What makes a liquid liquid questions.

[Mentat]

Alright, I have to get off-line soon, but I read up to page 5 (not so pathetic as it seems when you realize that I've got 4 other windows open, and am multi-tasking constantly (the basic idea is that, any time I would spend just scratching my chin, thinking about the implications of what the paper said, I spend - instead - responding to some casual E-mail or mathematical question that I could pretty much do in my sleep)), and am getting more and more irritated.

Broad had an excellent way of presenting his theory (I've come to this conclusion just from what I've seen so far). The problem, however, is this: He is basically instructing us as to how to properly construct a straw-man argument.

I don't say this to be derogatory, but merely as an observation of the nature of what he is saying. He's talking about the difference between mechanistic and emergent explanations right from the start, thus pre-assuming that there are "emergent" properties that need explaining. I did appreciate the part about forces, and how you can either explain what happens when one force is active on an object, or you can explain what happens when many forces are active on that object, and the explanations are of a different kind, since the second one is an explanation of that which emerges after all individual parts are taken into account. There is no real problem with this except in it's potential to mislead. You see, it is one thing to say (as Broad did) that all factors taken into consideration at once is different, in principle, from one factor taken into consideration at a time; and quite another to say that there is some emergent property of those numerous factors that arises from their interaction (the difference being that the first postulate still allows for a purely mechanistic approach, since the only difference between this many-factors consideration and a single-factor consideration is in the possible counter-actions between each single-factor).

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
I don't say this to be derogatory, but merely as an observation of the nature of what he is saying. He's talking about the difference between mechanistic and emergent explanations right from the start, thus pre-assuming that there are "emergent" properties that need explaining.

This is merely a matter of defining terms, not presuming that anything necessarily fits into these terms. I can define a set of criteria by which we would identify a purple unicorn without assuming that purple unicorns actually exist.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
This is merely a matter of defining terms, not presuming that anything necessarily fits into these terms. I can define a set of criteria by which we would identify a purple unicorn without assuming that purple unicorns actually exist.

But if his system for defining terms is flawed, then the conclusions drawn therefrom will also be flawed.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
But if his system for defining terms is flawed, then the conclusions drawn therefrom will also be flawed.

This is an entirely different objection than the one you presented before.

Besides, how is it that a definition in itself can be flawed? A definition can be thought of as a linguistic placeholder that allows certain concepts or phenomena to be placed into it. The placeholder itself is arbitrary and cannot be flawed; there can only be flaws if a certain concept does not 'fit' into the placeholder into which it is placed. You may wind up rejecting the notion that consciousness 'fits' into Broad's definition of an emergent phenomenon, but such a flaw would be a result of a mismatch between definition and concept, not a flaw in the definition itself.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
This is an entirely different objection than the one you presented before.

Besides, how is it that a definition in itself can be flawed? A definition can be thought of as a linguistic placeholder that allows certain concepts or phenomena to be placed into it. The placeholder itself is arbitrary and cannot be flawed; there can only be flaws if a certain concept does not 'fit' into the placeholder into which it is placed. You may wind up rejecting the notion that consciousness 'fits' into Broad's definition of an emergent phenomenon, but such a flaw would be a result of a mismatch between definition and concept, not a flaw in the definition itself.

OK, but is it really good philosophy to arbitrarily create new definitions and then try to fit certain phenomena into them?

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
OK, but is it really good philosophy to arbitrarily create new definitions and then try to fit certain phenomena into them?

Like the term "Sub-experiences"?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
Like the term "Sub-experiences"?

While I didn't coin the term, I also didn't invent the definition. It's definition existed and was being discussed long before I assigned a word to it. It's actually just another part of Chalmer's "easy problems".

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
While I didn't coin the term, I also didn't invent the definition. It's definition existed and was being discussed long before I assigned a word to it. It's actually just another part of Chalmer's "easy problems".

But it can't possibly mean the same thing to Chalmers as it could never be the bridge to solve the hard problem as it has been presented here.

 

[Canute]

Good point. Besides which it seems completely obvious that to explain a 'sub-experience' presents exactly the same problem as explaining an experience, unless it's now going to argued that a sub-experience is not a sub-experience.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Canute
Good point. Besides which it seems completely obvious that to explain a 'sub-experience' presents exactly the same problem as explaining an experience, unless it's now going to argued that a sub-experience is not a sub-experience.

I'd like to emphasize that this is a very succint and powerful way of stating the problem of 'sub-experiences' that somehow combine to make experiences as we perceive them. Using 'sub-experiences' in this way only begs the question (a recurring theme when one tries to explain consciousness via only physical reductionism), because it presumes that these sub-experiences themselves really have properties such that we can coherently see how they account for the properties of experience. (In this sense explaining experience in terms of sub-experience is not unlike explaining the sense of self in terms of a homunculus-- it merely pushes the real problem onto another level of analysis without adequately addressing it.) The whole problem to begin with is that materialism does not-- indeed, cannot-- mention any properties on any physical level that have a binding logical connection to the properties of subjective experience.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I'd like to emphasize that this is a very succint and powerful way of stating the problem of 'sub-experiences' that somehow combine to make experiences as we perceive them. Using 'sub-experiences' in this way only begs the question (a recurring theme when one tries to explain consciousness via only physical reductionism), because it presumes that these sub-experiences themselves really have properties such that we can coherently see how they account for the properties of experience. (In this sense explaining experience in terms of sub-experience is not unlike explaining the sense of self in terms of a homunculus-- it merely pushes the real problem onto another level of analysis without adequately addressing it.) The whole problem to begin with is that materialism does not-- indeed, cannot-- mention any properties on any physical level that have a binding logical connection to the properties of subjective experience.

I see your point. However, I must thank you for using the homunculus analogy, as it almost saves sub-experiences from irrelevance. You see, Dennett has used a reductive explanation involving homunculi that are, themselves collections of much more "stupid" homunculi, eventually reducing down to the level of a single neuron (the most "stupid" homunculus). Thus, if an experience is comprised of sub-experiences, and has no existence beyond the combination of these sub-experiences, and each sub-experience is composed of a set of even simpler computations...you see what I'm getting at?

Here's an example: When one experiences a red ball, flying toward them...the experience altogether is composed of many sub-experiences (including - but probably not limited to - the color red, the round shape of a ball, the increasing size (or apparent increase...caused by the approach) of the ball, and the knowledge that it will hit them), these being composed of much more simple computations ("round" is a categorization of all objects who have no sides (remaining "smooth" all around), red is a particular wavelength (or set of wavelengths) of light, increase in apparent size doesn't need much reduction, and the knowledge that it will hit you comes from the memory of previous occasions wherein something was thrown at you), these being (in Hume's terms) either mere "impressions" or "simple ideas" that are identical to previous "impressions".

The question then becomes (as it always seems to do) "How does the person become conscious of the 'impression' in the first place?", IOW, "Why doesn't the brain simply compute the 'impressions' instead of broadcasting them as a visual image?". My answer, of course, is that a visual cortex doesn't have any other way to process and store "impressions". It calls 'em like it sees 'em. What is your explanation?

 

[Canute]

Yes, and Terry Pratchett uses a similar explanation to account for the continuing existence of Discworld, although in his case it's turtles rather than sub-experiences.

You have to make up your mind. Either a neuron is a neuron or it is a sub-experience. If it a sub-experience then a priori we are experiencing it, and the problem remains unchanged.

Unfortunately it is no easier to explain how a single neuron gives rise to a sub-experience than it is to explain how a brain gives rise to a unified collection of them.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
Yes, and Terry Pratchett uses a similar explanation to account for the continuing existence of Discworld, although in his case it's turtles rather than sub-experiences.

You have to make up your mind. Either a neuron is a neuron or it is a sub-experience. If it a sub-experience then a priori we are experiencing it, and the problem remains unchanged.

Unfortunately it is no easier to explain how a single neuron gives rise to a sub-experience than it is to explain how a brain gives rise to a unified collection of them.

First off, it's now single neurons, they are the most "stupid" demons, which do nothing but get stimulated, and stimulate their neighbors (though they have the odd property of tending toward synchronous self-restimulation...that is, if they're a pyramidal neuron in the neocortex).

Secondly, I don't want to call the demons "sub-experiences" but what they are doing together is a "sub-experience" at different levels of complexity. Dennett called it the "question/answer" game (I really suggest that you all read his book, since I probably won't do it justice, no matter how hard I try), but I prefer the Selectionist approach of a Darwinian struggle for new territory. Anyway, it is the process that is a sub-experience, the "stupid demons" are just "experiencers" at different levels of complexity (down to the level of a single demon which can't be said to "experience" at all (though, of course, we haven't even defined "experience", so he could be "experiencing" more than a human for all I know...this cannot be discussed logically until we define the most integral term in the discussion).

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
First off, it's now single neurons, they are the most "stupid" demons, which do nothing but get stimulated, and stimulate their neighbors (though they have the odd property of tending toward synchronous self-restimulation...that is, if they're a pyramidal neuron in the neocortex).

I'll take your word for it.

Secondly, I don't want to call the demons "sub-experiences" but what they are doing together is a "sub-experience" at different levels of complexity.

Ok so experience does not reduce to single neurons, but interactions between groups of them. What machanism turns the physical interaction into a subjective experience?

Dennett called it the "question/answer" game (I really suggest that you all read his book, since I probably won't do it justice, no matter how hard I try), but I prefer the Selectionist approach of a Darwinian struggle for new territory.

I've read his books very carefully.

Anyway, it is the process that is a sub-experience, the "stupid demons" are just "experiencers" at different levels of complexity (down to the level of a single demon which can't be said to "experience" at all (though, of course, we haven't even defined "experience", so he could be "experiencing" more than a human for all I know...this cannot be discussed logically until we define the most integral term in the discussion). [/B]

So why not define 'experience' once and for all? According to you it can be defined as an interaction between neurons which act as 'experiencers', although these 'experiencers' cannot be said to experience at all, since we can't define experience.

However if we could define experience then we might be able to define it as an interaction between neurons, which we will define as 'experiencer's who can't really be said to 'experience' anything since 'experience' is an interaction between a group of neurons, which entails the neurons cannot be 'experiencers' unless we redefine experience in such a way that they can be, which may be possible since we cannot define experience, even though ex hypothesis we have defined it as an interaction between a group of neurons.

I don't buy it, and I find it genuinely hard to believe that you do. I prefer to think that the existence of consciousness has a rational explanation.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
The question then becomes (as it always seems to do) "How does the person become conscious of the 'impression' in the first place?", IOW, "Why doesn't the brain simply compute the 'impressions' instead of broadcasting them as a visual image?".

More difficulties. What do you mean by "broadcasting them as a visual image"? It sounds suspiciously like you are begging the question by once again assuming something about brain function.

My answer, of course, is that a visual cortex doesn't have any other way to process and store "impressions". It calls 'em like it sees 'em. What is your explanation?

Q: Why is the sky blue?
A: Because it can't be any other color except blue.

I don't find that answer very helpful.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
I'll take your word for it.

Ok so experience does not reduce to single neurons, but interactions between groups of them. What machanism turns the physical interaction into a subjective experience?

What's a subjective experience?

I've read his books very carefully.

I'm glad...I too, in the effort to keep an open-mind, have read some of the opposition (I'm reading a book by Chalmers now).

So why not define 'experience' once and for all? According to you it can be defined as an interaction between neurons which act as 'experiencers', although these 'experiencers' cannot be said to experience at all, since we can't define experience.

However if we could define experience then we might be able to define it as an interaction between neurons, which we will define as 'experiencer's who can't really be said to 'experience' anything since 'experience' is an interaction between a group of neurons, which entails the neurons cannot be 'experiencers' unless we redefine experience in such a way that they can be, which may be possible since we cannot define experience, even though ex hypothesis we have defined it as an interaction between a group of neurons.

I don't buy it, and I find it genuinely hard to believe that you do. I prefer to think that the existence of consciousness has a rational explanation.

It only seems irrational because of the way it was written. The groups of neurons are not "experiencers", they are "processers"; discreet units of computation. They compute on higher and higher levels of complexity. "Experience" is just a very high-complexity computation (at least, that's a paraphrased version of my definition which is, I think, better than no definition at all).

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
More difficulties. What do you mean by "broadcasting them as a visual image"? It sounds suspiciously like you are begging the question by once again assuming something about brain function.

Well, how would you phrase the emergent question...I was really just trying to state what your side would probably ask in that situation, but you would certainly do a better job at that...

And you're right, btw, my phrasing does beg the question.

Q: Why is the sky blue?
A: Because it can't be any other color except blue.

First off, the scientific answer is actually "It just is", since "why" is not a scientific question.

OTOH, if your question had been, what causes the sky to appear blue, the scientific answer would be something like: "The refraction of light waves from the sun by the particles that make up the atmosphere".

A question of "what cause" can be answered by science, but "why" has not meaning at all in the Scientific Method.

I don't find that answer very helpful.

Because you asked the wrong question. Ask the "freer" philosopher (one not confined to the bounds of the Scientific Method) and you will get their personal opinion, and that isn't very helpful either.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
Well, how would you phrase the emergent question...I was really just trying to state what your side would probably ask in that situation, but you would certainly do a better job at that...

You said:

The question then becomes (as it always seems to do) "How does the person become conscious of the 'impression' in the first place?", IOW, "Why doesn't the brain simply compute the 'impressions' instead of broadcasting them as a visual image?".

I think your first phrasing was fine, but not the second. The question is not "Why does the brain do this computation and not that computation?" but rather "Why should any neural computation be associated with subjective experience?" If we already assume that 'that computation' is responsible for consciousness, we have only assumed what we set out to explain in the first place.

And you're right, btw, my phrasing does beg the question.

But this is the same kind of phrasing you have been repeatedly using. Are you admitting that you are assuming what you are supposed to be showing?

First off, the scientific answer is actually "It just is", since "why" is not a scientific question.

I addressed this in another thread, but perhaps you hadn't read it yet when you replied.

Because you asked the wrong question. Ask the "freer" philosopher (one not confined to the bounds of the Scientific Method) and you will get their personal opinion, and that isn't very helpful either.

The point was that you were still answering in a manner that didn't address the question (essentially a "how" or "what cause" question).

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I think your first phrasing was fine, but not the second. The question is not "Why does the brain do this computation and not that computation?" but rather "Why should any neural computation be associated with subjective experience?" If we already assume that 'that computation' is responsible for consciousness, we have only assumed what we set out to explain in the first place.

I could probably ask ad nauseum, "Why should I associate A with B, when B isn't properly defined, and so cannot even be assumed to exist?"

But this is the same kind of phrasing you have been repeatedly using. Are you admitting that you are assuming what you are supposed to be showing?

I haven't been talking about "broadcasting images" the whole time, have I?

Besides, you may want to turn this question on yourself, during one of those times that you happen to think about our conversations. Ask yourself, "If I can't define 'subjective experience' without assuming it within the definition, how do I know there is such a thing? How do I know mine is a tenable position, when I'm trying to associate things that are readily definable with something that isn't?"

The point was that you were still answering in a manner that didn't address the question (essentially a "how" or "what cause" question).

In the end, while I still don't agree that "why this way and not some other way" = "how this way", it is irrelevant viz a viz the enormous problem that would exist if the child didn't demand to know how the sky appeared "blue", but demanded to know why it appeared "eulb", and refused to defined "eulb" in none-circular terms (his definitions would probably look something like, "eulb is any of a vast array of different shades of eulb").