What Lies Beyond the Limits of Consciousness?

[Rade]

What is beyond consciousness?

Existence.

 

[steersman]

Originally Posted by Loren Booda
What is beyond consciousness?

Awareness?

The higher dimensional architecture that supports and instantiates conscious thought --

beyond that possibly yet unseen complex and evolving forces, far more complex than fundamental forces we see in our everyday 3 dimensional view of the world.

 

[meteor]

The way i see it, Consciousness is a subset of a more general whole called "Mind". Similarly, Intelligence is a subset of the set Consciousness.

Thus, a human being would have Mind, Consciousness and Intelligence. A dog would have Mind and Consciousness, but not Intelligence. An ant would have Mind but would lack the other two qualities.

 

[moving finger]

The way i see it, Consciousness is a subset of a more general whole called "Mind". Similarly, Intelligence is a subset of the set Consciousness.

Thus, a human being would have Mind, Consciousness and Intelligence. A dog would have Mind and Consciousness, but not Intelligence. An ant would have Mind but would lack the other two qualities.

Why would you think a dog has consciousness? How would you tell?

I don't see that an agent necessarily needs to possesses consciousness in order to possesses intelligence.

Consciousness seems to be the ability of an agent to form a temporally extended and detailed self-representation, and to relate this self-representation to information gathered from (exchanged with) the “external” world.

Intelligence seems to be the ability of an agent to solve problems (the more difficult or intractable the problems, the more intelligence we ascribe to the agent).

I grant that consciousness and intelligence often go hand in hand (especially in biological agents which have evolved by natural selection), but it does not follow from this simple association that intelligence entails consciousness.

as for "Mind" - I'm not really sure what you mean by this.

Best Regards

MF

 

[Paul Martin]

The way i see it, Consciousness is a subset of a more general whole called "Mind". Similarly, Intelligence is a subset of the set Consciousness.

I can see it your way. For the purposes of this discussion I will agree with these relationships.

Thus, a human being would have Mind, Consciousness and Intelligence.

I am not willing to agree with this. What you say here is that the Mind is a constituent part or a possession or a component of a human. I am of the opinion that the human being is subordinate to a Mind, which I claim is outside and separate from this physical world and its bodies. Now, if by "having a Mind" is taken to mean "behaves as if it had a Mind", then I would agree that you could say that a human being appears to have a Mind. But so would a remotely controlled robot being operated by a human. I think that we would agree that the robot, in spite of its behavior, would have neither a Mind nor a consciousness.

Why would you think a dog has consciousness? How would you tell?

Good questions. On the other hand, Why would you think a human has consciousness? How would you tell?

Consciousness seems to be the ability of an agent to form a temporally extended and detailed self-representation, and to relate this self-representation to information gathered from (exchanged with) the “external” world.

While I agree that consciousness seems to have that ability, I don't think this is a sufficient condition for consciousness. With respect, I think that all of the functions you describe here can be programmed into a computer and yet not imbue the computer or the program with consciousness.

About a year ago, you and I worked out a mutually-agreed-upon set of necessary and sufficient conditions for free will (in the Libet's half-second delay thread, I believe). Maybe we can do the same for consciousness.

You have provided a starting point in this quote. I think that having these abilities is a necessary condition for consciousness, but I don't think it is sufficient. What is missing, IMHO, is the ability to know that the self-representation has been formed and to know not only that the self-representation is related to the worldly information, but also what the relationship is and at least something about how the two are related.

Now, in light of what I have already learned from you, I don't insist that the knowledge be infallible, except for some single bit of primordial knowledge at the very top of an enormously broad and deep hierarchy of knowledge. Thus, at the very top, the agent could declare with absolute certainty that "I know that I think I know that I think I know that..." We have been through this once before, so I think you know what I am getting at.

What are your thoughts?

Paul

 

[moving finger]

Good questions. On the other hand, Why would you think a human has consciousness? How would you tell?

There is no “objective test” that I know of for consciousness.
One could ask the agent to provide a report on its experiential states (if it has any), and try to form a judgement from that – but this works only for agents which are able to provide intelligible reports, hence would not work for a dog (unless we can find some way of complex intelligent communication with a dog).
Judgements based on such reports may also be fallible (depends on whether one believes in the possibility of zombies or not).

While I agree that consciousness seems to have that ability, I don't think this is a sufficient condition for consciousness.

I think your observation, though correct, misses the point. I did not suggest this as a “sufficient condition”, I suggested it as one way in which consciousness differs from intelligence, to show that intelligence is not (logically) necessarily a subset of consciousness.

With respect, I think that all of the functions you describe here can be programmed into a computer and yet not imbue the computer or the program with consciousness.

Agreed, but as I say I did not claim that my post was intended to provide any “sufficient conditions” for consciousness, only that I was trying to point out that consciousness and intelligence can be very different things.

About a year ago, you and I worked out a mutually-agreed-upon set of necessary and sufficient conditions for free will (in the Libet's half-second delay thread, I believe). Maybe we can do the same for consciousness.

You remember? I am flattered!
I’ve been unconscious for a while (as far as this forum is concerned)

You have provided a starting point in this quote. I think that having these abilities is a necessary condition for consciousness, but I don't think it is sufficient. What is missing, IMHO, is the ability to know that the self-representation has been formed and to know not only that the self-representation is related to the worldly information, but also what the relationship is and at least something about how the two are related.

Hmmm. Ability to “know”. Or ability to “believe”?
Knowledge entails truth, whereas belief does not. I do not think it is necessary that a conscious agent have true beliefs in order to claim consciousness, only that it has beliefs (which may be false). I would thus rather favour :
“the ability to form a belief that the self-representation has been formed, and to form a belief not only that the self-representation is related to the worldly information, but also what the relationship is and at least something about how the two are related.”
This condition allows that a conscious agent forms beliefs about how its self-representation is related to worldly information, but (unlike your suggestion) does not require that those beliefs be true. (For example, a brain in a vat could be conscious, but at the same time not believe, hence not know, that it was a brain in a vat).

Now, in light of what I have already learned from you, I don't insist that the knowledge be infallible, except for some single bit of primordial knowledge at the very top of an enormously broad and deep hierarchy of knowledge. Thus, at the very top, the agent could declare with absolute certainty that "I know that I think I know that I think I know that..." We have been through this once before, so I think you know what I am getting at.

Hehehehe ….. I answered the previous paragraph before I read the last paragraph! We think alike! In the intervening period of my unconsciousness, I have studied a little and learned a little about the differences between knowledge and belief.

I am not sure I agree with your claim that the agent could declare with absolute certainty that "I know that I think I know that I think I know that..."
I think the best any agent can ever claim (with absolute certainty) is that “I believe that I know……..” etc.

Nice to meet you again,

Best Regards

MF

 

[selfAdjoint]

Paul and moving finger; in these last couple of posts it sounds like you are closing in on http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/symposia/metzinger/precis.pdf", which I pointed to on another thread. What do you think?

 

[Paul Martin]

Nice to meet you again,

Likewise. Welcome back.

Hmmm. Ability to “know”. Or ability to “believe”?

Yes. That is the question. ... er... I mean "I believe that is the question".

I have studied a little and learned a little about the differences between knowledge and belief.

I am delighted to hear that. It means that I may be able to learn even more from you.

I am not sure I agree with your claim that the agent could declare with absolute certainty that "I know that I think I know that I think I know that..."

That is certainly understandable. My claim was intentionally vague. It was intended to summarize an inference from my personal, unorthodox, poorly described (by me), and persistent, model of reality. As we have discussed before, a major tenet in my model is that consciousness does not reside in the brain, or even in our physical world. This is actually a derivative of a more fundamental tenet, that there is only a single conscious agent in all of reality. So when I discuss notions such as the ability to know, or the ability to believe, I think of them in terms of that single agent as the sole entity possessing those abilities. Of course, I use those terms in the vernacular to refer to "human abilities", but I believe that in reality, those abilities are only illusions and the real abilities inhere only in that one single consciousness.

Now, in our previous discussions, we have agreed to talk only about some non-specific 'agent' which/who might be conscious, have free will, can know, or believe, etc. I think this is a good move because that way you don't necessarily have to buy into my strange model and yet we can have a rational discussion. Likewise, I can discuss those ideas as if humans had those abilities, and yet in the back of my mind, believe (or strongly suspect) that humans are merely vehicles through which the single consciousness acts, knows, perceives, wonders, etc. etc.

So, when I "claim that the agent could declare with absolute certainty that "I know that I think I know that I think I know that..."", I am interested in your opinion wrt some arbitrary and non-specific agent -- could be human, dog, or anything else. But, again, in the back of my mind, I see the vast hierarchy I mentioned as starting with the single cosmic consciousness at the top, and cascading down the various levels making appearances in vehicles such as humans and dogs giving the illusion that the humans and dogs can actually know or believe.

But don't get hung up on thinking you have to accept my model just yet. Instead, let me try to learn from you what the differences are between the ability to know and the ability to believe.

Would you agree that we seem to be forced to take these terms as primitive and undefined in the mathematical sense? Or do you think we can come up with a reasonable definition for either term?

Do you think an agent can believe without knowing it? Or is the ability to know a fundamental prerequisite for being able to believe?

I'm a little short of time right now, but I have been sitting here at the keyboard in a quandary over whether to try to articulate what I really see going on here. I'll make a quick stab at it and see how it comes out:

If we introspect and try to ascertain exactly what we know about something or other, it seems to me that we reach a point where we can say something like, "I don't know exactly what is going on when I see blue, but I know that I see blue." "I know an explanation of what is going on having to do with certain frequencies of EM radiation and my central nervous system, but this explanation doesn't satisfactorily explain blueness, which I know about." "I believe that explanation has at least something to do with the perception I know I am having, but I know, at the times I am looking, that I do have the experience of perceiving blue."

In the process of introspection like this, it seems to me that we can't know much if anything about what we claim to know, i.e. what we believe. But it also seems inescapable that at some point or stage, we certainly know at least something. That "something" seems not to be describable. If it really is indescribable, then it seems to me that the entire structure of knowledge is a hierarchy of beliefs with only a single item of true knowledge at the very top of the hierarchy.

Now, if that helped you understand what I was trying to say, good. Otherwise we will have to talk more about it later. Right now I have to go.

Good talking with you again, MF.

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

Paul and moving finger; in these last couple of posts it sounds like you are closing in on Metzinger's construction, which I pointed to on another thread. What do you think?

Thank you for your interest in my thoughts. I expressed my thoughts on Metzinger's construction in post #3 of your Metzinger thread.

Paul

 

[moving finger]

I must say it makes a nice change (in these types of fora) to have a rational and unemotional debate with someone who is prepared to make lucid and coherent arguments!

As we have discussed before, a major tenet in my model is that consciousness does not reside in the brain, or even in our physical world. This is actually a derivative of a more fundamental tenet, that there is only a single conscious agent in all of reality.

That is interesting. May I ask why you believe this?

So when I discuss notions such as the ability to know, or the ability to believe, I think of them in terms of that single agent as the sole entity possessing those abilities.

Understood.

Of course, I use those terms in the vernacular to refer to "human abilities", but I believe that in reality, those abilities are only illusions and the real abilities inhere only in that one single consciousness.

Understood. Regardless of whether one believes in a single consciousness, or multiple consciousnesses, the definitions of “to know” and “to believe” should not be affected.

I define knowledge as justified true belief. Would you agree?
(this is commonly referred to the JTB definition)
Thus for S to know that T there are three necessary and sufficient conditions :
1 T is true
2 S believes that T
3 S is justified in believing (has evidential justification for believing) that T

Now, in our previous discussions, we have agreed to talk only about some non-specific 'agent' which/who might be conscious, have free will, can know, or believe, etc. I think this is a good move because that way you don't necessarily have to buy into my strange model and yet we can have a rational discussion.

Agreed

So, when I "claim that the agent could declare with absolute certainty that "I know that I think I know that I think I know that..."", I am interested in your opinion wrt some arbitrary and non-specific agent -- could be human, dog, or anything else.

According to the above definition of knowledge, for any agent S to “know with absolute certainty that T” would require not only that S believing that it knows that T, but also that S cannot be wrong in S’s belief that it knows that T.

It is this condition that S cannot be wrong which I find problematic.

Would you agree that we seem to be forced to take these terms as primitive and undefined in the mathematical sense? Or do you think we can come up with a reasonable definition for either term?

I think I have answered that (at least in terms of knowledge).

Do you think an agent can believe without knowing it? Or is the ability to know a fundamental prerequisite for being able to believe?

“S believes that T” can be a true statement even if T is false (ie S may be mistaken in its belief).

Similarly, “S believes that S knows that T” can be a true statement even if T is false (ie S may be mistaken in its belief).

However, according to the JTB definition of knowledge, the statement “S knows that T” can be true if and only if T is true (knowledge entails truth). If T is not true, then the statement “S knows that T” is false (even if S believes that S knows that T).

Now let us look at your question :“Do you think an agent can believe without knowing it?”

Let proposition P = “S believes that T”.
Your question is (if I understand it literally), given P, is it necessary that S know that P?

Condition (1) of JTB is satisfied. P is true (by definition, it is a premise that S believes that T).
Condition (2) of JTB is (usually) also satisfied. S believes that P (in most cases).
But could there be some “contrived cases” where we could argue “S believes that T” is true, but at the same time “S believes that (S believes that T)” is not true? I’m not sure. Your thoughts?
And condition (3) of JTB is also satisfied. If “S believes that T” is true, then S is justified in believing that “S believes that T”.

Conclusion : In most cases, where P = “S believes that P”, and if P is true, then it follows “S knows that P” is also true. Is this true in all cases?

If it is, then it seems one thing we can know with certainty is that we hold beliefs (but it does not follow that those beliefs are true beliefs). (T may be false, and yet P could still be true, and S would know that P is true).

If we introspect and try to ascertain exactly what we know about something or other, it seems to me that we reach a point where we can say something like, "I don't know exactly what is going on when I see blue, but I know that I see blue." "I know an explanation of what is going on having to do with certain frequencies of EM radiation and my central nervous system, but this explanation doesn't satisfactorily explain blueness, which I know about." "I believe that explanation has at least something to do with the perception I know I am having, but I know, at the times I am looking, that I do have the experience of perceiving blue.".

I follow this, but in the above you have NOT referred to “certain knowledge” here, only to “knowledge”. I agree that an agent can know “anything”. (If it justifiably believes X, and X turns out to be true, then by definition it knows X). What it cannot possesses (with the possible exception of knowledge of its own beliefs) is certain knowledge (Why? Answer - How do we prove that X is true with certainty?).

In the process of introspection like this, it seems to me that we can't know much if anything about what we claim to know, i.e. what we believe. But it also seems inescapable that at some point or stage, we certainly know at least something. That "something" seems not to be describable..

If we cannot say exactly what it is that we know, how can we claim to know it? That seems incoherent to me.

If it really is indescribable, then it seems to me that the entire structure of knowledge is a hierarchy of beliefs with only a single item of true knowledge at the very top of the hierarchy.

But “true knowledge” of what exactly?
If “S knows that T” is this true knowledge at the top of the hierarchy, what is T?.

Best Regards

MF

If one pays attention to the concepts being employed, rather than the words being used, the resolution of this problem is simple. (Stuart Burns)

 

[moving finger]

Paul and moving finger; in these last couple of posts it sounds like you are closing in on http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/symposia/metzinger/precis.pdf", which I pointed to on another thread. What do you think?

Interesting paper. I'm reading it now...

MF

 

[moving finger]

Paul and moving finger; in these last couple of posts it sounds like you are closing in on http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/symposia/metzinger/precis.pdf", which I pointed to on another thread. What do you think?

Metzinger's paper is wonderful! He mirrors my thoughts almost completely, especially the claim that the existence of "self" is an illusion created by conscious awareness!

Thank you, selfAdjoint, for pointing me in this direction!

Are his ideas discussed in another thread on here?

Best Regards

MF

 

[selfAdjoint]

I see you found it! I am going to look into the paper again with regard to your concerns about his "minimal consciousness". My unformed idea is that this concept IS programmable, with a sufficiently simplified toy experential world. But I'll see.

 

[Paul Martin]

I am short of time again so I can't do justice to your entire post right now. But I can answer your easy question from the top of my head:

That is interesting. May I ask why you believe this[, that there is only a single conscious agent in all of reality]?

Yes, of course you may ask. I'll even assume that you are asking and I'll list the reasons that come to mind. They will be sort of chronological wrt when they came to my attention throughout my life.

1. It seems to answer a puzzle that has bothered me since childhood: Why, out of the 12 billion or so human eyeballs on earth, can I see only out of these two?
2. I think I remember seeing it for myself during a couple of altered-state experiences.
3. It seems to be nearly unanimously reported by the mystics of the past, especially in the Buddhist tradition.
4. It makes it easy, if not trivial, to explain how absolute justice prevails in this seemingly unjust world.
5. It provides a framework for a reasonable answer to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.
6. Gregory Bateson made a compelling (to me) case for the cosmos to be something like a Mind.
7. All reasonable explanations for a fundamental ontology (excluding ravens or endless stacks of turtles) seem to be converging on some sort of concept. Concepts are artifacts of Mind. This implies the primacy of Mind. Parsimony then suggests that there is only one such.
8. It fits into Gregg Rosenberg's "...Place for Consciousness" like a hand in a glove.
9. It was logically deduced, and believed, by Erwin Schroedinger, whose thoughts I very much respect.

More will undoubtedly come to mind the instant I post this, but they will have to wait.

Sorry to be in such a rush.

Paul

 

[eggman]

Mind cannot go beyond itself...

The question (What is beyond consciousness) is incorrect.

It appears to be based on an assumption.

 

[eggman]

Exsistance preceeds Essence I read somewhere...

The rest seems to be just mind games...

 

[Loren Booda]

eggman

The question (What is beyond consciousness) is incorrect.

It appears to be based on an assumption.

The assumption that consciousness may be limited?

 

[Rade]

Metzinger's paper is wonderful! He mirrors my thoughts almost completely, especially the claim that the existence of "self" is an illusion created by conscious awareness!

I do not agree with this logic. It requires that within any human a real consciousness is priori to a real self, which is impossible, for while it is possible for a human self to exist without a consciousness, it is not possible for a human consciousness to exist priori to or outside a self. Both the self and consciousness of Metzinger are real, and one can only hope that Metzinger knows it, for I cannot think of a more depressing mental state than not knowing that one exists as a self.

 

[moving finger]

Metzinger's paper is wonderful! He mirrors my thoughts almost completely, especially the claim that the existence of "self" is an illusion created by conscious awareness!

I do not agree with this logic. It requires that within any human a real consciousness is priori to a real self, which is impossible, for while it is possible for a human self to exist without a consciousness, it is not possible for a human consciousness to exist priori to or outside a self. Both the self and consciousness of Metzinger are real…..

According to Metzinger, there is no “real” self, the intuition of a “self” is an illusion brought about by the phenomenon of consciousness. All perfectly logical and self-consistent, there is nothing “illogical” about it.

Whether you agree with the premise that the “self” is an illusion is another matter, but your disagreement on this premise does not make Metzinger’s ideas “illogical”.

I find it an intuitively beautiful and totally coherent concept which explains everything that we need to explain, from the illusion of qualia, the illusion of free will and moral reponsibility, to the illusion of the “Hard Problem”.

Best Regards

MF

 

[moving finger]

1. It seems to answer a puzzle that has bothered me since childhood: Why, out of the 12 billion or so human eyeballs on earth, can I see only out of these two?

Because “you” is a concept created by the processing of the brain in that particular head. It makes no sense to think that “your” brain can create the concept of a “you” which is looking out of someone else’s eyeballs when your brain is not connected to those eyeballs.

2. I think I remember seeing it for myself during a couple of altered-state experiences.

No comment.

3. It seems to be nearly unanimously reported by the mystics of the past, especially in the Buddhist tradition.

No comment.

4. It makes it easy, if not trivial, to explain how absolute justice prevails in this seemingly unjust world.

Does absolute justice prevail? I don’t think it does. I’m not even sure what the concept is supposed to mean.

5. It provides a framework for a reasonable answer to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.

To my mind a more rational and coherent answer, without the need to invoke metaphysical universal consciousness, is Metzinger’s solution.

6. Gregory Bateson made a compelling (to me) case for the cosmos to be something like a Mind.

Not aware of this one.

7. All reasonable explanations for a fundamental ontology (excluding ravens or endless stacks of turtles) seem to be converging on some sort of concept. Concepts are artifacts of Mind. This implies the primacy of Mind. Parsimony then suggests that there is only one such.

Interesting. Parsimony suggests there is only one electron/positron also (originally Feynman’s idea), but it never got off the ground. Parsimony doesn’t always rule.

8. It fits into Gregg Rosenberg's "...Place for Consciousness" like a hand in a glove.

OK.

9. It was logically deduced, and believed, by Erwin Schroedinger, whose thoughts I very much respect.

OK (but believing in X simply because Y believes in X and one respects Y is not, to my mind, a good philosophy)

Best Regards

MF

 

[eggman]

eggman

The assumption that consciousness may be limited?

What i meant to say was that you being conscious is an assumption..

Science suggest we don't even exsist...

 

[Eric England]

Science suggests that we don't actually exist.

This is different than not existing.

 

[PIT2]

According to Metzinger, there is no “real” self, the intuition of a “self” is an illusion brought about by the phenomenon of consciousness.

Best Regards

MF

So then consciousness can exist without a self?
Experience without an experiencer?

 

[moving finger]

So then consciousness can exist without a self?
Experience without an experiencer?

No, consciousness cannot exist without a "self"
But the "self" (according to Metzinger) is not a real self, it is a virtual self, created by the (information processing) act of consciousness.

Best Regards

 

[Rade]

...According to Metzinger, there is no “real” self, the intuition of a “self” is an illusion brought about by the phenomenon of consciousness

OK, just so I understand, is then Metzinger saying that the consciousness is also an illusion ? It would seem so since "self" contains consciousness, just as self contains heart, liver, lungs. And, if both self and consciousness are illusion, then what does Metzinger classify as being "real", and how would Metzinger know it ?

 

[moving finger]

OK, just so I understand, is then Metzinger saying that the consciousness is also an illusion ? It would seem so since "self" contains consciousness, just as self contains heart, liver, lungs. And, if both self and consciousness are illusion, then what does Metzinger classify as being "real", and how would Metzinger know it ?

It depends on how one defines self. One could define self as the entire physical body, or one could define self as the feeling of conscious self which seems to exist somewhere within the brain (the agent which seems to be making conscious decisions and having conscious phenomenal experiences). For the purposes of discussion on consciousness, I am taking the latter definition of self. If you like we could call it "conscious self" to distinguish if from "physical self" (which latter woud be the entire body).

Consciousness is an information process which takes place within the brain. Consciousness is thus not an illusion, it is a very real information process. The outputs of consciousness, the feeling of "conscious self" and the phenomenal experiences we call "qualia", are virtual objects contructed within that information processing.

Where the "illusion" comes in is that this infornation processing system we call consciousness effectively "spins a story" centred on the virtual conscious self, to the effect that this virtual conscious self is having phenomenal experiences (what we call qualia). The illusion is that we think the conscious self and the qualia are somehow real entities that exist "somewhere in the brain", whereas all that is happening is a system of information processing.

Best Regards

 

[HMS]

What is beyond consciousness?

If we say X is beyond consciousness, are we not, by the very act of doing so, subjugating X to the realm of conscioussness ?

 

[Parabox]

I like enigmas like this, it's like theorizing additional dimensions
Let's first consider a few laws to base our decision on

- Anything not observable must be ascertained indirectly
- We can only discern what our mental capacity allows

Maybe hallucinations/dreams can give an indirect peak at what's beyond. Hallucinations are basically realities that are pieced together by subconscious mentality.

More like refexes. I would think this constitutes as beyond consciousness
In other words, uncontrolled awareness.

 

[quantumcarl]

From the website: http://www.isc.cnrs.fr/wp/wpjea9805.htm

3. Consciousness of action.
The first question to be discussed relates to conscious awareness of a self-generated action. It is known from the literature that normal subjects are poorly aware of the determinants of their own actions. For example, if a target briskly changes its location during the ocular saccade that precedes a pointing movement toward that target, subjects may remain unaware of the displacement (they see only one, stationary, target); yet, they correctly point at the final target location (e.g., Bridgeman, Kirch & Sperling, 1981).

This might have some pertinence to this thread.

 

[Royce]

What is beyond consciousness?

Being.
For something to be conscious, something must be.
For something to be and be aware it must be conscious.
That which is and is aware that it is, is conscious and is a being.
A being may not always be conscious but a being must always be.
Consciousness cannot be without a being to be conscious.