” (or are you just assuming that it would be?)
Because the assumption may not be true. Worse, there is no evidence that it is true. If we are talking about what Chalmers calls 'psychological consciousness' then there would be no problem. But if we are talking about what he calls 'phenomenal consciousness' ('what it is like'), then there would be nothing but problems, as we see from the lack of progress on the 'hard' problem.
Science does not progress by “proving statements true”, it progresses by showing hypotheses false. Nobody can “prove” that quantum mechanics, or general relativity, is true – all we can do is show that these explanations have not so far been shown to be false.
That's my understanding of science also.
How do you define an “ad hoc” theory – one which makes assumptions?
I'd define an ad hoc theory as one that rests on an ad hoc assumption.
Could you come up with a theory which is not “ad hoc”?
Yes. But it doesn't matter what I can and cannot do.
The premise that consciousness is a particular form of information processing does not entail that consciousness is an epiphenomenon.
I think this depends on your point of view. If consciousness is information processing then it's existence would be contingent on spacetime, and I tend to regard everything that is not fundamental as an epiphenomenon of what is. I agree though that even if it is no more than information processing it does not necessarily follow that it is epiphenomenal on brains.
What does any of this have to do with the premise that consciousness is a particular form of information processing?
If we make this assumption then we have elimated a possibility from our enquiries on a whim. Do you really think this is a good way to approach the problem? We wouldn't get far as a detective, and it is hardly a scientific approach. Of course, we need to make assumptions to explore and test the theories that derive from them, but it would be a strange decision not to bother to test the opposite assumption equally carefully.
Oh come, come, Canute. Schroedinger was not awarded the Nobel prize for his beliefs about consciousness. Being awarded the Nobel prize is not a sign of infallibility, and claiming that Erwin Schrodinger believed there is something more to consciousness than information processing is neither a good philosophical nor a good scientific argument.
Right, so Schrodinger was a perfectly sane and competent person at work, not to say a genius, but a fool at home who didn't bother to test his beliefs against his reason. Have you read his writings? It doesn't sound like it. I'm not saying that his view is correct, although I happen to think it is. I'm simply saying that it is foolish to dismiss the thoughts of a great physicist and thinker as nonsense without a reason. And of course, I mention him only as a well known example. There are countless others, many of them working professionally in consciousness studies.
Perhaps you believe I also cannot claim to know that the Tooth Fairy does not exist before I have demonstrated it. Hmmmmm, now, how would one go about demonstrating that the Tooth Fairy does not exist? Any ideas?
I think you are missing the point. It is impossible to prove this sort of thing. Ditto unicorns, ghosts and alligators in the sewers of New York.
Why does the premise that consciousness is a particular form of information processing entail that mysticism is nonsense?
Because in the esoteric view consciousness is more than this. However, some care is needed on the definition of 'consciousness'. In esotericism it has two definitions, the convential (information based) definition, which would cover our notion of individual selves, our thoughts etc., and a definition by which it is something more like Paul Martin's 'primordial consciousness' or the Buddhist 'pristine awareness'.
That consciousness is a particular form of information processing is an assumption or a premise, and it may indeed be false.
In this case we agree. This is all I'm saying.
Perhaps you would care to advance your alternative view of consciousness (which would also be an asumption or a premise).
This isn't the place, but I will somewhere else if you want. But you're wrong to assume it will be an assumption (it might be, it might not be). Our own consciousness is the only phenomenon we can know directly, without making assumptions. In my opinion we should not even assume that solipsism is true or false.
Btw, I'm being careful not to argue for any particular view here. If a person wants to believe that consciousness has an entirely functional explanation that's fine. If they want to believe our souls go to Heaven that's also fine. But when we set out to justify or falsify this belief using our reason we cannot start by assuming what it is we're trying to find out.
All I'm suggesting is that we should be as honest in researching consciousness as we are when researching anything else. We cannot dismiss a possibility just because it seems implausible to us. I thought this was an uncontentious idea but apparently not.
Regards
Canute